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Introduction
This volume is mainly concerned with two conceptual spheres or domains of experi-
ence, those of journey and knowledge, and with the way they interconnect in ancient
Greco-Roman representations and texts. The conceptual domain of journey is a proto-
typical example of what G. Lakoff terms the “Source-Paths-Goal” schema.1 Studies in
cognition have demonstrated that prototypical human movement is characterized by
progress from a starting point or “source” via a trajectory or “path”, to a destination or
“goal”. This “Source-Path-Goal” (SPG) schema is one of the fundamental schemas in hu-
man conceptualization,2 which not only underlines humans’ understanding of physical
movement (the ‘journey’ domain), but also all purposive activities (the ‘quest’ domain),
including narration (the ‘story’ domain).3 Indeed, the SPG schema is the key concept
underlying all artistic journey discourses.4
As claimed by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson in 2003, all the characteristics included
in the domain of journey emphasize development and change. Indeed, they emphasize
progress along the scale of linear time. This progress can often be seen as a growth and an
increase in life experience. Consequently, the domain of journey is conventionally em-
ployed in terms of a growth from childhood to adult life. In fact, the concept of journey
traditionally maps that of life, creating one of the most conventionalized metaphors we
live by:5
1 Lakoff 1987, 275.
2 Johnson 1993, 166. For supportive experimental
research, see Katz and Taylor 2008 and Ritchie 2008.
3 Forceville and Jeulink 2011, 41.
4 Forceville and Jeulink 2011, 41.
5 Metaphor We Live By is the title of a study on con-
ceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff and John-
son 1980. They challenged the traditional view that
sees metaphor as a matter of words alone, while ar-
guing that metaphor concerns the way we think,
being an unavoidable tool of human conceptual
upbringing. Their Conceptual Metaphor Theory
(CMT) has since been developed and refined and is
now the most prevalent paradigm in metaphor stud-
ies (see above all Gibbs 1994 and Kövecses 2010).
By contrasting the standard view that considers
metaphor as a mere artistic or rhetorical device,
CMT describes metaphor as a phenomenon of hu-
man thought processes, based on a cross-domain
mapping from a source to a target domain. Specifi-
cally, the domain from which we draw metaphorical
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A large part of the way we speak about life in English derives from the way we
speak about journey […]. Speakers of English make extensive use of the domain
of journey to think about the highly abstract and elusive concept of life.6
The pervasive and conventional nature of the structural conceptualization of life as a
journey is so familiar to us that it often goes unnoticed. Yet without it, any talking or
thinking about life would be seriously restricted. The paths of life, therefore, are pre-
eminently those of human development and growth of a child.
However, the conceptualization of progress in life and human growth often entails
the notion of progress in knowledge, namely an educational growth seen as an increase
in knowledge acquisition from childish ignorance to adult understanding. The paths of
one’s own life, therefore, often coincide with the paths of one’s own knowledge. In other
words, the conceptualization of life as a journey forms the basis of the conceptualiza-
tion of knowledge. The mapping between the two domains is clearly entrenched in the
idea that moving through life results in the progression of knowledge. Yet the concepts
of knowledge and journey are much more deeply intertwined. In fact, it is a common
experience that traveling is a means of increasing knowledge and broadening people’s
points of view. Indeed, gaining insights is facilitated by an encounter outside one’s com-
fort zone with the other. Seeing new places, viewing new cultures, meeting new people,
and experiencing different ways of life give us new perspectives on our life and humans;
while new experiences in turn can increase our resourcefulness by introducing us to
living situations we would never encounter at home.
The relationship between the domains of journey and knowledge is therefore not
only that of a metaphorical mapping; more precisely, it is that of a profound intercon-
nection, as actual journeys are concrete opportunities to gain knowledge. The narrative
plot involving traveling heroes exploits the correspondences between literal journey and
purposive activities that result in an increase of understanding. Additionally, they often
involve exploration and the exploratory journey is typically one of pursuit, including
the pursuit of truth. Pursuit, like inquiry, involves seeking and finding as well as having
the connotation of persistence.7 Homer’s Odyssey is the first and canonical example of a
quest story and a journey of pursuit in the Western world.
On the other hand, learning – hence, the acquisition of knowledge – can be con-
ceptualized in our daily experience as an unfolding process, akin to following a spatial
trajectory on which we move step by step. This way of conceptualizing elements of the
expressions to understand another domain is called
the source domain, while the domain that is under-
stood in this way is the target domain: see Kövecses
2010, 4. From CMT onwards, metaphor theorists
have been showing that metaphor is pervasively
used in everyday life and, as metaphor mapping
favors analogical reasoning, it plays a fundamental
role in our epistemological upbringing.
6 Kövecses 2010, 3.
7 Turner 1998, 28.
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domain of knowledge shows that we have coherently organized data about journeys
that we rely on when understanding and expressing the more abstract and elusive con-
ceptual domain of knowledge. Analogously, the process of reasoning relies on the same
conceptual mapping.
When we reason, we understand ourselves as starting at some point (a propo-
sition or set of premises), from which we proceed in a series of steps to a con-
clusion (a goal, or stopping point). Metaphorically, we understand the process
of reasoning as a form of motion along a path – propositions are the locations
(or bounded areas) that we start out from, proceed through, and wind up at.
Holding a proposition is understood metaphorically as being located at that
point (or in that area). This very general metaphorical system is reflected in our
language about reasoning in a large number of ways.8
Ancient authors employ similar conceptualizations of knowledge as a journey when
they speak of the ways of songs, paths of a story, methods of inquiry and the like.9 In-
deed, the pursuit of knowledge depicted as a journey, wisdom represented as the final
destination of a long course, and those who aim to know being described as travelers
on the too short road of life belong to a metaphorical domain that runs over the history
of Greco-Roman literature, if not of Western literature more generally.
This volume aims to explore the interconnection between knowledge and journey
by looking at the diverse and multifarious paths of knowledge that the Greco-Roman
world presents to us. Clearly, journey held a great fascination in ancient Greek and Latin
texts from Homer onwards, while ancient sages, literate men, physicians, philosophers,
and thinkers alike were eager to travel abroad in order to enlarge their wisdom and ac-
quire new knowledge. However, as we are dealing with ancient societies and texts, some
general comments on the cultural context of the notion of journey in the Greco-Roman
world, such as those applied in 2000 by D. Fowler in his analysis of the didactic plot of
journey in Vergil and Lucretius, are in order:
We are obviously not talking here of catching a plane or taking the train: we
are likely to build into our constructions of the concept of travel in the ancient
world such notions as the effort of travel, its length, and its dangers. Moreover,
the ancient journey cannot be accomplished in one day but requires a num-
ber of stops on the way, digressions in which we can temporarily recover our
strength. Road are less reliable, and we may need a guide. The situation is par-
ticularly true if we travel at night.10
8 Johnson 1987, 38–39. 9 Cf. Becker 1937; Ferella 2017; and the chapters of
Hose and Ferella in this volume.
10 Fowler 2000, 213.
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It is worth keeping this cultural contextualization of the concept of the (ancient) jour-
ney in mind, while addressing the main issue of the interconnection between journey
and knowledge in Greco-Roman texts. For, as we will see in several case studies in this
volume, it is each of these elements in the domain of journey that structures and or-
ganizes the way in which ancient authors understood and conceptualized notions of
knowledge.
By analyzing the elements of didactic poetry as a paradigmatic example of a dis-
cursive genre, Fowler explored the didactic plot of the journey in Latin didactic poetry
(especially Vergil and Lucretius).11 In his study, he emphasizes three main “paths” that
are presented within the main plot: the path of life, namely the path of human devel-
opment; the path of knowledge or the progress from ignorance to knowledge; and the
path through the texts, that is, “the path on which reader and author are setting out
together”.12 All contributions to the present volume show that the interconnection be-
tween knowledge and journey can be viewed and analyzed, as one, two, or all of the
paths that Fowler recognizes.
The central idea of this volume was first explored on the occasion of the Interna-
tional Conference Paths of Knowledge in Antiquity, hosted in Berlin in December 2016.
The conference was promoted within the initiatives of the Topoi Research Group C-2
Space and Metaphor in cognition, language, and texts. These two days of discussion between
young researchers and senior scholars of classical studies strongly enriched the theoret-
ical and thematic potential of the C-2 Topoi Research Group, while also establishing
a background for the present volume, which collects the proceedings of several papers
presented at that conference. We asked conference participants to present case-studies
from the Greco-Roman world that exemplify the interconnection between the two do-
mains of journey and knowledge in the Greek and Roman societies and cultures. In
particular, we asked them to explore the central theme following two major directions.
First, this interconnection is explored in terms of actual journeys and concrete paths
aimed at knowledge acquisition, such as literary quest stories, nostoi, training paths,
historical voyages, and the like. In the literary accounts of these kinds of traveling ex-
periences, ancient authors made the choice to give particular prominence to individual
aspects of that knowledge they may or may not acquire along a given path. At the same
time, they made a choice about which specific elements of the domain of journey (in-
cluding: the path itself, its qualities; movement, process, stages; origin or destination,
etc.) they aimed to foreground, and accordingly to conceal, for the sake of the story they
wanted to recount. Contributions to this volume clearly show to what extent, in each
11 Fowler 2000. 12 Fowler 2000, 208.
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case study, the macro-thematic of ‘journey’ is essential for the narrative of knowledge
acquisition.
Second, contributions to this volume also examine the interconnection between
knowledge and journey in terms of a metaphorical mapping in which elements included
in the conceptual domain of knowledge are depicted figuratively in terms of elements
connected to the source domain of journey. The case studies analyzed in this volume
compellingly show that in the Greco-Roman literature the more abstract and elusive no-
tion of knowledge is usually seen in terms of the more familiar and less elusive concept
of journey. Specifically, contributors successfully emphasize meanings and communica-
tive functions of verbal instantiations of the source domain of journey, and/or aspects
of the target domain of knowledge, that the metaphorical instantiations foreground.
However, contributors also show that the two directions we proposed, despite being
useful starting points for textual analysis, are often so intertwined in ancient texts that
it is in fact difficult to separate them. Actual journeys often become metaphors for the
right path to knowledge acquisition: for instance, Abraham’s actual journey becomes
an allegory for the soul’s journey to self-knowledge (Joosse). Similarly, Jesus’ journey
together with his disciples becomes a macro-metaphor depicting the right way to fol-
low the divine teacher (Breytenbach), while an actual journey to Rome can coincide
with a figurative pathway to discover one’s own Romanitas (Fascione). In turn, journey
metaphors are so essential to depict more unfamiliar and abstract physical processes
that, in theoretical constructions, those metaphors end up being used, as it were, liter-
ally. For instance, Hippocrates maintained that the soul really moves within the body
during sleep (Shcherbakova). Similarly, according to Empedocles, elements from the
objects of sensation literally enter the gates of the body and reach the heart by traveling
within channels in the body (Ferella). Some contributions, moreover, highlight that the
two directions we suggested also ramify in the third direction indicated by Fowler: the
metaphorical path to knowledge becomes the pathway through the text (Hose and Oki-
Suka). Along a different yet related direction, the actual paths and roads depicted in a
text offer the basis for the ‘imaginary’ journey of the reader who, while reading, traverses
the same places the author described in his work (Hawes).
The articles collected in this volume cover a wide range of topics and texts by con-
sidering diverse authors and areas of studies of the Greco-Roman world: from Homer
to Pausanias to Tzetzes and Eustatius, via Hippocrates and the Evangelist Marks; as well
as from literature to philosophy to theology, via medicine and history. Yet the volume
does not aspire to be exhaustive. It does not aim, therefore, to present a comprehensive
survey of the central theme of the interconnections of knowledge and journey in all
chief authors and periods of Greco-Roman literature. Rather, it is a collection of ideas
generated from an ongoing discussion and, as such, represents a starting point for fur-
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ther investigation. Therefore, it collects case studies in which the central theme ramifies
in diverse and thought-provoking directions that we hope might foster more extensive
and comprehensive reflection within classical studies.
The first paper is dedicated to the most famous voyage and canonical journey nar-
rative of Western literature: the Odyssey. The article by Elizabeth Stockdale entitled With
and without you: The νόστοι of Helen andMenelaos and the path to μῆτις aims to show the cor-
relation between a particular kind of journey, the return journey or νόστος and μῆτις.
The author emphasizes that μῆτις, seen as the knowledge gained at the end of the jour-
ney, is an important facet of the concept of νόστος in the Odyssey. In her paper, Stock-
dale examines two particular νόστοι within the main narrative of Odysseus’ own return:
those by Helen and Menelaos. Stockdale demonstrates that their journeying is presented
separately in their story-telling in order to foreground the revelation of the knowledge
they both gained on their journeys. In conclusion, the author shows that Helen and
Menelaos went on the same νόστος as a joint path to individual μῆτις.
The paper by Martin Hose with the title The journey as device for structuring poetic
knowledge: A poetic method in Pindar’s Epinicia shows how the diverse paths of knowledge
can be seen as paths through the poetic text or, more specifically, through the texts of
Pindar’s epinician odes. In fact, the author submits the view that the metaphor of the
poem as a journey can provide an underlying structure within several of Pindar’s com-
positions. By analyzing Pindar’s metaphor use of different elements deriving from the
domain of journey (including the different modes of moving: going, sailing, jumping,
flying), Hose demonstrates that a thorough exploration of the metaphors of the song
as a path and of the poet as a traveler can soften, if not completely solve, the notorious
question of the unity of Pindar’s odes. This is then exemplified in Hose’s original read-
ing of Pindar’s Nem. 9 – an ode in which the motif of journey serves as an instrument to
generate the poem’s unity. In conclusion, the author also shows that the metaphor of
the poem as a journey shapes the idea of the ‘material’ nature of Pindaric poetic com-
position.
My contribution, entitled ‘A path for understanding’: Journey-metaphors in (three) early
Greek philosophers, enriches Hose’s results with respect to the pervasive nature of the
metaphor domain of journey to illustrate aspects within the domain of knowledge in
early Greek thinkers. Specifically, the chapter analyzes the use of journey metaphors by
three early Greek philosophers (Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles), while high-
lighting the powerful and polyvalent nature of the metaphor cluster of journey to depict
aspects of knowledge both with reference to diverse authors and in the same text. Also
addressed is the question of the close interplay between journey metaphors, imagina-
tion, and philosophical argumentation, above all when a fresh metaphorical stratum is
introduced within an already established metaphor, as in the case of Empedocles. Analy-
12
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sis of this particular case shows to what extent metaphor use, and specifically the use of
journey metaphors by Empedocles, contribute to original developments in philosophi-
cal argumentation and to the construction of physical theories.
In line with my investigation of journey metaphors in philosophy, Mai Oki-Suga’s
paper, entitled An invitation from Plato: A philosophical journey to knowledge also nicely
complements Hose’s analysis of the metaphor of paths of song as a main route through
the text. Specifically, Oki-Suga shows that, in Plato’s view, tracing paths to knowledge or
traveling in search of knowledge is equivalent to reading a philosophical book. In fact,
she shows that Plato conceives of his dialogues as metaphorical journeys to knowledge.
In particular, the ascent–descent motif in Plato’s Politeia, on which the author focuses
in her paper, displays a possible way to read Plato’s dialogue as a philosophical journey
made by Socrates but in fact involving the reader in Plato’s own philosophical inquiries.
The following article by Elizaveta Shcherbakova, entitled The paths of the soul in the
Pseudo–Hippocratic De Victu, focuses on the specific metaphor use of the conceptual do-
mains of journey and knowledge as an illustration of the way in which the knowing
entity in humans, the soul, obtains understanding. Specifically, Shcherbakova analyzes
a medical text – a notoriously difficult passage in the Hippocratic treatise De Victu – that
deals with the activity of the soul during sleep. The author shows that this activity is seen
as a journey, yet this is not a journey of ‘the Pytagorean kind’, as scholars have tradition-
ally interpreted. Rather, the soul travels within the body in a way that aims to explain
the physiology of the soul/body relationship during sleep in a chiefly materialistic way –
a result that complements and enriches my discussion of the use of (journey) metaphors
in the construction of physical theories.
In line with Shcherbakova’s investigation of the soul and its way to obtain under-
standing, Albert Joosse, in his contribution entitled Philo’s De migratione Abrahami: The
soul’s journey of self-knowledge as criticism of Stoic oikeiôsis, shows that the image of jour-
ney can be used in an allegorical way to depict the soul’s development and increased
understanding. This is in fact the allegorical reading provided by Philo of Alexandria of
the biblical account of Abraham’s journey from Chaldaea to Palestine. In particular, as
Joosse shows, the image of journey is used by Philo in order to depict the soul’s activ-
ity as a process of self-knowledge. The author thereby demonstrates that the image of
journey in Philo’s discussion primarily fulfils the philosophical function of criticism: it
offers a vehicle to present Philo’s Platonizing ideas as an alternative to the Stoic theory
of moral progress or oikeiôsis.
Cilliers Breytenbach, in his contribution entitled Incomprehension en route to Jerusalem
(Mk 8:22–10:52), shows that the scene of the second part of the Gospel according to Mark
(8:22–10:52) is a narration about Jesus and his disciples traveling from the north of the
Lake of Galilee to Jerusalem in the south. Jesus uses the actual occasion of the journey
13
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as an opportunity to teach his disciples who lack proper understanding of who he really
is. The author demonstrates that Mark uses the road (ὁδός) as a backdrop to develop the
theme of how the disciples should follow Jesus. By addressing the question of a story in
which the teacher acts ‘on the way’ (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ), Breytenbach shows that Mark’s account
of the incomprehension of ‘traveling’ disciples becomes exemplary of the wrong/right
way to understand Jesus’ teachings. In other words, in a way that seems to be analogous
to that explored by Joosse in the case of Philo’s interpretation of the biblical account,
the concept of journey is seen here as a macro-metaphor illustrating the way in which
Jesus should be properly followed.
The paper by Greta Hawes, with the title Pausanias’Messenian itinerary and the journeys
of the past, explores the way in which Pausanias combines, in his account of Messenia,
the concept of knowledge preserved unchanged in texts with the idea of knowledge as
something encountered and attained through travel. The author shows that the claim
of Messene to an authority rooted in the mythical past of the region runs counter to the
usual situation in antiquity, in which knowledge of the past was transmitted, or said to
be transmitted, through the continuation of civic, cultic, and communal institutions.
The author argues that the interplay between a form of knowledge preserved in texts
and knowledge attained through travel is specifically relevant to this text, since it too
serves as a fixed, written object, which nonetheless offers opportunities for autonomous
exploration and experience to the ‘hodological’ reader-traveler.
In line with Hawes’ investigation, Sara Fascione tackles the theme of the relevance
of journey in the first book of Sidonius Apollinaris’ Letterswith an article entitled Finding
identities on the way to Rome. The author shows to what extent the motif of the journey
in the texts under analysis represents not only an opportunity for personal growth, but
also shapes the life of the travelers who, on their way to Rome, rediscover their greater
or lesser Romanitas.
The last two papers, in a sort of ring composition, return to Homer, by focusing
on the reception of the Odyssey in different periods by different allegorists and exegetes.
Specifically, the paper by Safari Grey, entitled Homer’s Odyssey in the hands of its alle-
gorists: Many paths to explain the cosmos, analyzes the idea, held by allegorists and exegetes
of Homer’s Odyssey from the sixth century BCE until today, that Homer’s epics, inten-
tionally or not, revealed philosophical doctrines about the shape and the working of
the cosmos. The author draws particular attention to the ancient grammarian Heracli-
tus and the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre, while suggesting that the tradi-
tion of cosmic allegorical exegesis of the Odyssey is still practiced in modern scholarship,
specifically by the Harvard Classicist Professor Gregory Nagy. Thereby, Grey shows the
many paths of cosmic interpretation that the Odyssey has offered to interpreters of all
times.
14
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The last paper, which is by Valeria F. Lovato and has the title The wanderer, the
philosopher and the exegete: Receptions of the Odyssey in twelfth-century Byzantium, deals
with another exegetic tradition, namely that interpreting the journeys of Odysseus as
the allegory of the philosopher’s struggle to reach authentic philosophical knowledge.
Specifically, the author presents the interpretation by Eustatius, in his commentaries on
Dionysius the Periegete, who, in order to prove that traveling is a philosophical matter,
embarks on an original interpretation of Odysseus’ journeys and of the interrelation of
his wanderings and superior wisdom. As Lovato shows, Odysseus’ voyage gives the cue
to Eustatius to present even Homer himself as both a wanderer and a philosopher. The
author concludes by comparing Eustatius and another Byzantine exegete, Tzetzes, and
highlights the relevance that Eustatius gives to the journey motif as a means to acquire
philosophical knowledge.
I would like to conclude this introduction by thanking in a very special way all
contributors to this volume as well as all speakers and participants in the Berlin Inter-
national Conference Paths of Knowledge in Antiquity. Although not all participants con-
tributed papers to this book, each did much to foster and benefit the volume’s discus-
sion. Additionally, I would like to thank the staff of the research cluster Topoi and of
the Edition Topoi, especially Dr. Katrin Siebel and Dr. Nadine Riedl, for their practi-
cal support during the conference as well as for their editorial and technical assistance.
Many thanks also to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions on a previous draft. The greatest part of the final revision of this volume has
been supported by the fellowship I received from the Harvard Center for Hellenic Stud-
ies (2017–2018). I am deeply grateful to the Director, Prof. Gregory Nagy, and each staff
member of the CHS for the friendly atmosphere of productive collegiality they foster at
the Center and for their invaluable practical and intellectual support.
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Elizabeth Stockdale
With and without You: The νόστοι of Helen and
Menelaos and the Path to μῆτις
Summary
Νόστος is a prime feature of Homer’s Odyssey. The epic contains many νόστοι and the focus
is on the main νόστος by Odysseus. This paper discusses the νόστοι by Helen and Menelaos
and how their journeying is presented separately in their story-telling. The purpose for this is
to reveal the knowledge gained on their journeys; μῆτις is an important facet of the concept
of νόστος in the Odyssey, and therefore Helen and Menelaos adhere to the finite paradigm.
An additional purpose is to highlight the κλέος of the individual relating their own νόστος
story. Their story-telling reveals they went to the same places, had similar encounters, both
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The Odyssey is critically defined by the concept of νόστος, the journey home. In Homer,
νόστος fundamentally means a return home from Troy by sea. Conceptually, νόστος
means both the return itself as experienced by those having returned and the poetic
telling of that experience either by those who underwent it, or by the poet.1 Within the
telling of that experience, νόστος additionally means a journey home involving the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. Though Odysseus’ νόστος is the prime focus of the epic, there are in
fact many νόστοι in the Odyssey. The beginning of the epic is marked by Phemius’ song,
which tells of the anguished returns of the Achaeans from Troy.2 While the other νόστοι
include those of Menelaos, Nestor, Agamemnon, Telemachos, Diomedes, Idomeneos,
and Philoctetes, one particular journey that has not been examined as pertaining to the
concept, is the one by Helen.
Helen is unique in that she is the only woman in Homer to undergo a νόστος. Her
νόστος means that she makes a full return to Sparta. Within the journey she adheres
to the Odyssean paradigm that the purpose of the journey is not just travel and visual
experience, but more importantly, is about the acquisition of knowledge, μῆτις.3 Sig-
nificantly, she tells of her νόστος just as the men tell of their own and of other men’s
νόστοι. The telling of the extraordinary journeys to strange and foreign lands, of the peo-
ple encountered there, the ξενία relations between these people, the knowledge gained
from them while encountering foreign lands, and the knowledge gained from gods and
ethereal beings are all aspects of her νόστος that enable the gaining of μῆτις and also
contribute to individual κλέος. Both Helen and Menelaos tell the stories of their νόστοι
separately without mentioning each other. This, I will argue, serves not to consciously
exclude the other from the experiences on the journey, but to highlight the κλέος of the
person narrating their story.
In book four of the Odyssey, Helen and Menelaos tell μῦθοι as part of their hospi-
tality to Telemachos. The nature of their ‘tellings’ has been argued as forming part of
Telemachos’ maturation;4 knowing about parts of his father’s νόστος contributes to his
understanding of the development of male κλέος. However, there are multiple purposes
1 Bonifazi 2009, 481.
2 Hom. Od. 1.325–327. This is also noted by Barker
and Christensen 2016, 93.
3 The importance of μῆτις in the epic is also demon-
strated by Odysseus’ distinctive epithet πολύμητις:
he is noted by Slatkin and Nagy as the only mortal
to bear this epithet in Homer. Slatkin 1996, 236;
Nagy 2013, 280–284.
4 Barker and Christensen 2016, 93.
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for the stories told by Helen and Menelaos. In their μῦθοι, ostensibly about Odysseus’
wanderings and aspects of his κλέος, they also reveal glimpses of sections of their own
respective νόστοι.
When “Helen left her fragrant high-roofed inner room”5, ἐκ δ᾽ Ἑλένη θαλάμοιο
θυώδεος ὑψορόφοιο ἤλυθεν, the poet tells of the accompanying goods that were brought
out with her; including the ἀργύρεον τάλαρον6 (silver basket) that had been given to her
by Alkandre, the wife of Polybos from Egyptian Thebes.7 In turn, Menelaos received gifts
from Polybos: δύ’ ἀργυρέας ἀσαμίνθους, δοιοὺς δὲ τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
“two silver bathing-tubs, a pair of tripods, and ten talents of gold”.8 Not only is this an
example of gift-giving between men and women, specifically between noble men and
women,9 but also a glimpse into the νόστος to Egypt by Helen and Menelaos. Clearly
it was here that they met another leading couple. Through the interaction of guest-
friendship, which implied that they stayed at the home of Alkandre and Polybos,10 they
were presented with the gifts in the ritual of hospitality, ξενίαι. Gifts were given to Helen
by Alkandre; the description of which focuses on their richness and purpose: weaving
and the storing of wool.
χωρὶς δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ Ἑλένῃ ἄλοχος πόρε κάλλιμα δῶρα:
χρυσέην τ᾽ ἠλακάτην τάλαρόν θ᾽ ὑπόκυκλον ὄπασσεν
ἀργύρεον, χρυσῷ δ᾽ ἐπὶ χείλεα κεκράαντο …
His wife gave separately her own beautiful gifts to Helen:
she gave her a golden distaff and a silver basket with wheels beneath,
and the edges done in gold …11
The various encounters in Egypt glimpsed in this section of book four allude to the
fact that both Helen and Menelaos were together. This was a journey they undertook
together, and they interacted with another couple in the Egyptian city of Thebes. In
Homer, the journey taken by Helen and Menelaos to Egypt is woven into the Odyssey’s
larger μῦθος; it is incorporated into their joint story: their return from Troy. What is
not presented in the text is the journey to Egypt, related by either of them.12 In fact, the
other three ancient sources on Helen and Egypt – Stesichorus, Herodotus, and Euripides
5 Hom. Od. 4.121–122. All translations are my own.
6 Hom. Od. 4.125.
7 Hom. Od. 4.126–127.
8 Hom. Od. 4.127–128.
9 Reece 1992,74–90.
10 For a selected discussion on Homeric gift-giving and
hospitality outside the martial context see Reece
1992, 74–90; Woodbury 1967, 1–16. Tracy empha-
sizes the self-sacrificing nature and trust between
strangers, while Edwards 1975, 51–72 focuses on
comparing details in descriptions and metrical
anomalies in hospitality scenes. He highlights the
irregularities and inconsistencies as a result of the
process of oral composition.
11 Hom. Od. 4.130–32.
12 Waern 1985, 165.
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– do not mention the journey to Egypt by Helen either. Herodotus, writing later in the
second half of the fifth century, thought Homer suppressed the Egypt story and gave his
own information on Helen arriving in Egypt shortly after leaving Sparta, adding that
King Proteus of Egypt, appalled by Paris’ seduction of Helen, refused to allow Paris to
take her on to Troy, thus detaining her in Egypt for the duration of the war.13 Stesichorus’
work (which was possibly the inspiration for Herodotus) also states that Helen never
went to Troy but stayed in Egypt,14 and Euripides’ play Helen has the true Helen in
Egypt while her εἴδωλον is in Troy. The Homeric version, that she visited Egypt on her
return from Troy (and it is impossible to ascertain if it is the original story), is woven
into the narrative and therefore becomes part of the larger μῦθος. It also supports in a
crucial way the values espoused throughout the epic, most notably νόστος, μῆτις, and
ξενία.
When Menelaos, the men, and Helen have grieved from listening to the stories of
Odysseus told by Menelaos,15 Helen ἔνθ’ αὖτ’ἄλλ’ ἐνόησ’, “thought of the next thing”.16
She puts a draught into the men’s wine to make them forget their sorrows and cease
crying no matter what emotional pain they were suffering.17 It is revealed by the poet
that these subtle draughts in her possession were
ἐσθλά, τά οἱ Πολύδαμνα πόρεν, Θῶνος παράκοιτις
Αἰγυπτίη, τῇ πλεῖστα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά:
ἰητρὸς δὲ ἕκαστος ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων
ἀνθρώπων: ἦ γὰρ Παιήονός εἰσι γενέθλης.
Good things, and given to her by the wife of Thon, Polydamna
of Egypt, where the fertile earth produces the greatest number
of medicines, many good in mixture and many bad:
and there every man is a doctor and more knowledgeable
than all men: for they are of the race of Paiëon.18
In this, the narrator reveals that the wife of Thon, named Polydamna, from Egypt, gave
these drugs – and also the knowledge of the drugs – to Helen. In this isolated section of
the text, Menelaos is not mentioned. We are told of Helen’s knowledge and her purpose
in drugging the wine to be consumed by the men.
13 Hdt. 2.112–120.
14 This is mentioned in Paus.10.26.1. Stesichorus also
composed a poem titled Νόστοι but it is fragmen-
tary (PMG209). This is also noted by Bonifazi 2009,
485, n. 485.
15 For a discussion on tears in Homer see Tracy 2014,
223–229.
16 Hom. Od. 4.219.
17 Hom. Od. 4.220–226.
18 Hom. Od. 4.228–232.
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Literary criticism of this section of the text has focused on Helen’s ambivalent na-
ture; she is neither good nor bad, in that while the drugs she deploys are described as
ἐσθλά, the effect of them dulls the senses, and makes the men morally desensitized.19
Scholarship on Helen has also examined this passage and made much, perhaps to ex-
tremes, of her knowledge. While M. Suzuki has referred to it as uncanny20 with an un-
derlying sense of otherworldliness, M. Gumpert has referred to her as orientalized and
as a witch-doctor and noted that it is difficult to ascertain whether she is good or bad.21
Similarly, N. Austin stated that the Odyssey has interpreted Helen’s magic as a medical
skill.22 What has not been examined is the fact that Helen has acquired this knowledge,
this μῆτις, on her νόστος; specifically, in her sojourn in Egypt. Contextually this inci-
dent focuses on the dulling of the senses of the men to ease their pain and moves forward
to Helen’s μῦθος regarding her encounter with Odysseus. There is a glimpse, however,
of Helen’s journey and like the prime journey in the epic, that of Odysseus, Helen’s
journey also contains the important element of acquired μῆτις, which is essential in
achieving κλέος in the Odyssey.23
Menelaos also acquires knowledge in Egypt as part of the experience of his νόστος.
The poet provides greater detail on Menelaos’ encounters there in comparison to what is
revealed of Helen’s experiences.24 While Helen gains μῆτις from a leading woman, Poly-
damna, Menelaos encounters two otherworldly individuals who both give him guidance
and specific knowledge for his νόστος. Menelaos reveals,
Αἰγύπτῳ μ᾽ ἔτι δεῦρο θεοὶ μεμαῶτα νέεσθαι
ἔσχον, ἐπεὶ οὔ σφιν ἔρεξα τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας …
καί νύ κεν ἤια πάντα κατέφθιτο καὶ μένε᾽ ἀνδρῶν,
εἰ μή τίς με θεῶν ὀλοφύρατο καί μ᾽ ἐσάωσε,
Πρωτέος ἰφθίμου θυγάτηρ ἁλίοιο γέροντος,
Εἰδοθέη· τῇ γάρ ῥα μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ὄρινα.
ἥ μ᾽ οἴῳ ἔρροντι συνήντετο νόσφιν
Though I was eager to return the gods held me in Egypt
here, because I had not offered complete hecatombs to them….
And now all the food would have gone, and the men’s strength as well,
if one of the gods had not been sorry for me, and saved me,
Eidothea, the daughter of mighty Proteus, the Old Man
19 Suzuki 1989, 66; Gumpert 2001, 41; Bergren 2009,
314–335.
20 Suzuki 1989, 64.
21 Gumpert 2001, 41. Clader also refers to Helen in
this incident as possessing ‘witch-like’ powers.
Clader 1976, 32.
22 Austin 1994, 77.
23 For a detailed discussion on μῆτις in the Odyssey see
Slatkin 1996, 223–238. Also Nagy 2013, 280–284.
24 For the scene as a whole focussed on Menelaos see
Barck 1971, 23–26.
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of the Sea, for I moved her heart greatly
when she met me wandering alone …25
Eidothea, the ethereal daughter of Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea, is the first other-
worldly being Menelaos encounters. She gives him instructions to see her father.
πωλεῖταί τις δεῦρο γέρων ἅλιος νημερτὴς
ἀθάνατος Πρωτεὺς Αἰγύπτιος, ὅς τε θαλάσσης
πάσης βένθεα οἶδε, Ποσειδάωνος ὑποδμώς:
τὸν δέ τ᾽ ἐμόν φασιν πατέρ᾽ ἔμμεναι ἠδὲ τεκέσθαι.
τόν γ᾽ εἴ πως σὺ δύναιο λοχησάμενος λελαβέσθαι,
ὅς κέν τοι εἴπῃσιν ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου
νόστον θ᾽, ὡς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσεαι ἰχθυόεντα.
καὶ δέ κέ τοι εἴπῃσι, διοτρεφές, αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσθα,
ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται
οἰχομένοιο σέθεν δολιχὴν ὁδὸν ἀργαλέην τε.
A certain always truthful Old Man of the Sea frequents these parts,
the immortal Proteus of Egypt, and he knows
the depths of all the seas. He is Poseidon’s servant of the whole sea.
And they also say he is my father, who begot me.
If somehow you could lie in wait and catch hold of him,
he would tell you the way to go, the stages of your journey,
and tell you the means to make your way home on the fish-full sea.
And he will tell you too, one cherished by Zeus, if you so wish,
what evil and what good has been done in your palace
while you have been away on your long and difficult journey.26
Eidothea’s instructions are important as a signpost to Proteus. Proteus, according to Ei-
dothea, will give guidance to Menelaos for his journey home and give him knowledge of
the events in his palace while he has been away. Not only does Proteus have the appropri-
ate navigational knowledge for Menelaos, he also has knowledge about the occurrences
within his own palace in Sparta; extraordinary knowledge, as it is an understanding of
happenings at a distance from his own sea life. When he finally meets Proteus and wres-
tles with him till he can force him to respond, Menelaos asks which one of the gods has
stalled him on his journey and how he may make his way home.27 Proteus’ response
provides him with exactly the knowledge Menelaos requested, no more no less. He says,
25 Hom. Od. 4.351–352; 363–367.
26 Hom. Od. 4.384–393.
27 Hom. Od. 4.454–470.
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οὐ γάρ τοι πρὶν μοῖρα φίλους τ᾽ ἰδέειν καὶ ἱκέσθαι
οἶκον ἐυκτίμενον καὶ σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
πρίν γ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἂν Αἰγύπτοιο, διιπετέος ποταμοῖο,
αὖτις ὕδωρ ἔλθῃς ῥέξῃς θ᾽ ἱερὰς ἑκατόμβας
ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσι:
καὶ τότε τοι δώσουσιν ὁδὸν θεοί, ἣν σὺ μενοινᾷς.
It is not now your fate to see your own people and return
to your well-made house, and to your ancestral land,
until you have gone back once more to the waters of Egypt,
the river fallen from Zeus, and there have offered holy hecatombs
in honor of the immortal gods who hold wide heaven.
Then the gods will grant you the journey that you so desire.28
In this response, Menelaos learns that he needs to make the necessary sacrifices to honor
all the gods so that he may proceed on his journey.29 There is a focus in Menelaos’ μῦθος
on the concept of the journey and how he needs to acquire μῆτις to complete it.30 In
comparison, the glimpses we are given of Helen’s νόστος reveal that her acquired μῆτις
is in regard to φάρμακα. While Helen’s μῆτις is gained on the journey, it is not like
Menelaos’, which is explicitly for the process of the journey.
Shape-shifting is a common feature of many of the gods. It is particularly the god-
dess Athena who shape-shifts in the Odyssey. In fact, Athena changes shape 16 times in
the epic.31 Odysseus also changes shape; once on his own, disguised as a Trojan beggar
entering Troy,32 and later with the help of Athena, when he is disguised as a beggar so
he can enter Ithaca undetected.33 There are different types of shape-shifting in the epic.
Disguise is one type. Both Odysseus and Athena change physical shape as a form of dis-
guise, so that people do not know them. Shape-shifting in the Odyssey is an aspect of
δόλος; a concept upheld and valued as one result of μῆτις. On their νόστος both Helen
and Menelaos shift. Helen adapts, shifts her voice multiple times so that she is heard and
understood to be other women. Menelaos shifts his physical shape, adopting the guise
of an animal to gain knowledge.
28 Hom. Od. 4.475–480.
29 For a discussion of the concept of νόστος by sea see
Christopoulos 2001.
30 For further discussion on νόστος and structure in
the Odyssey see Cook 2014.
31 Hom. Od. 1.205 as Mentes, Od. 2.268, 401, 416;
22.205–206; 24.503, 547–548 as Mentor; 12.222–
225 as herdsman; 7.19–20 as guide; 5.22 friend of
Nausikaa; 19.33–34 as lamp-bearer; 13.288–289 as
beautiful woman; 3.371–379 as vulture; 22.238–240
as swallow.
32 Hom. Od. 4.244–250.
33 Hom. Od. 13.393–403.
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Helen’s shift takes place at the end of the Trojan war. In his μῦθος, Menelaos re-
lates the circumstances involving the Trojan horse at the gates of Troy.34 He does not
focus on himself (though admittedly he does include himself in his μῦθος to ensure his
remembrance and therefore κλέος) but on his wife and Odysseus.35 He says,
οἷον καὶ τόδ’ ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ
ἵππῳ ἔνι ξεστῷ, ἵν’ ἐνήμεθα πάντες ἄριστοι
Ἀργείων, Τρώεσσι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φέροντες.
ἦλθες ἔπειτα σὺ κεῖσε· κελευσέμεναι δέ σ’ ἔμελλε
δαίμων, ὃς Τρώεσσιν ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι·
καί τοι Δηΐφοβος θεοείκελος ἕσπετ’ ἰούσῃ.
τρὶς δὲ περίστειξας κοῖλον λόχον ἀμφαφόωσα,
ἐκ δ’ ὀνομακλήδην Δαναῶν ὀνόμαζες ἀρίστους,
πάντων Ἀργείων φωνὴν ἴσκουσ’ ἀλόχοισιν·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ Τυδεΐδης καὶ δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
ἥμενοι ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀκούσαμεν, ὡς ἐβόησας.
νῶϊ μὲν ἀμφοτέρω μενεήναμεν ὁρμηθέντες
ἢ ἐξελθέμεναι ἢ ἔνδοθεν αἶψ’ ὑπακοῦσαι·
ἀλλ’ Ὀδυσεὺς κατέρυκε καὶ ἔσχεθεν ἱεμένω περ.
ἔνθ’ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἀκὴν ἔσαν υἷες Ἀχαιῶν,
Ἄντικλος δὲ σέ γ’ οἶος ἀμείψασθαι ἐπέεσσιν
ἤθελεν· ἀλλ’ Ὀδυσεὺς ἐπὶ μάστακα χερσὶ πίεζε
νωλεμέως κρατερῇσι, σάωσε δὲ πάντας Ἀχαιούς·
τόφρα δ’ ἔχ’, ὄφρα σε νόσφιν ἀπήγαγε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
Here is the way that mighty man acted and the way he endured
inside the carved horse, where inside we who were greatest
of the Argives were sitting and bringing death and destruction
to the Trojans. Then you came there, Helen; you will have been moved by
some daemon who wished to grant glory to the Trojans,
and godlike Deiphobos followed you when you came.
Three times you walked around the hollow ambush, touching it,
and you called out, calling to them by name, the best of the Danaans,
and made your voice sound like the voice of the wives of all the Argives.
Now I and the son of Tydeus and god-like Odysseus
were sitting there in the midst of them and we heard you calling
34 For discussion on the Trojan horse story as a narra-
tive technique filling in the story between the end
of the war and the present episode in Sparta see
Besslich 1966, 48–50; Heubeck 1954, 18ff.
35 For Odysseus’ accomplishments as expressed by
Menelaos see Nestle 1942, 73.
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aloud, and Diomedes and I started to get up, both in mind
to go outside, or else to answer your voice from inside,
but Odysseus pulled us back and held us, for all our eagerness.
Then all the other sons of the Achaians were silent:
There was only one, it was Antiklos, who wanted to call out,
but Odysseus, brutally closed his mouth in the clutch of his strong
hands, held him, and so saved the lives of all the Achaians
until Pallas Athene led you away from us.36
Helen’s actions here are certainly morally questionable. Suzuki says that this episode
shows Helen in her devastating spectrum: her infidelity to Menelaos is made worse by
her marriage to Deiphobus, and her mimicking of the voices of the wives of the Acha-
ians demonstrates her almost supernatural ability to enthrall and enchant.37 Suzuki does
have a point here, though she stretches the argument with mention of Helen’s infidelity:
Helen’s marriage to Deiphobus is not part of the story in the Odyssey, but appears in the
later Epic Cycle, specifically in the Little Iliad.38 Regardless, Helen’s actions are unset-
tling. Her attempt to deflect Odysseus from his true purpose, his heroic return, does
categorize her with the other femmes fatales he encounters on his journey: a point also
noted by Austin, Suzuki, and R. Blondell.39 J. T. Kakridis analyses this episode from a
narratological viewpoint and has argued for conflated stories regarding Helen and the
horse as a way of understanding the contradictory nature of Helen.40
Scholarship on Helen has focused on the unsettling aspects of her mimicking the
voices of the Achaian wives.41 D. Olson in particular has interpreted this particular
episode as demonstrating the tensions in the marital relationship, the wider sexual dy-
namics in the epic of the struggle between male and female, and the lack of trust men
place in women.42 While there are certainly sexual tensions in the Odyssey, specifically
between Odysseus and Penelope, the relationship between Helen and Menelaos in the
epic shows a reunited couple, at least on the surface, who have endured much. What
needs to be highlighted in the Trojan Horse episode, is that Helen shifts in voice, which
in itself is deceptive. Not only does she assume the voices of the wives of the Achaians,
from what is implied in what Menelaos indicates about his own response, Helen also
projects her own voice and calls to him. Though this is not a shift, her intent appears to
be deceptive. Helen demonstrates δόλος, a result of μῆτις. The encounter with the Tro-
jan horse marks the beginning of her journey back to Sparta. Therefore, the beginning
36 Hom. Od. 4.271–289.
37 Suzuki 1989, 69.
38 Evelyn-White 1936, 510.
39 Austin 1994, 79; Suzuki 1989, 65; Blondell 2013, 79.
40 Kakridis 1971.
41 For Helen as a contrast to Penelope regarding faith-
fulness and unfaithfulness see Klinger 1964, 79.
42 Olson 1989, 393–394.
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of Helen’s return is signposted by her μῆτις. In addition to this, the intent of this section
of the narrative was to highlight Odysseus’ μῆτις prevailing in the episode concerning
the Trojan horse.43
Menelaos’ μῦθος is partly aimed at giving information to Telemachos regarding his
father. It is a form of maturation for Telemachos.44 The beginning of Helen’s return
is triply embedded in that it is within Menelaos’ own νόστος (his journey within the
horse into and then out of Troy), told during the νόστος of Telemachos, and within the
main epic νόστος; Odysseus’ νόστος. In this way, Helen’s δόλος, a result of μῆτις, in this
episode, shows the beginning of her return in her νόστος, framed within the main νό-
στος; that of Odysseus, which itself is known for δόλος and μῆτις. The μῦθος functions
for both Helen and Menelaos, as Menelaos includes himself in this particular μῦθος in
book 4, which by doing so also indicates that he as well as Helen possesses δόλος.45
After all, he is concealed within the Trojan horse, which is itself deceptive. Helen and
Menelaos both show δόλος in this episode, demonstrating that they have this in com-
mon with regard to their experiences on their νόστοι. While Suzuki and Blondell have
mentioned Helen’s moral ambivalence,46 in this instance Menelaos is just as culpable.
Though his desire to fight for and regain his wife is honorable,47 his participation in the
duplicitous intent of the Trojan horse makes him a party to deception, δόλος.
Menelaos has another episode where he demonstrates δόλος. In this episode he
physically shape-shifts, whereas in the Trojan horse episode he inhabits the shape of de-
ception, the Horse itself. Menelaos’ physical shape-shifting is peformed to gain infor-
mation from Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea. Menelaos is provided with the means to
achieve this by Eidothea, Proteus’ daughter. Menelaos relates,
τόφρα δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἥ γ᾽ ὑποδῦσα θαλάσσης εὐρέα κόλπον
τέσσαρα φωκάων ἐκ πόντου δέρματ᾽ ἔνεικε:
πάντα δ᾽ ἔσαν νεόδαρτα: δόλον δ᾽ ἐπεμήδετο πατρί.
εὐνὰς δ᾽ ἐν ψαμάθοισι διαγλάψασ᾽ ἁλίῃσιν
ἧστο μένουσ᾽: ἡμεῖς δὲ μάλα σχεδὸν ἤλθομεν αὐτῆς:
ἑξείης δ᾽ εὔνησε, βάλεν δ᾽ ἐπὶ δέρμα ἑκάστῳ.
ἔνθα κεν αἰνότατος λόχος ἔπλετο: τεῖρε γὰρ αἰνῶς
φωκάων ἁλιοτρεφέων ὀλοώτατος ὀδμή:
τίς γάρ κ᾽ εἰναλίῳ παρὰ κήτεϊ κοιμηθείη;
43 For Odysseus’ Odyssean qualities in this episode see
Fränkel 1962, 96, 99.
44 For discussion on the education of Telemachos by
Menelaos see Petropoulos 2011, 52–56.
45 For detail on the rhetorical sophistication of Helen’s
and Menelaos’ speeches see Janka 2001, 7–26.
46 Suzuki 1989, 70; Blondell 2013, 84–85.
47 Achilles’ behavior and reaction to Briseis being
taken away from him in the Iliad reveals the nature
of their relationship. He makes a brief comparison
between Menelaos’ love for Helen and him fighting
for her, and his own love and care for Briseis and
fighting for her. Hom. Il. 9.339–343.
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ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ ἐσάωσε καὶ ἐφράσατο μέγ᾽ ὄνειαρ:
ἀμβροσίην ὑπὸ ῥῖνα ἑκάστῳ θῆκε φέρουσα
ἡδὺ μάλα πνείουσαν, ὄλεσσε δὲ κήτεος ὀδμήν.
πᾶσαν δ᾽ ἠοίην μένομεν τετληότι θυμῷ:
φῶκαι δ᾽ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἦλθον ἀολλέες. αἱ μὲν ἔπειτα
ἑξῆς εὐνάζοντο παρὰ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης:
ἔνδιος δ᾽ ὁ γέρων ἦλθ᾽ ἐξ ἁλός, εὗρε δὲ φώκας
ζατρεφέας, πάσας δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐπῴχετο, λέκτο δ᾽ ἀριθμόν:
ἐν δ᾽ ἡμέας πρώτους λέγε κήτεσιν, οὐδέ τι θυμῷ
ὠΐσθη δόλον εἶναι: ἔπειτα δὲ λέκτο καὶ αὐτός.
ἡμεῖς δὲ ἰάχοντες ἐπεσσύμεθ᾽, ἀμφὶ δὲ χεῖρας
βάλλομεν: οὐδ᾽ ὁ γέρων δολίης ἐπελήθετο τέχνης,
ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι πρώτιστα λέων γένετ᾽ ἠυγένειος,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων καὶ πάρδαλις ἠδὲ μέγας σῦς:
γίγνετο δ᾽ ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ καὶ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον:
ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἀστεμφέως ἔχομεν τετληότι θυμῷ.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δή ῥ᾽ ἀνίαζ᾽ ὁ γέρων ὀλοφώια εἰδώς,
καὶ τότε δή μ᾽ ἐπέεσσιν ἀνειρόμενος προσέειπε:
Meanwhile she (Eidothea) had dived down into the sea’s great bosom
and brought forth the skins of four seals from the water; and
all were newly skinned. She planned a trick on her father.
She hollowed out four beds in the sand of the sea, she sat there
waiting, and we came very close to her. Then there
she made us lie down in a row, and spread a skin over each man.
That was a most dreadful ambush, for the terrible
stench of those seals, bred in the salt water, badly distressed us.
Who would want to lie down next to a sea-born monster?
But she herself rescued us and devised a great help.
She brought ambrosia, and put it beneath each man’s nose,
and it smelled very sweet, and got rid of the stench of the monster.
All that morning we waited there, steadfast in spirit,
and the seals came forth thronging out of the sea, and when they came out
they lay down in a row along the shore of the sea.
At noon the Old Man came out of the sea and found his well-fed
seals, and went over to them all, and counted their number,
and we were among the seals he counted first; he had no idea
of any betrayal. Then he also lay down among us.
We with a yell, sprang up and rushed upon him, seizing him
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in our arms, but the Old Man did not forget the craftiness
of his arts. First, he turned into a great bearded lion,
and then a serpent, then a leopard, then a great boar,
and he turned into fluid water, into a tree with high and leafy branches,
but we determinedly held on to him with steadfast spirit.
But when the Old Man versed in devious ways grew weary
of all this, he questioned and spoke to me in words …48
The purpose of Menelaos’ shape-shifting is to acquire μῆτις, and this is done both on the
journey and for the sake of his return journey. Shape-shifting is certainly about δόλος,
deception, in the Odyssey. Its purpose enables the hero to proceed on his νόστος; con-
sider Odysseus entering Ithaca disguised as a beggar,49 and also Odysseus as described
in Helen’s μῦθος entering Troy in disguise on the spying mission.50 Both of these in-
stances in the prime νόστος in the epic involve shape-shifting as a means to gain μῆτις,
knowledge. Menelaos’ shape-shifting adheres to this principle. Through the telling of
this extraordinary μῦθος, Menelaos ensures that he will be remembered,51 and therefore
he will have achieved κλέος.
Helen’s voice shift however, is something different. Her purpose for mimicking the
voices of the Achaians’ wives is not to gain μῆτις. For it reveals that she already knows
the color and timbre of their voices, and she has the ability to assume them to the extent
that even their husbands are convinced it is their wives outside the Horse. In this way,
Helen’s shift demonstrates her δόλος and μῆτις, not a pursuit of μῆτις. However, her
μῆτις, despite its moral ambivalence in this episode, signifies that this is the beginning
of her return journey to Sparta. While Helen is outside the Horse, Menelaos is inside,
and it is at this juncture that they both have a shared (but independent) experience and
begin their return to Sparta.
Therefore, νόστος and μῆτις are demonstrated to be interdependent concepts val-
ued in the Odyssey, not just in relation to Odysseus’ νόστος, but in relation to Menelaos’
and Helen’s νόστοι as well. Barker and Christiansen consider the νόστοι in the Odyssey
as glimpses of rival traditions that are woven into the narrative to develop the poem’s
meanings and exploration of its themes.52 These other traditions are not rivals per se, but
other narratives concerning the individuals involved in and associated with the Trojan
war; essentially the Troy stories. The fact that they are incorporated into the narrative
48 Hom. Od. 4.435–461.
49 Hom. Od. 13.429–440.
50 Hom. Od. 4. 239–258.
51 Mueller discusses women and remembering, specif-
ically Penelope and remembering in the Odyssey,
and how this is associated with κλέος. Moran 1975,
337–362. On remembering in Homer see Mueller
2007, 195–211. On specifically story-telling and
κλέος in the Odyssey see chapter 1 Olson 1995. For
the complexities of κλέος, including remembering
and story-telling, see Segal 1983, 22–47.
52 Barker and Christensen 2016, 90–91.
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structure of theOdyssey is indicative of their importance in reinforcing the values deemed
necessary to be repeated and highlighted in this epic. It is also about the theme of the
journey home. Helen and Menelaos each tell their μῦθοι, revealing glimpses into their
νόστοι. Their joint νόστος foreshadows the successful return to the οἶκος for Odysseus.
Their self-reporting serves the purpose of revealing the knowledge they gained on their
journeys, as well as creating individual κλέος for each of them. They both have encoun-
ters at the fall of Troy that result in them gaining knowledge, they have the guidance of
gods, shift in voice or in shape exemplifying δόλος, acquire μῆτις in Egypt from foreign
and otherworldly individuals, and both return to Sparta. Helen and Menelaos have a
joint νόστος as they journey to the same places, have similar encounters, and return
together. Their narrations and glimpses into their joint νόστος serve the purpose of
highlighting the Odyssey’s prime focus, that of the νόστος. The uniqueness of their in-
dividual but joint νόστος highlights not only the conceptual facets of the physical and
sensory experiences of their journey, but also their pathway to individual maturity; their
acquisition of μῆτις, which greatly contributes to their κλέος.
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Mannigfach begegnet bei Pindar die merkwürdige Vorstellung,
dass das Lied dem Dichter ein Weg ist, den er dichtend geht.
Many times, the strange notion appears in Pindar that the song
is a path for the poet, which he walks while versing.
— Otfried Becker
Starting from this old observation by O. Becker,1 this contribution focuses on the main
topic of this book: the journey. How Pindar uses the ‘path’ as motif – as Becker observes
– can be seen as an image or – in its extended form – as a metaphor. It would indeed be
a dramatic understatement if one were to state that the importance of the metaphor2 in
Pindar’s poetic work has not yet been sufficiently researched. The opposite is true: the
analysis of exactly this literary device is a recurring topic in Pindar research. In recent
years alone the following books were published: G. Patten issued Pindar’s Metaphors: A
Study of Rhetoric and Meaning in 2009; C. Lattmann Das Gleiche im Verschiedenen. Meta-
phern des Sports und Lob des Siegers in Pindars Epinikien in 2010; and Z. Adorjáni’s Auge
und Sehen in Pindars Dichtung dates to 2011. Finally, in 2015, B. Maslov added Pindar
and the Emergence of Literature, which deals thoroughly with “image, metaphor, concept:
the semantics of the poetic language”.3 This small list could be significantly extended
by more Pindar research from the last 50 years: for instance, D. Steiner’s The crown of
song: Metaphor in Pindar published in 1986. The extensive literature reports by D. Gerber
and, recently, A. Neumann-Hartmann list many works dedicated to metaphor or – more
generally – the image in Pindar’s poetry.4
Thus, the metaphor seems to be, if published research is the measure, arguably the
central literary device of Pindaric poetry, through which diverse thematic areas of the
epinicia can be expressed: sport and victory,5 the symposium,6 the effect of song, and
finally song itself. Equally, those thematic areas can themselves be used as metaphors for
other things. It seems Pindar plays virtuously with ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’.
On an abstract-analytical level this shows nothing less than a significant prevalence
of this observation in comparison to the concept in Pindaric works. This prevalence is
much clearer than in the works of other authors, at least within Greek poetic litera-
ture, in which one of the most characteristic features is that potentially general themes
are treated in special cases. Does Pindar ‘think in images’?7 – this could be asked with
reference to a former study.
Without delving too deeply into the complex contemporary discussion regarding
metaphor, we can differentiate two functions of metaphor in ancient literature. On the
1 Becker 1937, 68.
2 Explaining ‘metaphor’ would need its own book.
For the ancient concepts see Lau 2006.
3 Maslov 2015, 117–245.
4 Gerber 1989; Gerber 1990; Neumann-Hartmann
2010.
5 Lattmann 2010.
6 Athanassaki 2016.
7 In reference to the title of Bernard 1963.
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one hand, it can be used to make ‘unfamiliar things’ familiar; with this cognitive acquisi-
tion metaphor fulfills one of the fundamental functions of language. On the other hand,
metaphor can also make ‘familiar things’ unfamiliar. With Russian formalism in mind,
one could name the latter function ‘defamiliarization’.8 Here we find a basic condition
for the ‘poeticness’ or ‘literatureness’ of a text.
Modern metaphor theory differentiates between ‘dead’ and ‘living’ metaphors; that
is, whether or not the metaphoric content of a linguistic expression is still recognized
as such in a speaker, listener, or reader community. The differentiation between dead
and living metaphors is an empiric task – and hence, when dealing with ancient works
without extant speaker communities, is difficult.9
Let’s return to the ‘poem as a journey’ in Pindar discussion. Becker has already
noted that the basis for the Pindaric image is apparently an old notion of the speech as
a journey.10 This notion also appears in the Homeric epics. Thus, Nestor can preface his
speech with the words ἐξείπω καὶ πάντα διίξομαι (Il. 9.61), “I will speak forth and walk
through everything”. The poet (or singer) can hence be imagined moving too.
Thus, Odysseus asked the Phaeacian singer Demodocus to switch from one topic
or theme in his speech to another, ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον (Od.
8.492), “But now, walk over [=switch] and sing about the construction of the horse.” De-
modocus fulfills the request and thus the Epic continues, … ὁ δ’ ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο
(Od. 8.499), “he [Demodocus], moved by the god, began”.11 In the same way it can be
said of singers like Demodocus that the Muse has taught them the way (= the singing),
οἴμας Μοῦσ’ ἐδίδαξε (Od. 8.481).
The fact that we find in Hesiod or in the Homeric hymns similar equating of song
and way,12 and, additionally, the fact that the word ‘proem’, which refers to the opening
part of a poetic work and is in this function attested in poetry since the fifth century,13
contains the meaning ‘pre-way’, indicates with some certainty that the notion that poetry
is a journey was known in older Greek poetic works.
In 1935, K. Meuli had suggested in his still-relevant article ‘Skythika’ that the origin
stems from the ecstatic netherworld journeys of shaman singers (whose traces are still
detectable in the traditions around Musaios, Epimenides, or Aristeas), where the singer
literally traveled to the places where the reported events happened: “Wir erschließen
also für den griechischen ἀοιδός, und nicht nur für den Propheten und Apokalyptiker,
8 Maslov 2015, 10, in reference to Shklovsky and
Jakobson in note 23.
9 Dornseiff 1921, 45, said in a pointed remark:
“Welche Gewähr hat man dafür, dass in einem
Ausdruck das ursprüngliche Bild noch gefühlt
wird, und dass er nicht schon Scheidemünze der
Umgangs- oder Dichtersprache geworden ist?”
10 Becker 1937, 68–70.
11 See Becker 1937, 60 n. 52.
12 See for instance Erga 659, Hymn to Hermes. 451, to
this in general Becker 1937, 69.
13 See for instance Pind. Pyth. 1.4; Nem. 2.3; Aesch. Ag.
1354. See also Meuli 1935, 172 n. 3.
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ein ekstatisches Erlebnis ganz ähnlicher Art wie beim Schamanen.” “We attest, thus, for
the Greek ἀοιδός and not only for the prophet and apocalyptic an ecstatic experience
similar in nature to the shaman.”14
Of course, this would just mean that only one particular type of poetry, the form
that leads to the hexametric epics of the historic period, is connected to the concept
of journey or travel.15 In addition, Meuli’s argument has a ‘flaw’: there is a difference
between whether a poem is perceived as travel, in which the poem describes what is
encountered during the travel, or as having traveled to a destination, and then reporting
what happens at that destination (Meuli’s point). More poignantly formulated, it does
not follow that the notion of travel would be the characteristic property of a poem, when
the very essence of traveling is missing. Meuli’s argument has, thus, not been followed
much in literature.16
If we cannot trace the concept of a song as a path or journey to the narrative epic or
the singer shamans, we must look to other forms of poetry for the roots of this concept.
One possible starting point is the remark by H. Fränkel, which can be found – nota bene
– in the register of his book Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums: “das Lied
‘existiert’ also nicht nur, sondern es ‘geschieht’, entsprechend dem archaischen Stil eines
kontinuierlichen Ablaufs in mannigfachen Figuren […].” “[T]he poem does not only
‘exist’, but it ‘happens’ according to the archaic style of a continuous sequence in various
figures […].”17 If, thus, the archaic Greek poetry, that is, specifically the melic poetry, im-
plicates a ‘happening’ and thus agency18 that is expressed in the text, it stands to reason
that we would also see agency in the references to walking a path. Here, the observations
of this article seem to accord with the so-called pragmatic Pindar-interpretations, espe-
cially the Italian Pindar research since the 1970s that demands we take into account “gli
aspetti situazionali ed extralinguistici della ‘performance’ della lirica pindarica”, “the sit-
uational and extra-linguist aspects of ‘performance’ in Pindaric lyric”.19 In this tradition
is the study by E. Krummen that analyzes Isthmian 4 and Pythian 5 in the context of The-
ban, or Cyrenic, festival proceedings.20 But this argument will not be pursued in what
follows; even if we can see considerable parts of the Pindaric composition in the context
of ritual walking, processions (κῶμοι), or symposia, we can rarely attest based on the in-
dividual texts alone that they are referring to such happenings. Can we really conclude
– as did Krummen21 – from Nem. 2.24–25 that this song was shown at a komos?
In the Nemee we find the following:
14 Meuli 1935, 172–173, quotation 173.
15 See Meuli 1935, 172.
16 Cf., for instance, the criticism, albeit to other points,
by Becker 1937, 69–70, n. 55.
17 Fränkel 1969, 587 s. v. Chorlyrik, allgemein.
18 Cf. for instance the verba visendi in Alkman Frg. 1
(PMG): V. 40: ὁρῶ, V. 50: ἦ οὐχ ὁρῆις; – here the
seeing of the speaker, or rather the prompting of the
recipient to see, is expressed.
19 See Cingano 1979, 169.
20 Krummen 1990.
21 Krummen 1990, 276.
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… τόν, ὦ πολῖται, κωμάξατε Τιμοδήμωι σὺν εὐκλέι νόστωι·
ἁδυμελεῖ δ’ ἐξάρχετε φωνᾶι.
For him [sc. Zeus], oh citizens, arrange a procession, for Timodemos and his
glorious return, and start with a sweet-sounding voice.22
With this double imperative the song concludes, which means that the text imagines an
apostrophized audience, the citizens of Acharnae, to organize a procession in celebration
of the victory when the victorious Timodemos returns (an exact date is not given; it is
an indefinite point in time in the future). In addition, the brevity of the poem indicates
that the song occurred where the competition was taking place; or, to reference the
fortunate phrase, which Thomas Gelzer derived from Bacchylides (2.11), the song was
a Μοῦσα αὐθιγενής.23 Thus, Nem. 2 simply anticipates a potential event in the future;
the reference to ‘komos’ alone does not indicate that the poem took place during such
an event. We are, then, left with the text and what happens in the text alone – even if
one may assume that the Pindaric songs were not just intended for reading. In the text
we find – and this may be seen as one of the accomplishments or attractive aspects of
Pindaric lyric – a wide range of concepts (I will avoid categorization into ‘metaphors’ or
‘images’ here) about producing poetry and the poet.24
Pindar can see his songs as prayers (Ol. 12.1: λίσσομαι; 14.5: εὔχομαι); they can be
called ‘nectar drink, gift of the Muses’ (Ol. 7.7: νέκταρ χυτόν, Μοισᾶν δόσιν), or even a
kind of ‘letter of the Muses’ (Ol. 6.91: σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν). The range of representations
for the entity ‘voicing’ the text (be it the poet or the choir) is similarly broad: the entity
can become an archer and the song an arrow (Ol. 2.83; 9.5), or the entity is referred to as a
javelin thrower and the song the javelin (Ol. 13.33; Pyth. 1.44); the poet can be compared
to a cork boat floating on the ocean (Pyth. 2.80: ἀβάπτιστος εἶμι φελλὸς ὣς ὑπὲρ ἕρκος
ἅλμας), signaling how easy the work is for him; or referred to as a long jumper (Nem.
5.20); finally, the song itself can even be compared to Phoenician goods sent across the
ocean (Pyth. 2.67–68).25
If one analyzes the instances that present the song as a path and the entity speaking
the song as a ‘traveler’, a dichotomy becomes apparent that was not treated by Becker.
For it is possible – grosso modo – to differentiate between a traveling choir, a procession
or κῶμος, on the one hand, and a messenger bringing news on the other. While, as al-
ready suggested, the traveling choir hints at traditional processions at Greek festivals, the
concept of the song being presented as narration by a messenger is somewhat different.
22 Pindar is quoted on the basis of the edition Maehler
1997 and Maehler 2001, the translations follow the
excellent German translation of Dönt 1986.
23 See Gelzer 1985, further to Bacchylides in Hose
2000.
24 Still read-worthy: Gundert 1935.
25 Equally the speed at which a ‘poetic message’ trav-
els: fast like a horse or a ship: Ol. 9.23–25.
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Archegetes of staging the voice as messenger is Solon’s opening of the Salamis elegy (Frg.
1 IEG2):
αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ’ ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος
κόσμον ἐπέων †ὠιδὴν ἀντ’ ἀγορῆς θέμενος.
I came as a herald from lovely Salamis myself
placing, on the market, artful words in a song, instead of a speech.
In Pindar26 this is a common orchestration. For instance, we find in Nem. 4.73–74:
Θεανδρίδαισι δ’ ἀεξιγυίων ἀέθλων
κάρυξ ἑτοῖμος ἔβαν.
Gladly I came for the Theandrides as herald of the contests, which strengthen
the limbs.
Similarly, Nem. 6.57b–59 has:
[…] ἄγγελος ἔβαν,
πέμπτον ἐπὶ εἴκοσι τοῦτο γαρύων
εὖχος […].
I come as messenger,
to announce this twenty-fifth victory.
Aside from κῆρυξ27 and ἄγγελος, the text further has μάρτυς – witness (Frg. 94b, 38–
39) – or τιμάορος – a person honoring somebody (Ol. 9.83–84) – as metaphors for the
function of the (vaunting) poet or their words.28 The second type, that of a choir that
is traveling or at least conducting a procession, does not occur less frequently than the
first type. The κῶμος or rather the verb κωμάζειν is part of Pindar’s core vocabulary.29
Admittedly, this, often with the phrase τόνδε κῶμον,30 without further connotation,
refers to the choir singing the song; a ‘journey’ is not implicit. That being said, there are
of course further, more interesting connections. One of those we find in Nem. 9, which
will be analyzed more thoroughly in what follows. This song has not been praised much
by recent scholarship. Th. Poiss, who has written – aside from B. K. Braswell – the most
26 See the collection in Nünlist 1998, 230–232.
27 Compare Pindar Dith. Frg. 2.23–24: ἐμὲ δ’ ἐξαίρετον
κάρυκα σοφῶν ἐπέων Μοῖσ’ ἀνέστας’ Ἑλλάδι.
28 Furthermore, the poet can be thought as an ‘ea-
gle’; that is, a fast-flying entity: Nem. 5.21; 3.80–81
(similarly Ol. 2.86–88 and Bakchylides 5.16–38).
Annamaria Peri pointed me also to the specifically
Pindaric technique to also combine typologies of
traveling (so in Ol. 9.23–25, Pyth. 11.38–40, Nem.
6.53–57).
29 See the evidence in Slater 1969, 296–297.
30 Ol. 4.9; 8.10; 14.16; Pyth. 5.22.
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thorough analysis of this work, has called the song Pindar’s “most average”;31 indeed,
it contains all typical elements of an epinicion: stating the occasion, mythos, gnomic
reflection, and praise of the victor and his homeland.32 Yet, as Poiss argues, the connec-
tion between those parts is not obvious: “zahlreiche Topoi, ein Bündel schwer zu funk-
tionalisierender Wort- und Themenbezüge und ein verunglückter Mythos.” “[V]arious
topoi, a bundle of hardly functionalizable word and topic relations, and an unsuccessful
mythos.”33
It would, hence, be a stretch to interpret Nem. 9 as a Pindaric masterpiece. Yet, the
concept of the journey in this text is noteworthy: for instance, Nem. 9 (possibly written
in 474 BC to honor Chromios of Aitnai’s victory in the chariot race) starts as follows:
Κωμάσομεν παρ’ ’Απόλλωνος Σικυωνόθε, Μοῖσαι,
τὰν νεοκτίσταν ἐς Αἴτναν, ἔνθ’ ἀναπεπταμέναι
ξείνων νενίκανται θύραι,
ὄλβιον ἐς Χρομίου δῶμ’.
We shall organize a procession, o Muses, of Apollo from Sicyon
to the newly founded Aitnai, where open
doors cannot take in more guests,
to the blessed house of Chromios. (v. 1–3)
This song celebrates, as indicated by the reference to Apollo and Sicyon and observed by
the scholion ad loc.34 for this and the two following songs, a victory not at the Nemean
games, but at the so-called Pythian games at Sicyon.35 This is, for this analysis, of im-
portance, as it begins with the request36 to start a procession, for which the origin and
destination are also given: Σικυωνόθε … τὰν νεοκτίσταν ἐς Αἴτναν. The length of the
song (11 stanzas with a total of 55 verses) indicates that it is an epinicion that is imag-
ined to be recited not at the place of the competition, but the home city of the victor;
that is, Aitnai. The beginning of the song, however, in its combination of hortative and
adverb of place – ‘from Sicyon’ – gives the impression that during the first verses the
whereabouts of the speaker/singer is the place of competition. The song itself, thus, is
an – imaginary – journey to the destination.
The epinicion can be divided in five parts.37 The first part (ll.1–10) can be called
prologue; I will discuss it in due course. The second part (ll.11–27) narrates the mythos
31 Poiss 1993, 29.
32 Braswell 1998, XI.
33 Poiss 1993, 72–74.
34 Schol. Nem. 9 (ed. Drachmann 1927, 149–150): …
ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ οἱ Σικυώνιοι τὰ Πύθια πρῶτον παρ’ ἑαυ-
τοῖς ἔθεσαν. […] αὗται δὲ αἱ ὠιδαὶ οὐκέτι Νεμεονί-
καις εἰσί γεγραμμέναι·
35 See Currie 2005, 23.
36 Regarding the verb in subjunctive, see Braswell
1998, 45.
37 See Braswell 1998, 42–44.
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of Amphiaros; he had ousted Adrastos to Sicyon (where the latter founded the games),
but he then reconciled with him and took him back, which ended in the disastrous
move of the Seven against Thebes, where Amphiaros was brought with his chariot to the
underworld by one of Zeus’ lightning bolts. The third part of the song (ll.28–34) prays
for the prosperous future of Aitnai, while the fourth (ll.34–47) reports of Chromios’
military successes and rewards. The final and fifth part (ll.48–55) leads to the feast, which
then has its – imaginary – start and shall celebrate the victory of Chromios in Aitnai.
The individual parts are entwined; because the metric stanzas do not agree in scope with
the thematic parts, there is, in addition, a formal entanglement of the whole song.
Part 1 and part 5 seem significant to me. The song begins with the request to the
Muses to perform a procession. Given the divine addressees, the procession is indepen-
dent of time or physical geography. It suffices to name the origin and destination of
the procession. At first, however, the song has a concrete time and place: in verse 4
Chromios boards the chariot, with which he won and with which he – apparently –
will ride to his home in Aitnai. In that moment, the choir of Muses would start singing:
ll.6ff. introduced and justified by a gnome cue this by prompting a lyre and flute (l.8).
The connected thematic reference, the crown of the horse race that Adrastos endowed
for Apollo, bridges to the mythos.
In this imaginary situation, the choir (sc. of the Muses) should sing the song that
follows line 11. The choir of the Muses moves forward together with Chromios on the
chariot during the song. Aitnai (the choir prays that it will not share Thebes’ fate; 30–31)
and Chromios (who is not brought to the underworld through one of Zeus’ lightning
bolts, but receives Olbos, l.45, from the gods) build counterpoints to Amphiaros and
Thebes. With those counterpoints in mind, the choir arrives in the presence of the vic-
tory feast, to which verses 48 ff. point. The choir – as well as Chromios and his chariot
– have now arrived in Aitnai from Sicyon: the aorist and the origin of the travel πέμψαν
… ἐκ τᾶς ἱερᾶς Σικυῶνος (52–53) mark the end of the journey.
It seems that in this song travel and singing is entwined; origin and destination are
connected by the mythos. The journey evidently allows this connection and can serve
as a vehicle to lead to a logic of connectedness of the elements. In this respect, maybe
this is not Pindar’s ‘most average’ song.
Now for the other type of the traveler, the messenger or ‘herald’. It has to be said that
the role of the messenger is less developed. However, there is some usage on a simple
linguistic level. For instance, when Pindar writes in Nem. 4.71–72:
ἄπορα γὰρ λόγον Αἰακοῦ
παίδων τὸν ἅπαντά μοι διελθεῖν.
For I find no way to walk through the whole story of Aiakos’ sons.
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This, then, produces an image where the speaker walks through the story, as if it were a
physical space, and the structure of the story is determined by that space – or rather in
this case: should be determined.
Furthermore, it is possible for Pindar to model even his song as a traveler or mes-
senger. For example, there is the famous phrase in Nem. 5.1–3:
οὐκ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ᾽, ὥστ᾽ ἐλινύσοντα ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτᾶς βαθ-
μίδος ἑσταότ᾽· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πάσας ὁλκάδος ἔν τ᾽ ἀκάτῳ, γλυκεῖ᾽ ἀοιδά,
στεῖχ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Αἰγίνας, διαγγέλλοισ᾽, ὅτι …
I am not a sculptor, so that I create statues that rest permanently on their
pedestal. No, you sweet song, board every transport ship and barge from Aigina
and announce that ….
‘Boarding’ and ‘announcing’ are abilities of a messenger and as such the poem is thought.38
A messenger reports what they have seen themselves. Usually this is something contem-
porary to the audience that they could not see or experience themselves. This, by the
way, is the concept of the messenger report in a drama. In this aspect, Pindar ‘breaks’
with this rule. In Pyth. 2.52–56 we find:
ἐμὲ δὲ χρεὼν
φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν.
εἶδον γὰρ ἑκὰς ἐὼν τὰ πόλλ᾽ ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ
ψογερὸν Ἀρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν
πιαινόμενον·
I have to forbear the offensive bite of evil speeches. For I could, living in a
different world, still see, how Archilochos, fond of blaming, brought himself
in helpless situations many times, bloating hate-filled speeches.
Since it seems biographically dismissible that Pindar knew Archilochos, this shows an
expansion of the role of the messenger in telling uncontemporary content. The messen-
ger became a time traveler.
If the song can be understood as a journey or path,39 there are some consequences
for the materiality of the song. How do you shorten a song (or how do you make it
short)? Pindar’s most famous Abbruchsformel (closing formula) shows how: Pyth. 4.247–
248:
38 The image that the leader of the choir is a letter is
similar: see Ol. 6.91.
39 Cf. Nem. 6.53–54 or Frg. 52h (Pae. 7b),11–14: early
poetry (the Homeric epic) is thought to be streets
that are drivable for a chariot; Isth. 3 and 4.19: many
paths are open to the poet to praise the family of the
victor.
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μακρά μοι νεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀμαξιτόν· ὥρα γὰρ συνάπται καί τινα
οἶμον ἴσαμι βραχύν· πολλοῖσι δ’ἅγημαι σοφίας ἑτέροις.
It is too long for me to continue the journey on my path. For time hurries me,
and I also know a short way. I can show this skill to many others.
If the song is understood as a path, then shortening the song can only mean to find a
short-cut. Pythian 4 speaks in the same way when referring to the οἶμος βραχύς that the
song walks along and finds. In the world of the image of a path the sudden stopping of
the song is plausible; nothing is ‘missing’ at the end of the song because the logic of the
short-cut helps to reach the destination faster.40 To be able to understand the song as a
path is based on the following requirements: the requirement of the performance of the
song in an unspecified here-and-now and the requirement of the song as a ‘happening’
(H. Fränkel). When those requirements change, as happens clearly in Hellenism,41 when
the song is understood as a text and hence as a material object, then a new metaphor
replaces the image of the path. The ‘Abbruchsformel’ makes this change apparent, as a
Callimachean fragment – from Victoria Berenikes (SH 264,1) – shows: αὐτὸς ἐπιφράσ-
σαιτο, τάμοι δ’ ἄπο μῆκος ἀοιδῆι, “add yourself [sc. the reader] mentally and that way
cut some length from the song!”.
This fragment42 is in the context of the narrative telling how Heracles meets the
farmer Molorchos, at whose place he had stayed before, again after the fight with the
lion. But the poem does not report the fight with the lion – which should be considered
by the reader as complementing the poem – as the poem itself can leave it out and, freed
from the obligation of narrating the fight, is made shorter. The effort of the readers, their
independent imagination, contributes to this brevity. Callimachus, however, does not
form it into the image of a path – for instance, encouraging the reader to take a short-cut.
Rather, the song and the book, the roll of papyrus that contains the song, are virtually
merged. The song is shortened by cutting something away from it (sc. the material on
which it is written). Instead of a path that is traveled with and in the poem, in Hellenism,
the song becomes a book.
40 We find the image of the path also in the Abbruchs-
formel of Pythian 11.38–40: the poet pretends to have
lost his way at a crossing (or at the sea).
41 This change has been thoroughly researched in re-
cent decades; see, for instance Bing 1988 and Bing
2009.
42 Text and translation after Asper 2004, see here in
general Hose 2008.
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Chiara Ferella
‘A Path for Understanding’: Journey Metaphors in
(Three) Early Greek Philosophers
Summary
This paper analyzes the use of journey metaphors by three early Greek philosophers, Hera-
clitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. My investigation emphasizes the powerful, malleable
and polyvalent nature of this metaphor cluster both with reference to diverse authors and
in the same text. It highlights, moreover, the relationship between metaphor, imagination
and philosophical argumentation, above all when a fresh metaphorical stratum is intro-
duced within an already established metaphor. Finally, it investigates to what extent the
introduction of a fresh metaphorical stratum contributes to creative thinking and, by struc-
turing and organizing new insights, to theoretical argumentation.
Keywords: Heraclitus; Parmenides; Empedocles; metaphor; journey; path; theoretical
argumentation
Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Verwendung von Reise-Metaphern von drei frühgriechischen
Denkern: Heraklit, Parmenides und Empedokles. Meine Untersuchung hebt die ausdruck-
starke, leichtplastische und polyvalente Natur dieses Metaphern-Bereiches sowohl in Bezug
auf diversen Autoren, als auch in ein und demselben Text hervor. Im Fokus steht der Zusam-
menhang zwischen Metapher, Imagination und philosophischer Argumentation, beson-
ders wenn ein neuer metaphorischer Stratus in einen schon etablierten Metapher-Bereich
eingeführt wird. Schließlich wird auch untersucht, in wie fern ein neuer metaphorischer
Stratus, indem dieser neue Kenntnisse und Einsichten strukturiert und organisiert, zum
kreativen Denken und zur theoretischen Argumentation beiträgt.
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1 Introduction
By paraphrasing the outset of a book by Z. Kövecses,1 consider the use in English of
the following phrases: following a story or feeling lost when not following it; going over a
talk; reaching a good point; going around in circles when arguing ineffectually; coming to
a conclusion; following a path of thoughts; and so on. These phrases would not count
in English as using particularly poetic or picturesque language. Yet the expressions in
italics are all metaphors related to the domain of journey. We can see that a large part
of the way we speak about aspects of knowledge in English derives from the way we
speak about journeys. In fact, it seems that speakers of English make extensive use of the
concrete and familiar domain of journey when they talk about the highly abstract and
elusive concept of knowledge.
Ancient Greek authors analogously spoke about aspects of knowledge by employ-
ing journey metaphors. In fact, a traditional, ancient image depicts poetry as a chariot
and the poet as a traveler who, following the paths of songs, composes. More gener-
ally, ancient Greek terminology depicts the act of composing a song or of storytelling
in terms of following paths, the results of this composing in terms of destinations, and
the poets or authors who are composing in terms of travelers who, during this journey,
acquire and at the same time give form to their knowledge.2
In this paper, I analyze the use of journey metaphors by three early Greek philoso-
phers, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, thereby attempting to indicate the pur-
poses behind their metaphor use. One main question that my analysis aims to raise con-
cerns the powerful, malleable, and polyvalent nature of a metaphor cluster both with ref-
erence to diverse authors and in the same text. Another question concerns the relation-
ship between metaphor, imagination, and philosophical argumentation, above all when
a fresh metaphorical stratum is introduced within an already established metaphor.
More specifically, to what extent does a fresh metaphorical stratum contribute to origi-
nal and creative developments in theoretical argumentation?
I will show to what extent, despite drawing from the same metaphor cluster, Her-
aclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles make use of the conceptual domain of journey
1 Kövecses 2002, 3.
2 See Ferella 2017, 112–114 and the contribution
of Hose in this volume. Becker 1937, 100–116,
by analysing the development of the traditional
motive of ways of songs or ways of stories in Pin-
dar, Herodotus, and the tragic poets Aeschylus
and Sophocles, already concluded that journey
metaphors developed from spoken language and
became, in Homer, a conventionalized way of refer-
ring to poetical composition, storytelling, or, more
simply, to talking/writing about something in gen-
eral. Journey metaphors depicting diverse aspects of
knowledge (which either have to be acquired or,
once acquired, must be expressed in words) are
especially conventional in prose, for instance in
Herodotus (where we frequently find expressions
such as ἒρχομαι φράσων, λέξων, ἐρέων; ἤια λέξων
or ἄνειμι, ἀναβαίνω, ἐπάνειμι, ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον λό-
γον, etc.
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in very different ways. However, in all cases, the evaluation of metaphor use is closely
dependent upon the context in which journey metaphors are employed. This may raise
problems with reference to fragmentary traditions, in which quotations of authors’ own
words are often given without context. In the present study, this particularly affects our
interpretation of Heraclitus’ metaphors, which will be analyzed and evaluated by taking
into account all possible contextual scenarios. As a consequence, Heraclitus’ use of jour-
ney metaphors may be either entrenched or highly lively and intentional, depending
on which context we account for. On the other hand, both Parmenides’ and Empedo-
cles’ use of journey metaphors can be considered as unconventional and deliberate; yet
they show diverse communicative purposes. Specifically, Parmenides’ metaphor use has
a strongly paraenetic scope: he uses journey metaphors to dramatize the choice towards
his philosophy, depicted as the only path that leads to ‘rescuing’ truth, in contrast to
the path of ‘ordinary’ people who, because they know nothing, are merely wandering
around. Empedocles, on the other hand, not only uses traditional journey metaphors,
but also introduces a fresh metaphorical stratum within the established metaphor cluster
for argumentative and theoretical purposes: journey metaphors structure and organize
his theory of sensation and knowledge acquisition.
2 Heraclitus
Heraclitus’ fragment DK 22 B 45 is constructed around journey metaphors:
ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν
λόγον ἔχει.
The one who travels over every road will not find out, by going, the limits of
the soul. So deep a logos does it/he have.3
3 The fragment is quoted by Diog. Laert. 9.7 as part
of a brief and general introduction to the doctrines
of Heraclitus. The text of the fragment, in the ver-
sion reported above, follows the new edition of Laks
and Most 2016, vol. 3, 188. See also Mouraviev 2006,
III.b/1, 115. However, its translation and interpre-
tation mainly follow Betegh 2009, 398–404. Nev-
ertheless, I am not entirely convinced by Betegh’s
proposal to exclude ἰών from the text (following
Tiziano Dorandi, the most recent editor of Diogenes
Laertius). The wording πείρατα ἰών is the result of
an emendation by Diels of the text transmitted by
the manuscripts. Specifically, the most important
manuscripts, B and P, present πειρατέ ον (but in
B έ is erased), whereas other manuscripts have πει-
ρᾶται ὃν. The correction πείρατα (scil. ψυχῆς) is a
good solution on the basis of the Latin translation
of the Heraclitean fragment by Tertullian (termi-
nos animae). The participle ἰών, in this position, is
instead more problematic (see von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff 1927, 276: “so gestellt ist ἰὼν un-
denkbar”). According to Betegh, since “the partici-
ple is not attested in the manuscripts, it does not
have the support of Tertullian, and does not seem
to add much to the meaning, and its syntactical po-
sition may be problematic”, the better option is to
expunge it from the text. To this I would object that:
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Explicit references to the domain of journey are represented by terms such as ἰών, ὁ
… ἐπιπορευόμενος and ὁδόν. That they are metaphoric instantiations is suggested by
the fact that they are used to conceptualize the abstract notions of soul and logos.4 Terms
such as πείρατα and ἂν ἐξεύροι could also be seen as metaphoric instantiations from the
same domain. However, we cannot elucidate Heraclitus’ metaphors in all their nuances
without first having a general interpretation of the fragment. This is particularly compli-
cated by the fact that the fragment has been transmitted without contextual information
and, for this reason, it offers more than one univocal interpretation.
As G. Betegh has shown,5 the Heraclitean sentence is composed of four syntac-
tic/semantic units: (a) the soul’s limits, which (b) will not be found out; (c) the traveler;
and finally (d) the depth of the logos that the soul or, according to Betegh’s interpre-
tation, the traveler has. A first problem is to identify which soul Heraclitus is talking
about. Two interpretations have been offered, according to which the soul is either (1)
the divine cosmic soul,6 or (2) the individual soul.7 According to the second reading,
moreover, the individual soul could be further specified as (2a) the specific soul of each
(human) individual; or (2b) the particular individual soul of the traveler.8
According to (1), the limits of the soul, indicating the internal extremities of the
space of the soul, characterize the soul as something that has spatial extension, present-
ing it in the same way as one of the cosmic masses. In fact, the expression ψυχῆς πείρατα
recalls the Homeric formulas such as πείρατα γαίης (e.g. Il. 8.478–479; Od. 4.563; Hes.
Erga 168), πείρατα Ὠκεανοῖο (e.g. Od. 11.12), or πείρατα πόντοιο (e.g. Il. 8.478–479).
The Homeric parallels could reinforce the idea of the soul as a cosmic mass like the
masses of earth and ocean.9 In this reading ψυχή coincides with the world soul. Conse-
quently, the limits of the world soul are to be taken as concrete points in space, probably
(1) the epic poetry offers examples of the interjected
participle ἰών, for instance at Il. 1.138 (referred by
Betegh 2009, 397); and above all (2) Pindar Pyth. 10.
29–30, namely the text that animates Diels’ emen-
dation, constitutes a relatively strong parallel and
helps explain the corruption in the transmitted text
at the lowest cost.
4 The definition of the Heraclitean notion of logos
is a notorious problem, which in a footnote I can
only try to explain in very general terms. Evidence
from ancient texts indicates that, at the beginning
of the fifth century BCE, the term logos described an
oral or written report usually presented to persuade,
please, or teach the public. Yet some pivotal Hera-
clitean fragments, especially B 1, 2, and 50, suggest
that the term can also indicate something that exists
independently from the ‘reporter’. This challenges
the traditional meaning of the word. For a detailed
yet schematic survey of the term logos in sixth and
fifth-century Greek literature, see Guthrie 1965, I,
420–424. More recently, Gianvittorio 2010 advocates
the opinion that Heraclitus’ logos must be translated
as ‘discourse’ or ‘report’ in all its occurrences. The
interpretation of the concept of logos touches on an
aspect of Heraclitus’ thought that, despite its pivotal
nature for the understanding of his philosophy in
general, is rather marginal to the comprehension
of his metaphor use. For this reason, in the present
study, I will leave the term untranslated.
5 Betegh 2009, 405.
6 Kahn 1979; Bollack and Wissmann 1972, 163–164.
7 Marcovich 1967, 367; Dilcher 1995; Pradeau 2002.
8 Betegh 2009, 412.
9 See Betegh 2009, 406. For a parallel, cf. B 36, which
treats the soul on a par with the cosmic masses wa-
ter and earth.
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along the vertical direction.10 According to Heraclitus, no matter how many roads (con-
crete) travellers travel, they won’t be able to discover the (concrete) limits or borders of
the world soul, since its logos is incredibly deep.
According to this reading, we can consider Heraclitus’ use of journey metaphors
as ‘undeliberate’.11 Spatial metaphors are, in fact, employed to conceptualize an abstract
notion, that of the world soul, in terms of a spatially extended mass, similar to the exten-
sion of the ocean, the terrestrial crust, and the size of the sky. We could hardly concep-
tualize and speak about the highly abstract concept of the (world) soul without the use
of metaphors.12 Moreover, as the concept of soul has to be specified in terms of a spa-
tially extended cosmic mass, the metaphors to be used are most likely spatial metaphors
like those employed by Heraclitus.13 Accordingly, Heraclitus’ metaphor use in this case
would be undeliberate, as there is no sign of an intentional use of spatial metaphors
as metaphors, and, consequently, it does not display any particular communicative pur-
pose. Simply, Heraclitus is using metaphors because they are essential tools in order to
conceptualize and speak of the abstract concepts of the world soul.
According to (2), on the other hand, the sense of the first part of Heraclitus’ sentence
will be, in very general terms, that much traveling on the part of the subject does not
help discover the nature of the human soul. According to this reading, the reference
to the limits of the soul needs to be explored further. In fact, if we are not referring
to a spatially extended cosmic soul, what does it mean to say that the human soul has
limits? R. B. Onians believes that πείρατα here means ‘bonds’ (rope-ends), implying
both ‘beginning’ and ‘end’. Taken in this way, the expression ‘bonds of the soul’ may not
indicate an actual place in the body where the soul has its end and beginning,14 but a
metaphorical place. Accordingly, the end and beginning of the soul could indicate its
origin and conclusion, hence the whole parabola of its existence; that is, its fate in this
life and, possibly, beyond. In this framework, another Homeric parallel indicates that
the word πείρατα can signify the end of a certain situation or state of things, signaling
the completion or final destination of a process. The word ‘limits’, accordingly, indicates
10 Betegh 2009, 407.
11 On deliberate metaphor use and its communicative
function see Steen 2008 and, more recently, Steen
2017.
12 See the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (or CMT) by
Lakoff and Johnson 1980. In their view, metaphor is
not simply a device of creative literary imagination;
rather, it is a valuable cognitive tool without which
neither poets nor ‘ordinary’ people could concep-
tualize and express abstract concepts such as time,
love, life, death, etc., as well as, in this case, the cos-
mic soul.
13 Similar observations can be made with reference
to the highly abstract concept of time, see Kövecses
2002, 23: “time is a notoriously difficult concept to
understand. The major metaphor for the compre-
hension of time is one according to which time is
an object that moves. Many common everyday ex-
pressions demonstrate this: ‘the time will come when
…’; ‘Christmas is coming up soon’; ‘time flies’; ‘in the
following week …’; ‘time goes by quickly’” (author’s
italics).
14 This is the interpretation by Marcovich 1967, 367.
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the idea of end, completion, or even achievement.15 Thus, no one could find out the
completion of the human soul, its origin and end – hence, its real nature – by traveling
over every road. The verb ἐξευρίσκω, expressing the idea of discovering, occurs in other
Heraclitean fragments. In B 94, discovery is the result of attentive observation, better
still, of control: the Furies, ministers of Justice, “will find it out” if the sun oversteps his
measures. Additionally, B 18 claims that “he who does not expect the unexpected will
not discover it”. It is worth noting that in B 27, “the unexpected” is the fate of men after
death.16 This parallel, together with the word πείρατα in the sense I indicated above,
suggests that the one who travels over every road cannot discern the fate of the human
soul. Furthermore, a comparable form of the verb ἐξευρίσκω occurs in B 22:
χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.
Seekers of gold dig up much earth and find little.
The fragment refers to the seeking of something that is highly precious, in this case
gold, which lies deep inside the earth’s surface and which can only be found, therefore,
through hard effort. In fact, the discovery of a small amount of gold requires that the
seeker digs up much earth. The parallel between εὑρίσκω in B 22 and ἐξευρίσκω in B 45
suggests the idea that looking for the fate of the soul, for its beginning and end, is like
seeking for gold. Accordingly, in order to find out the limits of the soul, one has to go
deep down below the surface of things, searching inside oneself,17 looking for hidden
meanings while digging up many irrelevant elements, because the logos lies, like gold,
at a great depth.
Thus, following reading (2), we understand the fragment as Heraclitus denying that
traveling over every road could lead to discovering the nature and fate of the soul. This
has mainly been explained in two different ways: either (I) Heraclitus is pointing out an
unsuccessful method of research coinciding with traveling over many places. In this case,
the ‘limits’ of the soul may potentially be found out if one pursues the right research,
which does not include much traveling; or (II) Heraclitus is paradoxically indicating that
“only the one who travels every road will not find out the limits of the soul”.18 In this
case the pivotal content of the fragment is that the soul is limitless. Therefore, searching
everywhere for the limits of the soul will result in the fundamental awareness that what
we are looking for cannot be discovered; for the soul is limitless and this is the truth that
only the one who travels every road can find. Reading (II), advocated by Betegh, requires
that, in the last phrase of Heraclitus’ fragment, οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει, the deep logos is
not that of the human soul in general, but that of the particular soul of the traveler: “so
15 Cf. e.g. Od. 23.248.
16 Cf. Kahn 1979, 129.
17 Cf. DK 22 B 101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.
18 See Betegh 2009, 412.
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deep a logos does he [i.e. the traveler] have”. According to this reading, traveling is taken
as a “precondition of having [a soul that has] a deep logos”. Betegh’s argument works
as follows: in as much as you travel over every road, your logos increases and gradually
becomes deeper and deeper. That your logos increases means that the logos of your soul
becomes deeper and deeper; yet, as much as your soul has a deep logos, its limits cannot
be found out. “This is why one will never find the limits of the soul – only such a person
will be aware of the limitlessness of the soul,” Betegh concludes.19
However, there is at least another possible reading for Heraclitus’ fragment. One
can interpret it in reference to the individual traveler and still make a point in favor
of reading (I), which seems to be more in line with other Heraclitean fragments. This
interpretation takes the sentence οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει, “so deep a logos does he [i.e.
the traveler] have”, as ironic: the one who travels over every road in order to inquire into
the nature and fate of his soul displays de facto a superficial logos. In fact, it is not unlikely
that we see in this fragment a hint at a method of research that Heraclitus seems to
have disliked elsewhere: that kind of inquiry that Heraclitus attributed, for instance, to
Hecataeus and Xenophanes (cf. B 40), and which was also pursued by Herodotus. This
approach to knowledge consists in traveling all around the known world in order to
collect as much information as possible. Yet, this accumulation of factual data is, for
Heraclitus, a form of polymathie, “much learning” that “does not teach understanding”
(B 40). In particular, this way of inquiry is not appropriate to specific kinds of topics, like
the logos or the nature and fate of the soul. In those cases, Heraclitus seems to recommend
introspection or, at least, an in-depth analysis of the object of research.
Note that it is according to this last reading that Heraclitus’ metaphor use displays
all its communicative power. Through the images of travelers and the many roads over
which they travel, Heraclitus may at first have referred, in a less figurative way, to jour-
neys of knowledge or journeys of discovery – a common practice of early thinkers at
Heraclitus’ time. Nevertheless, the notion of journeys of discovery hinted at by Heracli-
tus can be taken as a metaphor indicating a precise method of research, which, if you
are seeking into the limits of the soul, brings about no relevant results. For the soul can
be penetrated and discovered only through an in-depth analysis that looks for deep, sig-
nificant truth. In this reading, Heraclitus employs journey metaphors to depict the one
who wishes to know in terms of a traveler, while the ‘roads’ traveled could depict the
different methods of inquiry one pursues. Accordingly, knowledge acquired at the end
of the learning process is depicted as the destination of a journey or, more precisely,
as a discovery resulting from research journeys. Note that, as we have seen above, this
idea of a completion achieved at the end of a process is within the Greek concept of
πείρατα (this also being taken metaphorically). Ψυχῆς πείρατα, therefore, turn out to
19 Betegh 2009, 412.
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be the fragment’s most important words; indeed, the core of the message, outlined by
their very first position in the sentence.
3 Parmenides
Parmenides20 of Elea analogously used journey metaphors in his philosophy to talk
about topics and methods of inquiry in terms of roads, to refer to those who wish to
know as travelers, and to hint at the results of inquiry in terms of destinations. Much
more than in Heraclitus, however, in Parmenides journey metaphors and, in particular,
the figurative motif connected to path constitute the central and unifying motif of his
philosophical poem as a whole.21 In fact, Parmenides’ concepts concerning path, jour-
ney, and destination are part of a whole metaphorical scenario: Parmenides (and, in his
example, anyone who wishes to know) is a traveler on a journey with his inquiry-goals
seen as destinations to be reached. His philosophy could be seen as the vehicle that en-
ables people to pursue those goals. The journey is not easy. First of all, there are different
paths one can choose. These paths represent different ways of inquiry; hence, different
methods of inquiry and diverse arguments resulting from them. There are crossroads
where a decision must have been made about which roads and directions one must fol-
low.
To appreciate the centrality of journey metaphors in Parmenides’ philosophy, let us
consider Parmenides’ own words in DK 28 B 2 more closely:
εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ,
ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν
οὔτε φράσαις.
Come now, I shall tell – and convey home the tale once you have heard –
just which ways of enquiry alone there are for understanding:
the one, that (it) is and that (it) is not not to be,
20 The present analysis of Parmenides’ journey
metaphors is an abridged version of my previous
contribution on the cognitive aspect of Parmenides’
two ways of inquiry: see Ferella 2017, to which I also
refer for a more extensive analysis of the fragments
quoted in this chapter.
21 Cf. Reale and Ruggiu 2003, 28, 177–182.
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is the path of conviction, for it goes with true reality,
but the other, that (it) is not and that (it) must not be
this, I tell you, is a trail wholly without report
for neither could you apprehend what is not, for it is not to be accomplished,
nor could you indicate it.22
In the verses above, words relating to the same metaphor cluster are repeated four times
within eight lines: we haveways, ὁδοί, at l.2, path, κέλευθος, and goes with, ὀπηδεῖ, at l.4, as
well as trail, ἀταρπόν, at l.6. As we can see, not only does Parmenides compare methods
of inquiry to paths, but conviction about certain topics and ways of arguing about them
is said to go together with true arguments, suggesting that developing convincing and true
arguments might be understood as following paths. Elsewhere23 I already demonstrated
that this clustering of metaphors from the same domain is to be taken as a device activat-
ing metaphoricity. This means that Parmenides is here intentionally drawing attention
to the journey metaphors for specific communicative purposes.24
The suggestion that we deal here with textual devices drawing attention to the
metaphorical domain of journey gains force if we consider the fact that, in the origi-
nal layout of Parmenides’ poem, the verses of B 2 were closely followed by the verses of
B 6:
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <ἄρξω>,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φορεῦνται
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωὐτὸν νενόμισται
κοὐ τωὐτόν· πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.25
It is necessary to say and think that what is is; for it is to be,
but nothing is not. These things I bid you ponder.
For <I shall begin> for you from this first way of inquiry,
then yet again from that which mortals who know nothing
wander two-headed: for haplessness in their
22 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 364
and 365, slightly modified.
23 Ferella 2017.
24 On attention to metaphors as metaphors, commu-
nicative purposes, and deliberate metaphor use, see
n. 11 above.
25 The text and translation of this fragment (except
minor modifications) follow Palmer 2009, 366 and
367.
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breasts directs their wandering mind. They are borne along
deaf and blind at once, bedazzled, undiscriminating hordes,
who have supposed that it is and is not the same
and not the same; but the path of all these turns back on itself.
Here there are seven words relating to the metaphor cluster of journey within nine
verses. Besides the familiar mapping between ways or methods of inquiry and paths
(see ὁδοῦ at l.3 and κέλευθος at l.9), Parmenides verbalizes the conceptually related idea
according to which the one who wishes to inquire is understood as a traveler. In these
verses in particular, the focus is on human beings who, since they know nothing, βρο-
τοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν, at l.5 are said to wander around, πλάζονται. Yet it is helplessness that
directs, ἰθύνει, their wandering mind, πλακτὸν νόον. Thus, men are borne, φορεῦνται,
along a path that leads to no destination, as it turns back on itself, παλίντροπός ἐστι
κέλευθος.
Let us, furthermore, extend our analysis to B 7 and B 8.1–2, which might have closely
followed B 6 in the original poem:
(7) οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα
μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα
(8) μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν[.]
(7) For this may never be made manageable, that things that are not are.
But you from this way of enquiry restrain your understanding,
and do not let habit born of much experience force you along this way,
to employ aimless sight and echoing hearing
and tongue. But judge by reason the strife-filled critique
I have delivered.
(8) And yet a single tale of a way
remains. …26
The repetition of the same metaphor word in this fragment is noteworthy: the term ὁδός
(in different cases) is repeated thrice within seven verses. Here, as in all occurrences we
26 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 366–
369.
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have analyzed thus far, the word ὁδός is used metaphorically to indicate methods or
topics of inquiry. Yet it is worth noting that the first reference to ὁδός by Parmenides is
not in the metaphorical sense of ‘ways of inquiry’ as we find for the first time in B 2.2.
Rather, ὁδός is one of the first words of Parmenides’ poem as a whole, and we find it
twice within the very first five lines of the prologue to his philosophical poem (B 1.1–5).
Here, ὁδός does not indicate a method of inquiry, but a non-metaphorical27 pathway
that Parmenides travels:
ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ †πάντ’ ἄτη† φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῆι φερόμην· τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
The mares who carry me as far as the soul could reach
were leading the way, once they stepped guiding me upon the path of many
songs28
of the divinity, which carries over †all cities† the man who knows.
On it was I borne, for on it were the headstrong mares carrying me,
drawing the chariot along, and maidens were leading the way.29
27 Parmenides’ account of his extraordinary journey
in the opening of his poem is presented as an alle-
gory. Crisp 2005, 117, defines allegory as a “superex-
tended metaphor”, namely a metaphor “extended to
the point where all direct target reference is elim-
inated”. See, moreover, at p. 129: “Allegories can
be regarded as superextended metaphors. The re-
sult of their ‘superextension,’ however, is to remove
all language relating directly to metaphorical tar-
get. What remains is language that refers to and de-
scribes the metaphorical source, both literally and
non-literally”. We can refer to Parmenides’ proemial
journey as an allegory in the sense Crisp points out:
“Allegory in literary contexts refers to fiction that
are given a continuously metaphorical interpreta-
tion [...] What all allegories [...] have in common is
that they never refer directly to their metaphorical
target. Direct reference is only to the metaphorical
source constructed as a fictional situation” (Crisp
2005, 115–116). At pp. 127–128, Crisp clarifies this
conclusion: “There is no longer any of that mixing
or ‘blending’ of source- and target-related language
that is the linguistic basis for conceptual blending
[as for instance in an extended metaphor]. The lan-
guage of allegory simply refers to and describes the
metaphorical source. It thus consists of a set of pos-
sible references and predications, or, to speak less
literally, the source is construed as a possible, fic-
tional, situation.” Accordingly, we can say that Par-
menides, in his introductory depiction of his ex-
traordinary journey, employs non-metaphorically-
used, but literally-used language. “A distinction be-
tween metaphorically-used and literally-used lan-
guage can only be drawn in relation to a possible
situation. Language relating directly to that situ-
ation is literal; language relating to it indirectly is
not” (Crisp 2005, 128).
28 Palmer translates “far-fabled”, following Diels-Kranz
(“vielberühmt”), Guthrie 1965, II, 7 and Kirk,
Raven, and Schofield 1983, 243, but see Mourelatos
2008, 41 n. 93, and Cerri 1999, 167.
29 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 362
and 363, slightly modified.
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It is not unlikely that Parmenides’ audience, when hearing for the first time of the two
metaphorical paths of inquiry (B 2.2; see above), were immediately led to link them to
the ὁδός of many songs they heard in the prologue (B 1.2–3). This hypothesis gains force
if we consider the fact that the lines of B 6 appear to be constructed in parallel with the
lines of the prologue. In particular, the description of ordinary people in B 6 plays on the
contrast with Parmenides’ self-representation in the very beginning of his poem. As we
have seen above, in B 6 we are told that mortals know nothing (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν,
B 6.4), while Parmenides is here depicted as a man who knows (εἰδότα φῶτα, B 1.3).
Moreover, mortals wander along (πλάζονται, B 6.5), and have a wandering understand-
ing (πλακτὸν νόον, B 6.6), because they are borne along (φορεῦνται, B 6.5). In contrast,
mares carry (φέρουσιν, B 1.1) Parmenides along a divine path that leads (φέρει, B 1.3) to
a precise, divine destination that coincides with the source of Parmenides’ knowledge
and philosophy, as we apprehend a few verses later. In contrast, the path of mortals
turns back on itself (παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, B 6.9), and as such, does not lead to
any destination or knowledge. Given this, it seems reasonable to conclude that, when
hearing of the two ways of inquiry in B 2 and of the depiction of wandering people in B
6, Parmenides’ audience has recalled the whole scene of Parmenides’ journey depicted
in the prologue.
It is worth mentioning that Parmenides’ prologue, quoted in its entirety by Sextus
Empiricus (Adv. Math. VII, 111 ff. = DK 28 B 1), is the account of Parmenides’ exceptional
journey to the house of Night, in order to meet a goddess who is presented as the source
of Parmenides’ philosophy. In fact, the rest of Parmenides’ philosophical discourse co-
incides with the words the goddess reveals to Parmenides (addressed throughout in the
second person singular) on the occasion of their encounter. As M. M. Sassi (1988) has
convincingly pointed out, the first words the goddess reveals to Parmenides confront
him with a metaphorical crossroads, namely, as we saw above, with the choice between
the two paths of inquiry. As Sassi argued, the motif of the crossroads plays an essential
role in several accounts of the soul’s journeys to the afterlife that we find in the so-called
golden tablets30 and in some of Plato’s myths (like the myth of Er in the tenth book of
Plato’s Republic, 614b).31
30 The golden tablets are texts found in funerary graves
and tumuli of the fifth and fourth century BCE.
They consist of brief texts in hexameter, engraved
on small pieces of gold, destined to provide post-
mortem instructions for the initiates in the under-
world. Scholars have suggested that the texts en-
graved on the tablets come from a more ancient oral
tradition that employed, like Parmenides’ poem,
Homeric material: cf. Edmonds 2004, 32, and Fer-
rari 2007, 120–121. It is worth noting that there are
remarkable verbatim parallels between the text of
the golden tablet from Hipponion and Parmenides’
poem: see Ferrari 2005, 115–117. A detailed analysis
of the tablets can be read in Pugliese Carratelli 2001;
Bernabé and Jiménez 2008; Graf and Johnston 2013.
31 On the myth of Er, see also the analysis by Oki-Suga
in this volume.
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In fact, accounts of the journeys of the souls to the afterlife follow a recurrent pat-
tern. This includes, among other details, the description of a crossroads between differ-
ent paths, which the soul has to choose and follow. In these journeys of the soul the
crossroads between different paths represent the possibility for the soul to reach salva-
tion, following the right path, or perdition, following the wrong road. The road, in other
words, symbolizes the fate of the soul, which in fact is dramatically determined by which
path it will follow. Scholars of Parmenides have extensively shown that the prologue to
Parmenides’ philosophy is full of reminiscences and echoes of these extraordinary, ex-
tramundane journeys of the soul,32 not without eschatological and initiatory aspects.33
Sassi compellingly points out that the philosophical crossroads between two opposite
and indeed mutually exclusive methods of inquiry is another element in this framework,
even though it is not part of the account of Parmenides’ journey in the prologue, but is
included in his philosophical discourse.
However, in contrast to the eschatological texts, in Parmenides, the crossroads is
a journey metaphor indicating the philosophical choice between two methods of re-
search.34 Yet Parmenides’ insistence on journey metaphors as motifs of his philosophical
argumentation and the echoes, through these metaphors, both to his own extraordinary
journey to knowledge and to the soul’s extramundane journeys to salvation or perdi-
tion render Parmenides’ journey metaphors part of a symbolic (and dramatic) frame-
work. Accordingly, his metaphorical crossroads adopts the symbolic value it has in the
accounts of the soul’s journeys. Parmenides’ journey metaphors serve the purpose of
dramatizing one’s own choice towards the right way of inquiry.35
Thus, Parmenides’ use of journey metaphors intentionally draws attention to a con-
ventional and widely used metaphor cluster, that of the journey depicting aspects of
knowledge. His metaphors have, at the same time, argumentative and paraenetic pur-
poses. On the one hand, the idea of a crossroads between two paths of inquiry that the
philosopher/traveler must follow if he wants to gain knowledge has a strongly philo-
sophical value in Parmenides’ poem, as it is very apt to depict Parmenides’ philosophical
dilemma and the principle of tertium non datur: either it is or it is not. Yet, while the god-
dess urges Parmenides to adopt a specific method of inquiry, to abandon the antipodal
method, and to follow a specific theory about the physical world, Parmenides wishes
to present and promote his philosophy by persuading his audience to make the right
choice: the choice for his philosophy. In fact, Parmenides’ figurative language suggests
32 Cf. Morrison 1955; Feyerabend 1984; Pugliese
Carratelli 1988; Sassi 1988; Battezzato 2005, 90; Fer-
rari 2005, 115–117; Palmer 2009, 58–61.
33 Note that εἰδότα φῶτα (B 1.3) and κοῦρος (B
1.24) have been examined as elements indicating a
mystery-initiatory context, as Diels 1897, 49, already
highlighted. See moreover Burkert 1969, 5 with n.
11 and at 14 with n. 32. More recently, see Ferrari
2007, 103.
34 Sassi 1988, 390–391.
35 See Ferella 2017.
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the idea that, just like an extraordinary traveler (such as the soul), the one who wishes to
know about natural philosophy can make a crucial choice of either the right or wrong
path. At the core of his philosophical arguing, therefore, Parmenides might have felt the
need to emphasize that choosing his philosophy is not just an option among other valu-
able alternatives. Rather, it coincides with the sole possibility to gain true knowledge
against unawareness. Once the ‘travelers’ have made the effort to choose the unusual
but right ‘path’, they will experience an extraordinary ‘journey’ that ‘will lead’ them to
the promised ‘destination’, the root of true wisdom, and rescue them from their original
condition as ‘randomly wandering men’. Parmenides’ use of journey metaphors, in con-
clusion, conveys the symbolic and dramatic notion that knowledge of the truth, that is
Parmenides’ philosophy, is ultimately a matter of life or death.
4 Empedocles
Like Heraclitus and Parmenides, Empedocles draws from the metaphor domain of jour-
ney in order to depict himself as a traveler who, by following a certain path of song,
composes his philosophical poem. I am referring in particular to the lines B 3.3–5 that
run as follows:
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι· ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ᾽ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ᾽ εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
And you, virgin Muse, white-armed, much wooed,
I entreat you: send what is right for creatures of a day
to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from Piety.
Clearly Empedocles picks up a famous journey motif relating the image of poetry to
a chariot in which the poet, guided by his Muse, rides while composing his song. The
image of the chariot of poetry is a traditional metaphor. Parmenides’ chariot on which
he is borne to the house of Night can be seen as another instantiation of the same image
and, as such, it is traditionally identified with the chariot of poetry. In this context, the
Daughters of the Sun, who lead the way for Parmenides, are compared to the Muses
who traditionally lead the chariot of poetry and the poetical composition.36 Empedocles
36 As Fränkel 1951; D’Alessio 1995; Asper 1997, 21–98;
Cerri 1999, esp. 96–98, and Ranzato 2015, 25–28
have shown. In this account note that Parmenides
is borne, on his chariot, along a path that is charac-
terized as ὁδὸν … πολύφημον, “a road … of many
songs” (B 1.2). This word occurs once in Od. 22.
375–376 as an epithet of Phemius, the poet “of
many songs” of Odysseus’ house, and in Pindar Istm.
8.56a–61 in which it characterizes the Muses’ thrēnos
on Achilles’ corpse. This is a further element in Par-
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might have had precisely this traditional image in mind when he encourages his Muse
to drive the chariot (of poetry) from Piety. Through this metaphor he claims for himself
the composition of a pious, sacred (εὐσεβής), and divinely inspired song.
Like in Heraclitus and, above all, in Parmenides, in Empedocles we also find the
metaphor of people as travelers in the journey of life and, while traveling/living, they
may acquire more or less valuable knowledge. In fact, whereas ordinary people just wan-
der along and know nothing, those who wish to know shall leave the common path and
change their method of inquiry.
Let us examine Empedocles’ fragment B 2:
στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ᾽ ἔμπαια, τά τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας·
παῦρον δὲ ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος
πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι· τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον <τίς ἄρ᾿> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν;
οὕτως οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστά
οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά. σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης,
πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.37
For narrow devices are spread through their limbs,
and many wretched things strike in and dull their meditations.
And having seen [only] a small portion of life in their lifetime,
swift to die, carried up like smoke they fly away
convinced only of that which each has chanced to experience
being driven in all directions. Who then boasts that he has found the whole?
These things are not to be seen or heard by men
or grasped with mind. But you then, since you have turned aside to this place,
shall learn: mortal intelligence certainly rises no higher.38
menides’ proem conveying the traditional image of
the chariot of poetry led along the path of divinely
inspired songs.
37 The text of the fragment follows the reconstruction
by Laks and Most 2016, vol. 5, 386–388.
38 The text of the manuscript tradition is not exempt
from some problems. The most intricate is related
to the last line. In my text I accept the reading trans-
mitted by the manuscripts οὐ πλεῖον γε, considering
the modern emendations unnecessary. Like Calzo-
lari 1984, 76 n. 17, and Bollack 1969, III.2, 10 n. 9,
I set a punctuation mark after πεύσεαι. Deichgrae-
ber 1938, 23 n. 37, already adopted this ‘conserva-
tive’ solution, whereas Diels-Kranz followed here
the nineteenth-century editors who reconstructed
the line as follows: πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη
μῆτις ὄρωρεν. Their text emphasizes the antithe-
sis between human means and divine knowledge.
For instance, Kranz’s translation “nicht mehr, als
sterbliche Klugheit sich regt und erhebt” highlights
the idea of a limited human understanding with-
out any differences between ordinary people and
the disciple: Empedocles wanted to communicate
to Pausanias no more than any other human be-
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Sextus Empiricus, who quotes these lines in Adv. Math. 7.122–4, refers them to Empedo-
cles’ disdain for sense organs as means to gain genuine knowledge. Human beings are
depicted as equipped with narrow devices,39 which, in conjunction with many wretched
things dulling their meditations and with a small portion of life,40 restrain human be-
ings from finding τὸ ὅλον, the whole. Hence people merely know what they chance to
experience and are, for this reason, driven in all directions by their impressions, πάντοσ᾽
ἐλαυνόμενοι. The image of people being driven in all direction by their powerless senses
closely recalls Parmenides’ description of ordinary humans knowing nothing, βροτοὶ
εἰδότες οὐδέν, and wandering along because of helplessness that directs their mind.
Thus, just like Parmenides, Empedocles uses journey metaphors to depict ordinary peo-
ple’s unawareness in contrast to a few chosen people who know or will know.
Furthermore, the image of people being driven by their sensorial impressions points
to a method of inquiry that is not appropriate to ‘the whole’ and genuine truth. For per-
ceptions are narrow means able to grasp only a small portion of reality. In contrast, in a
way that is reminiscent of Parmenides, Empedocles’ disciple is said to have exceptionally
chosen a different path. In contrast to ordinary people wandering about, we have seen
above that Parmenides is borne on a precise pathway, which people do not usually walk
upon. This leads to the divine source of knowledge. Similarly, Empedocles’ disciple has
to part from the common path if he wants to gain true knowledge: σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽
ἐλιάσθης, πεύσεαι. In conclusion, we can see that Empedocles extensively draws from
the conceptual domain of journey in order to metaphorically organize and structure his
idea of inquiry and knowledge more generally.
ing can know. However, as Calzolari has already
pointed out, “l’alterità che il frammento stabilisce
tra i mortali impotenti di fronte alla forza delle cose
e il soggetto che si è appartato, per così dire, fuori
dalla mischia (cfr. v. 8), appare ben più evidente
qualora implichi un’antitesi altrettanto marcata tra
non-conoscenza e conoscenza alla cui acquisizione
sia preliminare (come in Parmenide 1, 9) lo strani-
amento, appunto, dall’orma del volgo.” Following
Calzolari, I maintain that the emphasis on “you”
(l. 8) gives prominence to the unique nature of the
disciple’s experience in contrast to all other people.
At the end of his learning process, Pausanias will be
able to know much more than any other ordinary
human being.
39 The term παλάμη, which originally means “the
palm of the hand” and is used as synecdoche to in-
dicate the “open hand” (in opposition to the fist) –
hence, “hand” in most general terms – is here used
metonymically to indicate sense organs. With regard
to sensation, this term conveys the idea that sense
organs are able to grasp reality, as if sensation were a
form of contact. In fact, as we will see in due course,
Empedocles argues for perception occurring be-
cause of a contact, mediated by effluences, between
the organs and the objects of perception.
40 Human beings are depicted as ὠκύμοροι at l.4. The
epic compound ὠκύμοροι always has in Homer the
meaning of “destined to prompt death” and “bearer
of prompt death”. It denotes extraordinary cases
of heroes who hurl themselves upon the enemy.
Empedocles in contrast employs it as an epithet for
the whole of humanity with a shade of universal
pessimism.
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4.1 A new metaphorical stratum
In doing so, Empedocles follows a well-established tradition. In fact, in the examples
analyzed above, we have seen that Empedocles employs, with minor poetical variations,
already established and even entrenched journey metaphors to depict his poetical com-
position and method of inquiry, hence, more generally, various elements related to the
domain of knowledge (the chariot of poetry, the paths of research, ordinary people wan-
dering along, the inquirer as a traveler, knowledge as the destination of the right road of
inquiry, etc.). As we have seen, these metaphors have already been activated by Heracli-
tus and, above all, Parmenides. In the examples that now follow, on the other hand, we
will observe much more substantial innovations where Empedocles introduces, within
the already established metaphor cluster of journey, a fresh metaphorical stratum. This
relates to the cluster under analysis, but contributes, by eliciting creative thinking and
structuring new insights, to original developments in theoretical arguing.
Let us look at fragment B 3 and, in particular, ll. 9–14:
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι, πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ᾽ ἀκουήν
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ᾽ ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον.
But now consider with every power how each thing is clear
without holding any seeing as more reliable than what you hear,
nor echoing ear above piercings of the tongue
and do not in any way curb the reliability
of the other limbs by which there is a passage for understanding
but understand each thing in the way in which it shows itself.
In these lines Empedocles urges Pausanias to consider everything “in the way in which it
shows itself”, ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον, with every sense organ he has at his disposal, πάσηι πα-
λάμηι.41 These verses are Empedocles’ advice to Pausanias to sharpen every sense organ
and to make correct use of each of them when inquiring into the physical world. Correct
use requires, for instance, that Pausanias should not prefer a particular sensation over
the other sense organs. Even though sight was traditionally considered as the sensation
that “reveals many distinctions and most enables us to know”,42 Pausanias shall know
41 See n. 39 above.
42 Cf. Aristotle Metaph. 980a. The same opinion is held
by Heraclitus B 55 and 101a and by the Hippocratic
author of De Arte 13.1.
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each thing in the way in which it shows itself. Each sense organ is in fact a “passage for
understanding”, πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι43 (B 3.12).
My claim is that Empedocles is building his theory of sensation upon the metaphor-
ical meaning of πόρος. The word πόρος, which originally indicated a passage over a river
or a narrow part of the sea (a strait), metaphorically depicts a passage through a perme-
able substance such as the skin.44 In Empedocles’ theory of sensation, πόροι are passages
that connect the sense organs at the periphery of the body to a central organ in the body,
which functions as the controlling organ.45 In the metaphor use of πόρος indicating
body channels carrying perceptions along the body, we see that the established clus-
ter of journey/knowledge welcomes a new metaphorical stratum: the notion of traveling
‘quanta’ of knowledge. In other words, while the established metaphor cluster typically
envisages the perceiving and knowing subject as a traveler, the new metaphorical stra-
tum introduces the notion that (material elements coming from) objects of perception
and knowledge can travel.46 This creative element permits the eliciting of productive
reasoning and gives the cue for a new theory of perception and knowledge acquisition
that, as we shall now see, rests upon journey metaphors.
That Empedocles builds upon the metaphorical value of the word poros in his the-
ory of perception and knowledge acquisition is emphasized by fragment B 133. Here,
43 In Homer, the verb νόησα means “perceive by
the mind”, hence “apprehend”: τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ἐνό-
ησε, Il.11.599; οὐ ἴδον οὐδ᾽ ἐνόησα, Od.13.318, cf.
Il.10.550, 24.337, etc. By extension, it also means
“think”, “consider”, and “reflect”: φρεσὶ ν. ἔνθ᾽ εἴην ἢ
ἔνθα in Il.15.81; μετὰ φρεσὶ σῇσι νόησον Αἰνείαν, ἤ
κέν μιν ἐρύσσεαι ἦ κεν ἐάσῃς in Il. 20.311; οὐδ᾽ ἐνό-
ησε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν ὡς ... Il.15.264; see
von Fritz 1943.
44 In Empedocles a further metaphorical meaning for
the term πόρος is attested indicating a textual pas-
sage in a given work (cf. B 35.1).
45 Empedocles did not give a thorough explanation of
what these πόροι are made of and, above all, what
they contain inside: see Theophr. Sens. 13. More-
over, the metaphorical use of the term poros with
reference to sense organs may not be an Empedo-
clean innovation. Alcmaeon of Croton could have
employed this term before Empedocles in order
to refer to body channels that connect the eyes to
the brain. However, as we do not have Alcmaeon’s
words on his theory of perception, but only reports
of later sources (specifically Theophrastus and Cal-
cidius), we cannot evaluate his use of the term poros
or his metaphorical language in his theoretical dis-
course. Therefore, Empedocles’ verses remain the
first Presocratic first-hand source we have to ex-
plore this particular topic. Moreover, even though it
could be hypothesized that, because of Alcmaeon’s
use, πόρος at Empedocles’ time is already on its way
to become a technical term in theories of percep-
tion and knowledge acquisition, we can be pretty
sure that Empedocles still perceives its metaphor-
ical aspect. A strong indication of this is Empe-
docles’ use of the synonymous word ἁμαξιτός for
πόρος in B 133 (see below) – an unusual word in
such a context, which activates the metaphoricity
of the whole image. On the estranging effect of rare
words in metaphor use and their power to activate
metaphoricity in such contexts, see Ferella 2017,
116–117.
46 This idea can be related to the traditional image of
words that move and can be moved. In fact they are
winged (Il. 1.201, 2.7, 4.69 etc.), pass the barrier of
the teeth (Il. 4.350, 14.83, etc.) and can be put into
the listener’s θυμός (Od. 1.361, 21.355. Cf. Hes. Erga
274).
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according to Clemens of Alexandria,47 Empedocles presents the divine (τὸ θεῖον) as an
entity that cannot be known by sensation:
οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ἡμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἧιπερ τε μεγίστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.48
It is not possible to approach it with our eyes
or to grasp it with our hands, by which the greatest
road of persuasion penetrates to the mind of men.
For the present study, the phrase ἧιπερ τε μεγίστη/πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς
φρένα πίπτει is highly relevant: therein Empedocles expresses the idea that knowledge
gained from sense organs such as our eyes or our hands is the most persuasive form of
knowledge. What is important to note is that this idea is expressed through a journey
metaphor presenting eyes and hands, metonymies indicating the respective sense or-
gans, as the beginning of a road that leads persuasion to the mind. The idea of sensory
pores as roads through which sensation and also persuasion can find passage, hence a
pathway into the body, suggests the image of traveling objects of perception and knowl-
edge entering the body. In fact, according to Empedocles, some elementary streams of
these objects do travel from them through space and may reach the inside of the body,
where the controlling and knowing organ lies.49
Empedocles’ theories of perception and knowledge acquisition are known to us
thanks to Theophrastus’ systematic treatment of the most important theories concern-
ing perception and knowledge acquisition before Aristotle.50 According to Theophras-
47 Strom. 5.81. 2 (DK 31 B 133). Clemens quotes the
lines together with a fragment of Solon (F 16) and
one of Antisthenes (F 24), within a treatment on
how to obtain πίστις about topics that are beyond
the realm of sense organs and escape, therefore,
perception.
48 The text of the fragment follows the reconstruction
by Laks and Most 2016, vol. 5, 366.
49 Empedocles variously refers to this organ by the
term φρήν (or in the plural φρένες), σπλάγχα and
πραπίδες: φρήν: B 134, 4; 23, 9; 114, 3; 133, 4. φρέ-
νες: B 5; B 17, 14. πραπίδες: B 110, 1; 129, 2 and 4;
132, 1. σπλάγχα: B 4.3. It is debated both which
part of the body they describe exactly, and whether
they are used as synonyms to depict the same organ.
It can be generally maintained that they all refer to
“the part of the thorax that is the physical basis of
thinking”: see Wright 1995, 164.
50 In his De Sensibus, Theophrastus classifies the pro-
cesses and the objects of perceiving, thinking, and
knowing with reference to nine early thinkers,
specifically, Parmenides (sections 3–4), Empedo-
cles (7–24), Alcmaeon (25–26), Anaxagoras (27–
37), Cleidemus (38), Diogenes of Apollonia (39–
48), Democritus (49–82), and Plato (5–6 and 83–
91). While relatively little space is given to the the-
ories of Parmenides, Alcmaeon, and Cleidemus,
Theophrastus draws more attention to Anaxago-
ras, Diogenes, and Plato and dedicates to each of
them approximately ten sections. However, as we
can see, Theophrastus’ investigation focuses above
all on Empedocles and Democritus, and this is a
sign of the importance that these theories have in
their philosophical system. Theophrastus’ prefer-
ence for Empedocles and Democritus may also be
explained by the fact that these two thinkers argue
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tus, Empedocles argues that perception occurs through an adaptation, ἐναρμόττειν,51
of the perceived things to the pores, πόροι, of each sense organ. The adaptation be-
tween sense organs and objects of perception is mediated through ἀπορροαί, literally
“streams”, which are continuously emanated from compounds.52 These streams get in
touch with sense organs and, if they fit them, they may enter the body. Empedocles does
not provide precise information about the nature of the aporroai. Do they have the same
qualities of the objects that emanate them? It seems fair to assume so;53 otherwise it is
difficult to imagine how the perceptual objects could be recognized.
Another general inference we may make is that effluences emanating from com-
pounds are themselves made of (at least one of) the four elements. Indeed, Empedocles’
ontology seems to require that, like everything else in the physical world, effluences too
are elementary substances. Moreover, words, hence sounds, are regarded as ‘things’ in
the epic poems:
In Homer words are winged (Il. 1.201, 2.7, 4.69 etc.), go past the barrier of the
teeth (Il. 4.350, 14.83, etc.) and are put by the listener into his or her θυμός—
μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ (Od. 1.361, 21.355); cf. Hes. Erga 274 […] Such
a physical representation of words and thoughts, found in Homer, continues
through the work of other Presocratics (Heraclitus is an obvious example) to
Plato […], Aristotle […] and the Stoics’ assumption of φοναί as σώματα.54
It follows that, during the contact between material aporroai emanating from the per-
ceptual object and poroi in the body, there is an exchange of substance and transit of
external elements into the body. Sensation, in other words, is a material transfer of ele-
mentary streams from the object to the subject of perception. In B 133 it is specified that
eyes and hands are limbs by which the road of persuasion leads εἰς φρένα. The transit of
sensory elements, therefore, ends in the mind, which, according to Empedocles, is col-
located in the chest. To sum up, the sense organs function as ‘gates’ in the body that may
be entered by streams of sensory elements. Thus, by listening to Empedocles’ doctrine,
by observing things in the world, by smelling, tasting, or touching them, hence by get-
ting in touch with every perceptual item of the physical world, people receive, through
for physiological and quite mechanistic theories that
aim to explain sensation and knowledge acquisition
in a unified and complex system. This may have led
Theophrastus to concentrate on them in order to
submit them to his most meticulous criticism. See
Sassi 1978, 5–6.
51 At chapter 15, Theophrastus reveals that the word
αρμόττειν is explicitly used by Empedocles to refer
to processes of recognition of things.
52 Cf. Plutarch Quaest. nat. 916 D (=DK 31 B 89): σκόπει
δὴ, κατ᾿ Ἐμπεδοκλέα “γνούς ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορ-
ροαί, ὅσσ᾽ ἐγένοντο …” οὐ γὰρ ζῴων μόνον οὐδὲ
φυτῶν οὐδὲ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίθων
ἄπεισιν ἐνδελεχῶς πολλὰ ῥεύματα καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ
σιδήρου.
53 Cf. Long 1966, 260.
54 Wright 1995, 259.
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their own sensory pores, streams of elementary substance. Through body channels, this
substance travels inside the body and reaches the mind. Here the substance of sensation
is stored up in order to produce thought and knowledge.
Consider now fragment B 110:
εἰ γάρ κέν σφ’ ἀδινῆισιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας
εὐμενέως καθαρῆισιν ἐποπτεύσηις μελέτηισιν,
ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται,
ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει
ταῦτ’ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι.
εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι, οἷα κατ’ ἄνδρας
μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας,
ἦ σ’ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο
σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι·
πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν.
For if, thrusting them in your crowded praecordia
willingly you will gaze on them with pure meditations
these things will all be with you throughout your life
and many other things will spring from these: these will
increase them, each according to its character, where each has its origin.
But if you will turn to other things, such as
the ten thousand wretched things which are among men and blunt their
meditations,
quickly they will leave you with the passing of time
desiring to get to their own spring:
know that everything has thought and a share of understanding.
What are those things, which under certain circumstances will be with Pausanias through-
out all his life, making other things spring from them and increase them, while, under
other circumstances, they will leave him and get back to their offspring?55 I would argue
for interpreting the neutral plurals as all inputs that Pausanias may gain by sensation,
55 The hypotheses of scholars can be divided into those
interpreting the neuter plurals either as the four
elements or as Empedocles’ teachings or true state-
ments about the world. Diels translated them as
“die Lehren des Meisters”. According to Schwabl
1956 the reference is to “die Grundkräfte der Natur”.
Long 1966 suggested that σφε refers to “my teach-
ings”, or “true statements about the world (con-
ceived in physical terms)”, and αὐτὰ ... ταῦτα to
both external elements, that is, teaching in its physi-
cal term and to the elements within a body. Bollack
1969, 577, argues for a reference to the “puissances
[…] sans doute le six”. Trépanier 2004, 160 identifies
them prima facie with Empedocles’ teachings, but
these, “in as much as they are true, can be conceived
analogously to, or rather simply identified with, the
elements themselves”.
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ranging from Empedocles’ words to every single piece of information the disciple has
gained by observing, touching, and testing “each thing as it shows itself”. In other words,
ταῦτα/αὐτά here are likely to correspond to all pieces of aporroai emanated by the sur-
rounding world, including Empedocles’ words. Moreover, since they are able to increase
themselves if pushed firmly in the organs of thought, ταῦτα/αὐτά might also include all
‘secondary’ notions and concepts one may obtain by reasoning, hence all elements po-
tentially useful to gain and deepen one’s knowledge.
As ll.4–5 refer to some sort of growth (αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει/ταῦτ(α)), a reference that
involves the elements seems to be necessary, unless αὔξει is said metaphorically. As I
shall show hereafter, however, we can make sense of these verses in the best way by
taking αὔξει literally and assuming that Empedocles is talking of a physical growth.
According to Empedocles’ physics, growth is an aggregation of elements, while de-
crease coincides with their separation. Growth and decrease imply, therefore, that the
things subjected to them are material compounds (that is, they are made of elements).
However, ταῦτα also indicates something to which one must direct all one’s concern
and attention. Doing so, ταῦτα will be by you through the rest of your life, while many
other things will spring from ταῦτα and increase them. This rules out the four elements
as referent:56 according to Empedocles’ ontology the elements are the principles of ev-
erything and the only things that really are. It makes no sense to state, therefore, that
other things will spring out in addition to the elements and increase them. It follows, there-
fore, that although ταῦτα/αὐτά are made of elements, the referent here cannot be shifted
to the level of the four eternal principles but must stay at the level of perishable com-
pounds.
As we have seen above, all kinds of aporroai are made of physical matter, hence of at
least one of the four elements. Moreover, in Empedocles’ worldview, thoughts may be
seen as somata of some sort, as they are produced by processing the elementary substances
of the aporroai stored up and “cut up” in the chest.57 Furthermore, the bodily nature of
thoughts may be inferred from B 110.4–5: all inputs coming from the environment can
multiply if one reflects on them. Yet they increase not only one another, as argued in the
lines above, but they also make the mind grow, as we read in B 17.14: ἀλλ᾿ ἄγε μύθων
κλῦθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει, “But come! Hear my words; for learning will expand
56 See n. 55 above.
57 Cf. PStrasb. a(ii) 29: ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι δείγ-
ματα μ[ύθων.] Here Empedocles invites Pausanias to
“store up in his mind”, κομίζω φρενί, Empedocles’
words as unerring evidence of the truth, ἀψευδῆ
δείγματα μύθων. This indicates that effluences (in
this particular case those originating from Empe-
docles’ words) can be stored up in one’s φρήν. Else-
where, we read that Empedocles’ words can also be
“cut up”, διατέμνω, in one’s σπλάγχα (γνῶθι δια-
τμηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο, B 4.4). Clearly
both passages indicate a process of reflection or
meditation finalized to produce new thought and
knowledge.
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your mind”. Here, like in B 110.4–5, it is stressed that the process of knowledge acqui-
sition deriving from Pausanias’ attention to, hence his reflection upon, Empedocles’
words favors growth in the body and, precisely, in the mind.58 As mentioned above,
growth is always related to the aggregation of elements. This indicates that thoughts,
concepts, epistemic notions, and, in general, all “mental products” of this sort are com-
pounds of elements and have, as does everything else, a physical basis that is subjected
to aggregation and separation.
Thus, as we can see, what happens to the body during sensation and knowledge ac-
quisition is depicted as a mechanical process resting upon an array of journey metaphors:
streams of elementary substances departing from all physical things move through space
and may enter the gates of sense organs, travel through body channels into the body and
arrive at the central organ in the thorax. Here aporroai are stored up, pushed firmly into
the mind, gazed upon and assimilated. Since they are made of physical stuff, once assim-
ilated, they produce a growth in the body (specifically, in the mind). Thought produc-
tion and subsequent mental growth only occur, however, if Pausanias is well disposed
towards the inputs the environment continuously emanates. Otherwise, the sensory sub-
stances of the aporroai will abandon him quickly and return to their spring, hence to the
object that emanated them. Once again, we observe that metaphor journeys are employed
to depict substances of perception and knowledge travel from the object to the person,
and even the other way around, if the one who wishes to know is not well disposed to
receive them.
By way of concluding, the purpose behind metaphor use in these Empedoclean
fragments is highly argumentative: journey metaphors are employed in philosophical,
better still in physiological argumentation in order to theorize processes of perception
and knowledge acquisition. What is worth noting here is that Empedocles, by drawing
from a traditional metaphor cluster, creates a completely new picture. Whereas jour-
ney metaphors are traditionally employed according to a standard pattern that depicts
those who aim to know as travelers, their method of inquiry as a path they follow, and
knowledge as the destination of this journey, the poetic genius of Empedocles uses in-
stantiations from the same metaphor cluster to create an innovative image – elements of
knowledge moving through space, entering the body along body channels, and arriving
at the knowing central organ. In conclusion, Empedocles’ variation of an established
metaphorical pattern and his introduction of a new metaphorical stratum result in a
creative, original, and well-formulated mechanical theory of sensation and knowledge
acquisition. Empedocles’ metaphor use is a clear example, I believe, of how influential
58 Note that the expression ὅπηι φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι
in B 110.5 may indicate blood or, more generally,
φρένες as that organ “where each (mental product
or epistemic input) has its origin”.
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(the variations of) a metaphor cluster may be in the production of philosophical rea-
soning. Furthermore, it unambiguously shows to what extent metaphor use contributes
to the formulation of scientific theories, which will have an important legacy for later
philosophical speculation.
5 Conclusion
Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles pervasively employ journey metaphors to de-
pict aspects of knowledge, but have very different ways of using them and, accordingly,
diverse purposes when drawing from the same metaphor cluster. Heraclitus employs
them either to conceptualize the abstract notion of the world soul or to depict and re-
ject a common method of inquiry coinciding with journeys of research and collection
of factual data, which are found to be insufficient when seeking into the soul (and its
logos). In Parmenides, journey metaphors are employed to depict diverse methods of in-
quiry but display a highly symbolic and paraenetic purpose: by echoing the destiny of
the soul in the afterlife, Parmenides uses these metaphors to dramatize the choice for his
philosophy, presented as the only path that leads to vivifying truth. Finally, Empedocles
uses the same metaphor cluster both in the ‘standard’ way, to depict poetic composition
and ways of inquiry, and by significantly innovating on the traditional pattern for gen-
uinely argumentative purposes: journey metaphors depict the physiological processes of
sensation and knowledge acquisition.
All this points to the powerful, malleable, and even polyvalent nature of the
metaphor cluster of journey/knowledge among different philosophers and even within
the same text (above all in the case of Empedocles). The case studies presented here of-
fered some important glimpses into the relation between metaphor, imagination, and
argumentation, above all when a fresh metaphorical stratum is introduced within an
already established metaphor. In particular, they pretty well show to what extent the
introduction of a fresh metaphorical stratum contributes to original developments in
philosophical theories.
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Elisaveta Shcherbakova
The Paths of the Soul in the Pseudo-Hippocratic
De victu
Summary
In my paper I propose a new interpretation of a notoriously difficult passage from the
Pseudo-Hippocratic treatise De victu, which deals with the activities of the soul during
sleep. The passage in question has been interpreted by many scholars as a kind of Orphico-
Pythagorean journey of the soul, and thus as key evidence for body-soul dualism in De
victu. However, as I attempt to demonstrate, the soul does indeed take a journey, but not
a Pythagorean one: in my reading of the text, it travels from the periphery deeper inside
the body, to a place the author calls the “oikos of the soul”. I argue that this oikos best corre-
sponds to a kind of ‘cognitive center’, located in the chest and/or heart-region. This type of
soul-journey points not to a dualist but to a materialist interpretation of De victu’s psychol-
ogy. Further, I argue that overall the treatise is closer to the materialist psychophysiology of
such fifth century Presocratics as Diogenes of Apollonia.
Keywords: journey; De victu; Hippocrates; soul; Diogenes of Apollonia; dualism; material-
ism
In meinem Aufsatz schlage ich eine neue Interpretation einer notorisch schwierigen Stelle
aus der Pseudo-Hippokratischen Schrift De victu vor, in der es sich um verschiedene Akti-
vitäten und Bewegungen der Seele während des Schlafens handelt. Die betreffende Passage
wurde von vielen Forschern als eine Art orphisch-pythagoreische Seelenreise gedeutet und
galt lange als Schlüsselbeweis für einen Körper-Seele-Dualismus in De victu. Wie ich jedoch
zu zeigen versuche, unternimmt die Seele tatsächlich eine Reise, aber keine pythagorei-
sche: Laut meiner Hypothese bewegt sich die psyche von der Peripherie tiefer in den Körper
hinein, zu einem Ort, den der Hippokratische Autor als ‚oikos der Seele‘ bezeichnet. Ich
behaupte, dass dieses oikos am besten als eine Art ‚kognitives Zentrum‘ zu verstehen ist, das
sich in der Brust- und / oder Herzregion befindet. Weiter argumentiere ich, dass De victu’s
Seelenlehre der materialistischen Psychophysiologie solcher Vorsokratiker des 5. Jahrhun-
derts, wie Diogenes von Apollonia, näher steht.
Keywords: Reise; De victu; Hippokrat; Seele; Diogenes von Apollonia; Dualismus; Materia-
lismus
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But then begins a journey in my head,
To work my mind, when body’s work’s expired
The philosophical world of the pseudo-Hippocratic treatise De victu is a strange one. It
is a world largely defined by motion, yet it is not a random motion of atoms or flux of
matter, but rather an eternal poreia of all its constituents. In an apparent imitation of
the famous Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus, the author says that “Everything human
and divine periodically travels back and forth. The day and the night go from maximum
to minimum. The moon – from maximum to minimum. The sun goes from its longest
to its shortest path.”1 According to De victu, both the microcosm and the macrocosm
are bound to a kind of back and forth path, a continuous oscillation of all things be-
tween two cardinal points. This peculiar cosmology seems to be at least partly based on
a metaphorical model, which surprisingly is a ‘microcosmic’ one and comes from the
world of human technology. A. Peck aptly calls it the “cosmic saw”.2 We see this princi-
ple operate even at the most basic elemental level of De victu’s system. Fire and Water,
the two cosmic masses out of which everything else is made, are locked in an eternal
game of advance and retreat, always traveling down the same ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω (De victu
I.3), just like two carpenters, who are pulling a saw forward and backward.
There is, however, one principal agent in this system of periodically shifting matter
that seems to deviate from its prescribed upwards and downwards path. Namely, the
soul, or to avoid unnecessary connotations, psyche; a term favored by the author of De
victu but otherwise not very common in the Hippocratic collection. Now, this psyche is a
genuinely puzzling entity. Firstly, it is essentially a ‘Jack-of-all-trades’ responsible for both
mental phenomena, such as cognition, intelligence, and perception, as well as motor
and even reproductive function. Secondly, it is described as a mixture of Fire and Water;
that is, a material substance made of the same stuff the body consists of. Yet, despite
this fact, psyche seems to be not fully bound to the body and capable of independent
existence.
1 De victu I.5: Χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώ-
πινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα. Ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη
ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ὡς σελήνη ἐπὶ τὸ
μακρότατον καὶ βραχύτατον … ἥλιος ἐπὶ τὸ μακρό-
τατον καὶ βραχύτατον.
2 In Peck 1928, xiv.
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Scholars have long been grappling with this rather enigmatic soul-doctrine in an
attempt to pin it to some known type of ancient Greek psychophysiology. But so far, in
this respect, the treatise seems to resist even the most basic categorization: it is unclear
whether it has a purely Materialist concept of the soul or if it adheres to some form
of body-soul Dualism. Many believe, as do I, that the solution to this challenging and
important problem lies in the (correct) interpretation of one particular passage, which
seems to describe a kind of emancipation, or even a journey, of the soul away from the
body. The passage in question comes from the fourth book of De victu, which deals with
dreams – or more precisely, a particular kind of medically prophetic dream – and even
offers a system of medical diagnosis from them.3
In De victu IV.86, which is the object of our study, the author attempts to explain the
underlying mechanism behind such dreams:
Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐγρηγορότι μὲν τῷ σώματι ὑπερητέουσα, ἐπὶ πολλὰ μεριζομένη,
οὐ γίγνεται αὐτὴ ἑωυτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀποδίδωσί τι μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκοῇ,
ὄψει, ψαύσει, ὁδοιπορίῃ, πρήξεσι παντὸς τοῦ σώματος• αὐτὴ δ’ ἑωυτῆς ἡ διά-
νοια οὐ γίνεται.
Ὁκόταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυχάσῃ, ἡ ψυχὴ κινευμένη καὶ ἐγρηγορέουσα* διοικεῖ
τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσεται.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δ’ ἐγρηγορέουσα γινώσκει, καὶ
ὁρῇ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει τὰ ἀκουστὰ, βαδίζει, ψαύει, λυπεῖται, ἐνθυμεῖται,
ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα, ὁκόσαι τοῦ σώματος ὑπηρεσίαι ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, ταῦτα πάντα ἡ
ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διαπρήσσεται.
*ἐγρηγορέουσα Diels, Jones, Joly; ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ σώματα M (Marcianus graecus 269
saec. X); ἐγρηγορέουσα. τὰ πρήγματα θ (Vindobonensis medicus gr. 4 saec. XI); ἐπε-
ξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος Recentiores, Littré.
Thus, according to De victu:
During wakefulness the soul acts as a servant to the body, it is divided into
many parts, and does not belong to itself, but gives a part of itself to each bodily
function: hearing, sight, touch, locomotion, and all bodily tasks, and does not
take itself into consideration. But when the body is at rest, the soul being in
motion and awake4 manages its own household and performs all the bodily
3 Or prodiagnosis, to be more exact, since according to
De victu dreams of this kind signal diseases that are
not yet manifest, which means that the dreams of
both sick and healthy people should be studied by
the physician. See Hulskamp 2008, 203.
4 ‘Awake’ in my translation obviously renders ἐγρη-
γορέουσα, a reading taken from the manuscript θ,
and adopted by most editors and commentators in-
cluding Joly and Byl 2003; Jones 1931, and more
recently Bartoˇs 2015, 201.
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tasks on its own. The body while asleep is devoid of sense, but the soul being
awake remains conscious: it sees what is to be seen, and hears what is to be
heard, it walks, touches, feels pain, deliberates, all while confined to a narrow
space. How many functions there are of the soul and body, the soul performs
all of them during sleep.
On first inspection, it would seem that psyche, while bound to the body during wakeful-
ness, acquires a degree of autonomy during sleep.
Strangely enough, despite the intense scholarly attention this short paragraph has
received in recent years, there still remain glaring textual and interpretative difficulties,
which have been overlooked or glossed over by editors and commentators, and which
need to be solved, if we are to make sense of what psyche actually does, how it acquires
its autonomy, and how this autonomous state should be understood. Only after all this
textological legwork is done, can we proceed to larger and ultimately more important
questions about psyche’s material or non-material status and the philosophical origins of
De victu’s ‘psychology’.
De victu IV.86 has first been interpreted by A. Palm as a reflection of what he called
an ‘Orphic’ doctrine.5 What Palm meant was that De victu’s description of the soul be-
coming active during sleep and thus acquiring prophetic powers closely resembles the
tradition associated primarily with such ancient Greek miracle workers as Aristeas and
Hermotimos, who fell into a kind of trance, when their souls would leave their bod-
ies and travel far and wide appearing in different places and foretelling epidemics and
natural disasters.
Palm was later followed by E. R. Dodds,6 who famously suggested that such doc-
trines are shamanistic in origin, and then by Marcel Detienne,7 who attempted to
strengthen Palm’s and Dodds’ thesis by adducing a fascinating parallel from an appar-
ently ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ passage in Plato’s Phaedo about sleep and purification. In
Phd. 67c 5 67d 1, katharsis is described as a retreat of the soul from the body (πανταχό-
θεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) with the ultimate goal of achieving almost complete independence
and liberation from the “bodily shackles”.8 On first glance, this description of katharsis
5 Palm 1933, 62–68.
6 Dodds 1951, 118–119.
7 Detienne 1963, 71–72.
8 Pl. Phd. 67c 5–67d 1: Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ το-
ῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ
χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ
σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ
οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ
ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ’ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ
[ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. In Harold Fowler’s
translation: “And does not the purification consist
in this which has been mentioned long ago in our
discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul
from the body and teaching the soul the habit of
collecting and bringing itself together from all parts
of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now
and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as
from fetters?”
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does indeed look similar to De victu both in thought and in wording.9
This outward similarity was accepted unquestioningly by, among others, R. Joly
in his seminal edition and standard commentary of the treatise,10 and thus became re-
ceived wisdom among modern scholars. Still, there were some dissenters, most notably
G. Cambiano, who challenged Detienne’s view and proposed an entirely ‘Materialist’
interpretation of the phenomenon of enypnia in De victu.11 He rightly observed that the
parallel between Phaedo and our Hippocratic author is largely superficial: first, there is
no mention of sleep in Plato, and second, katharsis, understood as a liberation of the soul
from the body, is a desired permanent state and not just a condition that occurs when
the body is inactive. Moreover, according to Cambiano, the ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ idea
that the soul becomes active and wanders away while the body lies in some state of un-
consciousness (sleep or trance), is not present in De victu at all. In IV.86 it explicitly states
that the soul remains active during both sleep and wakefulness.
It is unfortunate that scholars almost entirely overlooked this very valid criticism.
Joly, for example, although he cites Cambiano in his commentary, still maintains that
there are essentially two concepts of psyche in De victu, or rather, that the term is used
in two basic senses: (1) a material substance and (2) an entity that is presumably imma-
terial, or at least – and Joly is not very clear on this point – somehow different from
the body. This perceived dual nature of psyche has troubled scholars ever since. P. van
der Eijk12 tried to escape this conundrum by questioning – quite rightly, I believe – the
entire Materialism vs. Dualism framework.13 H. Bartoˇs, although he insists that psyche
in De victu is indeed wholly material – it is a Fire/Water mixture that may be affected
by digestion and other bodily processes – seemingly follows the same line of reasoning
when he insists that De victu’s ‘soul-doctrine’ is essentially a Materialist interpretation of
Pythagorean transmigration. Thus, the same goes for the liberation of the soul during
sleep: it is a ‘Pythagorean’ χωρισμός but conceived in Materialist terms.14
To sum up: most current research seems to agree that the sleep-doctrine in De victu
IV.86 should be understood as a separation of the soul from the body. It is important,
however, to distinguish the two types of ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ comparanda typically
cited in this context. Detienne thinks that the author of De victu is talking about purifica-
tion, which means that the soul aims to be independent of the body as much as possible
9 Cf. for example Phd.: τὴν ψυχὴν … οἰκεῖν … μόνην
καθ’ αὑτήν and De victu: (Ὁκόταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυ-
χάσῃ) ἡ ψυχὴ … διοικεῖ τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς
τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσε-
ται. Also note the similarity of expression in the two
passages: οἰκεῖν and διοικεῖν, ψυχὴν … μόνην καθ’
αὑτήν and ἡ ψυχὴ … οὐ γίγνεται αὐτὴ ἑωυτῆς.
10 Joly and Byl 2003, 28: “Ce texte est le témoignage le
plus détaillé d’une doctrine d’origine chamanique:
pendant le sommeil, l’âme est ramassée sur elle-
même et plus active que pendant la veille”.
11 Cambiano 1980.
12 Van der Eijk 2005, 198.
13 Van der Eijk 2005, 199.
14 Bartoˇs 2015, 201–207.
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and at all times. Others suggest that the closest analogy is not katharsis, but another re-
lated doctrine, namely the ‘extatic’ journey of the soul when it leaves the sleeping body
and travels on its own, thus gaining its prognostic knowledge, as it were, en route.
Still, we should ask ourselves: Are both those parallels legitimate? If the soul in De
victu does indeed make a journey, what is its ‘itinerary’? Besides, if it does indeed separate
itself from the body, how exactly does this separation work? Finally, how does the soul
become aware of the body’s coming afflictions, the early signs of which it shows us in
dreams?
Recently, van der Eijk has proposed an alternative interpretative scheme, according
to which the relationship of the soul to the body in De victu is that that of degrees of
separation, without full separation ever occurring.15 While I accept that this is indeed
the right approach, in my estimation, it can be elaborated further.
If we take a close look at the text as it stands in our best editions we quickly notice
that the reading ἐγρηγορέουσα (awake) is not an original manuscript reading but a par-
tial emendation of an originally corrupt text. The tradition diverges in this particular
place, and both our oldest and most important manuscript give mostly unintelligible
readings. The eleventh-century Vienna codex, which goes by the siglum θ, reads ἐγρη-
γορέουσα. τὰ πρήγματα. While the earlier Marcianus Graecus (tenth century, siglum
M) gives an equally difficult reading, ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ σώματα. Obviously both variants
are incomprehensible as they stand, so neither can be fully accepted, but for some rea-
son most scholars – including Joly, Jones, Diels,16 and many others – have opted for the
smoother and less problematic reading of the MS θ (ἐγρηγορέουσα), but without the
incomprehensible τὰ πρήγματα.
I believe, however, that they chose the wrong reading: the form ἐγρηγορέουσα is
indeed rare,17 but the reading given by M, ἐπεξέρπουσα, is an absolute hapax legomenon
found only in De victu IV.86 and nowhere else. Moreover, ἐπεξέρπουσα is supported by
other passages from De victu: the author says three times that psyche ἐσέρπει (‘crawls’,
‘creeps’) into the body (De victu I.6, 7, 25). Thus, overall, ἐπεξέρπουσα is not only the
more difficult reading but also the better one.
But even if we adopt ἐπεξέρπουσα instead of ἐγρηγορέουσα, as I think we should,
we are still facing a problem with the word τὰ σώματα, which comes directly after ἐπε-
ξέρπουσα in the manuscript M. The famous editor of Hippocrates, E. Littré, was keenly
15 Van der Eijk 2012.
16 Diels 1910, 146–147; Jones 1931, 475; Joly and Byl
2003, 219.
17 Unlike the more common ἐγείρουσα (present par-
ticiple of ἐγείρω), ἐγρηγορέουσα (from ἐγρηγο-
ρέω) occurs in the Hippocratic corpus only once
(or twice if we accept it in this passage). According
to LSJ it appears for the first time in Xen. Cyn. 5.11,
but is likely a lectio falsa, and after that in Arist. Pr.
877 a 9.
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aware of this difficulty and made the sensible decision to adopt the reading of the recen-
tiores of the M family: ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, which to my mind is a far
superior editorial choice than the universally accepted ἐγρηγορέουσα, especially since
we find exactly the same form, ἐγρηγορέουσα, directly in the next sentence: ἡ δ’ ἐγρη-
γορέουσα γινώσκει etc. Littré takes ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος to mean: “l’âme
…parcourant les parties du corps,” which is somewhat vague, because, first of all, ἕρπω
in ἐπεξέρπω is unlikely to have lost its original meaning of ‘to slither’ (the author delib-
erately uses the form ἐσέρπω, ‘creep into’, to describe the movements of the soul); and
secondly, because it is unclear how Littré imagined the soul’s ‘trajectory’; when it runs
or creeps through the extremities of the body, does it travel from periphery to center, or
from center to periphery?
We obviously have no examples for ἐπεξέρπω, but the combination of ‘ἐπεξ- + verb
of spatial motion + direct object’ is by no means rare. Littré, I think, was quite right in
taking ἐπεξέρπω to be broadly synonymous with ἐπέξειμι/ἐπεξέρχομαι, both of which
when used in their literal sense with an accusative seem to mean roughly speaking ‘to go
entirely through and leave behind’. LSJ gives the following examples of this usage: Hdt.
7.166 τὸ πᾶν γὰρ ἐπεξελθεῖν διζήμενον Γέλωνα (Gelon has been everywhere – literally,
has traversed all places – in search of him); Hdt. 4.9 πάντα δὲ τῆς χώρης ἐπεξελθόντα
τέλος ἀπικέσθαι ἐς τὴν Ὑλαίην (having traveled through every part of the country, he
finally arrived at Hylaia); and Clearch. (FHG II 315) πάντας τοὺς ὀρείους ἐπεξῄει δρυ-
μούς (went through all the mountain thickets).
These comparanda can give us a sense of the type of motion implied in ἐπεξέρπειν,
but do not clarify in which direction psyche might be traveling. To solve this problem,
we need to take a closer look at the rest of our passage:
(ἡ ψυχὴ) ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος διοικεῖ τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς
τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον
οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δ’ ἐγρηγορέουσα γινώσκει, καὶ ὁρῇ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει
τὰ ἀκουστὰ, βαδίζει, ψαύει, λυπεῖται, ἐνθυμεῖται, ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα etc.
The soul ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος18manages its own household and
performs all the bodily tasks by itself. The body while asleep is devoid of sense,
but the soul being awake remains conscious: it sees what is to be seen, and hears
what is to be heard, it walks, touches, feels pain, deliberates, all while confined
to a narrow space.
18 I have intentionally left this short phrase untrans-
lated. The meaning of ἐπεξέρπουσα will be dis-
cussed below.
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Thus, the soul left to its own devices ‘manages its household’. Scholars have understood
the strange expression διοικεῖ οἶκον to mean something like ‘minds its own business’ or
‘becomes her own mistress’. As Wilamowitz has pointed out,19 οἶκον οἰκεῖν is a generic
‘Ionic formula’ (Ionisches Sprichwort); yet, I am convinced that in this particular case it is
not generic at all but refers to something rather concrete, for in the next sentence the
author says that psyche performs all the activities of the body (seeing, hearing, touching,
walking, etc.), all while enclosed in an unspecified narrow space (ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα).
Scholars have been baffled by this remark as early as S. Mack, who promptly dealt
with it by replacing ἐν ὀλίγῳ with ἑνὶ λόγῳ, thus simplifying and trivializing a perfectly
transmitted and absolutely intelligible text. This unjustified emendation, unfortunately,
made its way into Jones’ otherwise excellent Loeb edition of De victu.20 It should be said
in his and Mack’s defense, that at least they acknowledged the problem with ἐν ὀλίγῳ,
which is more than can be said of modern commentators, who just seem to ignore it
altogether. To my mind, the most natural interpretation of this passage would be that
psyche is confined to a small enclosure, situated somewhere inside the body, and that the
enigmatic oikos of the soul refers to the same thing. Thus, if during wakefulness the soul
is spread throughout the organism and performs all its sensory and motor functions, but
during sleep finds itself inside a narrow space or oikos, then I suggest it must have arrived
there by traversing the extremities of the body (ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος).21
Many have noted that the closest parallel to this doctrine is not Plato, but a much
later text – a short tract on medical diagnosis from dreams attributed to Galen called De
dignotione ex insomniis.22 According to this treatise, medically relevant dreams – that is,
dreams that signify disease or disturbance in the body – occur because the soul leaves
the sensory organs and dives into its depths:
ἔοικε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις εἰς τὸ βάθος τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ εἰσδῦσα καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀποχωρήσασα αἰσθητῶν τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα διαθέσεως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
It appears that the soul during sleep dives deep into the body, and having left
behind the outward sensations, perceives the body’s disposition.23
This notion of sleep seems to be of Stoic origin or at least stoically influenced: if we are
to trust our doxographic sources, the Stoics described sleep as a retreat of the soul from
19 In Fredrich 1899, 206.
20 Jones 1931, 475.
21 The present tense of the participle in this sentence
need not be taken literally; that is, as describing an
action simultaneous with διοικεῖ. For example, in
De victu I.25 (ὅστις δύναται πλείστους ἀνθρώπους
τρέφειν, οὗτος ἰσχυρός· ἀπολειπόντων δὲ τούτων,
οὗτος ἀσθενέστερος; whoever is capable of feeding
the most people, is strong; but should they leave,
he is weaker), the present participle ἀπολειπόντων
seems to have both a temporary and a conditional
sense and likely refers to a completed action.
22 Bartoˇs 2015; Hulskamp 2008, 202–204.
23 Gal. On Diagnosis from Dreams 6.833, 17.
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the periphery to the hegemonikon.24
This similarity between an early Hippocratic text25 and a much later Stoic doctrine
is surprising indeed, but before we can attempt to explain it, there are other clarifications
to be made. We have learned so far that the soul’s journey in De victu is not a mystic or
a Pythagorean one: the soul does not leave or liberate itself from the body in pursuit
of prophetic knowledge but descends into its depths, where its ‘home’ is to be found.
Iwould suggest that this ‘retreat’ or ‘home’ of the soul may cautiously be identified,
although my argument is by no means conclusive and should be entertained only as a
working hypothesis.
There is in De victu another, regrettably no less difficult, paragraph that describes an
arrangement or diakosmesis of the human organism by a type of creative fire. This fire
has arranged everything in such a way that “the large corresponds to the small and the
small to the large”, this means that the human body is shaped in ‘imitation’ (apomimesis)
of the macrocosm: the stomach corresponds to the sea; the flesh around it to earth; and
then there are three concentric circuits, called periodoi, situated above the stomach, in
the chest-region, and in the ‘outer periphery’, which alternatively may be the skin or the
head:
Ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ τρόπον αὐτὸ ἑωυτῷ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ
πῦρ, ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά· κοιλίην
μὲν τὴν μεγίστην, ὕδατι ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ ταμεῖον, δοῦναι πᾶσι καὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ
πάντων, θαλάσσης δύναμιν, ζώων συμφόρων τροφὸν, ἀσυμφόρων δὲ φθορόν·
περὶ δὲ ταύτην ὕδατος ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ σύστασιν· διέξοδον πνεύματος ψυ-
χροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ· ἀπομίμησιν τῆς γῆς, τὰ ἐπεισπίπτοντα πάντα ἀλλοιούσης.
καὶ τὰ [μὲν] ἀναλίσκον τὰ δὲ αὖξον σκέδασιν ὕδατος λεπτοῦ καὶ πυρὸς ἐποι-
ήσατο ἠερίου, ἀφανέος καὶ φανεροῦ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ξυνεστηκότος ἀπόκρισιν, ἐν ᾧ
φερόμενα πάντα ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀφικνεῖται ἕκαστα μοίρῃ πεπρωμένῃ. Ἐν δὲ
τούτῳ ἐποιήσατο πυρὸς περιόδους τρισσὰς, περαινούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ
εἴσω καὶ ἔξω· αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ [πρὸς
τὴν ἔξω περιφορήν]* πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρων δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι
καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι <ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι>**.
Τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων κρατεῖ, διέπον ἅπαντα
κατὰ φύσιν, ἄθικτον καὶ ὄψει καὶ ψαύσει, ἐν τούτῳ ψυχὴ, νοῦς, φρόνησις,
24 Compare for example the definition of sleep in an-
other medical text of Stoic origin, the Definitiones
medicae 19.381.15 Ὕπνος ἐστὶν ἄνεσις ψυχῆς κατὰ
φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (Sleep is
the naturally occurring retreat of the soul from the
periphery to the hegemonikon).
25 Scholars for the most part agree that De victu cannot
be older than the end of the fifth or the beginning
of the fourth century BCE. Cf. Joly and Byl 2003,
44–49.
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αὔξησις, κίνησις, μείωσις, διάλλαξις, ὕπνος, ἐγρήγορσις· τοῦτο πάντα διὰ πα-
ντὸς κυβερνᾷ, καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐκεῖνα, οὐδέκοτε ἀτρεμίζον.26
* [πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορήν] secl. Fredrich ** <ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι> add. Joly; πρὸς
τὰς ἑτέρας ἡλίου δύναμιν Diels–Kranz. Cf. De victu IV, 89 ἄστρων μὲν οὖν ἡ ἔξω πε-
ρίοδος, ἡλίου δὲ ἡ μέση, σελήνης δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα.
In a word, all things were arranged in the body, in a fashion conformable to
itself, by ire, a copy of the whole, the small after the manner of the great and
the great after the manner of the small. The belly is made the greatest, a steward
for dry water and moist, to give to all and to take from all, the power of the sea,
nurse of creatures suited to it, destroyer of those not suited. And around it a
concretion of cold water and moist, a passage for cold breath and warm, a copy
of the earth, which alters all things that fall into it. Consuming and increas-
ing, it made a dispersion of fine water and of ethereal fire, the invisible and the
visible, a secretion from the compacted substance, in which things are carried
and come to light, each according to its allotted portion. And in this fire made
for itself three concentric fiery circuits: those towards the hollows of the moist,
the power of the moon; those towards the outer periphery, towards the solid
enclosure, the power of the stars; the middle circuits, bounded both within and
without <has the power of the sun>. The hottest and strongest fire, which con-
trols all things, ordering all things according to nature, imperceptible to sight
or touch, wherein are soul, mind, thought, growth, motion, decrease, muta-
tion, sleep, waking. This governs all things always, both here and there, and is
never at rest.27
There are numerous problems with this passage, such as, the macrocosmic and the
anatomical identification of the three circuits, as well as their physiological function
and connection to psyche and the ‘hottest and strongest fire’ mentioned at the end of the
passage, where it is somehow located.
First, the middle circuit is not identified with the sun expressis verbis: the reading
“the middle concentric circuits have the power of the sun” (αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω
περαίνουσαι ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι) is, in fact, a long-accepted editorial emendation.
Luckily, however, the exact macrocosmic correspondences of the circuits are established
beyond doubt in De victu IV.89: ἄστρων μὲν οὖν ἡ ἔξω περίοδος, ἡλίου δὲ ἡ μέση, σε-
λήνης δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα (the outer circuit is the circuit of the stars, the middle circuit
– of the sun, and the one next to the cavity (of the stomach) is that of the moon).
26 De victu I.10.
27 The passage is extremely difficult, and I presently
cannot touch on all its philological problems. I
quote the excellent translation by Jones 1931 with
a few of my own very slight alterations.
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As for their anatomical correspondences, they are even more difficult to pinpoint
with any certainty. Hüffmeier infers from a parallel passage (De victu I.9. cf.) that they
must be identified with the so-called ‘hollow vessels’ (φλέβες κοῖλαι).28 As for their
physiological function, he describes them as a kind of ‘metabolic center’ (“Zentrum des
Stoffwechsels”), since they are the carriers of blood, breath, digested nutrition, and also
– it would seem – psyche. Although this is far from certain: while the anonymous author
does mention a ‘circuit of the soul’ he never plainly equates it with one of the three
periodoi.
Now, apart from being bound to a certain, not clearly identified circuit, psyche is
also explicitly associated with a particular type of Fire, which the author calls ‘the hottest
and strongest’;29 thus, to understand the soul’s exact role and place in this convoluted
scheme, we need to know exactly what this Fire is and where it is located. Joly apparently
thinks that the θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ is the same creative fire mentioned at
the beginning of the chapter; that is, the one that arranges the microcosm. He is also
vague about its connection to the periodoi.30 Jouanna, on the contrary, assumes that the
hottest Fire must be placed in the middle circuit, making it thus the periodos of the soul.31
Bartoˇs, who prefers to err on the side of caution, thinks this interpretation “certainly
possible” but “not conclusive”, yet I suspect that it may be further strengthened if we
could get a firmer grasp of the transmitted text.32
The universal assumption that the phrase that immediately precedes τὸ θερμότατον
καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ is corrupt seems to me far from certain. The Latin translation,
which represents a branch of tradition independent from both the manuscripts M and
θ, in this case agrees with both of them and does not register a lacuna. It reads: illi
autem qui medii sunt et intus et foris agunt calidissimum (sic!) et fortissimus ignis, propter quod
itaque omnia tenet et singula gubernat secus naturam.33 Therefore, I do not think that the
text needs an extensive emendation such as ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι but can be read as it
stands αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι [verb in the ellipsis] τὸ θερμότατον καὶ
ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ etc., which is to be understood as ‘the middle circuits <contains> the
hottest and strongest fire’. This, in turn, would correspond perfectly with the periodos of
the sun – the strongest and hottest fire in the cosmos.
28 This identification is based on De victu I.9. cf.
Hüffmeier 1961, 71). The expression φλέβες κοῖλαι
in the Hippocratic corpus refers to many different
types of vessels and is of course not to be confused
with the modern medical term venae cavae.
29 Despite the fact that the soul is regularly described
as a mixture of Fire and Water, its identification
with Fire is not surprising per se. After all, the soul’s
‘higher’ intellectual qualities seem to depend pri-
marily on its fiery component. Cf. De victu I.35.15
ff. For example, when Water dominates in the soul-
mixture, the unfortunate owners of such souls are
slow and unintelligent.
30 Cf. Joly and Byl 2003, 241.
31 Jouanna 2012, 205.
32 Bartoˇs 2015, 196.
33 I cite the Latin text according to Deroux’s and Joly’s
1978 edition Deroux and Joly 1978.
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This suggests that Jouanna’s initial interpretation is likely correct: the sentient and
regulatory Fire that contains psyche is indeed confined to the middle circuit, which must,
therefore, be its periodos. Hence, it seems plausible that the ‘narrow enclave’, the oikos
where psyche retreats during sleep, is also to be found in this middle periodos, which has
been alternatively identified as the vessels in the chest region or, more speculatively, as
the heart.34 The notion that the chest-circuit is the mysterious ‘home of the soul’ is, of
course, hypothetical; however, it does find some corroboration in a passage from De
victu III.71 and IV.93 where it is implied that the ‘circulation’, or periodos, of the soul
continues during sleep.
To sum up what we have learned so far: we know that during wakefulness the soul
is spread throughout the body. It is likely present in all three bodily circuits but is clearly
not confined to them. From a passage in De victu I.35 we learn that the soul also travels
through certain pathways or channels (poroi), which connect it to the bodily periphery
and which may become blocked and, thus, hinder its movements. Therefore, I suggest
that the psychophysiology of sleep and dreaming in De victu is best described as a type of
journey or path: while the organism is awake, the soul is dispersed within the circuits and
channels, but during sleep it creeps back into its proper home, which (hypothetically)
is found in the μέση περίοδος, that is, the circuit blood vessels in the chest region.
The description of the soul’s activities during sleep is thus, I believe, devoid of any
‘Pythagorean’ or ‘Orphic’ influences. What is described in De victu IV.86 is neither an
out-of-body journey nor a χωρισμος,́ but something quite the opposite: the soul never
loses contact with the body, neither during wakefulness nor during sleep, it just travels
deeper inside the body to its proper ‘home’, which I have (strictly hypothetically) placed
in the middle circuit in the chest. This journey from the bodily periphery to the oikos
provides the soul with data on the current state of the body, which are presented in
dreams in an indirect form.
How does the soul acquire its knowledge about the state of the body and the not-
yet-manifest disturbances, which it later communicates in dreams? The dream-theory in
De victu is a complex one. The author distinguishes between different types of prognos-
tic dreams according to their subject matter: from dreams that mimic a person’s daily
activities, to dreams about natural phenomena, or nightmares about misshapen bodies
and monsters. Generally speaking, this theory is based on the same parallelism between
the micro- and the macrocosmos that we have observed in De victu I.10: in dreams all
the bodily organs are represented by their macrocosmic counterparts. For example, an
irregular appearance of the sun, moon, and stars, is a sign of problems in their respective
periodoi in the body.
34 Hulskamp 2008, 163; Joly 1960, 41–43.
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Although these dreams are treated as an important diagnostic and prognostic tool,
the physiological mechanism by which they occur, although the author tries to explain
it in De victu IV.86, remains unclear. Most have thought that the soul separates itself
from the body and thus somehow gains insight into future events (in this case loom-
ing maladies), just like in the tales of the journeys of Hermotimos’ or Aristeas’ soul. I
suggest that the soul does indeed take a journey but a journey of a different kind: it
is while traveling through the limbs and the other circuits (towards its home) that the
soul amasses its knowledge about the body’s current state. In a sense, it is also a ‘cosmic
journey’ since the body is an ‘imitation’ of the macrocosm.
Bearing all this in mind, we can now touch upon the problem of Materialism versus
Dualism in De victu. I believe, based on the evidence of De victu IV.86, that it is unnec-
essary to postulate any sort of Dualism or even a special Materialist interpretation of
Dualism. On the contrary, De victu’s soul-doctrine shows some common traits with a
certain type of Materialist psychophysiology, which, although its roots are sometimes
traced back as early as Anaximenes, was first fully fleshed out by Diogenes of Apollo-
nia in the fifth century BCE. Diogenes’ theory, shared by the author of the Hippocratic
tract De morbo sacro, postulates a material substance (in the case of Diogenes, warm air),
which is the carrier of intellectual, sensory, motor, and to some degree even reproductive
function. This air enters the body from without (with breath) and is then distributed
inside it via special channels, while a certain ‘higher’, ‘purer’ portion of it settles in the
brain, which thus becomes a kind of ‘command center’ within the body. This inner aer
is also conceived as the actual ‘organ of perception’, while the eyes, ears, etc. are just its
ducts, or channels through which it travels. Thus, I think that overall De victu is closer
to Diogenes’ model than it is commonly believed.35
To reiterate, according to De victu, psyche is a material substance with a variety of
functions from mental to motor and reproductive, which is spread within the body but
also has its own proper place, or ‘home’. As I have speculated, this home is probably also
the locus of higher intellectual and regulatory functions and is situated in the so-called
‘middle circuit’; that is, blood vessels in the chest/heart region. Also in De victu IV.86,
the soul is described as exclusively responsible for perception, which echoes Diogenes’
35 Jouanna in Jouanna 2012 has famously and impres-
sively argued that Regimen owes much of its Seelen-
lehre to Empedocles; especially the notion that the
Soul’s intelligence depends on the state of mixture
of its primary constituents. While it is certainly true
that there are Empedoclean influences in Regimen’s
psychology, some points of comparison outlined by
Jouanna strike me as less persuasive. For example,
psyche in both cases is a fluid substance but this is
never made explicit in Regimen, on the contrary,
it is said to enter from the outside into every ani-
mal that breaths and into people of all ages (De victu
I.25 ψυχή … ἐσέρπει ἐς ἅπαν ζῶον, ὅ τι περ ἀνα-
πνέει καὶ … ἐς ἄνθρωπον πάντα καὶ νεώτερον καὶ
πρεσβύτερον). I do not believe this passage can be
naturally interpreted as dealing with reproduction,
cf. Bartoˇs 2015, 209. Furthermore, the fact that psy-
che enters the organism, presumably, with breath,
points to its gaseous rather than liquid nature.
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notion that it is the aer and not the sense organs that ‘see and hear’.36 Finally, the idea
of the soul retreating inside the body during sleep also finds an interesting parallel in
Diogenes: according to Ps.-Plutarch’s Placita 5.23, sleep is caused by the channels being
filled with blood and the blood driving the aer from the periphery into the breast and
belly, which thus become warm.
Now if De victu, as I suspect, does indeed follow this general outline (although with
some obvious deviations), it would partially explain the surprising parallel between De
victu and the Stoic notion of sleep as a retreat of the soul to the hegemonikon. This is not
to say that De victu’s soul doctrine in general or its theory of sleep specifically is derived
directly or exclusively from Diogenes. In fact, there are quite a few crucial differences
that need to be emphasized: first of all, psyche in De victu is never identified with air,
although the author does say in De victu I.25 that it enters the organism with breath.
Second (if my interpretation of De victu I.10 is correct), the higher mental powers are
associated with the fiery part of psyche and are located in the chest, not in the brain, like
in Diogenes and De morbo sacro. Finally, in Diogenes’ view, the air does not return to
the center of cognition (the brain) during sleep but seems to move away from it and
proceed from the extremities into the chest and stomach. In De victu, on the other hand,
the expression ‘the soul’s own home’, where psyche retreats during sleep, suggests to me
that what the author had in mind was a path precisely to the body’s cognitive center
(just like in our Stoic parallels).
These are all important differences; important enough to suppose that Diogenes of
Apollonia is almost certainly not, or not the only, source of De victu. I cannot speculate
here about other possible influences,37 because it would require a separate investigation,
and this is not my primary purpose. I have attempted to show that De victu, in its views
36 Willy Theiler (Theiler 1965, 6–10) even suggested
that the famous ‘windows-simile’, which we find
in Lucretius (De rer. nat. 3.359–361), Cicero (Tusc.
I.20.46), and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. VII.127)
and which likens the sensory organs to windows,
from where the soul, as it were, peeks out, may go
back to Diogenes. It should be noted that ‘oikos’ of
the soul in De victu seems to come from the same
metaphorical vocabulary. Interestingly, Diller (Diller
1941, 376–378) thinks that it might be even earlier
than that and our Skeptical tradition might be right
in attributing this doctrine directly to Heraclitus.
37 Such as Heraclitus. There are in fact some intriguing
similarities between some Heraclitean doxography
(of Stoic and Peripatetic origin) concerning psyche
and De victu. For example, there is one late but in-
triguing report (Hisdosus Scholasticus (Chalcid.
Plat. Tim. cod. Paris. l. 8624 s. XII f. 2), according to
which Heraclitus said that the souls ‘domicillium’
(oikos?) was in the heart, which operates in the body
like the sun in the macrocosm (cor mundi) and occu-
pies a position in the middle of the cosmos (μέσαι
περίοδοι?). Besides, Heraclitus’ own description
of the soul in Fr. 117 DK as a material substance
oscillating between a moist and a dry state (dry-
ness being naturally associated with intelligence)
shares some common traits with De victu’s descrip-
tion of the soul as a σύγκρησις of Fire and Water.
Therefore, it would seem that the question of possi-
ble Heraclitean influence in De victu’s Seelenlehre is
worth further investigation.
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on the nature of the soul, follows a certain long-standing Materialist tradition; but iron-
ically, an incorrect interpretation of the soul’s journey as a ‘spiritual’ one, has led most
researchers astray – if the reader will pardon the pun.
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Mai Oki-Suga
An Invitation from Plato: A Philosophical Journey to
Knowledge
Summary
To trace paths to knowledge or to follow the journey searching for knowledge is to some
extent equivalent to reading a philosophical book. Plato, who perceives this relation be-
tween journey and philosophy, writes his dialogues as if each of his works were a journey
to knowledge. This paper inquires into the ascent and descent motif that is the symbolic
motion of a philosophical journey and appears in Plato’s Politeia repeatedly. By means of
this motif, Plato depicts the journey of the soul in several different ways. This examination
will show a possible way to read Plato’s dialogue as a philosophical journey. This journey
is undertaken by Plato or the figure Socrates, but at the same time it involves its readers in
philosophical inquiries.
Keywords: Plato; philosophy; Republic (Politeia); journey of soul; dialogue
Das Lesen eines philosophischen Buches kann in einem gewissen Sinne mit einer Weg-
beschreitung oder einer Reise zum Wissen gleichgesetzt werden. Platon, der sich dieses
Verhältnisses zwischen Reise und Philosophie bewusst war, verfasste seine Dialoge, als ob
sie Reisen zum Wissen wären. Diese Abhandlung behandelt das Begriffspaar Aufstieg und
Abstieg, das als symbolische Bewegung der philosophischen Reise in Platons Politeia mehr-
mals verwendet wird. Mit diesem Motiv stellt Platon die Reise der Seele auf unterschiedli-
che Weisen dar. Meine Untersuchung zeigt eine Leseweise, mit der Platons Dialog als phi-
losophische Reise verstanden werden kann, die zwar von Platon oder der Figur Sokrates
unternommen wird, gleichzeitig jedoch den Leser in die philosophischen Fragestellungen
miteinbezieht.
Keywords: Platon; Philosophie; Staat (Politeia); Seelenwanderung; Dialog
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1 Introduction
At the very end of Plato’s Politeia, Socrates introduces the Story of Er, which is a report
on how souls travel and what they do in the Afterlife. Among several unique elements in
this story, the motifs of anabasis and katabasis, ascent and descent, have attracted scholars’
special attention. These motifs, which are mostly used as a pair, appear repeatedly in the
Politeia.1 The most famous passage in which this paired motif appears is the Allegory
of the Cave in Book 7. In this allegory, a person bound in a cave is depicted as going
up to the outside, and, after a while, returning down to the cave. It is also well known
that the dialogue begins with Socrates’ word ‘kateben’ (I went down), which is sometimes
regarded as an allusion to the Allegory of the Cave.2 If we compare the first sentence with
the last sentence, we cannot doubt that Plato uses the ascent–descent motif intentionally.
The aim of this examination is to understand the framework of Plato’s Politeia,
which sustains the entire philosophical discussion expounded in the dialogue from the
perspective of the ascent–descent motif. As the Story of Er shows distinctly, this motif
can be seen as a sign indicating the journey of souls. Depicting the journey of souls on
different levels, Plato tries to illuminate how we are able to set out our philosophical
inquiries, which are likened to journeys.
In the following, I first give an overview of the concept of a journey in a philosoph-
ical sense. Then in the second section, I analyze three passages of the Politeia in which
the ascent–descent motif plays the central role. They are, namely, the Story of Er, the
Allegory of the Cave, and the opening scene. The third section compares these passages
so that we can see how they are related to each other. Finally, in the fourth section, I
propose a possible way to read the Politeia as an invitation from Plato, showing the close
1 The English translations taken from the Politeia are
based on Bloom 1991. I have modified his transla-
tions on occasion. The citations from the original
Greek text are based on Slings 2003.
2 Referring to Proclus’ argument, Burnyeat under-
stands that “Socrates’ going down to the Peiraeus
and being detained there, somewhat reluctantly”
corresponds to “an image of how [...] the philoso-
phers would con–descend, somewhat reluctantly”
Burnyeat 1998, 6.
94
an invitation from plato
connection between the first and the last sentence of the dialogue. The whole examina-
tion shall reveal a possible way to interpret the message Plato places in the last sentence
of his second-longest dialogue.
2 Philosophical inquiry as a journey
Before we examine Plato’s Politeia, an overview of the concept of ‘journey’ in general
will help our understanding of the philosophical journey. It is not easy to define what is
and is not counted as a journey. Besides, the existence of several terms in ancient Greek,
implying a journey in the broad sense, makes this task more complicated.3 Nonetheless,
it is not the main aim of this section to judge which terms belong to the journey category.
Let me first loosely define the concept.
Despite the variety of terms, if a certain word indicates a movement that contains
the following two elements, we possibly understand it under the concept of a journey:
leaving a place with which a person is familiar and acquiring something, whether ma-
terial or intellectual, that could not be found as long as the person stays at the original
location. Using these two conditions, we find that journeys in ancient Greek written ma-
terial can be grouped into two categories: (1) a journey in the literal sense includes those
taken by (quasi-) fictional figures, such as Odysseus, and those reported to be taken by
historic figures, such as Plato; and (2) a journey in the metaphorical or intellectual sense
does not have to include physical motion but occurs in someone’s mind or intellect,
sometimes in a conversation.
Journey (1) is characterized by a linear movement in general, even though it in-
cludes detours and other adventures. Simplified, such movements are described as ‘go-
ing there and going back’. People taking this kind of journey, whether they are historical
or fictional, depart from their homelands or the places with which they are familiar and,
after a while, return to the places where they started their travels. This feature also im-
plies that journey (1) has clear aims or destinations. People’s journeys or movements are
eventually the means to reach their destinations and fulfill their aims. Consider some
examples. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, Odysseus leaves his homeland to beat the Trojan
enemies. After accomplishing this goal, he tries to return to his homeland. His depar-
ture from his homeland has a clear, simple aim and destination. As another example,
Plato leaves Athens to answer the request of Dion, who wants him to educate (or to do
3 The apparently most famous one is νόστος, which
describes, for example, the process of Odysseus’
return home from Troy to Ithaca (cf. Od. 1.5). In
Plato’s texts, we can find for instance πορεία (cf.
Phaid. 115a).
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philosophy with) the young tyrant of Syracuse.4 This goal is not attained in the way that
Plato wishes, and he returns to Athens in despair. Nevertheless, his journey has a clear
aim and destination.
In contrast, journey (2) does not necessarily include linear movement. Plato’s philo-
sophical journey can be pictured with the zigzag motion or the dialectic (dialektische
Aufhebung).5 This difference in the motion can originate from the clarity of the aims
that are set in the journeys. The destinations of philosophical journeys are usually quite
vague, especially in the case of Plato’s so-called aporetic dialogues. Unlike journey (1),
people who attempt to go on journey (2) are unsure of what they could retain by under-
taking it. Their only aim is to escape the situation where they are trapped in dark and
blurred knowledge. Note that this aim differs from that of attaining new knowledge.
Those who endeavor to take the philosophical journey do not know at the beginning
whether it will be able to bring them something new. This special character entails a
tricky problem on its own.
This difficulty is introduced in Plato’s Meno in the form of the paradox of philosoph-
ical inquiries referred to by Meno, who is familiar with the “eristic argument” (Meno
80d–e).6 The point of the paradox is that we cannot search for a thing if we do not know
what it is. Even if we were to find it, we cannot recognize it as the object of our search.
Otherwise, if we are able to identify it as such, it necessarily means that we have already
known what we are looking for. Hence, the method of philosophical inquiries leads to
‘puzzlement’ (aporia).
Comparing this paradox to our previous observation, we notice that the puzzlement
that the paradox leads to characterizes the uniqueness of the philosophical journey. The
question that Meno asks Socrates can be formulated as follows and is also directed to
those who attempt to make a philosophical journey: how can we take a journey, although
we do not have a clear, particular destination? This question does not serve as a spiteful
means to refute the inclusion of the philosophical journey under the broader concept of
a journey. Rather, its function is to caution; it warns that an intellectual inquiry – that
is, the philosophical journey – is unlike a treasure hunt through which someone will
discover something given externally.
Related to this point, it should also be noted that the end of a philosophical journey
differs from that of journey (1). While journey (1) ends with the return to the traveler’s
4 The whole story of Plato’s travel to Syracuse is re-
ported in his Seventh Letter.
5 The hypothetic method of inquiries (Phaid. 100b–
102a) and the dialectic (Rep. 532b–535a) can be de-
picted with the zigzag motion.
6 Socrates himself does not view the paradox as a well-
formulated argument. He develops the theory of
recollection as the solution or its opposing argu-
ment to the paradox after the particular passage.
Regarding this paradox, Klein mentions the differ-
ence between ‘searching’ and ‘learning’. Klein 1965,
90–92. The English translation of Meno is based on
Sedly and Long 2011.
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homeland, namely the place found comfortable, journey (2) ends by reaching the place
found uncomfortable, even if it is one’s homeland. After the philosophical journey, it is
almost impossible to return to the original position from which the journey started.
Despite some peculiarities of journey (2), as long as the movements contain the
two previously mentioned elements, we can understand them under the concept of a
journey.7 If we observe the ascent–descent motif from the perspective of the concept of
a journey sketched above, it appears not merely as a repeated motif but as the decisive
element that builds the entire dialogue of the Politeia as a philosophical journey.
3 Three passages where the ascent–descent motif appears
This section concentrates on the examination of three passages of the Politeia where the
ascent–descent motif appears: the Story of Er in Book 10, the Allegory of the Cave in
Book 7, and the opening scene in Book 1. Let’s start our inquiry into Plato’s own text.
3.1 The story of Er
Although it is placed at the end of the dialogue, it seems apt to examine first the Story
(μῦθος) of Er because it describes the journey of souls more clearly than the two other
passages. Briefly, this story has two purposes: to let people know the rewards and pun-
ishments that souls shall receive after their bodily deaths and to encourage people to
live justly. Instead of telling it simply, Socrates introduces it as a story reported by Er,
a “brave man” who died in war (614b3). In the following paragraphs, I focus on two
elements of this story: the journey of the soul(s) and Er’s role as a messenger.
First, consider the description of the journey of Er’s soul. According to Er, his soul
“made a journey (πορεύεσθαι) in the company of many” after it left his body (614b8–c1).
Er’s death itself is portrayed as a journey. Although such a depiction was not unknown
at that time,8 it is noteworthy that the journey of his soul is not expressed with any
word relating to the image of a descent. It implies that Socrates intentionally changes the
7 Plato lets the character Socrates describe his in-
quiry by comparing it with “the second voyage”
(ὁ δεύτερος πλόος) in the Phaedo. When Socrates
heard that Anaxagoras explains intelligence (νοῦς)
as “the cause of everything”, Socrates was pleased
(Phd. 97b8–c6). However, after examining the ar-
gument of Anaxagoras, he is “swept away from his
marvelous expectations” (Phd. 98b7) and decided to
pursue his “second voyage” (Phd. 99c9–d1). For the
Greek text, I use Burnet 1900. The English transla-
tion is based on Sedly and Long 2011.
8 For example, Herodotus reports the reincarnation
(Seelenwanderung) as follows: “The Egyptians were
the first who maintained the following doctrine,
too, that the human soul is immortal, and at the
death of the body enters into some other living
thing then coming to birth.” Godley 1920, Book
2.123.
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place of the afterlife that Homer offered and Homer’s followers had inherited.9 Socrates
does not depict the world of the dead as a place under the earth; it is no longer the
underworld.10 The journey of Er’s soul ended when his soul “came back to his body”
(621b6). However, the journey of the soul(s) portrayed in the story concerns not only
Er but also others. Er reports how the souls of others make their journeys. Those who
are judged to have lived justly go “up” (ἄνω) to the sky and enjoy rewards and happiness,
while those who are judged to have lived unjustly go “under” (κάτω) the earth and re-
ceive punishments and torment (614c3–d1). After a thousand-year journey, they gather
again. The just souls that rose to the sky “come down” (καταβαίνειν), while the un-
just ones “go up” (ἀνιέναι) (614d6–e1). The journey of souls in the afterlife is explicitly
illustrated by the ascent–descent motif.
The other important point in the story is the role of messenger, which Er plays.
The judges who render a decision for each soul inform Er that “he ha[s] to become a
messenger to human beings (ἄγγελος ἀνθρώποις) of the things” in the afterlife, “and
they [tell] him to listen and to look at everything in the place” (614d1–3). A few pages
later, he is again called “the messenger from that place” (ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος) (619b2). Er
is instructed to become the messenger, as well as the witness to the truth of the afterlife.
To know the truth, humans are in need of a messenger who tells the truth to others
and who “save[s]” (σώζειν) the story (621b8).11 This point is decisive if we consider it
together with the previous one. As already stated, Plato – or Socrates as the storyteller
– seems intentionally to change the picture of the afterlife that has been inherited from
Homer and his followers. To tell a new type of journey of the soul, Plato calls neither
Odysseus nor Orpheus, who have both been accepted as messengers from the afterlife,
but Er as a new messenger.12
In this way, Er’s story pictorially represents the journey that all souls are fated to
take after leaving their bodies. Souls in this story are depicted to some extent as having a
close relation with the bodies in which they once dwelled because they are able to move
physically, upwards and downwards, at least as far as Socrates – or the original narrator
9 Socrates names “tragedy and its leader, Homer” as
those who are said to “know all arts and all things
human ... and the divine things too” (598d8–e2).
10 Männlein-Robert emphasizes this point: Männlein-
Robert 2014, 55; Männlein-Robert 2016. Some pas-
sages imply that the world of the dead is somewhere
in or above the sky, which can be compared with
the image of the Christian heaven. This world-view
is also shared in the soul-chariot allegory of the Phae-
drus (246a–254e). Additionally, the astronomical ob-
servations seem to reinforce the image of the world
of the dead as placed somewhere in or above the sky.
11 Halliwell comments on the word ‘save’ as follows:
“The presumable point is that most tales ‘perish’
as soon as they are told; Plato’s sow a seed that can
grow in us.” Halliwell 1988, 193.
12 Männlein-Robert’s view supports this point: “An-
ders als Odysseus gelangt er jedoch nicht ab-
sichtlich, sondern als zufällig ausgewählter Bote
dorthin. Sein nüchterner Botebericht wird im Kon-
text der Politeia vom Philosophen Sokrates referiert
und dezidiert als Gegenstück zur homerischen Lü-
genmärchengeschichte des mythischen Helden
Odysseus beschrieben” (Männlein-Robert 2014, 56).
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Er – describes them. This ‘saved’ story becomes known through the mouth of a brave
warrior, a “randomly selected messenger”.13
3.2 Allegory of the cave
Let us move on to examine a passage found in Book 7: the Allegory of the Cave. It is
undoubtedly one of the climaxes of the dialogue.14 In the following paragraphs, we read
the text step by step, paying attention to three points that are important for our inquiry:
the bound state of prisoners, the compulsion of ascent, and the compulsion of descent.
Socrates begins the allegory with the description of bound people or “prisoners”
(δεσμῶται) in the cave to “make an image of our nature in its education and want of
education” (514a1–2). Their necks and legs are bound. Therefore, they are unable to
flee from the cave and to “turn” (περιάγειν) their heads around (514b1–3). As a result,
their heads are always directed toward the wall. A fire is burning behind them; between
them and the fire lies a “path” (ὁδός) on which human beings carry all sorts of artifacts
(514b3–7). Due to this environment, the prisoners always see only shadows on the wall
and believe that these are real. Additionally, since voices and sounds, which originally
come from things moving on the path between the fire and the prisoners, echo against
the wall, they believe that these voices and sounds come from the shadows (515b7–9).
This is “our nature” (ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις) (514a1–2). It shows how much humans’ visual
and auditory perceptions are deceived. Note that people are already “under the earth”
(ἐν καταγείῳ) in the cave (514a3), although Socrates does not mention how they have
descended to the cave. This means assumedly that humans are generally born with visual
and auditory senses that are often hindrances to attaining a higher form of existence.
The second and the third points concern the hypothetical experiment of what hap-
pens to the prisoners when released from their yokes. This experiment begins with the
scene depicting “someone” (τις) attempting to release a bound person.15 After doing so,
this someone “suddenly compels (ἀναγκάζοιτο) him to stand up (ἀνίστασθαι), to turn
his neck around, to walk and look up (ἀναβλέπειν) toward the light” (515c6–8). The
prisoner is forced to do all of the acts that he could never attempt in his bound state.
The contrast between the prisoner’s situation and what “someone” compels the prisoner
to do distinctly illustrates how demanding the first stage of the liberation is. However,
the liberation process has just begun. Subsequently, someone “drags him away from the
cave by force (βίᾳ) along the rough, steep, upwards way (ἀνάβασις)” (515e5). In this
13 Männlein-Robert 2014, 56.
14 If we follow Szlezák’s argument, the Politeia is con-
structed symmetrically, putting Books 5 to 7 at the
center. See Szlezák 1984, 38; Szlezák and Rufner
2000, 920–922.
15 Here, both the person who attempts to release and
the person who is released are written in the singu-
lar form. For example τις and αὐτῳ at 515d2.
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sentence again, using words such as “by force”, “rough”, and “steep”, Socrates empha-
sizes the difficulty of getting away from the cave. This hardship reflects the requirement
of “someone” who compels – but actually helps – the prisoners, because without this
someone, the prisoners never dare to escape from the cave. As far as Socrates describes
the situation, there is no chance for the prisoners to “stand up” and “turn [their] necks
around” by themselves. As a result, nothing ‘outside’ of the cave exists for them. The
presence of this someone, who remains anonymous,16 corresponds to the existence of
the world outside the cave. Thus, the passage regarding the prisoner’s liberation includes
two significant messages; the liberation must be compelled by someone and its process
is extremely difficult. As shown, the liberation process is characterized by an ascending
motion, suggested by the words “stand up”, “look up”, and “upwards way”.
The latter part of the hypothetical experiment involves the return of the people who
have been released and have gone outside the cave. After staying outside, “they are not
willing to mind the business of human beings (τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων), but … their souls
are always eager to spend their time above (ἄνω)” (517c6–d1). If they go back down
to the cave, they have to “contest about shadows of justice” with others who still and
always will remain in the cave (517d6–9). The discomfort of returning to the cave is not
limited to this aspect, however. If those released attempt to liberate other prisoners so
that the latter group can also enjoy what the former has savored outside, the latter group
resists the former’s efforts; the prisoners “would kill” those who attempt to release them
(517a6). Therefore, the released group’s unwillingness to return to the cave originates
not only from simple comfort but also from the danger of dying. Nevertheless, the peo-
ple who have been outside the cave are neither allowed to “remain” (καταμένειν) there
nor “be unwilling to go down again” (ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν) (519d4–5). Just as
people were compelled to turn their necks around and to go up after they were liber-
ated, now they are forced again to return to the cave. This passage, which seems to hint
at Socrates’ death sentence, is also characterized by the compulsory turn from comfort
to discomfort.17 Contrasted to the former one, this turn is described with the descent
motion (καταβαίνειν).
Thus, the Allegory of the Cave depicts the ascent–descent motif on two different
levels. On one hand, it presents a concrete image of the cave and the prisoners who are
16 We may regard this ‘someone’ as Socrates himself.
Männlein-Robert explains this ‘someone’ by com-
parison with Odysseus, arguing: “Wie Odysseus
seine Geschichte, in der er als Οὖτις/ ,Niemand‘
erforderlich aus der Höhle entkommt, selbst erzählt,
so erzählt auch Sokrates sein Höhlengleichnis mit
dem τις/ ,Jemand‘ der aus der Höhle aufsteigen und
herausführen kann, selbst (auch der Armenier Er
erzählt das eigene Ergebnis)” (Männlein-Robert
2013, 249).
17 Unlike the ascent, we do not know whether those
who go back down to the cave will find comfort
there again. Glaucon defines life in the cave as
“worse” (χεῖρον) than that outside it (519d8–9).
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bound under the earth, released, and then led above; this is the level of the image.18 On
the other hand, the ascent described here does not actually indicate physical movements.
Socrates argues that it explains not simply the “twirling of a shell” (στροφή) but “the
turning of a soul around (ψυχῆς περιαγωγή) from a day that is like night to the true day”
(521c5–7). Since the allegory is defined as “the turning of a soul”, we can also understand
the ascending motion in a metaphorical sense. Therefore, it indicates that the incidents
described in the allegory actually happen interiorly to human beings, or more precisely,
in their souls. Unlike the Story of Er, a soul is able to experience ascent and descent
without dying.19 However, the situation where the liberated are placed is tenser than
that faced by Er, for in the worst case, death awaits those who are released. This death
may also indicate something that should be understood figuratively, but in any case, the
descent clearly involves painful discomfort, which is not mentioned in the Story of Er.
Nonetheless, the compulsory moment of descent plays a significant role in the opening
scene.
3.3 Opening scene
We can find a clear representation of the descent motif in the opening scene (327a1–
328e7). In relation to the previous examinations, three points should be noted: the motif
of descent in the first line, the compulsion by Polemarchus, and Cephalus’ request.
Let us start by reading the first line: “I went down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon,
son of Ariston” (κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος; 327a1–2).
To reiterate, the very first word of the dialogue is κατέβην (I went down). However, the
place where Socrates heads to is neither the underworld nor the cave but the port city
Piraeus. A. Bloom comments as “the center of Athenian commerce, it was the place to
find all the diversity and disorder that come from foreign lands”.20 Piraeus is the point
where diverse cultures and viewpoints meet. The first sentence further includes two
details that attract our attention. First, the whole story is introduced as an incident that
occurred “yesterday”. The narrator Socrates always tells the story to his interlocutors, as
well as the readers of the Politeia, in the time frame of “today”. Second, Socrates went
down to Piraeus “with Glaucon”, which means that Socrates’ descent is not solitary. This
18 In the beginning of the allegory, Socrates says,
“Next, then, ... make an image (ἀπείκασον) of our
nature in its education and want of education, liken-
ing it to a condition of the following kind” (514a1–
2, emphasis added).
19 However, we can also find a point shared with the
Story of Er, where death is depicted as a soul’s jour-
ney, equivalent to the departure from its body or its
physical material. In the Allegory of the Cave, the
cave is pictured as a place where visual and auditory
perceptions interrupt a person’s way upwards or
paths to knowledge. Thus, the liberation from the
cave can be compared with death as the departure
from the body. This must be the reason why phi-
losophy is called “practicing dying” in the Phaedo
(67e5).
20 Bloom 1991, 440–441.
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point seems different from the situation of the released who is portrayed as going back
down alone among the prisoners in the cave.21 Additionally, the person accompanied
by Socrates is Glaucon, “son of Ariston”, who is one of Plato’s brothers. Plato is also a
“son of Ariston”.22
The second noteworthy point in the opening scene is the compulsion by Pole-
marchus. Polemarchus “ordered” (ἐκέλευσε) his slave boy to “order” (κελεῦσαι) Socrates
and Glaucon to wait for him (327b3–4). As the author, Plato quotes the boy’s words
again, “The boy said, ‘Polemarchus orders (κελεύει) you to wait’” (327b5).23 Plato uses
the word “order” three times in three lines to emphasize the compulsory character of
Polemarchus’ words. This compulsion appears more powerful when Polemarchus forces
Socrates to choose between two options: either Socrates and Glaucon “prove [them-
selves] stronger” than Polemarchus and his companions or “stay” with Polemarchus
(327c9–11). Polemarchus also adds that Socrates will fail to “persuade” (πεῖσαι) him to
let Socrates go because he has no desire to listen to Socrates’ opinion at all. Since Socrates
and Glaucon actually have no choice other than staying with Polemarchus and his com-
panions, Glaucon (not Socrates) decides to follow them to Polemarchus’ house.24 Note
that the descent to Piraeus is not against Socrates’ will because he himself went there
for the purpose of observing the Thracian festival. However, this descent by “turning
around” (μετεστράφην) (327b6) and “staying” in Piraeus is against his will.
We can find one more compulsory element in Cephalus’ words, which appear more
moderate than those of his son Polemarchus. Cephalus complains that Socrates does
not come down (θαμίζειν καταβαίνων) to him in Piraeus very often, which is what he
“should” (χρῆν) actually do (328c6). Cephalus’ grievance against Socrates suggests that
they normally live in different places. Cephalus resides somewhere ‘down there’, while
Socrates dwells somewhere ‘above’. Although Piraeus is the crossing point of ‘down’ and
‘above’, the fact that Socrates and Glaucon meet Polemarchus and Cephalus in the port
city and that Cephalus requests that Socrates come down hint at the difficulty for those
down there to go above. Cephalus repeats his request at the end of the same passage,
“Come here regularly (φοίτα) to us as to friends and your very own kin” (ὡς παρὰ φί-
λους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους) (328d5–7). Cephalus shows his will to become like Socrates’
“friends” and his “very own kin”, whom Socrates visits often.
The opening scene attracts the readers’ attention to the descending movement with
its very first word, although we cannot find its corresponding movement (i.e., the ascent)
21 An example is “if such a man (ὁ τοιοῦτος) were to
come down again” (516e3–4). On the other hand,
it is possible that there are some people who are re-
leased and go outside the cave, because Socrates says
“not to permit them (αὐτοῖς) what is now permit-
ted” (519d2).
22 If we accept that the emphasis is placed on the “son
of Ariston”, we may be able to consider Plato the
actual companion of Socrates in this descent.
23 Szlezák 1985, 273–275.
24 Szlezák 1985, 272.
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in Book 1. The situation under which Socrates and Glaucon are placed, confronting
Polemarchus who compels them to stay down there, reminds us of the circumstances
surrounding those who are liberated and then return to the cave. However, unlike the
prisoners who attempt to kill the liberated, the elderly man down in Piraeus expects to
become like the ‘friends’ of Socrates. Although the same motif of descent is used in the
allegory and in the opening scene, these two passages create opposite impressions.
4 Comparison of the three passages
So far, we have read three passages from the Politeia, using the ascent–descent motif as a
clue. First, let me summarize them from the perspective of the concept of a journey so
that we can understand how the three separate passages are interrelated.
The Story of Er depicts how souls take their journeys, with ascending and descend-
ing motions. In other words, the ascent–descent motif connotes the journey(s) of the
soul(s) in the Politeia. The narrative is told as a true story through the messenger Er.
His soul’s journey enables him to convey a new and true perspective on the afterlife,
which differs from the widely held view.25 Er’s role as a messenger suggests that the
journey, especially that of souls, brings people new Weltanschauung, which can be called
‘knowledge’ in the broad sense.
The ascent–descent motif that we sporadically find in the Story of Er appears in
the Allegory of the Cave in a clearer way. If we compare the ascending and descending
motions of the released with the description of the movements of souls in Er’s story,
the process of liberation from the bound state in the cave can be interpreted as a sort of
journey. Er, who is released from his body, journeys to the afterlife and after acquiring a
new perspective, returns to deliver the message; that is, the new Weltanschauung, which
will never be obtained as long as one’s soul is detained in one’s body.
Similarly, the opening scene can be regarded as illustrating part of the journey be-
cause the descent motif appears quite obviously there. While the journey beginning in
the opening scene completely differs from the other two journeys, it is often said that
Plato alludes to the Allegory of the Cave and the bitter fate awaiting the people released
from the cave in the beginning of the dialogue.26 The descent motif and the description
of Socrates being compelled to stay can easily be associated with the same images ap-
pearing in the last half of the allegory. Indeed, the opening scene and the allegory share
some points in terms of the descent motif. Socrates is not allowed to stay someplace
25 Regarding this point, Halliwell argues: “It is, in ef-
fect, a reinvented myth, and as such one contribu-
tion to Plato’s larger project of (re)appropriating
the medium of myth for his own philosophical pur-
poses.” Halliwell 2007, 447.
26 For example Burnyeat 1998, 6.
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“above” and is compelled to “stay” at the place where people live with others. What is
contested in the house of Cephalus can be understood as shadows of justice because the
interlocutors of Socrates cannot discover a firm definition of justice in the conversation
made in Book 1 of the Politeia. Cephalus’ house, where Socrates and Glaucon have just
arrived, seems to possess the same characteristics as the cave, where the prisoners com-
pete for the best “knowledge” about shadows, and the surroundings of Er, whose soul
has just returned to his body.
However, if we focus too much on the common points, we will lose sight of what
the journey in the beginning of the whole dialogue actually is. First, we should not for-
get one crucial difference between the opening scene and the allegory. Specifically, the
people in Cephalus’ house do not try to kill Socrates, while the bound people in the
cave would “get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release and lead up”
those who are released and try to liberate other prisoners (517a4–6).27 On the contrary,
Cephalus requests that Socrates come down and visit him and his company often (θαμί-
ζειν and φοιτᾶν). What, then, does Cephalus’ readiness bring to the journey of Socrates
and Glaucon?
To explore this point more precisely, a small excursion to other Platonic texts will
be helpful. We can find an expression similar to Cephalus’ words in the Laches, one of
Plato’s earlier aporetic dialogues. Lysimachus, who had not met Socrates until the day
of the dialogue, says to Socrates, “You ought to have visited us often and thought [of] us
as your kin” (181c1–2).28 After they become acquainted, Lysimachus says that Socrates
should visit him and his company, so they can keep their friendship (φίλια). Needless
to say, Lysimachos’ words, “to visit us often” (φοιτᾶν) and “to think of us as your kin”
(οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι), are equivalent to those of Cephalus.
In the beginning of the dialogue, he promises his interlocutors twice that he will
“speak frankly” (παρρησιάζεσθαι) (178a4–5, 179c1–2). After becoming acquainted with
Socrates, he asks Socrates to regard him as “one of your best-willing friends” (εὐνούστα-
τόν σοι) (181b8–c1). Lysimachos emphasizes his two essential traits: frankness (παρρη-
σία) and goodwill (εὔνοια). Michel Foucault argues that in this text we can “see the
series of precautions taken to set up the conditions, the zone of truth-telling”.29 To put it
another way, these attributes constitute the preconditions or requisites for those who try
to acquire truth. In the Gorgias as well, frankness and goodwill are counted as two of the
three qualities that Socrates demands of a person “who would sufficiently test (βασανί-
27 As Bloom mentions, the opening scene could be an
allusion to Socrates’ trial. Bloom 1991, 310. How-
ever, as I point out later, even Thrasymachus does
not try to kill Socrates.
28 For the Greek text of the Laches, I use Burnet 1903.
The English translation of the Laches is based on
Jowett 1931.
29 Foucault, Ewald, and Burchell 2011, 128–130.
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ζειν) a soul” (487a1–3).30 The settings of the Laches and the Gorgias prepare the space that
enables “a permanent test of the soul, a basanos (test) of the soul”, in Foucault’s words.31
Note that these characteristics only offer the space necessary for the emergence of truth.
They do not guarantee that dialogues between people with these traits will necessarily
produce or discover truth.
Returning to the Politeia, if we read the compulsion and the request of Polemarchus
and Cephalus from the perspective not only of the Allegory of the Cave but also of
“a basanos (test) of the soul”, we can find an ideal setting for philosophical inquiries in
Cephalus’ house. Thus, Socrates and Glaucon’s descending journey, originally against
Socrates’ will, begins to acquire a color different from the descent that those released
from the cave would experience. While Socrates narrates the allegory conveying the bit-
ter fate of the released, his own descent is heading in another direction that does not
lead to that bitter fate. What then is Plato’s aim in depicting the discordance between
what Socrates tells in the form of an allegory and the situation where Socrates is placed?
5 An invitation from Plato
As mentioned above, the descent motif represented with κατέβην can be associated with
the journey of the soul, just as the Story of Er shows. But at the same time, when it ap-
pears with a compulsory element, the close connection between the opening scene and
the Allegory of the Cave will be emphasized. It is not difficult to regard Socrates head-
ing to Piraeus as parallel to the liberated prisoner returning to the cave. On the other
hand, Cephalus’ eagerness to be in Socrates’ company seems to suggest that something
different from the bitter fate that the liberated would suffer is awaiting the figure of
Socrates in the Politeia. By preparing the house of Cephalus, Plato endeavors to write
another scenario, which is different not only from the fate awaiting the liberated in the
allegory, but also from the real misfortune that befell Socrates.32 The following investi-
gation shall explain why we can see that the descent of Socrates depicted in the opening
scene hints at another fate for the prisoners liberated from the cave, paying attention to
the concept of a journey that was the original starting point of our entire inquiry.
As previously stated, the character of Cephalus makes the opening scene distinct
from the other two passages. His frankness and goodwill secure the space for the “basanos
(test) of a soul”. Perhaps Thrasymachus, the main interlocutor in Book 1, plays a role
30 The rest is episteme or knowledge. Socrates tells this
to Callicles, who is one of the most hostile figures in
Plato’s dialogues. For the Greek text of the Gorgias, I
use Burnet 1903.
31 Foucault, Gros, and Burchell 2010, 366–367.
32 Socrates was sentenced to death for impiety against
the gods of Athens and corruption of youth (Apol.
19b and 23c).
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similar to that of those who “get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release
and lead up” the prisoners. He is indeed aggressive toward Socrates: he “hunched up like
a wild beast, he flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336b5–6). But thanks to
the secured space prepared by Cephalus and the dialectical conversation with Socrates,
Thrasymachus becomes gradually calm and finally shows his willingness to listen to
Socrates.33
Although the house of Cephalus is portrayed as an appropriate space for the philo-
sophical inquiry Socrates is undertaking, it should be stressed that it is merely the start-
ing point of the philosophical journey. The house where Socrates’ interlocutors gather
is not a ὁδός (path) on the journey. Now let’s focus on how Socrates uses the word ὁδός
in the opening scene.
After Cephalus requests Socrates visit him in Piraeus more often, Socrates answers,
“I am really delighted to discuss with the very old …, one ought, in my opinion, to
learn from them what sort of path (τινὰ ὁδόν) it is” (328d8–e2). Here, Socrates com-
pares one’s life, or way of life, to ὁδός. The literal meaning of ὁδός is ‘path’ or ‘road’, but
here Socrates uses this word in a very metaphorical sense. Its meaning is almost equiva-
lent to ‘life’; to walk the path means growing old and living one’s life. In this sense, the
old Cephalus represents one of the predecessors whose footsteps will be followed by the
younger people. The path, as life, is not homogeneous for all people. Each person walks
his/her own path, but there are several types of paths. The path of Cephalus is charac-
terized by his piety, because in the middle of the discussion Cephalus leaves to “offer
a sacrifice to the divine” (331d10). While this behavior seems to portray Cephalus as a
devout old man, it can also be regarded as evidence of him being afraid of the afterlife,
whose image has been brought to him by the stories he has heard since his childhood.34
Thus, Cephalus is often seen as a figure representing those with conservative views of
the afterlife.35
Socrates chooses another path on which Cephalus has not walked. On one hand,
Socrates cannot follow the footsteps of Cephalus, because Cephalus leaves Socrates and
other younger ones, although he was eager to talk with Socrates. Many prevailing stories
concerning the afterlife hinder Cephalus from listening to the message delivered by
Socrates and, as a result, from walking the path Socrates is to walk. On the other hand,
Socrates does not choose the path Cephalus has chosen, because he has already chosen
33 Thrasymachus urges Socrates to continue talking
about the regime at 450a–b.
34 This point is clearly shown in the following words
of Cephalus: “The tales told about what is in Hades
... at which he laughed up to then, now make his
soul twist and turn because he fears they might be
true” (330d7–e2). As to this point, my understand-
ing relies largely on Lear’s following comment:
“[Cephalus] can now recognize the Achilles tale
as a story, but the tale has already done its psychic
work. And by the time he tries in adulthood to
think about what courage is, he is already looking
out from Achilles’ perspective.” (Lear 2006, 30).
35 For example Blackburn 2006, 28.
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another path, which leads upwards. Socrates stayed in Piraeus to show this upward path
to his interlocutors.
Yet, an inconsistency appears here. If we assume that the ascent–descent motif de-
scribed in the allegory is a model of the philosophical journey, the inquiry into justice is
supposed to be described with an ascending motion. Thus, I now propose the following
interpretation: Socrates needs to descend so that he may ascend with friends with whom
he is capable of acquiring a new Weltanschauung. This interpretation is supported by the
last sentence of the Politeia, where Socrates says, “We shall always keep to the upper path”
(τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἑξόμεθα) (621c4–5). We can associate this expression with the upward
way in the cave, which leads to the entrance (or the exit) of the cave (515e6). The “up-
per path” indicates the path leading to the outside of the cave, the yoke of ignorance. I
believe we are allowed to regard this upper path in the last sentence as corresponding
to the descent in the first sentence.
The difference between the first and the last sentence is, however, not only the direc-
tion. The last sentence has the verb ἑξόμεθα (‘we shall keep’ or ‘we will have’), whereas
Socrates uses κατέβην (‘I went down’) in the opening. The numerus and the tempus of
the verbs make a sharp contrast. The change of numerus from first person singular to
first person plural connotes that Socrates acquired his companions throughout the di-
alogue, with whom he is able to go above. Socrates’ use of the future form in the last
sentence hints that a new philosophical journey is about to begin. But if this is so, who
is included in the ‘we’ who shall keep the upper path?
There is no definite answer to this question because Plato does not write about it.
However, if we recall that the Politeia begins with Socrates’ narration without referring
to whom he tells his story about ‘yesterday’, it seems reasonable to argue that “we” in
the last sentence includes not only Socrates’ interlocutors and the attendees there,36
but also the readers of the Politeia to whom Socrates tells his story from the viewpoint
of ‘today’. The one who prepares this setting is, needless to say, the author Plato. By
making the dialogue open-ended, Plato invites us, the readers of his dialogue, to a further
philosophical journey.
36 The dialogue attendees are not equal to the inter-
locutors of Socrates; that is, Glaucon, Adeimantus,
Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and Cephalus. In ad-
dition to these interlocutors, five people are named
(Nicheratus at 327c2 and Lysias, Euthydemus, Char-
mantides, and Cleitophon at 328b4–7), although
there seems to be more people because Socrates says
“and some others” (καὶ ἄλλοι τινές) at 327c2–3.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper examined how Plato depicts philosophical inquiries as journeys of souls, us-
ing the ascent–descent motif. The Story of Er describes the journey to the afterlife of
Er’s soul as well as the journey of others’ souls with ascending and descending move-
ments. In the Allegory of the Cave, the liberation of the prisoners in the cave is pictured
with compulsory ascent and descent. The opening scene appears to be an allusion to the
Allegory of the Cave at first sight, but our close examination revealed it has some pecu-
liarities that make Socrates’ descent to Piraeus different from the compulsory descent of
the liberated prisoners.
By means of the same motif, Plato on the one hand illustrates as philosophical jour-
neys all philosophical inquiries that bring people new perspectives about the world, but
on the other hand he tries to convey that we are also undertaking a philosophical journey
by reading his dialogue. We should not forget that Plato wrote the Politeia. Because it was
intended to be published, Plato wrote it with the awareness that it would have readers.37
The role of a messenger was handed down from Er to Socrates and Socrates passed on
the message to his interlocutors, especially Glaucon and Adeimantus within literature,
but also to his young friend Plato in the real world. Now Plato tries to pass the message
he received from Socrates to us, his readers. We open Plato’s books and read them, be-
cause we are “really delighted with the very old” philosophers and we think “one ought
to learn from them what sort of path” they have made (328d8–e2). The Politeia shows us
only one of numerous possible paths to knowledge. As the request of Cephalus triggered
the discussion led by Socrates, for us, the readers, the Politeia functions as an invitation
from Plato that brings us to the journey of our own souls. He provokes his readers to
participate in the dialectic and write a continuation of his dialogue.
37 It is well known that after Plato’s death people
found “a wax tablet with [the] first words of the
Politeia written and rewritten in different arrange-
ments”. Burnyeat 1998, 4. Diogenes Laertius reports
this anecdote as follows: “Euphorion and Panaetius
relate that the beginning of the Politeia was found
several times revised and rewritten.” Hicks 1938, III.
37. See also Adam 1963, 1.
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Philo’s De migratione Abrahami: The Soul’s Journey of
Self-Knowledge as Criticism of Stoic oikeiôsis
Summary
This paper considers Philo of Alexandria’s interpretation of Abraham’s journey from Chal-
daea to Palestine, foregrounding Philo’s use of the journey as a metaphor to criticize the
Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. The journey is a metaphor that helps Philo to advance his views
about self-knowledge as an alternative to this Stoic theory of moral progress. In this implicit
polemic, Philo suggests that the Stoic theory guides us in the wrong direction, remains too
immanentist, and posits an end state to a process that has no end.
Keywords: Philo; self-knowledge; Stoics; oikeiôsis; polemic
In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass die Interpretation der Reise des Abraham von
Chaldaea nach Palästina im Werk Philons von Alexandrien implizit eine Kritik der stoi-
schen Oikeiôsislehre darstellt. Das Bild der Reise ermöglicht es Philon, seine Vorstellungen
über Selbsterkenntnis als Alternative zur stoischen Theorie der ethischen Entwicklung zu
formulieren. Durch seine implizite Auseinandersetzung legt Philon nahe, dass die stoische
Theorie sich in eine falsche Richtung entwickelt hat; zu immanent bleibt; und einen End-
zustand eines Prozesses annimmt, der kein Ende haben kann.
Keywords: Philon; Selbsterkenntnis; Stoiker; oikeiôsis; Polemik
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The metaphor of a journey can play many different philosophical roles including, as
this paper aims to show, that of criticism. In his treatise De migratione Abrahami, Philo
of Alexandria interprets the biblical account of Abraham’s journey from Chaldaea to
Palestine as an allegorical description of the soul’s development from attachment to
the body and the sensible world, to a grasp of the transcendent deity.1 An important
aspect of Philo’s interpretation is that he sees the soul’s development as a process of
getting to know oneself. This is remarkable considering that Genesis 12.1–6, the text of
which Philo’s treatise offers an exegesis, does not speak of self-knowledge. Why then does
Philo choose to talk about self-knowledge in this context? First, because he thinks self-
knowledge is an important part of what a soul must acquire to improve itself. Second,
and this is what I hope to establish in this paper, the image of the journey, as described
in this Genesis passage, offers Philo a useful vehicle to present his Platonizing ideas about
self-knowledge as a criticism of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis (‘familiarization’).
While there is much in Stoicism with which Philo agrees, he decidedly rejects their
materialism, pantheism, and the positive view of nature in their ethics.2 This rejection
also shows in Philo’s criticism of oikeiôsis, which is the theory the Stoics offer to account
for moral development. Interestingly, Philo never makes his engagement with this the-
ory explicit.3 The metaphor of the journey is used as a useful vehicle for Philo to develop
this criticism because it allows him to show, without having to say it explicitly, that the
theory of oikeiôsis has been developed in the wrong direction, that true growth needs to
surpass the boundaries that oikeiôsis sets us, and that self-knowledge is never achieved,
only striven for.
1 Philo’s concern is primarily exegetical: he believes
that Scripture contains the highest wisdom and
philosophical truth and tries to bring this out as
much as he can. In his case, this has the remarkable
implication that interpretations of different passages
need not necessarily be philosophically consistent
with one another. Moreover, events or people men-
tioned in the Bible do not necessarily receive the
same interpretation in different treatises. For this
reason, one ought to be very careful in explaining
one Philonic text by means of another. In this paper
I have, therefore, kept references to other works of
Philo to a minimum, including references to texts
that are close to De migratione (Migr.), such as De
Abrahamo (Abr.) 62–80 and De somniis (Somn.) 1.41–
67: there are many parallels between these texts,
but since Philo’s concern in the other two texts is
a different one, such parallels function within a
different interpretative whole. (My references to
Philo’s works follow the standard abbreviations of
the Studia Philonica Annual.) On the issue of Philo’s
‘contrainte exégétique’ and the relative nature of his
thought (relative to a particular text of Scripture),
see the emphatic position of Nikiprowetzky 1977,
esp. 236–242. – Related to the theme of the journey
is that of flight and exile, on which see Runia 2009.
2 See Hadas-Lebel 2003, 271–274, for a brief overview
of Philo’s attitude towards Stoicism (which empha-
sizes the continuities between Philo and the Stoics).
For an inventory of passages in which Philo uses Pla-
tonic and Stoic ideas on the soul see Reydams-Schils
2008. For a corrective of the common view that
Philo adheres to Stoicism on the issue of the pas-
sions see Lévy 2009, 156–161. Long 2008 urges cau-
tion about using Philo as evidence for Stoic views
on physics.
3 He does not do so anywhere in his writings: see the
important study of Lévy 1998 as well as Lévy 2009,
146–148.
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In what follows, I will first briefly introduce three stages of self-knowledge that Philo
distinguishes. I will review the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis in section two, and provide ev-
idence that Philo engages with this theory in section three. Sections four, five, and six
discuss the three stages of self-knowledge in more detail in order to tease out the sub-
stance of Philo’s criticism of the Stoics.
1 Philo’s three stages of self-knowledge
From the various statements that Philo makes about self-knowledge in De migratione, it
is possible, with some simplification, to distinguish three stages: ignorance, study of the
senses, and the move towards knowledge of god.4 There are some passages that compli-
cate the picture, which I will discuss later. The first stage is that of the natural philoso-
phers, which Philo associates with the Chaldaeans. It is a state of complete ignorance
of oneself combined with the illusion that one has knowledge about the universe and
about phenomena contained within it. The call to self-knowledge is meant to pull peo-
ple away from this state and into the next stage of self-knowledge. The second stage of
self-knowledge is the study of the body and the senses, which should lead to a discov-
ery of the worth of the intellect. Philo locates it in Haran, the place where Abraham
(and his father Terah) lived for a while. It is associated with the realisation that one lacks
knowledge about many things, and that one would do best first to get to know oneself.
In the final stage, self-knowledge is tied up with knowledge of god. It remains unclear,
here as elsewhere in Philo, to what extent one can really have knowledge of god.5 This
third stage really consists in a transition from the previous form of self-knowledge. Philo
mentions the idea that self-knowledge allows us to know god as the cause of everything,
an ability that arises by analogy from our acquaintance with our intellect, which is the
cause with respect to the rest of our soul and body. At other moments, Philo retracts
such epistemic confidence.
4 These are based on the treatise as a whole, as dis-
cussed in this paper, but particularly the three stages
Philo himself distinguishes in 194–195. Nazzaro
1969 proposed an alternative triad: self-knowledge
as (i) an antidote to presumption, (ii) an aware-
ness of human insignificance, and (iii) a route to
knowing god. I choose to deviate from this in par-
ticular because it contains significant overlap be-
tween its second and third stages (and between all
stages in Nazzaro’s discussion). Cf. also Courcelle
1974, whose brief but sagacious treatment signals
key themes in Philo’s corpus as a whole (39–43).
5 On this matter see among other publications Früch-
tel 1968, 147–163; and Runia 2002, especially 299–
303, where he offers an analysis of Spec. 1.32–50 and
Praem. 36–46. Mackie 2009 offers a careful account
of Philo’s statements about the possibility of seeing
god, drawing out both the variance among the ideas
found and the factors that may affect their presence
(audience, focus of the exegesis, and spiritual ad-
vancement of the ‘seer’).
113
albert joosse
As we will explore below, Philo presents his thoughts on self-knowledge as part of an
alternative view of moral development to the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. However, the three
stages of self-knowledge also relate to Plato’s philosophical writings. In ways which I will
discuss in sections four and five, Philo integrates disparate elements that he finds in the
Platonic corpus, especially in the Phaedrus and in the Alcibiades I. In the Phaedrus, Socrates
famously comments that he cannot evaluate the truth of exegeses of the Boreas myth in
naturalistic terms because he has not yet come to know himself. This move of epistemic
modesty is clearly echoed in Philo’s first stage. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates claims that
self-knowledge is knowledge of oneself as a soul. He also, somewhat later, claims that
one can know oneself most of all after having come to know everything divine. These
comments are related to Philo’s second and third stages. Philo’s use of these Platonic
texts makes clear that he conceives of his criticism of the Stoics as a Platonic criticism.
Moreover, they also serve a more specific polemical purpose: like the Platonists, the
Stoics also looked to Socrates as a moral example, and the Phaedrus and Alcibiades I are
exactly the kind of texts that provided them with an understanding of Socrates.6 Before
we explore Philo’s thoughts on self-knowledge and their Platonic background further,
however, let us remind ourselves of the broad outlines of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis and
the way it extends into the Stoic view of our place in the cosmos.
2 Stoic oikeiôsis and cosmo-theology
The classic account of oikeiôsis is given in Diogenes Laertius. The amount of references to
Stoic texts that Diogenes provides inspires confidence that his account presents a more
reliably Stoic version of the theory than some other accounts.7
They [the Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation as the object of its
first impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it (oikeiousês), as
Chrysippus says in hisOn ends book 1. The first thing appropriate (prôton oikeion)
to every animal, he says, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this. …
This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate
(oikeion). …
And since reason, by way of a more perfect management [than in the case of
animal impulse], has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in ac-
cordance with reason comes to be natural for them. … Therefore Zeno … was
6 On Stoic use of the Phdr. as a Socratic text see
Brouwer 2014. For the Alcibiades I compare Cic.,
Tusc. 1.52; Epict. Diss. 3.1.
7 Notably that of Cicero’s character Cato in Fini. 3.16–
25, which could be orthodox but may well contain
Peripatetic thought too: see Schmitz 2014 for an
argument to that effect.
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the first to say that living in agreement with nature is the end, which is living
in accordance with virtue. … Further, living in accordance with virtue is equiv-
alent to living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature, as
Chrysippus says[.]8
The key factors in this account are: a) nature; b) the process of ‘familiarization’, oikeioô; c)
constitution; and d) reason. Let us briefly review the theory by looking at each of these.
(a) The theory operates within a framework of naturalism. Nature takes care of its
creatures by giving them the impulse to preserve themselves, and as such, the affective
motivation to pursue that which helps them prosper and avoid that which threatens
their existence. The Stoics provide an argument for this conclusion that means to show
the absurdity of two alternative possibilities: that nature would alienate creatures from
themselves or that it would leave them indifferent to themselves. The only way for na-
ture’s creative action not to be in vain, according to this argument, is if nature also
subsequently gives its creatures the impulse to persist, and this happens when creatures
identify with themselves.9
(b) What nature does is to familiarize (oikeioô) a creature with things in its envi-
ronment. The verb oikeioô unites different meanings that all play a role in this theory
(and I have used several in the last paragraph).10 Oikeios can mean ‘one’s own’, and it
is this sense of identification (and of possession in a derivative way) that plays a major
role in the initial stages of oikeiôsis described by Diogenes above, as well as in the ul-
timate stages of identifying with the rationality of nature and other rational agents. A
related but different sense is ‘intimate’, an affective sense that is prominent when Stoics
talk about the care taken in choosing what promotes one’s life and repelling that which
harms it. Common too is the sense ‘akin’, to which the description of the social com-
ponent of oikeiôsis makes an appeal: we can imagine other human beings as located in
ever wider concentric circles, centred around ourselves, which we are able to draw in,
so that those in distant circles come to seem like close kin.11 In this way, we come to
assume a moral stance in which we treat other people’s interests as our own, or in any
case as equal in importance to our own.12 All these meanings, hard to reproduce in any
8 Diog. Laert. 7.85–87; tr. Long and Sedley 1987.
9 On this argument see Inwood 2016. Philo himself
expresses similar ideas in other works, when speak-
ing about divine providence: see Opif. 10; Praem. 42;
Spec. leg. 3.189; Prov. 1.26.
10 On the word and the Stoics’ use of it see especially
Kerferd 1972; Görgemanns 1983, 181–187.
11 The core text here is from Hierocles, preserved in
Stobaeus 4.671.7–673.11 (text 57G in the collec-
tion of Long and Sedley 1987). For discussion see
Inwood 1984; Konstan 2016.
12 Opinions differ on whether this stance should be
described as one of impartiality (e.g. Annas 1993,
159–179, 262–276) or as identification (e.g. Algra
2003). The more ‘social’ aspect of oikeiôsis has some-
times been regarded as different from the initial,
personal oikeiôsis. See Annas 1993, 265; Inwood
1983; cf. Inwood 1985, esp. 184–194; Inwood 1999.
See also Engberg-Pedersen 1986. Lee 2002 and Algra
2003 persuasively argue for the unity of the theory.
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particular modern translation, should be kept in mind when we interpret ancient texts
about oikeiôsis.
(c) It is worth noting that when they describe the object to which one is familiarized,
the Stoics do not simply speak of self-love, but of animals’ identification or affinity with
their constitution. It is the structure of one’s being. Hence the emphasis we encounter
in many Stoic accounts on the different kinds of beings that exist. In the account in
Diogenes Laertius, we get a description divided into plants, animals, and reason (I have
included only the latter in the citation above). Animals are distinguished from plants
because they have impulses, which are necessary for them to reach for and move towards
food that does not come to them of its own accord. This impulse is the leading aspect of
their soul and, therefore, an important element in the constitution to which an animal
feels oikeios (a plant has no oikeiôsis to impulse). Since this impulse to be oikeios with
something (and act on it) comes from nature, it is the natural thing to do for an animal
to live by its impulse. (In other texts the description is extended to particular kinds of
animals, with their typical impulses towards and away from e.g. specific other animals
like predators or prey.)13 Human beings also start out in this way (children in fact have a
constitution that is very comparable to that of animals).14 As reason develops, however,
human beings start to notice rational patterns: in the actions they naturally perform
and in the workings of nature. When moral development is not stilted, a human being
comes to act from a different motivation than before; it acts, not because it has partic-
ular impulses to do and avoid certain sets of things, but because acting on such natural
impulses is the reasonable thing to do. They come, in other words, to understand them-
selves as rational beings. For them, reason has become paramount in their constitution,
and it is to reason above all that they sense themselves to be oikeios. Living rationally,
therefore, becomes the natural life for human beings.
(d) In one sense, then, the reasonable life for human beings is a life lived in accor-
dance with the reason (logos) that they sense themselves to have or be. The Stoic theory
is not, however, a subjectivist theory in which virtuous agents follow the decrees of their
own particular reason. The human faculty of reason is essentially the same as the reason
that pervades the universe.15 A virtuous life can, therefore, also be described as a life
lived in accordance with the commands of Zeus, the name the Stoics use to refer to cos-
mic rationality. Indeed, it is a major component of a rational being’s understanding of
its own constitution that it understands itself as of a piece with God. The fundamental
13 Particularly in Hierocles, Elements of Ethics II.19–
III.54 (Bastianini and Long 1992); Sen. Ep. 121 (on
this letter see Bees 2004, 16–45).
14 The focus on children in this kind of argument
(there are comparable ones in the Epicurean tradi-
tion) has earned them the name ‘cradle argument’,
coined in Brunschwig 1986.
15 For the debate about subjectivist readings of oikeiôsis
(usually taking their bearings from Cicero’s account
in Fin. 3) cf. among others Engberg-Pedersen 1986;
Lee 2002.
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importance of this cosmic sense of reason also comes to the fore in the last sentence of
the citation above, where Chrysippus fine-tunes Zeno’s slogan that the best life is a life
lived according to nature: it is specifically a life lived in accordance with the experience
of what happens naturally. For Chrysippus, then, the rational life is a natural life in two
senses: it is natural because nature produced the mechanism by which a human being
comes to identify with their rational constitution and because living rationally involves
an actual understanding of (and compliance with) the ways and means of the nature of
the whole.
It turns out, then, that the theory of oikeiôsisflows smoothly into a cosmo-theology.16
Stoic perfection consists fundamentally in regarding rationality, as expressed in the cos-
mos and in other rational beings, as one’s own. At the same time, the Stoic sage is
also very much situated in a particular environment, for which she takes responsibil-
ity. As studies in the last decades have shown, rationality requires social involvement
and proper care for the body.17 When the Roman Stoic Seneca addresses this theory
in his letter 121, he even speaks of different constitutions that he says belong to differ-
ent phases of a human life. These two perspectives – one socially embedded, the other
cosmic-rational – may lead to theoretical tensions, but they are both central to Stoic
ethics.
When we turn to Philo, it is worth stressing two aspects of the Stoic theory. First,
there is a great deal of continuity here with the thinking of other ancient schools, par-
ticularly the Peripatetics and the Platonists. The differences should not be exaggerated,
even if ancient polemic might suggest this. Second, the Stoic theory posits a funda-
mental continuity between nature and perfection. In terms of the metaphor of oikeiôsis,
Stoic moral development is at bottom a process of coming to be (and feel) at home in
the world; this is very different for Philo.
3 Philo targets oikeiôsis
Philo does not speak explicitly of ‘oikeiôsis’.18 It is nevertheless plausible that he has this
theory in view when we consider his use of related words: the root oikos (house) and
the opposite term allotriôsis (‘alienation’). Philo finds reason to speak of one’s oikos in
16 See especially Lee 2002 for the profound connec-
tions between oikeiôsis and Stoic cosmo-theology.
17 See especially Reydams-Schils 2005; Graver 2007.
18 With one exception in a different context: in
47, Philo speaks of the theoretical life being
oikeioumenos (appropriate) to a rational being. Else-
where in Philo, the term oikeiôsis and derivatives oc-
cur occasionally. For a markedly polemical use of it
(and of allotriôsis) see Post. 135; Gig. 28–29; Conf. 82.
As Lévy 1998 shows, Philo uses the term to describe
the kinship between the mind and the divine, rather
than the Stoic process, in an attempt to play down
the significance of the Stoic theory: cf. Radice 2008,
142–143; Bonazzi 2008, 246–250.
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the text of Genesis 12.1 itself: “And the Lord said unto Abraham, Depart out of your
land (gê), and out of your kindred (sungeneia), and out of your father’s house (oikos).”
(Migr. 1)19 Of course, the presence of the word ‘house’ in a text does not immediately
make it a response to oikeiôsis; but Philo uses the word in a specific way. He uses oikos
to mean embodied existence and the human constitution in general, the very condition
to which the Stoics say human beings have oikeiôsis. Initially, it is true, Philo interprets
land, kindred, and paternal home – the three things which the text says Abraham should
leave – as the body, the sense, and speech, respectively (paragraphs 2–6).20 In this initial
division, leaving the oikos is interpreted as a separation from the traps of rhetoric and
language (12).21 I shall return to this initial use of the word below. Elsewhere in the text,
however, Philo employs a broader understanding of oikos, in the description of what I
have called the second stage of self-knowledge. One should study one’s own oikos, Philo
says repeatedly when refering to this second stage. In 185, for instance, which is part of
a speech that Moses is imagined to have addressed to the Chaldaeans, we read:
Explore yourselves only and your own nature, and make your abode (oikêsantes)
with yourselves and not elsewhere: … observing the conditions prevailing in
your own individual household (kata ton idion oikon), the element that is master
in it and that which is in subjection, the living and the lifeless element, the
rational and the irrational, the immortal and the mortal, the better and the
worse.
This conception of what counts as one’s oikos includes the whole of human nature; in
terms of the threefold division from the beginning of the text, it includes the body and
the senses. The body is termed the oikos of the soul in 93. In 187, sense perception is
described as the oikos of thought (dianoia). In 189, the study of the various sense organs
and their functioning is called the investigation of one’s individual oikos. In 195, Philo
makes this identification with the three initial factors explicit, when speaking about the
mind’s “study of the features of its own abode (idios oikos), those that concern the body,
sense-perception and speech”.
The things Philo mentions in these various descriptions are the very things about
which one can have self-awareness according to the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. They are
what make up the human constitution. When he exhorts his readers and the Chaldaeans
to study their own oikos, then, he calls on them to perform an exercise of self-study that
his readers will have recognised as very similar to the initial stages of Stoic oikeiôsis.
19 Here, and throughout the paper, I use the transla-
tion of Colson and Whitaker 1932, slightly modern-
ized and with occasional modifications.
20 Philo calls the third item ho kata prophoran logos (2,
12), using a Stoic term.
21 Philo emphasizes the secondary importance of lan-
guage by describing it in Platonic terms as only an
imitation of the nature of things (12).
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What Philo propagates is not Stoic oikeiôsis, however. As I mentioned previously, it
is conspicuous that he avoids the Stoics’ own term of art, oikeiôsis, and any form of the
verb oikeioô. This already signals his polemical intent.22 Nor is the description above in
185 completely compatible with Stoic self-study: the strong dualism in the passage and
the reference to immortality establish a distance from Stoic views.
A second aspect of Philo’s treatment of the word oikos that makes an engagement
with Stoic oikeiôsis plausible is the fact that he connects embodied existence with one’s
home, as the Stoics would do, rather than with some kind of exile. The latter option
was certainly open to Philo: he makes this exact move in other treatises,23 echoing the
thought in Plato’s Timaeus that the mind is a heavenly, not an earthly plant (90a4–7). It
is, therefore, a choice on Philo’s part that in De migratione he describes existence in the
body and on this earth as home.
This brings us to the other term that establishes a link between De migratione and
Stoic oikeiôsis plausible: allotriôsis, the opposite of oikeiôsis. It comes at a prominent mo-
ment in the text, when Philo turns to the meaning of the word ‘depart’ (apelthe). He
has identified the domains from which one should depart as the body, the senses, and
speech. What does it mean to depart from them, however? Philo starts with a warning
reminiscent of Plato’s Phaedo: this is not a call to pursue a real separation, for such a
separation ‘in being’ (kata tên ousian) would mean death. It is rather a call to acquire a
mental distance from them. The decisive word here is allotriôthêti:
The words ‘Depart out of these’ are not equivalent to ‘Sever yourself from them
absolutely,’ since to issue such a command as that would be to prescribe death.
No, the words import ‘Make yourself a stranger to them in judgement and
purpose’ (tên gnômên allotriôthêti).24
Philo’s choice of words is precise; through them he reminds his readers of Stoic oikeiôsis
and makes clear that his moral ideal diverges from the Stoics’ moral ideal. He exhorts
his readers to de-familiarize themselves from their human constitution.
Terminology that reminds us of oikeiôsis recurs a little further on, when Philo dis-
cusses what it means specifically to depart from the senses. The mind, he says, has be-
come someone else’s property (allotrion agathon) in its attachment to the senses and has
cast off what is its own (idion) (10). It should stop letting itself be alienated (allotriôsas)
22 Cf. the remarks about the whole of Philo’s œuvre in
Lévy 1998, 156.
23 Philo, in places, treats Abraham’s journey itself as
a kind of exile. See for instance Her. 82: ἀποδημίαν
ἡγούμενον ὅλον τὸν μετὰ σώματος βίον, ὁπότε δὲ
δύναιτο τῇ ψυχῇ μόνῃ ζῆν, ἐν πατρίδι καταμένειν
ὑπολαμβάνοντα; Conf. 82; Somn. 1.45. Philo cites
the passage from Tim. in Plant. 17 (I am grateful to
Albert-Kees Geljon for this reference.)
24 Migr. 7.
119
albert joosse
and finally enjoy its own goods (ouk othneiôn all’ oikeiôn agathôn) (11). In another vari-
ation, Philo expresses the mental distance one should maintain from speech as living
separately from it (dioikizomenon, 12). So we see that Philo avoids strict oikeiôsis termi-
nology but uses words that are very similar to it, including its direct opposite. Moreover,
Philo urges the mind to estrange itself from the common objects of Stoic oikeiôsis; the
way to reclaim that which is its own is by withdrawing from bodily existence.
4 The first station
Referencing Philo’s vocabulary has already shown us something of his polemical treat-
ment of oikeiôsis. In order to see how Philo’s criticism plays out in more detail, let us
consider the three phases of self-knowledge in turn. Philo starts his treatise by talking
about a departure from the body, the senses, and speech. In terms of the journey of the
rational soul (represented by Abraham), however, the beginning is to be found some-
where else, in an attitude that Philo associates with the Chaldaeans. A number of dif-
ferent qualifications come together in Philo’s descriptions of the Chaldaeans. They are
astrologers, students of the stars and people who “walk on” and “talk air”,25 who claim
to know the causes of each and every natural phenomenon, who think that good and
bad result from particular stellar constellations, who emphasize the unity and harmony
of the cosmos, who regard fate as a divinity, and who identify the cosmos with god.26
The Chaldaeans of Philo’s text are commonly associated with the Stoics.27 A num-
ber of Stoic positions support this connection. First, we saw that the Stoics identify
the cosmic order with god and regard heavenly bodies, such as the stars, as gods. Sec-
ond, they regard fate as identical with this god. Third, they think that moral perfection
consists in a type of knowledge; we saw that Diogenes Laertius reports Chrysippus as
describing the moral end as “living in accordance with experience of the actual course
25 Aitherobateîte (184), aeromytheîte (138) – the latter is
an extremely rare word: this is the only occurrence
in the corpus of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, with
only four cognate forms (one of which is aeromythos
in Philo’s De sacr. 32). Both words are reminiscent
of the word aerobateô – the charge that Socrates
cloudwalked was levelled at him in Aristophanes’
Clouds (225, cf. 1503; cf. Pl. Ap. 19c4) and in 184
Philo speaks of the Chaldaeans floating in the air,
clearly alluding to the Clouds. Philo redirects the
accusation: he has a use for Socrates in his call for
self-knowledge and sees the Stoics as the cloudwalk-
ers / air talkers. (Pace Nazzaro 1969, 68 n. 75, who
denies any link with Aristophanes for the reason
that Philo uses it “mai parodistico”.) The variation
aeromytheîte is likely an allusion to Phdr. 229d–230a,
cited below. Cf. ti huper nephelas pêdâis?; in Somn.
1.54 and meteôroleschôn in Somn. 1.54 and 1.161.
26 Philo describes the Chaldaeans in 136, 138, 178–
179, 184, 187, 194. He also presents Abraham as
formerly being a Chaldaean. For discussion of the
Chaldaeans in other Philonic works see the refer-
ences in Borgen 1997, 217; Wong 1992.
27 Though rarely identified with them. See among
others the discussion in Beckaert 1961, 28 n. 1; Ru-
nia 2002, 290 cautions against identification (cf.
Sandelin 1991, 132–133).
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of nature”.28 Fourth, as treatises like Seneca’s Naturales Quaestiones demonstrate, the Sto-
ics put this conviction into practice by engaging in considerable detail with the study
of natural philosophy.29 Not all characteristics Philo ascribes to the Chaldaeans, how-
ever, are apposite descriptions of the Stoics. While the Stoics allocated an important role
to the mantic art, it would be a misrepresentation to say that they thought that good
and bad follow from particular stellar constellations. The idea that the Chaldaeans are
astrologers also seems to have more to do with traditional ideas about the Chaldaeans
than any specific Stoic convictions. To some extent, then, Philo’s Chaldaeans are a mix-
ture. They are, nevertheless, a useful textual instrument for Philo to criticize the Stoics.
Philo uses Platonic/Socratic weapons to develop this criticism. He and his Moses
call the Chaldaeans back, down from heaven, towards themselves. He considers them
and their claim to know the causes of everything as epistemically arrogant. What they
should first do, Philo urges, is to study themselves. This is a call to a Socratic condition.
As he puts it in 134, once the Chaldaeans engage in a serious study of themselves, they
will discover that they did not know what they thought they knew. Indeed, the highest
a human being will ever reach is an awareness of ignorance (more on this below, in sec-
tion 6). Not only the condition is Socratic, but so is the very move. In Plato’s Phaedrus,
Socrates is asked what he thinks of naturalistic explanations of myths; the myth in ques-
tion is about Boreas’ abduction of a nymph, which some might explain as the North
Wind’s blowing a girl off a rock. Socrates responds:
I have no time for such things; and the reason, my friend, is this. I am still
unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems
to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This
is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally believed,
and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self[.]30
Socrates’ direct concern in this passage is with demythologizing explanations, as they
were apparently propagated by some sophists. The scope of his remarks, however, is
broader, and they were interpreted in broader terms in antiquity. Socrates’ stance here
signals a turning away from natural philosophy to the study of oneself.31 Philo appro-
priates Socrates’ exhortation and addresses it to the Chaldaeans, thereby presenting a
28 ζῆν κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων, Diog.
Lart. 7.87; also Stobaeus 2.76.8.
29 For Stoic engagement with astronomy and astrology
see Jones 2003, esp. 331–342.
30 Phdr. (229e4–230a3); tr. Nehamas/Woodruff.
31 Behind this broader interpretation of Phdr. 229e4–
230a3, we may also detect the influence of the Apolo-
gy’s contrast between Socrates’ behavior and that of
the natural philosophers (18a7–19d7) and the so-
called autobiography of Socrates in Phd. 97b8–99b6,
in which the search for natural causes is exchanged
for the search for the good of processes.
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Socratic criticism of Stoic science.32
Interestingly, however, the condition to which Philo recalls the Chaldaeans is a Stoic
condition just as well as a Socratic one. As we saw above, the study of one’s own abode
is not just any part of Stoic oikeiôsis, but is its beginning. Philo, in other words, recalls
the Stoics to their own starting point, effectively urging them to travel in the oppo-
site direction from the direction their oikeiôsis has taken. For Philo, studying oneself is
a middle stage and constitutes progress with respect to the arrogant theorizing about
natural phenomena with which he associates the Stoics. The Stoics have mistaken the
route, however, treating the middle stage as the beginning of development and its initial
stages as its culmination. In this way, the metaphor of the journey helps Philo to criti-
cize the Stoic theory as leading people astray, away from the correct direction of human
development.
What is wrong then with the Stoic view? First, as mentioned earlier, Philo criticises
their epistemic optimism about discovering the causes of natural processes. All he thinks
they have are deceitful opinions. This emerges most clearly in 136, where he addresses
the Chaldaeans, and, via them, his readers:
Come forward now, you who are laden with vanity and gross stupidity and vast
pretence, you that are wise in your own conceit and not only declare (in every
case) that you perfectly know what each object is, but go so far as to venture in
your audacity to add the reasons for its being what it is[.]
In order to criticise the Stoics here, Philo can and does appeal to the whole spectrum of
Socratic language in its criticisms of sophistic and other false claims to knowledge. To be
fair, the Stoics did not claim that they were sages, as Philo was well aware. Nevertheless,
their philosophy is premissed on the strong possibility that the human mind can achieve
perfect knowledge of nature.
Second, the Stoics identify the cosmic order itself as the divine. In a passage in which
he explicitly identifies the difference between the Chaldaeans and Moses, Philo presents
this deification of the cosmos as a result of the Chaldaeans’ being impressed with the
harmony of the cosmos (179):
[T]hey have exhibited the universe as a perfect concord or symphony produced
by a sympathetic affinity between its parts, separated indeed in space, but house-
mates in kinship (sungeneiai de ou diôikismenôn). These men imagined that this
visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or con-
32 Philo’s charge that the Chaldaeans talk (hot) air
(aeromyteîte, 138) is a pun on Socrates’ rejection of
the Boreas myth; see note 22.
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taining God in itself as the soul of the whole. And they made Fate and Necessity
divine[.]
In the notion of sympathy (sumpatheia) and that of fate and necessity (heimarmenê, anagkê),
we recognise core Stoic notions. Philo goes on to note Moses’ agreement with the thought
that the cosmos is a sympathetic unity, as well as his disagreement with the idea that the
cosmos is the primary god (ho prôtos theos, 181). The bonds of the universe are not iden-
tical to god, but are his powers (dunameis): god is transcendent and prior to everything
that comes to be (183).
This fundamental disagreement about the nature of god goes beyond Philo’s criti-
cism of the theory of oikeiôsis, but also constitutes part of it. Stoic oikeiôsis ought to lead
to a rational being’s identification with the divine rational order, to its knowledge of
the natural order and its self-perception as a part of this divine whole. In Philo’s view,
the end stage of oikeiôsis is both an instance of epistemic hybris and a fundamental mis-
conception of the nature of god and, therefore, of the ultimate end of humanity.
The metaphor of the journey and its different stages allows Philo to present this
disagreement as not just a matter of different views. As I suggested above, we are looking
at a process of self-awareness gone wrong, which has set its practitioners back. What the
Stoics consider progress is actually a regression. Much seems to depend, then, on the
way in which Philo’s middle stage plays out. What goes wrong when the Stoics conduct
self-study? How does Abraham, Philo’s rational soul, do better? We will now turn to
these questions.
5 Haran: studying one’s own home
Philo calls on the Stoics to leave behind natural philosophical speculation and to con-
centrate on the study of their own homes, just as Abraham lived in Haran after his
departure from Chaldaea. As we have seen, this is a recall to the beginnings of Stoic
oikeiôsis, a recall aimed at a better grasp of what one is.
The difference between Philo’s proposal and Stoic self-perception is not immedi-
ately evident, however. When we look closely at Philo’s descriptions of his middle stage
of self-knowledge, at first sight it seems that the Stoics can agree with much of what he
says. Take, for instance, Philo’s exhortation in 137:
[T]ake knowledge of yourselves, and say clearly who you are, in body, in soul,
in sense-perception, in reason and speech, in each single one, even the most
minute, of the subdivisions of your being. Declare what sight is and how you
see, what hearing is and how you hear, what taste, touch, smelling are, and how
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you act in accordance with each of them, or what are the springs and sources
of these, from which is derived their very being.
The strong emphasis in this passage on the workings of the senses (which we also find,
e.g., in 189) may differ from what the Stoics would emphasize in one’s self-perception,
but they would not disagree with it either. When Philo raises the question of the origin
of the senses, the Stoics can consider that to be a reference to the hêgemonikon, the leading
part of the soul from which the other parts – the senses, the faculty of speech, and the
power of reproduction – spring. At the beginning of De migratione, Philo himself seems
to cite this doctrine, when he speaks of the intellect “sowing in each of the parts of the
body the faculties that issue from itself” (3).33 What Philo writes about studying the
senses, then, is not problematic for a Stoic.
Similarly, there is agreement between the Stoics and Philo when the latter speaks
of the need to get to know what is good and bad in one’s own home. Studying one’s
own home in 195 involves “com[ing] to know, as the phrase of the poet puts it: ‘All that
exists of good and of ill in the halls of your homestead’”.34 There are differences between
Philo’s and the Stoics’ views on goods. The Stoics recognise only moral perfection and
actions in accordance with it as good, while Philo would consider other things to be
good as well. But these differences are hardly at stake here. The implicit contrast in
this passage, rather, is with what Philo has called the Chaldaeans’ conviction that good
and bad follow from stellar constellations. Here the Stoics can wholeheartedly agree:
goodness and evil must be sought in oneself, in one’s knowledge or ignorance. With
respect to this ethical aspect of self-knowledge, then, the Stoics can also go along with
Philo’s prescriptions.
In fact, the difference between Philo’s middle stage of self-knowledge and the self-
perception of Stoic oikeiôsis does not lie in the content of what is studied but in the di-
rection in which this study leads. For the Stoics, self-perception leads to an identification
with human nature and action in accordance with one’s constitution. In a philosophi-
cally mature agent, this becomes an identification with the order of the world. For Philo,
however, self-study should lead us to overcome the limits of oikeiôsis: The process is all
about distinguishing the higher from the lower elements in one’s constitution, in order
to identify with the higher elements and alienate oneself from the lower elements. The
natural condition of a human being ought not to be embraced, but to be left behind.
33 The Stoics would say hêgemonikon or dianoia rather
than nous, but the view is very similar. Note also that
with the exception of the generative part, all other
Stoic soul parts (the senses and speech) are cited
throughout this treatise as elements of one’s own
home, together with the body.
34 A reference to Od. 4.392, a very popular phrase
among philosophical writers. (Philo also cites it in
the similar context of Somn. 1.57.) This ethical as-
pect of self-knowledge is also emphatically present
in Migr. 219 and in 189.
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The alienating effect of self-study can be clearly observed when Philo mentions the
ruling structures in the soul. As we saw in 185, Philo’s Moses calls on the Chaldaeans to
come to know the master and the servant in themselves (and cf. 219). Now, the Stoics too
could speak of command in the soul, as is clear from their use of the term hêgemonikon
to refer to the highest aspect of the soul. Once more, therefore, it is not necessarily the
content of what is studied that makes the difference (although Philo perhaps makes a
stronger case than a Stoic would be comfortable with). It is rather what the study should
lead to (this passage continues the text from paragraph 7 cited above):
[L]et none of them [the body, senses, and speech] cling to you; rise superior to
them all; they are your subjects, never treat them as sovereign lords; you are a
king, school yourself once and for all to rule, not to be ruled; evermore be com-
ing to know yourself, … for in this way will you perceive those to whom it befits
you to show obedience and those to whom it befits you to give commands.35
Studying the senses and speech, and realising that they are by nature such as to be com-
manded rather than to be obeyed, here goes hand-in-hand with a separation from them.
It is instructive to see that cognitive and political verbs are put in coordinate position in
this passage: ‘rise superior’, ‘treat as subjects’, ‘school yourself’, ‘be coming to know’, and
‘perceive’. The cognitive verbs at the end are not intended to refer to a prior state, sub-
sequent to which you might undertake a mental withdrawal from what you have come
to know as subservient. The idea seems rather to be that the process is mutually rein-
forcing, and that a progressively better knowledge of yourself results from rising above
subservient elements.36 Moreover, the recognition of ruler and ruled involves identifica-
tion with the one and alienation from the other. The verbs in this passage are not only
coordinate with each other but also with the verb that occurred just before: ‘alienate
yourself’. As you get to know yourself, then, you also come to identify with your ruling
element and to estrange yourself from whatever it is in yourself that does not rule.37
As in the first stage of self-knowledge, Philo can draw on Platonic texts for this sec-
ond stage as well. He signals this in a different treatise (Somn. 1.58) by likening Socrates,
as the person who sought to know himself, to Terah, the father of Abraham who died
35 Migr. 7–8.
36 This does not prevent Philo from presenting the two
aspects as different phases in the journey elsewhere,
for instance in 189: “when you have surveyed all
your individual dwelling with absolute exactitude,
and have acquired an insight into the true nature of
each of its parts, bestir yourselves and seek for your
departure hence, for it is a call not to death but to
immortality.”
37 On the occurrence of gnôthi sauton in 8 and, partic-
ularly, the connection Philo makes between it and
the phrase proseche seautôi which occurs in the Septu-
agint, see Nazzaro 1970.
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in Haran.38 Particularly important, here, is the Alcibiades I.39 In this dialogue, Socrates
develops an argument for identifying with your soul rather than with your body. This
argument hinges on the issue of use and rulership. On the basis of analogies with crafts-
men like carpenters, Socrates argues that a human being is whatever it is that uses, not
only tools, but body parts like hands and indeed the whole body. It turns out that there
is no better candidate for this identification than the soul: it uses and rules the body (Alc.
I 129b5–130c4). As in Philo, this Platonic text posits a strong discontinuity between soul
and body. It is Philo, however, who turns this into an anti-Stoic point and emphasizes
the need for alienation as a psychological process.
It is worth staying with the Alcibiades I for a moment because it contains a possible
model of reference for Philo’s connection between the second and third of his stages
of self-knowledge. The Socrates in this dialogue continues the philosophical search for
self-knowledge by asking how the soul may come to know itself. This is only possible
when it focuses on the wisdom in a soul (Socrates implies that one soul needs another
in order to understand itself). Moreover, since this wisdom and the divine are alike,
understanding oneself involves knowing the divine:
Can we mention anything about the soul which is more divine than that where
knowing and understanding are? – No, we can’t. – Then that region in it resem-
bles god, and someone who looked at that and grasped everything divine (pan
to theion), god and understanding, would in this way have the best grasp of
himself as well (houtô kai heauton an gnoiê malista).40
In the model described here, the wisdom present in a soul is similar to the divine. Its
similarity both allows you to come to know the divine and seems to be presented as a
reason why knowing the divine is necessary for knowing yourself. This last claim is prima
facie puzzling. Why should it be necessary to know something similar to you in order
to know yourself? We must note, however, that the question of self-knowledge in this
dialogue is driven by the desire for self-improvement. The most plausible explanation,
38 For discussion see Nazzaro 1969, 85–86; cf. Lévy
1992, 145–146.
39 In addition to the thematic connections, note that
logos figures in Alc. I 129b5–c6, one of the rare pas-
sages in the Platonic corpus that expressly distin-
guish the human being from the logos he uses.
Among verbal appropriations notice particularly
Migr. 195, where various elements from the Alc. I
are used: μαθὼν ἀκριβῶς ἑαυτὸν εἴσεται τάχα που
καὶ θεόν, οὐκέτι μένων ἐν Χαρράν, τοῖς αἰσθήσεως
ὀργάνοις, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστραφείς. Socrates
speaks of knowing oneself akribôs in implied ref-
erence to 132c–133c in 130c9; the aorists mirror
those of 133c4–6; the phrase tacha pou eisetai recalls
tach’ an gnoîmen/an tach’ heuroimen in 129a8–b2 (all
of these passages concern self-knowledge). The ar-
gument from Alc. I that the body is an instrument
for the soul was widely referred to by means of the
terminology of organa; its central teaching that one
needs to care for and know the soul was interpreted
as Socrates’ turning Alcibiades, and, by extension,
every one of us, towards himself (epistrophê, see Albi-
nus, Prol. 5.15–17; Procl. in Alc., passim).
40 Alc. I 133c1–6.
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therefore, is that the divine is the perfect example upon which the soul models itself. An
understanding of the divine will also give you an understanding of what you really are,
even if this is not yet what you are.
How does this Platonic dialogue help us understand the connection between the
second and third stages of self-knowledge in De migratione? We can appreciate that Philo
does not take himself to be saying something new when he connects self-knowledge to
knowledge of god. We should focus on what he says about this connection (and here
I anticipate what we will find in the next section). Philo turns out to engage in some
implicit polemic with the Platonic tradition as well. As we shall see, he turns around
the order of knowledge suggested by Socrates. In the Alcibiades I, knowledge of god is
necessary in order to know yourself. Philo suggests that knowledge of yourself is the
basis from which to investigate god as well. The effect of this is that knowledge of god
comes to seem more and more difficult to reach. Although the Platonic dialogue does
seem tentative, to some extent, about this cognitive process (the wording “in this way
… the best”, in combination with the massive condition of having to know all of the
divine in order to know oneself), Philo’s epistemic caution is much more evident. The
difficulty of obtaining knowledge of god is increased by the difficulty of getting to know
yourself. Philo agrees with the suggestion in theAlcibiades I that self-knowledge can never
be completed. So much the more is it difficult to come to know god. It is time to see
how these ideas are developed in Philo’s text itself.
6 Beyond oikeiôsis
The process of identification with whatever it is that rules in you can be extended, and
Philo does extend it, beyond the boundaries of oikeiôsis. In this final section, we will
consider how he does so. We will also consider two alternative outcomes that Philo
seems to present for the process of self-study: analogy and ignorance. Once we consider
the way in which Philo presents these outcomes and the tension that exists between
them, we will see that his concern was not to describe a specific end point for the process
of self-knowledge, but to present it as an ongoing process. The metaphor of the journey
once more proves to be very apposite to what Philo wants to communicate.
Let us then consider the ways in which Philo extends the identification of oneself
with the ruling element in oneself. There are three telling elements in the text. The first
element is the way in which he continues after paragraphs 7–12. In these, as we saw, Philo
describes alienation from the body, the senses, and speech. In terms of the stages of the
journey, Abraham has already left or is leaving Haran, the place in which the soul studies
its own home. Nevertheless, paragraph 13 opens as follows: “So we find that when the
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mind (nous) begins to know itself (arxêtai gnôrizein heauton) and to hold converse with the
things of the mind (noêta), it will thrust away from it that part of the soul which inclines
to the province of sense-perception”. We notice, again, the combination of getting to
know oneself and alienating oneself from the lower elements. The most striking thing
about this passage, however, and relevant to the point I am making, is that the mind
here is said to begin to know itself. Getting to know oneself has only just begun when
one has been studying the constitution of the body, the workings of the senses, and the
powers of speech. Even when the mind has moved beyond that and started to occupy
itself with intelligible objects of study, it is still said to be beginning to know itself.
A second, minor, textual element that points us to the incremental nature of self-
knowledge is the use of the word oikos. We saw above that Philo uses this word to indicate
the whole of the body, the senses, and speech in the contexts in which he speaks of the
need to get to know ‘your oikos’, but that he has a stricter use of the word oikos in the
opening paragraphs of the treatise (Migr. 2–12). We have now seen that, in terms of the
progress of Abraham’s journey, the opening paragraphs are posterior to many of the pas-
sages that speak of the need to study one’s own home. The latter are about the need to
go to or to dwell in Haran, whereas the beginning paragraphs are about one’s departure
from Haran. Against this background, Philo’s restriction of oikos to speech in 2–12 can
be interpreted as the result of self-study. The mind has progressively refined its under-
standing of what counts as ‘itself’; just so, the word ‘home’ is also applied increasingly
articulately and strictly, no longer to refer indistinctly to the whole compound of body
and soul, but to speech as the immediate setting of the mind.41
Thirdly, Philo’s text also supports the interpretation of a continuous and progressive
process of self-knowledge by explicitly stating that when you obtain knowledge that
goes beyond knowledge of your human constitution, you are turning towards yourself
and obtaining knowledge of yourself. This comes out most clearly in paragraph 195,
when Philo recapitulates the three stages of self-knowledge. After he has introduced
the second as, “the [mind’s] consideration of itself”, he says that in the third stage the
mind “withdraw[s] into itself”.42 Key to understanding statements like this one is the
realisation that Philo does not mean to refer to a static entity when he speaks of knowing
‘oneself’. The reference of ‘oneself’ changes according to how far the mind has advanced
in the process. On all three counts, then, it seems that the language with which Philo
speaks of self-knowledge supports the idea that it is a continuous process.
41 Philo signals this aspect of restriction and articula-
tion by distinguishing oikos from oikia (3).
42 The aorist denotes temporal priority with respect
to knowing god (which Colson’s translation does
not bring out clearly), but what is termed ‘turning
towards oneself’ here is different from the study of
body, senses, and speech, from which I infer that it
also takes place after the departure from Haran (in
that sense Colson’s translation is justified).
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Regarding self-knowledge as a process may also help us with a radical tension in
Philo’s account between two outcomes of the study of oneself in Haran. There are pas-
sages in De migratione in which Philo sounds a very confident note about the results of
self-study. In 185, for instance, he writes that once you have distinguished the different
roles played by different elements in yourself – the master, the servant, that which has
soul and that which doesn’t, the rational and the irrational, and the immortal and the
mortal – you will “gain forthwith (euthus) a sure knowledge (epistême saphê) of god and
of his works”. This is because knowledge of yourself allows you to construct an analogy
(186):
Your reason will show you (logieisthe) that, as there is a mind (nous) in you, so
is there in the universe, and that as your mind has taken upon itself sovereign
control of all that is in you, and brought every part into subjection to itself, so
too He that is endued with lordship over all guides and controls the universe
by the law and right of an absolute sway.
In other words, study of yourself will allow you to realise that the structure of the cosmos
is similar to the structure of the human being; both have an intelligence that rules the
rest. Moses, who here addresses the Chaldaeans, seems to be extremely hopeful that this
will deliver “sure knowledge of god”.43
In other passages, however, Philo presents a very different picture of what results
from self-study. Consider what he says in 134:
What, then, is the end (telos) of right-mindedness (phronein orthôs)? To pronounce
on himself and all created being the verdict of folly (aphrosunê); for the final aim
of knowledge (peras epistêmês) is to hold that we know nothing, he alone being
wise, who is also alone God.
This passage clearly states that the limit of human knowledge is the awareness of one’s
ignorance.
Let me briefly digress to highlight the partially polemical aspect of this description
of the telos.44 Philo speaks about it in the course of his exegesis of Gen. 12.4 – his treat-
ment of Gen. 12.1–3 has taken up paragraphs 1–126 of the treatise, 127–175 are devoted
to Gen. 12.4. The Genesis account here starts speaking about Abraham’s response rather
than God’s promises: “and Abraham journeyed as the Lord had told him” (Migr. 127).
43 As Wolfson 1948, 2.78–80, points out, the letter of
this argument is congruent with Stoic arguments
for the existence of god; the difference is in the dis-
tance between the ruler and the ruled (cf. 80–81).
44 Note that Philo does not seem interested in select-
ing only one formula as his telos throughout his
works: many different descriptions can in fact be
found. For this see Besnier 1999; Runia 1986, 474–
475; Bonazzi 2008, 246–250; Dillon 2016, 116–119.
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Philo first interprets this journeying in accordance with the Lord’s command as similar
to “the aim (telos) extolled by the best philosophers, to live agreeably to nature” (128).
In this description we recognise the Stoic end of life. This reference to the Stoic telos
prepares us for Philo’s own description of the telos, which he introduces in 134 (the pas-
sage cited above). To see to what extent Philo’s alternative description is polemical, let
us notice two things.45
First, Philo makes clear that he can agree with the Stoic telos to some extent. He
connects it to the slogan ‘to follow god’, which we know as a Pythagorean description of
the telos, and of which Philo says that this is the telos according to Moses (131). His alter-
native is, therefore, not a straightforward rejection of the formula as such. However, and
this is the second thing to notice, Philo rejects, as before, the epistemically overconfident
attitude of the Stoics. Following god is not the acquisition of perfect knowledge about
nature, but the realisation that in comparison with god, human beings are ignorant.
Not incidentally the paragraph following 134 is one of the texts in which Philo calls the
Chaldaeans down from their heavenly studies to the investigation of themselves.
Again, then, Philo calls the Chaldaeans back from natural philosophy using a So-
cratic formula – that the limit of knowledge is awareness of our ignorance. How does
this square with the optimistic analogy that Moses proposed to the same Chaldaeans?
This is a tension that is not going to go away and that characterises Philo’s work else-
where too.46 The tension, however, can be mitigated.
After the introduction of the idea of coming to know god through analogy in 185,
this idea returns, but with greater caution and also with significant changes to the con-
ception of god that is involved. In 192, Philo offers another explanation of how the
analogy works. After a withdrawal from what is mortal about yourself, “you will go on
to receive an education in your conceptions (doxas) regarding the Uncreate”. On the ba-
sis of the mind’s epistemic separability from the body, senses, and speech – its ability to
understand things without these three – Philo’s Moses argues that God must be onto-
logically separate from the world. Again, since the mind has not made the body, it can
be contained in it; therefore God, who has made the cosmos, cannot be contained in it.47
With the inference that God transcends the cosmos, these arguments lead to a stronger
conclusion than in 185, where ontological separation was not yet (explicitly) at stake.
With the stronger conclusion, however, the gap between the basis for the analogy (the
mind) and its inference (god) also becomes conspicuously wider. In the second passage
45 As the expression ‘the best philosophers’ shows,
Philo’s appreciation of Stoic philosophy is beyond
doubt; this makes the fundamental points of dis-
agreement with them all the more pressing in this
treatise.
46 It is expressed poignantly and indeed embraced in
Somn. 1.60. See Früchtel 1968, 147–163; cf. Runia
1986, 436–437.
47 On Philo’s view of creation see Runia 1986, esp.
438–446.
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in which the analogy recurs, 195, the epistemic confidence in the analogy is very clearly
muted:
The third stage is when, having opened up the road that leads from oneself (aph’
hautou), in hope (elpisas) thereby to come to discern the Universal Father, so
hard to trace and unriddle, and having come to know itself accurately (mathôn
akribôs), it will perhaps (taxa) also know God.
Here the mind ‘hopes’ and will ‘perhaps’ know God. Finally, in the third passage in
which the analogy recurs, we find a surprising absence of God. In 219–220, in the course
of interpreting what it means that Abraham “travelled through” (216) the land, Philo
exhorts the soul by means of an analogy between a human being and the cosmos, along
the microcosm – macrocosm model (219–220):48
Travel through (diodeuson) man also, if you will, o my soul, bringing to exami-
nation each component part of him. For instance … find out what the body is
and what it must do or undergo to co-operate with the understanding [etc…].
[220] Travel again through the greatest and most perfect man (ton megiston kai
teleôtaton anthrôpon),49 this universe, and scan narrowly its parts, how far asun-
der they are in the positions which they occupy, how wholly made one by the
powers which govern them, and what constitutes for them all this invisible
bond of harmony and unity.
Here God has disappeared from view. The task of grasping him by means of analogy
has turned out to be increasingly difficult as the narrative progresses. The point Philo
is making is, again, directed against the Stoics. To see how, let us revisit 181, in which
Philo explains the disagreement between Moses and the Chaldaeans (whose position he
has described in 179, cited above on pages 122–123. The Chaldaeans thought that the
cosmos is God or contains God as its soul. Moses disagrees strongly: that which holds
the cosmos together is not God, but his invisible powers.50 To avoid misunderstanding,
Philo adds (182):
Wherefore, even though it be said somewhere in the Law-book: “God in heaven
above and on the earth below”, let no one suppose that He that is is spoken of
– since the existent Being can contain, but cannot be contained.
48 On this model in Philo see Borgen 1997, 218–219.
49 In Her. 155, Philo reports and ascribes to others
the view that the cosmos is a large human being;
this pair of human beings (micro- and macrocos-
mos) is distinct from the pair of ‘heavenly man’ and
‘earthly man’, the former of which is the intelligi-
ble paradigm after which the latter is created (for
discussion see Früchtel 1968, 29–36).
50 On the idea of the desmos (‘bond’) see Runia 1986,
238–241 (interpreting Tim. 41b1–6), 448–449 (iden-
tified with the logos).
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This distinction between God in his real being and his powers underlies 219–220 as well.
Though at first sight the analogy seems to function on the same level as those in 185 and
192, a closer look reveals that a different item has inserted itself between the mind and
god to occupy the place of that to which the analogy leads: the cosmos, unified by the
powers of the God who himself remains out of reach for analogical reasoning.
It is striking that Philo now supports cosmological study, when he has called the
Chaldaeans down from it time and again. In narrative terms, the journey metaphor
and its three stages help keep Philo’s study of the cosmos separate from the Chaldaean
enterprise. Substantively, the crucial difference is that Abraham has come a long way. He
has taken a road on which he has learned to separate the mind and intelligible things
from what is below them. His journey has prepared him methodologically, so to speak,
for the proper study of the cosmos, since he will now not give in to the temptation to
identify the cosmos and god.
I spoke above of two outcomes of self-study and of the tension between them. Over
the course of his account, Philo nuances the epistemic optimism about analogical rea-
soning which he had Moses express in 185. Why then was Moses so optimistic? We might
think of this paragraph, the opening section of Moses’ address to the Chaldaeans, as tai-
lored to their wishes: their study is undertaken to discover the first god, so Moses at first
offers them hope of attaining such knowledge along his route. As we proceed in the trea-
tise, and as Philo comes to address his readers, or his soul, a much more careful account
comes to the fore, one which may not be as incompatible with the terminal ignorance
described in 134 as the optimistic account of 185.
With a clear grasp of God receding behind the horizon, the emphasis of Philo’s
account returns to where it was at the beginning: to the journey, the process of getting
to know yourself. In 7, Philo speaks of coming to know yourself all the time (panta ton
aiôna). In 219–220, it is through the verb diodeusai, ‘travel through’, that he expresses the
long duration of the process of coming to know oneself.51 In Philo’s reference to the
greatest man, even getting to know the cosmos is now conceptualized as part of self-
knowledge. In the few remaining paragraphs of the treatise after that, he comments on
the need to persist and not give up, even if matters are dark and difficult (dustheôrêton,
222). The soul never arrives in Philo’s treatise, it journeys on in a process of progressive
self-knowledge.
51 On this passage cf. Kotzia-Panteli 2002, 124–131,
who rightly stresses the protreptic character of this
text and argues that in 217–220 Philo uses Peri-
patetic material (Theophrastus, perhaps dialogues
by Aristotle). Cf. Abr. 65–66.
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7 Conclusion
The process of knowing oneself, as Philo envisages it, cannot be reduced to one epis-
temic state. It is a movement towards perfection that reaches beyond human nature.
The Stoics have been well aware of the moral need to move beyond the concerns for
one’s own organism. Their theory of oikeiôsis, in Philo’s view, is right to connect human
identity with the order of the whole cosmos. Nevertheless, the Stoics’ epistemic over-
reach blinds their view to the true, modest position of humankind. Had they stayed
longer in Haran, i.e., had they better grasped their own nature, they would not have de-
parted on the wrong footing and under false premises. They would have realised that the
correct analogy from the position of nous in human beings leads not to a divine world
soul but to positing a transcendent mind, a creator who is far superior to the cosmos.
Indeed, Philo seems to point to a common mistake underlying both the Stoics’ account
of self-awareness and their cosmo-theology. In both cases, they assume too much of a
continuity between the ruling mind and the elements over which it rules. In the initial
stages of oikeiôsis, this leads to an identification with the body and the senses rather than
an alienation from them; in their account of the cosmos, it leads to a failure to posit a
radical break between the highest god and the cosmos which he has caused.
Philo employs Abraham’s journey of migration as a metaphor to describe the tra-
jectory of the soul. Its first role is to indicate the errors of the Stoics. We ought to come
home, he urges, to come down from idle speculation, and to reside within ourselves.
This is the true place of oikeiôsis and the correct form of familiarization. The second role
of the journey metaphor is to emphasize the need to pass beyond Stoic oikeiôsis. Study of
our home should lead us to move away from it again, to become alienated with respect
to the body, senses, and speech, the things with which nature has endowed us. Our task
is to see the limits of our home and to leave it behind. The process to which we are
called, and this is the third role of the metaphor of the journey, is ongoing: in human
epistemic terms, we will never complete self-knowledge, nor will we be able to reach
beyond that to get to know the divine itself.52
52 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the
important idea in Philo of God’s taking possession
of the wise person’s mind and of his gift of knowl-
edge (as expressed for instance in Her. 265: ἐξοικί-
ζεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θείου
πνεύματος ἄφιξιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μετανάστασιν αὐτοῦ
πάλιν εἰσοικίζεται). See Runia 1986, 437, for a suc-
cinct statement of the issue. According to Cazeaux
1965, 18, Migr. is composed to lead up to, without
ever mentioning, God’s revelation of himself as de-
scribed in Gen. 12.7; this may be (cf. Abr. 77–80).
Perhaps Philo hints at knowledge as a gift in Migr.
140 (just after the description of terminal ignorance,
the soul bears fruit, “it does not know how”) and 35
(part of a section where Philo speaks about his own
writing process).
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Cilliers Breytenbach
Incomprehension en route to Jerusalem (Mk
8:22–10:52)
Summary
The second part of the Gospel according to Mark (8:22-10:52) is a narration about Jesus
and his disciples travelling from the north of the Lake of Galilee to Jerusalem in the south.
On the narrated journey, the disciples follow Jesus and he teaches them, but they do not
understand his teaching. For the implied audience the story about the incomprehension of
the disciples becomes a negative example of how not to react on Jesus’s teaching and the
journey itself a macro-metaphor explaining how one should follow Jesus.
Keywords: way; teaching; incomprehension; disciples; Gospel of Mark; narrative frame;
macro metaphor
Der zweite Teil des Markusevangeliums (8,22–10,52) ist eine Erzählung über die Reise Jesu
und seiner Jünger vom Norden des Sees Genezareth nach Jerusalem im Süden. Auf dieser
Reise folgen die Jünger Jesus und werden von ihm unterrichtet, aber sie verstehen seine Leh-
re nicht. Für die implizierte Zuhörerschaft werden die Erzählungen über das Unverständnis
der Jünger zu einem negativen Beispiel dafür, wie man nicht auf Jesu Lehre reagieren sollte.
Die Reise selbst wird zu einer Makro-Metapher, die erklärt, wie man Jesus folgen sollte.
Keywords: Weg; Lehre; Unverständnis; Jünger; Markusevangelium; Erzählrahmen;
Makro-Metapher
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1 A short introduction to the Gospel according to Mark
It is almost communis opinio that the Gospel according to Mark (= Mk) is the first gospel
ever written.1 It was written around the Jewish-Roman war of 66–70 CE. A decade or so
later it was used by the Gospels according to Matthew and to Luke and known to the
author of the Gospel according to John. The Gospel according to Mark is an episodi-
cal narrative,2 and in telling his story about the teaching, trial, and death of Jesus from
Nazareth, the author makes use of several sayings, proverbs, parables, and chreiai (pro-
nouncement stories) from the oral tradition attributed to Jesus. He combines this with
stories about Jesus and his disciples and narratives familiar to him about Jesus as a healer
and exorcist. Most probably, Mark, whoever he was, told his story about Jesus to Chris-
tian audiences familiar with the topography of Galilee and Jerusalem.3
The first part of his narrative (Mk 1:16–8:21) is primarily situated in Galilee during
the latter part of the reign (4 BCE – 39 CE) of Herod Antipas. The narrated time sets in
shortly before this vassal of Rome and son of Herod the Great killed the Jewish prophet
John the Baptist (Mk 1:14 and Joseph. AJ 18.116–119). The third part of the narrative
(11:1–16:8) is located in Jerusalem in the Roman province Judea, whose fifth prefect
Pontius Pilate (26–36 CE) had Jesus executed by crucifixion (Tac. Ann. 15.44). Jesus was
a Galilean crucified on the outskirts of the Roman Empire. Mark’s story took communal
memory as its point of departure.4 The scene of the second part of the Gospel according
to Mark (8:22–10:52)5 is the journey of Jesus, traveling from the towns of Caesarea on
the territory north of Galilee (8:27–33), through Capernaum in Galilee, heading south
on the eastern side of the Jordan to pass Jericho (10:46–52) and enter into Jerusalem
in Judea (11:1–11). In the story, Jesus, followed by his disciples, is en route to Jerusalem
and uses the journey as an opportunity to teach his disciples. The special setting of this
teaching and its metaphorical meaning will be the topic of our discussion.
1 For an introduction and commentary, cf. Focant
2012.
2 On this see Breytenbach 1985, 138–169.
3 Cf. Bosenius 2014.
4 On this see Breytenbach 2013, 19–56.
5 The earliest commentaries of Meyer and Weiss did
not structure the text, but since the introduction
of this practice, scholarly commentaries were di-
vided on the demarcation of this part: cf. Wohlen-
berg 1910, ix (IV. Abschnitt: Vom Messiasbekenntnis der
Jünger bei Caesarea Philippi bis kurz vor der Ankunft in
Jericho 8,27–10,45); Klostermann 1936, 1 (8:27–10:52
Jesus auf dem Wege nach Jerusalem); Lohmeyer 1937
(IV. Der Weg zum Leiden (8:27–10:52)); Taylor 1966,
109 (V. Caesarea Philippi: The Journey to Jerusalem. viii.
27–x. 52); Pesch 1977, 1 (Vierter Hauptteil. Der Weg des
Menschensohnes zum Leiden und die Kreuzesnachfolge
der Jünger (8,27–10,52)); Gnilka 1979, 9 (Die Kreuzes-
nachfolge (8,27–10,45)); Lührmann 1987, 141 (Jesus
Weg nach Jerusalem); Collins 2007, 396 (8:27–10:45
The Mystery of the Kingdom); Focant 2012, 336 (Forth
Section: Mark 8:31–10.52). I found most agreement
with Schweizer 1978, 87 (V. Jesu Offenbarung in un-
verschlüsselter Rede und die Nachfolge der Jünger 8,22–
10,52).
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2 Framing and structuring the journey to Jerusalem
Since, in the Gospel according to Mark the word ἀκολουθέω always has the notion of
literally following someone,6 Mark uses the road (ὁδός) as a backdrop to develop the
theme of how the disciples should follow Jesus.7 The concept of ‘following’ entails the
one who is followed. The journey has five sections: around Caesarea Philippi (8:27–9:1),
on and at the foot of the mountain of transfiguration (9:2–29), on the way to and in
the house in Capernaum (9:30–50), attempting to go to Judea via Perea (10:1–31), and
finally on the way to Jerusalem (10: 32–52).
The first question Jesus asks his disciples on their way (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ) from Bethsaida
to the villages of Caesarea of Philippi, is who the people are and who do they think
he is (8:27–28). The pattern of asking and instructing the disciples while traveling is
continued after they have left Caesarea Philippi. While traveling through Galilee, Jesus
teaches his disciples (9:30–31), and after returning to the house in Capernaum, he asks
(9:33) what they discussed on the road (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ). They do not answer, because on the
road (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ) they discussed who of them is the greatest (9:34). According to 10:1, the
Markan Jesus sets out to travel on the eastern side of the river Jordan to the regions of
Judea but is interrupted in this first attempt by the crowds and so he first teaches them.8
The questions asked by the Pharisees and a rich man (10:1, 17) and the answers given
by Jesus (10:2–9, 18–22) lead to further instruction of his disciples (10:10–16, 23–31).
When Jesus and the disciples are finally on the road traveling up to Jerusalem (ἦσαν δὲ
ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἀναβαίνοντες εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα) he again teaches his disciples (10:32–34).
When they left Jericho, the blind Bartimaeus was sitting by the roadside. The story
of his healing illustrates that the journey is much more than just a journey from the
north to Jerusalem in the south. It is a ‘literary’ construct,9 framed by two episodes,
telling the audience that Jesus healed two blind people, one at the beginning (8:22–52)
and one at the end (10:46–52) of the journey. The frame around the journey, the healing
of two blind people (8:22–26; 10:46–52), underlines from the beginning to the end of
the journey that there is something to see, to understand.
6 Cf. Bauer et al. 1999, s.v.
7 On previous research, cf. Bosenius 2014, 251–256.
8 Mk 10:1 is a crux interpretum. The phrase ἐκεῖθεν
ἀναστάς refers to the house in Capernaum (9:33).
The narrator lets Jesus go towards the regions of
Judea (ἔρχεται εἰς τὰ ὅρια τῆς Ἰουδαίας). With א
B C L Ψ 0274 892 2427 etc. one should read the ex-
plicative καί before πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου. Jesus was
intending to travel on the other side (πέραν) of the
river Jordan and then into Judea. The phrase συ-
μπορεύονται πάλιν ὄχλοι πρὸς αὐτόν in the next
sentence refers the audience back to the motif of the
crowd encroaching on Jesus. As usual, he teaches
them (cf. 2:13; 4:1; 5:21, 53; 10:1). In 10:10, Jesus is
back in the house in Capernaum and according to
10:17a he makes a second attempt to go out on the
road, but the journey is interrupted by the question
of the rich man and Jesus’ answers to him and the
disciples (10:17b, 18–22, 23–31) and is only contin-
ued in 10:32.
9 Cf. also Bosenius 2014, 249, 260–261: “das Bewe-
gungsprofil Jesu im vorliegenden Erzählabschnitt
(wirkt) stilisiert”.
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This form of framing of a section – with an episode at the beginning correspond-
ing to another at the end of the section – is a compositional technique the narrator
already used to frame preceding sections. The first section of the Gospel according to
Mark (1:16–3:12) starts at the Sea of Galilee when he calls four fishermen to follow him
(1:16–20), then, on the Sabbath, Jesus teaches in the synagogue in Capernaum (1:21–
28). The section ends with Jesus healing a man with a withered hand in the synagogue in
Capernaum (3:1–6) before he teaches the multitude at the seaside (3:7–12). The pattern
is repeated in the next section, which starts with the installing of the Twelve (3:13–19), is
followed by the redefinition of Jesus’ family as those doing God’s will (3:20–22, 30–35),
and is concluded by the rejection of Jesus in his patria Nazareth (6:1–6a) and the sending
and return of the Twelve (6:6b–13,30).
Before we try to determine the function of the frame of the two stories of the healing
of the blind (8:22–26 and 10:46–52) around the narrative about the journey to Jerusalem
(8:27–10:45), it is important to look at the way in which the narrator structures the
journey itself. In typical threefold manner Mark lets Jesus announce his suffering (8:31,
9:31; 10:32–34).10 Each of these announcements is placed on three different stations on
the way, followed by an utterance by the disciples that demonstrates their complete lack
of understanding of Jesus’ prospective suffering (8:32–33; 9:33–34; 10:35–40). In every
instance Jesus reacts with instructions on how his followers should conduct themselves
(8:34–9:1; 9:35–37; 10:41–45).
This threefold pattern indicates that the narrator lets Jesus predict his suffering,
death, and resurrection to his disciples and conveys their reaction to it to create a context
for further instruction on what it means to follow him on his journey to Jerusalem.
3 Jesus teaching the disciples en route to Jerusalem: Mk 8:34;
9:35b–37; 10:43–44
Following Jesus and conformity with his example could be regarded as a decisive trait
of the ethics of the Gospel according to Mark. In the first place, it is Jesus who is being
followed. He leads the way. We already noted that in Mark the Greek verb ἀκολουθέω
includes the meaning to follow someone spatially. But there is more to this. In his first
teaching, after the first failure of the disciples to apprehend his destiny, Jesus sets out
the requirements to follow him. These requirements are not restricted to ‘you must go
behind me and follow me’. It also addresses fundamental attitudes of the disciples.
In the second instance it is important to note that the role of those who were called
to follow Jesus is presented in an ambivalent way by the Markan narrative. On the way
10 On Mark’s use of prolepsis, see Toit 2001, 165–189.
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Prediction Mk 8:31 Prediction Mk 9:31 Prediction Mk 10:32–34
Incomprehension Incomprehension Incomprehension
Mk 8:32–33: He said all this
quite openly. And Peter took
him aside and began to rebuke
him. Mk 8:33: But turning and
looking at his disciples, he re-
buked Peter and said, “Get
behind me, Satan! For you are
setting your mind not on divine
things but on human things.”
Mk 9:32–34: But they did not
understand what he was saying
and were afraid to ask him.
Mk 9:33: Then they came to
Capernaum; and when he was in
the house he asked them, “What
were you arguing about on the
way?” Mk 9:34: But they were
silent, for on the way they had
argued with one another who
was the greatest.
Mk 10:35–37: James and John,
the sons of Zebedee, … said to
him, “Grant us to sit, one at your
right hand and one at your left,
in your glory.”
Teaching Teaching Teaching
Tab. 1 Repetitive pattern in Mark 8:(27)31–10:45.
to Jerusalem, the disciples are characterized as if they cannot serve as a positive example
of how Jesus should be followed, but rather as a negative example of how he has not
been followed.
3.1 Mk 8:31+34 (Caesarea Philippi)
After the story of the healing of a blind man at Bethsaida (8:22–26), the disciples and
Jesus are on their way from the towns of Caesarea of Philippi through Capernaum and
finally towards Jerusalem (8:27–10:45). The first scene in the villages of Caesarea Philippi
(8:27–33) is about who Jesus is. According to Peter, who speaks for all the disciples, he
is “the Christ”,11 the anointed King in the lineage of King David. In line with a central
motif developed since Mk 1:25, Jesus forbids them to tell this to anybody12 and corrects
Peter’s utterance by teaching his disciples that God has ordained (δεῖ) that he (ὁ υἱὸς
11 In the declarative sentence σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστός uttered
by Peter in the Gospel according to Mark, the verbal
adjective χριστός (from χρίω, ‘to anoint’) is used
with the article ὁ and thus means ‘the anointed’ and
refers to the Messiah, the Anointed of the Lord as in
Ps 2:2; PsSol 17:32; 18:5, 7.
12 Commandments not to make Jesus’ identity known
form a central part of the narrator’s central story
line, cf. Wrede 1901, 33–51, 95–101.
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τοῦ ἀνθρώπου)13 must suffer severely (πολλὰ παθεῖν), be probed and rejected (ἀποδο-
κιμασθῆναι) by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes, be killed (ἀποκτανθῆναι),
and after three days rise (from the dead, ἀναστῆναι). Jesus announced his death and
resurrection for the first time in the narrative, and Peter as spokesperson of the disci-
ples reprimanded him. By reproaching him, Jesus shows that with the confession “you
are the Christ” Peter did not have this type of suffering Messiah in mind. From Peter’s
reaction, it is clear that the disciples do not understand the announcement by Mark’s
Jesus.14 He rebukes Peter by using the phrase ὕπαγε ὀπίσω μου, σατανᾶ (Mk 8:33). He
calls Peter ‘Satan’, an Aramaic word (אָנָטָס) meaning ‘adversary’ and usually denoting the
‘enemy’ of God, because Peter has his mind on the things of humans and not the things
of God. Literally, he commands him to leave his presence (ὑπάγω), not wishing Peter
to follow him any longer. In a speech, carefully constructed from traditional sayings
from the synoptic tradition,15 he teaches them and the crowd accompanying him what
following him on this journey entails (8:34–9:1).
He called the crowd with his disciples, and said to them, ‘If any want to become
my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.
35 For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their
life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. (Mk 8:34–35 NRS).
Following Jesus necessarily implies an answer to the questions of who he is and on whose
authority he acts. The topic ‘following Jesus’ can thus only be discussed in relation to
the question of who he is. Jesus, who leads the way to Jerusalem, must suffer there, must
be rejected and killed. The Markan Jesus thus first instructs his disciples on what has
to happen to him (8:31) and then on how they are to follow him (8:34).16 The first say-
ing (8:34) states the three conditions for those who want to walk behind Jesus (εἴ τις
θέλει ὀπίσω μου ἐλθεῖν17). In the last instance, to go behind Jesus means to follow him
(ἀκολουθείτω μοι – Mk 8:34). They should follow Jesus constantly, leaving work, family,
and property behind (cf. 10:27–31). But Jesus adds two other conditions for following
him. Mark’s Jesus formulates from a male perspective, but since there are women in
the group following him from Galilee to Jerusalem (15:41), the women cannot be ex-
cluded: those who wants to follow him, must deny themselves (ἀπαρνησάσθω ἑαυτόν)
13 The Greek expression ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (liter-
ally, ‘the Son of the Man’) comes from Aramaic.
In Mark, in accordance with a use attested in later
Aramaic (אַשָׁנֱא רַבּ), it is best taken to refer to Jesus as
speaker.
14 The inability of the disciples to understand Jesus’
words and deeds also forms a central part of the nar-
rator’s central story line, cf. Wrede 1901, 95–114.
15 Cf. the parallels to Mk 8:34 in MtQ 10:37–38/LkQ
14:26–27; to Mk 8:35 in MtQ 10:39/LkQ 17:33; Mk
8:38 in MtQ 10:32–33/LkQ 12:8–9.
16 For a detailed analysis of verses 35–38, see the com-
mentaries of Focant 2012 and Collins 2007.
17 The reading of א A B C2 K L Γ f 13 33 579 etc. is to
be preferred over ἀκολουθεῖν in P45 C* D W Θ
0214 f 1 M etc. In favor of the text in Nestle, K.
Aland, B. Aland, et al. 2012, cf. Toit 2006, 44–45.
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and take up their pole/patibulum (ἀράτω τὸν σταυρὸν18 αὐτοῦ). The first condition is
the prerequisite for the second. Following Jesus requires self-denial, in Greek ἀπαρνέο-
μαι, to act in a wholly selfless manner by giving up all self-interest. People who cannot
act in a selfless manner, would also not be able to risk their own lives for the sake of
another person, preferring to deny the other person. People who want to go after Jesus
must deny themselves up to the point of giving up life, because at the end of the journey
Jesus will suffer, be rejected, then killed. In the second condition, the Markan Jesus is
indicating how he will be killed. He will have to take up his cross, carry it, be nailed
unto it, and die. Those who listened to Mark’s story being told would understand that
to take up one’s cross means to be on the path to be crucified and die, like Jesus did.
They would, however, have extended the meaning metaphorically to refer to any action
that could lead to death. It is important to note that Jesus is the one that is to be followed
by those taking up a cross.
All conditions have a proleptic function that is taken up in later episodes in the
narrative. In Mark’s story, after celebrating Pesach, Jesus is arrested and all the disciples
flee (14:50). They do not take up crosses and are not crucified. Peter, who follows him
from a distance (14:54), does not deny himself. Most probably, the historical audiences
of the Gospel according to Mark were familiar with these episodes from the Passion
narrative. In Mark’s story, the episode of Peter’s denial is told only later, but it is fore-
shadowed when Jesus requires self-denial from his followers. When real danger loomed
in the aula of the high priest, the same Simon Peter who said “You are the Christ” denies
Jesus (14:68, 70). Before the cock crowed thrice he had taken an oath, saying “I do not
know this man you are talking about” (Mk 14:71).
Why does the author of Mark introduce the motives of self-denial, taking up one’s
cross, and following Jesus into the speech of Jesus? Only to show that the disciples were
not able to deny themselves, that Peter eventually denies Jesus, that none of them were
able to take up their cross, and that they all fled? The narrative is not about reporting
Jesus’ teaching to the disciples and relating their misapprehension of who he is and
what is required from them. The narrator intends to use the teaching on the road as
a means of communicating and illustrating the requirements of discipleship for those
who want to engage in discipleship. The narrator uses the failure of the disciples as a
negative example, teaching his own audience to act differently.19 In the late sixties CE,
when the Gospel according to Mark was read to audiences, it was not possible to follow
Jesus on the road, but it was perhaps possible to be crucified. It is more likely, however,
that audiences would understand the requirement to follow Jesus and the demand to
18 In 14:21 the word σταυρός is used to refer to the
patibulum. See also the references to Plutarch
(Moralia 554a), Chariton (42,7), and Artemidor
(2:56) in Bauer et al. 1999, s.v.
19 On this see Tannehill 1977, 386–405.
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take up one’s cross metaphorically. How this is meant is explained by Mk 8:35: to take
up the cross would be to describe the willingness to die for the gospel in terms of Jesus’
crucifixion. To follow him is to obey his words.
3.2 Mk 9:31–37 (On the road to Capernaum)
Initially all disciples seem to fulfil the first condition and followed Jesus’ footsteps on
the way to Jerusalem. When they had left the mountain of the transfiguration and passed
through Galilee, Jesus again was teaching his disciples, for a second time announcing
his suffering and resurrection to them: “The Son of Man is to be betrayed into human
hands, and they will kill him, and three days after being killed, he will rise again” (Mk
9:31). Immediately the narrator states that they did not understand what he was saying
and were afraid to ask him. When they came to Capernaum, to the house of Peter and
Andrew, Jesus asked them, “‘What were you arguing about on the way?’ But they were
silent, for on the way they had argued with one another who was the greatest” (Mk
9:33–34).
Those who were required to deny themselves when they wanted to follow Jesus were
arguing behind his back about who was the greatest. The contrast between required and
actual behavior is severe. What happened on the road (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ) through Galilee leads
to Jesus’ teaching in the house at Capernaum. How does the Markan Jesus react? He sits
down, calls the Twelve and continues teaching: “Whoever wants to be first must be last
of all and servant of all.” He then takes a little child, whom he places among them and
takes into his arms, saying: “Whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes
me, and whoever welcomes me welcomes not me but the one who sent me” (Mk 9:37).
In his teaching, Jesus disqualifies the behavior of the disciples on the road and shows
them the right conduct. Again, his teaching applies to the intended audience of the
Gospel according to Mark, using the behavior of the disciples on the road as a negative
example. Rather than striving to be the greatest, they should be like the child, who is
here used as a symbol of being the last and servant of all.
3.3 Mk 10:32–34 (On the way to Jerusalem)
In the last section of the journey to Jerusalem, Mark addresses the issue of willingness to
suffer and to die, repeating the threefold pattern of announcement, incomprehension
of the disciples, and teaching by Jesus. They were on the road going to Jerusalem, Jesus
was leading them (ἦν προάγων αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς), and they were following. Knowing
the thoughts and the feelings of his characters, the omniscient narrator tells the audi-
ence that those following Jesus were afraid. Taking the Twelve aside, Jesus reiterates his
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announcement that he would suffer in greater detail.
See, we are going up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man will be handed over
to the chief priests and the scribes, and they will condemn him to death; then
they will hand him over to the Gentiles; 34 they will mock him, and spit upon
him, and flog him, and kill him; and after three days he will rise again. (Mk
10:33–34)
In light of the expected danger, how will the Twelve deal with the second condition:
to take up the cross? Within the Christian tradition of the Gospel according to Mark,
this is certainly a metaphoric notion, expressing suffering leading to possible death.
This time, not Peter but the two other leading disciples, John and James, the sons of
Zebedee (cf. 1:16–20), react with a question that discloses their total misapprehension
of the situation. They who have experienced the foreshadowing of Jesus’ future glory on
the mountain of transfiguration (9:2–8) came up to20 Jesus, who was leading them, and
asked him: “Grant us to sit, one at your right hand and one at your left, in your glory”
(Mk 10:37 NRS). Ignoring Jesus’ third announcement, John and James want to reign
with him when he retains his glory (10:35–40). From their request it is clear that they
do not expect to suffer with Jesus. They still did not accept that he is going to Jerusalem
to be handed over, condemned, mocked, and eventually killed. They are heading for
glory, public repute.21
In reaction to their request, the other disciples became indignant. In the teaching
that follows (10:41–45) the Markan Jesus recapitulates the topic of self-denial needed
for communal life. He draws a sharp contrast between his followers and the non-Jewish
rulers. Among his followers, it should be different. Jesus instructs the disciples that who-
ever wishes to become great among them must serve the others and whoever wishes to
be first among them must be slave of all. He provides motivation for this instruction by
referring to his own example. Referring to himself as the Son of Man, he says that he
did not come to be served but to serve, and to give his life as ransom for many (10:45).22
Again, the failure of the disciples to act correctly on the road is the incentive for the
narrator to let Jesus instruct them on the demands on those among his followers in
leadership positions. His teaching of the Twelve on the road sets the demands for lead-
ership for those who would listen to Mark’s narrative.
20 Προσπορεύονται is a historical present.
21 For this sense of δόξα, cf. Bauer et al. 1999, s.v. 3;
Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1996, s.v. II.
22 On this, see Breytenbach 2014, 153–168.
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4 Function of the prolepsis and the framing
The disciples follow Jesus from Caesarea of Philippi through Capernaum to Jerusalem.
The narrator guides the audience in evaluating the reaction of the disciples in the light
of Jesus’ teaching on his imminent death and resurrection. From Peter’s refusal to ac-
cept Jesus as a suffering Messiah among the villages of Caesarea Philippi (8:32b–33), the
quarrel on the way back to Capernaum about who is the greatest while Jesus leads them
on his way to serve and suffer (9:34), up to the request to reign in glory by John and
James (10:35–45), the tension is increased and the grade of incomprehension deepens.
The audience will notice the contradiction between Jesus’ way and that of his followers.
They strive for mundane power, rank, and honor, instead of engaging in mutual service.
The Markan Jesus teaches the disciples, stressing that they be humble, willing to suffer,
and should serve not reign. The audience is led to dissociate with them and to identify
with Jesus, who leads the way he himself is teaching. Unlike the disciples, the audience
should understand what it means to follow Jesus.
One has to ask why the journey is framed by two episodes narrating the healing of
blind people. In the narrative, incomprehension is depicted by the metaphor of blind-
ness and deafness. The text of the prophet Isaiah played a major role in the origin of
this metaphoric speech.23 Those who do not understand the message are spiritually
blind; they have eyes but do not see, have ears but do not hear.24 Just before the jour-
ney starts in Bethsaida, the Markan Jesus asks his disciples, who are worried that they
do not have enough bread (8:17a–b), “Why are you talking about having no bread? Do
you still not perceive or understand?” They should have understood that he who had
fed 6000 and 4000 people,25 could feed them all from one loaf. Echoing the metaphor
of the hardening of the heart from Isaiah 6:10, which he left out in 4:12, the author lets
Jesus ask (8:17c): “Are your hearts hardened (πεπωρωμένην ἔχετε τὴν καρδίαν ὑμῶν)?”
The Markan Jesus continues his speech with a metaphorical allusion to Isaiah 6:9: “Do
you have eyes, and fail to see? Do you have ears, and fail to hear?”26 The two framing
23 “Metaphorical expressions can be part of the inter-
textual relationships between different texts [...]”,
(Semino 2008, 29).
24 Cf. Mk 4:12: βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ μὴ ἴδωσιν,
καὶ ἀκούοντες ἀκούωσιν καὶ μὴ συνιῶσιν, μήποτε
ἐπιστρέψωσιν καὶ ἀφεθῇ αὐτοῖς. Mk cites Isaiah
6:9–10 freely, not from the LXX–version (καὶ εἶπεν
πορεύθητι καὶ εἰπὸν τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ ἀκοῇ ἀκούσετε
καὶ οὐ μὴ συνῆτε καὶ βλέποντες βλέψετε καὶ οὐ μὴ
ἴδητε [….] μήποτε ἴδωσιν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τοῖς
ὠσὶν ἀκούσωσιν καὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ συνῶσιν καὶ ἐπι-
στρέψωσιν καὶ ἰάσομαι αὐτούς) skipping the ini-
tial phrase in verse 10 (ἐπαχύνθη γὰρ ἡ καρδία τοῦ
λαοῦ τούτου καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν αὐτῶν βαρέως ἤκουσαν
καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἐκάμμυσαν).
25 Cf. Mk 6:30–44; 8:1–10.
26 Mk 8:18: ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες οὐ βλέπετε καὶ ὦτα
ἔχοντες οὐκ ἀκούετε; Nestle, K. Aland, Black, et
al. 1979 suggests that Mk 8:18 cites JerLXX 5:21 and
B. Aland et al. 2014 notes that the verse alludes to
it (ἀκούσατε δὴ ταῦτα λαὸς μωρὸς καὶ ἀκάρδιος
ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐ βλέπουσιν ὦτα αὐτοῖς καὶ
οὐκ ἀκούουσιν). The introductory motif πεπωρω-
μένην […] τὴν καρδίαν in Mk 8:17, however, is
from Isaiah 6:10 and suggests that the allusion in
Mk 8:18 is to Isaiah 6:9.
146
incomprehension en route to jerusalem
episodes of the healing of the blind give hope that eventually the disciples will ‘see’ and
understand. The two healing stories show that the blindness of those who trusted Jesus
was healed, that the incomprehension of the disciples can be overcome.
5 En route to Jerusalem as metaphor?
Historically, Jesus was from Nazareth, but was crucified in Jerusalem. Thus, he must
have travelled from Galilee to Jerusalem, probably more than once. In his recollection
of communal memory, however, why does the narrator tell the story in such a way that
Jesus teaches his disciples ‘on the way’ (ἐν τῇ ὁδω)? It fits his narrative concept. From the
beginning, the theme of ever-larger crowds encroaching upon Jesus is developed.27 He
could teach his disciples only in the house of Peter and Andrew or in the boat on the
lake.28 On the journey this was easier; here, he was leading those who left everything to
follow him (10:28). By letting Jesus predict to his disciples all that must happen (8:31)
according to the Scriptures (14:21, 41) – his eminent passion, death, and resurrection –
the narrator can explain who this Jesus is. Through these prolepses it becomes clear who
is to be followed and where he leads his disciples.
This explanation however, does not suffice. The central concept in the Gospel ac-
cording to Mark that expresses the relationship between him and his disciples is that
they follow him on all his travels through Galilee (6:1; 10:28, 32), that they are with
him (3:13–19; 4:10). This concept also draws on the communal memory still reflected
in the gospel tradition; namely, Jesus called people to follow him.29 Part of this commu-
nal memory is also that Jesus’ disciples did not understand him until after Easter; they
failed to follow him until the end.30
Recasting the traditional role of the disciples, who did not understand Jesus, into a
highly structured narrative of the journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, the narrator uses
the disciples while they are on the road following him as an example of what disciple-
ship and following Jesus should not be. At the outset of the final journey to Jerusalem,
Mark uses this tradition to explain the conditions for following Jesus (8:34–35). Every
time they fail to understand; but Jesus does not stop teaching them. By telling the story
of how Jesus taught the conditions of following him to those with him, the narrator
instructs his audience. Of course, the audience cannot follow Jesus from the villages of
Caesarea of Philippi in the north uphill to Jerusalem in the south in Judea. But with the
27 Cf. Mk 1:32–33, 45; 2:2, 13, 15; 3:7–9, 20; 4:1–2;
5:21, 24, 27, 31; 6:33–34; 7:14; 8:1.
28 Cf. Mk 7:17; 9:28, 33; 10:10 (house) and 4:10; 8:14–
21 (boat).
29 Cf. Mk 1:18; 2:14–15; 10:21; LkQ 9:57–59/MtQ
11:19–22; Lk 9:61.
30 On this cf. Breytenbach 2013, 39–40.
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rise of Christianity after Easter, ‘to follow’ (ἀκολουθεῖν) Jesus became a metaphor for
discipleship in general, also in Mark’s narrative.31
The audience should ‘follow’ as the disciples should have done, not as they did.
Jesus gives direction and with his instruction ‘to follow’ and its conditions, demands ac-
tion according to his instruction and example. These demands are framed by the spatial
metaphor ‘to follow’ and the metaphor functions to give orientation: metaphorically,
the audience should go the way Jesus did. It is this metaphoric use of the concept of
following Jesus that paved the way to the use of the journey from Galilee to Jerusalem
as a macro scene for teaching the disciples what it entails to deny oneself, be prepared
to die for the sake of the gospel, and ‘to follow’ Jesus. In this manner, ‘on the road’ (ἐν
τῇ ὁδω) becomes a metaphor itself. For the narrator, it sets the narrative frame for the
story of Jesus teaching his disciples.32 For the audience, it is a metaphorical ‘journey’ on
which they are required ‘to follow’ Jesus as he required from his disciples, who failed
to understand his teaching. On two occasions, the – for the audience metaphorical –
narrative frame ‘on the way’ (ἐν τῇ ὁδω) is interrupted by going into a house (εἰς οἶκον
– 9:28), being at home (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ – 9:33; εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν – 10:10). Jesus’ teaching to his
disciples in the house includes other topics than how to follow him; such as, how to
treat other missionaries (9:38–50), a prohibition on divorce and on remarriage (10:10–
16), and how to deal with children and with wealth (10:17–27). Together the scenes of
teaching ‘on the road’ and teaching the disciples ‘in the house’33 serve to include several
other aspects of the ethical teaching of Jesus that the narrator wanted his audience ‘to
follow’.34
31 See also Toit 2006, 302–304.
32 On metaphor creating narrative frames, cf. Semino
2008, 40.
33 On both scenes, cf. Bosenius 2014.
34 Cf. Breytenbach 2006, 49–75.
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Pausanias’ Messenian Itinerary and the Journeys of the
Past
Summary
Messene was unusual among ancient poleis. It was one of the few major settlements on the
Greek mainland to be founded in the Hellenistic period. Moreover, on account of this,
its claim to a culturally authoritative past rooted in the mythic period could not rest on
suppositions about the continuity of knowledge handed down through the continuation
of civic, cultic, and communal institutions. This chapter examines how Pausanias’ account
of Messenia (book four of his Periegesis) approaches this dilemma by making knowledge
both an artefact preserved unchanged in texts, and a conceptual possession encountered and
attained through travel. It goes on to argue that the interplay between these two forms of
knowledge is specifically relevant to this text, since the Periegesis also serves as a fixed, written
object, which nonetheless offers opportunities for autonomous exploration and experience
to the hodological reader-traveler.
Keywords: Pausanias; Messenia; travel writing; Homer; genealogy; Greek myth; transmis-
sion of knowledge
Messene war eine ungewöhnliche Polis. Gegründet in hellenistischer Zeit, war sie eine der
wenigen großen Siedlungen auf dem griechischen Festland. Messenes Ansprüche auf eine
kulturelle Vergangenheit, die Maßstäbe setzte und in mythischen Zeiten wurzelte, konn-
ten daher nicht auf bloßen Vermutungen über die Kontinuität des Wissens, das durch bür-
gerliche, kultische und kommunale Institutionen weitergegeben wurde, beruhen. Dieses
Kapitel untersucht wie sich Pausanias in seiner Darstellung von Messene diesem Dilemma
nähert (im vierten Buch seiner Periegesis), indem er Wissen sowohl zu einem Artefakt er-
klärt, das unverändert in Texten erhalten ist, als auch zu einem konzeptuellen Besitz, der
durch Reisen erworben werden kann. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass gerade das Zusammen-
spiel dieser beiden Wissensformen von größter Bedeutung für den Text ist, da Pausanias’ Pe-
riegesis selbst als ein festgeschriebenes Objekt verstanden werden kann, welches gleichwohl
Gelegenheit bietet, vom hodologisch versierten Text-Reisenden eigenständig erkundet und
erfahren zu werden.
Keywords: Pausanias; Messenien; Reiseliteratur; Homer; Genealogie; griechische Mytho-
logie; Wissenstransfer
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1 Introduction
The idea that knowledge possesses spatial dimensions seems so obvious to us in English
that we barely register it as a figural trope. Knowledge can be described as a landscape
with disciplinary boundaries and frontiers, intellectual climates, conceptual landmarks
and horizons; it can be discovered, explored, and charted.1 In our hyper-literate cul-
ture, knowledge is encoded in stable, tangible forms; and yet we instinctively speak of
the textual archive as if it were a living organism, still developing and forming. Even
an ancient text can communicate to us as if a present interlocutor: “Herodotus says
that…” “He makes the point that…” “This means that…”.2 Despite the separation of mil-
lennia, millennia that have seen the emergence of ever more sophisticated technologies
for recording and storing information, we hold to the idea that knowledge is attained
through personal, experiential intimacy.
The spatiality of the textual archive overwhelms its potential temporal dimensions:
we would naturally say “where does Herodotus say that?” (and not, for example, “when did
Herodotus say that?”). We look for information in particular places (regrettably we cannot
replicate the ambivalence of τόποι or loci); we encounter characters in novels; we stumble
across useful references; and when we experience a moment of aporia – where we cannot
proceed further because we have lost the track we were following – we describe this as a
‘dead-end’. Such figurative language is neither accidental nor insignificant. It accompa-
nies the very practical observation that texts preserve knowledge in material forms but
that such knowledge is activated through human action and desire. Transmission is less
a facet of precise, disinterested objectivity; it is rather a product of countless interlock-
ing journeys through space and time. For travel is made up of irreplicable moments,
of accidental encounters, and of subjective observations. To attribute this sensibility to
texts is to lend them an experiential ephemerality.
1 For knowledge as a territory and a journey, see
Salmond 1982, esp. 68–72, who rightly goes on to
argue for the cultural specificities of such tropes.
2 On this point, Pausanias is instructive: when he uses
present tense verbs of speaking or showing, only
context allows the reader to determine if he is refer-
ring to a written or an oral source. See Jones 2001,
34.
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In this chapter I explore how Pausanias combines the concept of knowledge pre-
served unchanged through time in texts with the idea of knowledge as something en-
countered and attained through travel. These two aspects of knowledge are not, as we
have seen, antithetical, and Pausanias brings them together in various configurations in
his account of Messenia. The particular history of this region, which only emerged as an
independent polity in the Hellenistic period, raises questions about how a previously
subordinate group might claim to have kept safe and recovered unique knowledge about
their past despite a long period of political subjugation. In this context, the necessity of
journeying in search of knowledge and the need to exploit the preservative power of
texts take on pragmatic pertinence. That said, we must not fall into the trap of assuming
that, just because it is observably true that knowledge comes from both personal autopsy
and from reading, all claims to have recovered knowledge in these ways are equivalent
to ‘real journeys’. As we shall see, in Pausanias’ vision of Messenia such claims also bear
rhetorical weight.
The area of the south-western Peloponnese designated Messenia was, from some
point in the archaic period, subject to Lacedaemonian control. It developed a distinc-
tive economic system based on helot labor within scattered, small-scale settlements. In
369 BC Epaminondas’ defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra led to the founding of
Messene beneath Mt Ithome as notional head of an independent Messenian polity.3
Pausanias’ account reveals that the Messenians had developed this bare outline into a
national foundation narrative – the Messenian Wars – of conquest, rebellion, and lib-
eration. We recognize in this historical narrative a prime case-study in the mutually-
enforcing power of mythmaking and ethnogenesis: it is not merely that Epaminondas’
victories created a Messenian polity; the polity required stories of subjugation, resistance,
and liberation as a foundation for its sense of identity.4 In this chapter I am not con-
cerned with the strict historicity of Pausanias’ account, nor with the question of whether
particular aspects of Pausanias’ account accurately transmit sources or attitudes appar-
ent within Messenia at any point in its history. Rather, I take Pausanias’ account as an
idiomatic artifact in its own right, one that is “the product of his coming to terms with
the structural aspects of Messenian memory and of the Messenian landscape, as they
had been taking shape over the centuries”;5 and one that in very real ways shaped how
archaeologists and historians have understood and approached the region in the millen-
nia since.6 In the three sections that follow, I examine how Pausanias grapples with the
3 Although the city bore the name Ithome, Pausanias
calls it “Messene” and I, for clarity, follow his lead.
His practice in this regard reflects his general confla-
tion of the founding, ambitions, and perspective of
the city, those of the broader Messenian polity, and
the region of Messenia as a whole.
4 For the formation of Messenian identity, see esp.
Alcock 1999; Alcock 2002, 132–175; Luraghi 2002;
Luraghi and Alcock 2003; Luraghi 2008.
5 Luraghi 2008, 323.
6 For the influence of Pausanias’ account in these
ways, see Alcock, Cherry, and Elsner 2001, 146–153.
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problem of conveying knowledge about a place whose relationship to secure knowledge
was fraught.
2 The paths of Pausanias
Without Pausanias, we would know much less about ancient Messenia. His fourth book
preserves – uniquely – the entire story of the Messenian Wars, and is our only detailed
eyewitness account of Messenian topography.7 Yet, at the beginning of his account Pau-
sanias comments not on the gaps in knowledge that he does fill, but on a particular gap
that he cannot fill. So, regarding basic data on the region’s eponymous heroine:8
I was eager to know the children born to Polycaon by Messene, so I read through
(ἐπελεξάμην) the Ehoeae and the epic Naupactia, and then the genealogies of
Cinaethon and Asius, but no reference is made to them in these works. I am
aware that the Great Ehoeae says that the Polycaon who is the son of Butes mar-
ried Euaichme, the daughter of Hyllus, son of Heracles, but it does not mention
the Polycaon who was husband of Messene, nor Messene herself.9
With this extravagant display of aporia, Pausanias sets out his antiquarian bona fides and
his Herodotean aspirations10 while pointing out a distinctive characteristic of Messenia:
its traditions are poorly represented in the panhellenic textual tradition. In fact, without
Pausanias’ testimony we would assume that Messene was just another colorless eponym:
among our mythographic resources, neither R. L. Fowler nor T. Gantz have information
on her, and W. H. Roscher and J. Larson both send us to Pausanias.11 Aside from some
brief genealogical comments in a Euripidean scholion (ad Or. 932), only Pausanias of-
fers Messene any kind of literary footprint. He explains her role in the early history of
Messenia: she, daughter of the king of Argos and unsatisfied with being married off to
the brother of the king of Laconia, persuaded her husband to raise an army and take
Messenia as their own kingdom.12
7 The Messenian Wars dominate Pausanias’ account
of Messenia (4.4.1–4.27.11). He mentions two third-
century writers as sources: the historian Myron of
Priene and poet Rhianos of Bene. We cannot of
course know how closely he followed either. See
Musti and Torelli 1991, xvi–xxvii.
8 Another prominent comment on the lack of infor-
mation regarding Messenia appears in Pausanias’
discussion of the hero(in)es associated with the sanc-
tuary at Andania (4.33.6).
9 Paus. 4.2.1. All translations are my own.
10 Pausanias’ unusual use of the verb ἐπιλέγομαι to
mean ‘read’ here recalls Herodotus’ usage. See Jones
2001, 34.
11 Drexler 1965, s.v. Messene; Larson 1995, 157.
12 Paus. 4.1.1–2.
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We cannot know for sure where Pausanias found this information, but he must have
had access to sources within the region itself. Pausanias models himself on Herodotus.13
He ascribes his authority to his extensive personal experiences and on-site investigation.
This is not merely a rhetorical trope; without falling into the trap of equating autopsy
with perfect knowledge, or suggesting that Pausanias offers unmediated access to epi-
choric sources, it is certainly the case that, whether we can prove that on-site research
informs any one specific passage or not, the Periegesis is generally a product of personal
travel, inquiry, and autopsy, and these affect its perspective.14
Travel also shapes the structure of the work. The ten books of the Periegesis describe
the southern and central Greek mainland with each, more or less, dedicated to a different
region.15 This framework, then, necessitates that a certain amount of time – so to speak
– is spent in each region of Greece; thus, the small villages and outlying sanctuaries
receive attention alongside the major poleis and panhellenic sites, and no region can be
left out if the coverage is to be systematic. It is for precisely this reason that Pausanias’
account of Messenia exists, and this is why Pausanias must record what he can about the
eponym Messene, since such information is part of the standard genealogical material
with which he begins each region.
The bulk of the Periegesis is taken up in itineraries through each region. These linear
paths offer the reader encounters with the sights and traditions of Greece, one after the
other. But in fact, there is a tension between the overall structure of the work, which
assumes strict separation between each region and its neighbors, and the itineraries,
which are concerned with the details of each place on the ground and where such de-
marcations might not be so clear. As Elsner observes, this collocation of geographical
and textual divisions has phenomenological implications:
These borders, as felt by the traveller on the actual land and as announced to
the reader by the text, […] mark not merely lines on a map, but boundaries
and thresholds in the experience of Greece. They delimit places not simply to-
pographically, but as areas of culture, of race, of identity.16
13 This aspect of the text has been extensively docu-
mented. For details and bibliography, see Hawes
2015, 337–340.
14 The credibility of Pausanias’ claims to autopsy was
an important feature of his rehabilitation as a rep-
utable author (most notably in Habicht 1985). More
recent approaches have rather emphasized the lit-
erary aspects of the work (e.g. Hutton 2005; Pretz-
ler 2007) and its reflection of cultural norms and
ideological perspectives (e.g. many of the essays in-
cluded in Alcock, Cherry, and Elsner 2001). Such
approaches complicate our understanding of Pausa-
nias’ relationship to the material he describes with-
out of course undercutting the validity of his on-site
observations. For attempted reconstructions of Pau-
sanias’ methods, see Jones 2001; Pretzler 2004.
15 The reality is, of course, rather more complicated.
The best discussion on the structure of the work as a
whole appears in Hutton 2005, 68–82.
16 Elsner 1992, 13. Italics are in original.
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Fig. 1 Itineraries through Laconia and Messenia, Periegesis books 3 and 4.
When Pausanias disputes the border between Laconia and Messenia in the western
Mani, the tension between geographical and textual integrity is palpable.17 This bor-
der was long contested and territory – notably the Ager Dentheliatis and the sanctuary
of Artemis Limnatis – changed hands several times in the Hellenistic and early Impe-
rial periods.18 The border in Pausanias’ time was the Choerius river, and he uses this
to divide his third book – on Laconia – from his fourth – on Messenia (see Fig. 1). But
in his account of the free Laconian poleis of the western Mani in the final chapters of
book three, Messenian views begin to edge in, so that this area is marked out as no-
table on account of its ethnic porosity. In essence, Pausanias suggests that the current
geo-political border is too far to the north to correspond to an essential cultural divide
between the Laconians and the Messenians, and he makes this point not by telling the
reader this, but by showing her: as she reads, the reader ‘travels’ towards and through the
area in question, experiencing a textual simulation of contesting voices.
17 Thus, Shipley 2006, 38: “[Pausanias] is working with
a model of land division that purports to make
political reality conform with ethnic identity, and
identifies certain changes [i.e. along the frontier be-
tween Messenia and Laconia] as violations of that
code.”
18 See Cartledge and Spawnforth 1992, 138–139;
Luraghi 2008, 16–27.
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Here are the relevant excerpts from the final chapters of book three:
The inhabitants of Thalamae say that the Dioscouri were born [on Pephnus, a
nearby island]. … The Messenians say that this land was once theirs, and so they
consider that the Dioscouri belong more to them than to the Lacedaemonians.
Leuctra is 20 stades from Pephnus. I don’t know the reason for the city’s name.
If, as the Messenians say, it is indeed from Leucippus, son of Perieres, then, I
think, this would be why they worship Asclepius above all other gods, since
they consider him to be the son of Arsinoe, daughter of Leucippus. …
I know that the following happened in the territory of Leutra, towards the coast,
in my own time. Wind pushed fire into a forest, and many of the trees were
burned. The area was laid bare, and a statue of Zeus Ithomatas was found to
have been set up there. The Messenians say that this is evidence that Leuctra
was once part of Messenia. But it would be possible, if the Lacedaemonians
have lived in Leuctra since ancient times, that they worshipped Zeus Ithomatas.
Cardamyle, which is included by Homer in the gifts promised [to Achilles]
by Agamemnon, has been under the control of the Lacedaemonians at Sparta
since the Emperor Augustus separated it from Messenia. …
The city which is now called Gerenia was in the Homeric epics called Enope. Its
inhabitants are Messenians, but it belongs to the league of the free Laconians.
Some say that Nestor was brought up in this city, others that he came here as an
exile after Heracles took Pylos. Here in Gerenia there is the tomb of Machaon
the son of Asclepius, and a sanctuary. … There is a statue of Machaon standing
upright and wearing a crown on his head, which the Messenians call in their
local dialect, kiphos.19
With notable regularity, Pausanias gives space to Messenian perspectives on the La-
conian side of the border. In doing this, he emphasizes the preponderance of Messe-
nian religio-mythical features there: Leucippus and Nestor were undeniably Messenian
heroes (two of the few undisputed ones, in fact, as we shall see), and Zeus Ithomatas –
despite Pausanias’ skepticism – one of the few paradigmatically Messenian gods.20 That
Asclepius and the Dioscouri were Messenian were chancier claims, but could never-
theless be justified.21 Highlighting Messenian views within Laconian territory creates a
19 Paus. 3.26.2–11.
20 For his cult as a key element of Messenian identity
both before and after liberation, see Alcock 2002,
143–144.
21 The Messenian claim to Asclepius and his family is
discussed below.
157
greta hawes
suggestive ideological undercurrent to what is ostensibly a straightforward topograph-
ical description. The reader experiences these places as oriented towards the cultural
network anchored across the Messenian border.
We can identify an even subtler example of Pausanias’ biases at work in his identi-
fication of the sites of the seven cities “near the sea and bordering on sandy Pylos” that
Homer has Agamemnon offer to Achilles in his attempt to placate him (Il. 9.149–153).
When another geographer, Strabo, sets out to identify the locations of these cities, he
describes a situation of uncertainty and dispute:
Of the seven cities offered to Achilles, I have already spoken of Cardamyle,
Pherae, and Pedasus. Some say that Enope is Pellana, others that it is a place in
the vicinity of Cardamyle, and others that it is Gerenia. Some identify Hire as a
place on the mountain that is near Megalopolis in Arcadia, on the road leading
to Andania (the one which I said is called Oechalia by Homer); but others say
that Hire is now Mesola, which is on the gulf between Taygetus and Messenia.
Aepeia is now called Thouria, the place I described near Pherae. It is sited on
a high ridge, from which it got its name. … Regarding Antheia, some say it
is Thouria, and that Aepeia is Methone; but others say that Asine, which lies
between the two, is the most likely of all Messenian cities to be described “rich
in meadows” [i.e. the epithet of Antheia, Il. 9.151]. In the territory of Asine,
on the sea, is the city Corone, and some say that this city was called Pedasus by
Homer.22
Strabo’s ambivalence here is a useful point of contrast with Pausanias’ approach since
Pausanias, by contrast, identifies each of Homer’s place names with a single location
and mentions no disputes over such attributions. I set out the relevant identifications
in Table 1. But of course, this table somewhat skews Pausanias’ mode of presentation,
for he does not discuss these identifications in a single passage as Strabo does. Rather,
as in the examples of Cardamyle and Gerenia in the passage from the end of book three
quoted above, he simply notes the Homeric connection when his narrative reaches the
appropriate place. Thus, a reader like me wanting to identify all seven cities needs to
hunt through Pausanias’ third and fourth books and map the resulting data accordingly.
Given the evidence of Strabo, we must recognize that Pausanias’ seemingly straightfor-
ward identification of these cities is in fact the result of a particular interpretative stance.
Two consequences of his decision to present the cities in this way would not be appar-
ent to the casual reader of the text, working through it in a hodological manner, and yet
they would nonetheless color her understanding of what she had read.
22 Strabo 8.4.5.
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Homer (Il. 9.149–153) Pausanias Strabo
Cardamyle Cardamyle 3.26.7 Cardamyle 8.4.4
Enope Gerenia 3.26.8 Pellana / place near Cardamyle / Gerenia 8.4.5
Hire Abia 4.30.1 Near Megalopolis / Mesola 8.4.5
Pherae Pherae 4.1.4; 4.30.2–3 Pherae 8.4.4
Antheia Thouria 4.31.1 Thouria / Asine 8.4.5
Aepeia Corone 4.34.5 Thouria / Methone 8.4.5
Pedasus Mothone 4.35.1 Methone 8.4.3 / Corone 8.4.5
Tab. 1 The identities of the seven cities offered by Agamemnon to Achilles in Strabo and Pausanias.
Firstly, as we have seen, Pausanias identifies each city categorically. This gives the impres-
sion of Messenian consensus on the Homeric passage; in fact, as Strabo showed, most of
the Homeric toponyms had several claimants within Messenia. The absence of any hint
of disagreement in Pausanias’ account strengthens his projection of a unified Messenian
polity under the hegemony of Messene; in fact, such unity was much less apparent on
the ground.23 Secondly, whereas Strabo’s locations take in Pellana (in Laconia, east of
the Taygetos mountains) and Eira (on Messenia’s northern border, identified with Hire),
Pausanias’ cluster tidily around the Messenian gulf (see Fig. 2). Identifying them in this
configuration adds implicit weight to the idea that the second-century border is too far
to the north. Pausanias’ itinerary around the gulf encounters the cities in the same order
that Homer listed them. The book division – corresponding to the contemporary bor-
der – thus seems to arbitrarily separate into two distinct groups those places forming a
tight linguistic and conceptual cluster in the epic. If these seven cities belonged together
in Homer, then Cardamyle and Gerenia, now lying in free Laconian territory, should
not be detached from the other five.
23 Several poleis within the region had at various
times asserted their independence from Messene
(e.g. Abia, Pherae, and Thouria were independent
members of the Achaean league from the early sec-
ond century), and alignment with Lacedaemon is
evident in Imperial Thouria and Cardamyle (see
Luraghi 2008, 26, 37–39). Nonetheless, Pausanias
only once suggests disagreement between Messeni-
ans, at 4.32.2, over a minor detail. On this passage,
see Luraghi 2008, 326–327. For further evidence
of Messenian heterogeneity, see Spencer 1995, 289
(on subtle gradations apparent in archaeological
evidence); Alcock 2002, 152–155, 164–167, 171–
173 (on divergent memories); Luraghi 2008, 300–
323 (on strategies for displaying prestige amongst
the elites of Roman Messene). On the general phe-
nomenon of diversity in Roman Greece, see Alcock
2002, 68–73; Jones 2004.
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Fig. 2 Locations of the seven
cities offered by Agamemnon to
Achilles, according to Pausanias.
The observable phenomenon that travel and on-site investigation create knowledge makes
a virtue of individual subjectivity: Herodotean-style rhetoric makes the possession of
unique information and discriminating judgement products of personal experiences in
the wider world. Such knowledge cannot be transferred to another person tout court
(since the mechanisms that produce it are necessarily individualistic and empirical) but
it can be communicated. Pausanias’ mode of communicating his knowledge – a series
of itineraries – simulate the sensations of travel so that the reader, too, encounters these
places in a linear manner.24 Yet her accumulation of knowledge through this process is
controlled at each point by the set itineraries that Pausanias has created. She ‘sees’ only
what Pausanias shows, and does not register what he does not mention. Her ‘path of
knowledge’ through the Periegesis is not so much a ‘real journey’ as a matter of literary
fact. What is put before her eyes does not change; yet, subjectivity remains at play. For
even within this set narrative itinerary she might chose to hunt back and forth, putting
24 Here my approach to Pausanias parallels Michael
Scott’s description of a reader working her way
through Strabo: “Literary constructs of space differ
fundamentally from physical ones, since they unfold
in a linear fashion as part of a narrative. […] [The]
reader is forced to discover parts of that construct as
he travels along with Strabo in his periplous journey
around the oikoumene. Learning is hodological; it is
a process, a journey. Our perspective as readers alter-
nates as Strabo moves in his own spatial perspectives
from bird’s-eye cartographical description, through
mythological and historiographical landscape, to
join us as he travels himself around (some of) these
regions […] He learns as he moves through space,
just as we do […].” (Scott 2013, 157).
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clues together in different ways. She might create a cumulative map of Homer’s seven
cities, for example, or her personal affiliations might drive her to resist Pausanias’ philo-
Messenian biases and to recognize that his highlighting of Messenian perspectives in the
western Mani is no objective account of topographical fact. Because Pausanias ‘shows’
rather than ‘tells’, only through the experience of reading – that is, traveling along the
paths that his itineraries offer – does the reader glean knowledge for herself.
3 The paths of exiles
Two compelling anxieties shaped the myth-making of post-liberation Messenia: the de-
sire to promote a Messenian culture identifiably distinct from that of Laconia, and the
desire to afford this culture the dignity of a long lineage. Within a culture in which
authenticity and authority were rhetorically aligned to antiquity and originality, the
‘break’ in Messenian culture through the period of Lacedaemonian control posed a real
problem. As Pausanias observes when his itinerary encounters the tombs of two promi-
nent Messenian heroes at Sparta, stable political power is a prerequisite for the effective
memorializing infrastructures that protect local knowledge:
The disasters which the Messenians suffered and the period of their exile from
the Peloponnese have consigned to obscurity many of their early traditions,
even now that they have returned. And because they no longer know these tra-
ditions, anyone who wishes may lay claim to them.25
Whether – and how – Hellenistic Messenians could actually possess accurate knowledge
of their pre-Lacedaemonian culture raises practical questions of cultural transmission.
Of the two starkest possible responses – that successive generations of enslaved and ex-
iled people carefully cultivated and passed on ancestral knowledge, or that in fact the
Messenian past and the traditions of the region were deliberately invented tout court at
the point of liberation – Pausanias holds optimistically to a version of the former.26
He identifies several mechanisms through which the Messenians might have preserved
earlier knowledge intact, and it is to these ‘paths of knowledge’ that I now turn.27
25 Paus. 3.13.2.
26 Variations on these positions were put forward
through the twentieth century by historians of an-
cient Messenia. For discussion, see esp. Alcock 1999.
The work of Susan Alcock and Nino Luraghi (ref-
erenced throughout this chapter) has led debate in
more productive directions by stressing the inven-
tive power of cultural memory and the opportunis-
tic fluidity of collective identity.
27 In this chapter I am concerned only with Pausanias’
assessment of the transmission of Messenian cul-
ture, not with the actual processes through which
this might have been achieved. Alcock 2002, 132–
164, examines the historical and archaeological evi-
dence for opportunities within pre-liberation Messe-
nia for the cultivation and communication of com-
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Surprisingly, Pausanias says almost nothing about the activities of the helots – the
enslaved population of the region – under Lacedaemonian control.28 Rather, after Aris-
tomenes’ defeat he focusses on the various communities beyond the south-western Pelo-
ponnese who identified as Messenian exiles. As Pausanias tells it, it was almost entirely
external agitation which brought about the expulsion of the Lacedaemonians, and the
new Messenia was the product of the diaspora’s uniform sense of identity and purpose:
After winning the battle at Leuctra, the Thebans sent messengers to Italy and
Sicily and to the Euesperitae and they summoned to the Peloponnese Messeni-
ans from every other place where they might be. And the Messenians gathered
faster than anyone might have expected, driven by a desire for their ancestral
land, and by a lasting hatred of the Lacedaemonians.29
Pausanias observes that, despite almost three centuries in exile – longer than any other
Greek community – the Messenians preserved their ancestral traditions to a remarkable
degree:
In this period they clearly lost none of the customs of their homeland, nor did
they relinquish their Doric dialect: still today they preserve the purest Doric of
all the Peloponnesians.30
Here is Pausanias’ first solution to the problem of Messenia’s antiquity: a spectacular feat
of trans-generational conservation by a scattered diaspora. This tidy narrative of knowl-
edge preserved ‘on the road’ has obvious ideological advantages, not least because it of-
fers a vision of how something authentically ‘Messenian’ might have survived untainted
by Lacedaemonian influence. It invests preservative power not in physical spaces, mate-
rial objects, or the institutions of the polis, but in the ephemeral, everyday phenomena
of habitual customs and language within a community of people.
To be integral once more, then, the polity needs these exiles back in their ‘proper’
territory. But the people also need the land: Pausanias notes that Messenians of the dias-
pora won no victories at Olympia and yet, “when the Messenians returned to the Pelo-
ponnese, their luck in the Games returned too”.31 Pausanias’ second solution for the
munal memories. Luraghi 2008, 202–208, offers an
assessment of the emergence of a distinct and uni-
fying sense of Messenian identity in the region in
the classical period which is narrower in focus and
which stresses the role of perioikoic communities.
28 See Asheri 1983, 39–41; Figueira 1999, 219–221. The
helots are mentioned briefly at 4.23.1, and there is
an account of their revolt at 4.24.5–7. Pausanias’
general silence regarding the helots parallels the
general absence of the centuries of Lacedaemonian
domination from the commemorative landscape of
the region. Luraghi 2008, 219–227, argues that this
characterizing of the exiles as the true descendants
of the old Messenians and the core of the new polity
(to the detriment of helot and perioikic populations)
was the general Theban-Messenian position.
29 Paus. 4.26.5.
30 Paus. 4.27.11.
31 Paus. 6.2.11.
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preservation of knowledge exploits this sense of the power of place via comments re-
garding the conservative capacity of objects buried in the ground. This motif bolsters
the significance of the return of the exiles by having them encounter and recognize
some aspect of Messenian culture, which had evaded the grasp of the Lacedaemonians.
The most prominent merging of these epichoric and exilic lines of reasoning appears
in the founding narrative of Messene. The influx of the exiles as a new population of
Messenians is paralleled by a return of Messenian heroes: at the ceremonies marking
the foundation of Messene, Epaminondas and the Thebans summon back the region’s
heroes to reside once more in the territory (ἐπεκαλοῦντο δὲ ἐν κοινῷ καὶ ἥρωάς σφισιν
ἐπανήκειν συνοίκους32); in the case of Aristomenes, the celebrated hero of the Messe-
nian wars, they relocate his tomb from Rhodes.33 But this spatial logic of exile and re-
turn operates in tandem with a story that stresses the importance of the new city’s fixed
location:
Epaminondas thought that it would be difficult to build a city which would
withstand a Lacedaemonian attack, and was at a loss as to where this city might
be sited. For the Messenians refused to live again at Andania or Oechalia, since
they had suffered disasters there. …
Epiteles [an Argive general] was ordered in a dream to go to the place where
yew and myrtle had grown on Ithome, to dig in its midst, and to rescue an old
woman: she was shut up in a bronze chamber, worn-out, and almost dead. The
next morning, he went to the place indicated and dug up a bronze urn. He took
it straightaway to Epaminondas, explained about the dream, and urged him to
remove the lid and look within. Epaminondas … opened the urn and found
within it sheets of tin, rolled exceptionally thinly.34
Inscribed on these sheets are the mysteries of Andaria. Here writing has both concep-
tual and material aspects. Conceptually, writing affords support for cultic traditions;
materially, writing exists as a precious object. These sheets of tin appeared earlier in
Pausanias’ account, being buried by Aristomenes.35 There they are described obliquely
as “something kept hidden” (τι ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ). An oracle foretells that, if these should
be preserved safely, then the Messenians would again recover their land. Aristomenes,
knowing this, and aware that defeat by the Lacedaemonians is imminent, buries them
secretly on Ithome. Only with the retrieval of the texts three centuries – and seven chap-
ters – later does the reader learn what exactly was the mysterious “something” whose
preservation was so important. The effect of strategic ignorance in Pausanias’ narrative
32 Paus. 4.27.6.
33 Paus. 4.24.3; 4.32.3.
34 Paus. 4.26.6–8.
35 Paus. 4.20.4.
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mirrors the function of the texts themselves: they are physically in Messenia through the
period of Lacedaemonian control, but the knowledge that they contain is only activated
when they are recovered and read.
In both this oracle and an earlier dream,36 the foundation of the new Messene is
depicted metaphorically as the revivification of an old woman. Here political change is
rendered paradoxically as ancient continuity: Messene is neither a new city nor a colony
of Thebes. It is an ancient site inhabited once more by its proper population: immigrants
who were not immigrants read texts long unread to found a new city to be home to a
culture that is transplanted – yet local – to its new – native – soil. In Pausanias’ account,
Messenia’s legitimacy is vouchsafed by the only mechanisms available to it: residence
within the soil, and journeys out of and back into the region. These epichoric and exter-
nal mechanisms are foils to each other: when the returning exiles’ paths cross the tracks
of the departing Aristomenes, the new Messene comes into being, and, crucially, the
intervening centuries are lithely papered over.
These mechanisms reveal once more the false dichotomy between the stable exis-
tence of knowledge in textual form, and the ephemerality of knowledge gained through
travel. For, in the case of the rites of Andania, these texts do not exist without their read-
ership. In effect, only through the experience of being read are they activated as objects
of knowledge.
4 Homeric paths
My final ‘path of knowledge’ again concerns the (re-)activation of texts. This time I am
concerned not with secrets inscribed onto tin, but with the manifest authority of Home-
ric epic.
The period of Lacedaemonian control coincided with the flourishing of a panhel-
lenic literature that made some Greek myths prominent beyond their local community
and which served as a supra-regional mechanism for their future transmission. We have
seen that Messene and Polycaon were practically invisible within this material; Pausanias
believes that their descendants ruled for five generations, but he cannot name them.37
With the next dynasty, however, he is on firmer ground. Over six chapters38 he narrates
Messenian myth down to the time of the return of the Heracleidae. The major figures
in this account can be gathered together into a single genealogy (Fig. 3).
Pausanias’ account is exceedingly tidy, and he presents it – remarkably – without
mentioning any points of dispute over names or relationships. When we look closely
36 Paus. 4.26.3.
37 Paus. 4.2.2.
38 Paus. 4.2.4; 4.3.2.
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Fig. 3 Trans-Messenian mythic genealogy, after Pausanias 4.2.4–3.2. Figures in italics are not mentioned in this
passage, but are well-attested elsewhere in the literary tradition.
at the genealogy it produces, we find that Pausanias has fashioned his Messenian myth-
history by recounting the stories associated with the family of Aphareus (which Pausa-
nias places at Arene) and taking care to tie in the other prominent Messenian dynasty,
that of Neleus at Pylos.39 We can find independent textual support for almost every ele-
ment of Pausanias’ genealogy; indeed, the Apharetidae and the Pylians are two rare ex-
amples of Messenians with prominent roles in panhellenic myth. Homer’s ‘sandy Pylos’
was localized on the Messenian coast from at least the time of Pindar, who calls its ruler
Nestor “Messenian”.40 Arene was much more obscure geographically,41 but Aphareus’
family achieves renown in several ways. Homer preserves the genealogical significance
of his son, Idas: Cleopatra, his daughter with Marpessa, is the wife of Meleager42 and
versions of a story alluded to by Homer, in which Idas challenges Apollo for Marpessa,
appeared in Simonides43 and Bacchylides44, and on the Chest of Cypselus.45 Meanwhile,
39 All of the figures Pausanias mentions in this part
of the account are clearly related genealogically
to one another with the exceptions of Melaneus
and Oechalia (4.2.2–3), whose significance will be
discussed below, and Lycus and Caucon, who in-
troduce the mysteries to Andania (4.2.6). Caucon
also has a role in the later story of Messene, being
recognised as the figure in Epiteles’ dream who gives
instructions for the retrieval of the hidden texts
(4.26.8).
40 Pind. Pyth. 6.32–36. The Messenian location was not
uncontested. Homer also describes Pylos as near
the Alpheus river, suggesting a site in Elis. Despite
Strabo’s notable dissenting voice (8.3.7), the Messe-
nian site was generally accepted as Nestor’s home-
land in antiquity (see Hope Simpson and Lazenby
1970, 82; Visser 1997, 522–531; Allen 1921, 75–79).
Pausanias places Nestor in Messenia but accepts the
Eleans’ argument that it is their Pylos that is men-
tioned at Il. 5.544 (6.32.6) and reports (6.25.3) their
interpretation of the problematic Il. 5.397.
41 Paus. 5.6.2.
42 Hom. Il. 9.555–564.
43 563 PMG.
44 Fr. 20A SM.
45 Paus. 5.18.2.
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Lynceus’ sharp eyesight was proverbial.46 Both brothers are killed in a fight with the
Dioscouri (Pindar Nem. 10.55–74, among others, has this story).47 The cause of their
dispute is sometimes the Dioscouri’s abduction of the Messenian Leucippidae Phoebe
and Hilaera, a scene well-represented in Greek art.
Pausanias’ tidy account, then, capitalizes on the fact that these parts of Messenian
myth existed in textual form. But the pattern of preservation is instructive: Messenian
stories are not told – and thus preserved – for their own sake. Rather, these Messenian
heroes appear where they intersect supra-regional traditions: Nestor and his sons join
the expedition to Troy; the Leucippidae find fame in their abduction by the Dioscouri;
Idas and Lynceus take part in the Calydonian boar hunt48 and the voyage of the Argo.49
Preservation by virtue of intersection is also apparent in Messenian genealogical con-
nections. Few of those who appear in the genealogy in figure 3 belong exclusively to
Messenia; aside from Aphareus, Leucippus, and Neleus, and their immediate offspring,
the family tree shifts quickly from the prestigious supra-regional Stammväter Aeolus and
Perseus to the Calydonian line of Idas and Marpessa and the Argolid line of the Neleids.
Note that without Arsinoe (the third daughter of Leucippus, to be discussed in a mo-
ment), the line of ‘exclusive’ Messenians quickly ends.
Recognizing the importance of these points of intersection has crucial implications.
Pausanias’ account of this period of Messenian myth-history leaves us with the distinct
impression that Messenia’s public, trans-regional mythology diverges little from what
can be found in earlier texts. Certainly, Pausanias adds little to this archive. He supplies
only one minor detail not attested elsewhere: that Idas’ daughter Marpessa, like her
own daughter and granddaughter, committed suicide on the death of her husband.50
Pausanias is an author notoriously enamored of diverging and obscure mythic trivia;
yet in this instance he reveals no hint of a more extensive tradition available locally.
Mythical knowledge ‘on the ground’ seems coextensive with – and, we might suspect,
largely derived from – the literary archive.
Where the Messenian tradition is extended, it is done by exploiting opportunities
proffered by this archive. In his account of Pherae, Pausanias adds another branch to the
trans-Messenian genealogy that he had traced earlier:
They say that the founder Pharis was the son of Hermes and Phylodameia,
daughter of Danaus. They say that he had no sons, just a daughter, Telegone.
Homer gives the descendants of Telegone in the Iliad: Crethon and Ortilochus
46 Pind. Nem. 10.61; Ap. Rhod. 1.153–5; Palaephatus 9.
47 On sources for the deaths of the Apharetidae, see
Gengler 2003; Sbardella 2003; Drexler 1965, 97–100.
For the various genealogies that connected Leucip-
pus, Tyndareus, and Aphareus (in some sources they
are full brothers, elsewhere half-brothers), see Gantz
1993, 180–181; Fowler 2013, §13.2.
48 Apollod. 1.8.2.
49 Ap. Rhod. 1.151–2; Hyg. Fab. 14.
50 Paus. 4.2.7.
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Fig. 4 Mythic genealogy of
Pherae, after Pausanias 4.40.2–3.
Figures in upper case also appear
in Iliad 5.541–560.
were the twin sons of Diocles; Diocles himself was son of Ortilochus, son of
Alpheus. But he does not actually mention Telegone, who, in the Messenian
account bore Ortilochus to Alpheus.
I heard this further information at Pherae: as well as his twin sons, Diocles had
also a daughter, Anticleia, and her sons were Nicomachus and Gorgasus, whose
father was Machaon, son of Asclepius. They remained at Pherae and inherited
the kingdom after Diocles died.51
Here Pausanias reveals quite clearly the two composite sources for this lineage: the male
line comes from Homer and women are added by the Pheraeans as ‘pegs’ to connect into
other traditions (see Fig. 4). To begin with the former: the four generations beginning
with Alpheus appear in the Iliad. This genealogy is given as Aeneas kills the brothers Or-
tilochus and Crethon and thus seemingly ends the dynastic line.52 Their father, Diocles,
51 Paus. 4.30.2–3. Pausanias spells the name of this
city Φαραί (hence its founder is Pharis/Φᾶρις). Else-
where, including in Strabo and Homer, it is spelt
Φηραί. I use ‘Pherae’ throughout this chapter for
consistency.
52 Hom. Il. 5.541–560: ἔνθ’ αὖτ’ Αἰνείας Δαναῶν ἕλεν
ἄνδρας ἀρίστους / υἷε Διοκλῆος Κρήθωνά τε Ὀρ-
σίλοχόν τε, / τῶν ῥα πατὴρ μὲν ἔναιεν ἐϋκτιμένῃ
ἐνὶ Φηρῇ / ἀφνειὸς βιότοιο, γένος δ’ ἦν ἐκ ποτα-
μοῖο / Ἀλφειοῦ, ὅς τ’ εὐρὺ ῥέει Πυλίων διὰ γαίης, /
ὃς τέκετ’ Ὀρτίλοχον πολέεσσ’ ἄνδρεσσιν ἄνακτα·/
Ὀρτίλοχος δ’ ἄρ’ ἔτικτε Διοκλῆα μεγάθυμον, / ἐκ
δὲ Διοκλῆος διδυμάονε παῖδε γενέσθην, / Κρήθων
Ὀρσίλοχός τε μάχης εὖ εἰδότε πάσης. / τὼ μὲν ἄρ’
ἡβήσαντε μελαινάων ἐπὶ νηῶν / Ἴλιον εἰς εὔπωλον
ἅμ’ Ἀργείοισιν ἑπέσθην, / τιμὴν Ἀτρεΐδῃς Ἀγαμέ-
μνονι καὶ Μενελάῳ / ἀρνυμένω· τὼ δ’ αὖθι τέλος
θανάτοιο κάλυψεν. / οἵω τώ γε λέοντε δύω ὄρεος
κορυφῇσιν / ἐτραφέτην ὑπὸ μητρὶ βαθείης τάρφε-
σιν ὕλης· / τὼ μὲν ἄρ’ ἁρπάζοντε βόας καὶ ἴφια
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is described as residing in Pherae and being descended from Alpheus, which “flowed
through the land of the Pylians”.53 In the Odyssey, Telemachus visits Diocles in Pherae on
route from Pylos;54 a generation earlier, Odysseus had stayed with the elder Ortilochus
“in Messene”: it was there that he received his famous bow and quiver from Iphitus, son
of Eurytus.55 These allusions suggest that Pherae was an integral node in the Homeric
network of heroes; indeed, that Odysseus visits Ortilochus to reclaim flocks lost in an
earlier raid implies a fuller set of stories now lost. Again, it is their intersectional quality
which ensured that these tidbits of the Messenian past survived to be rediscovered: the
story of Odysseus’ bow and quiver brings Ortilochus into the ambit of the Ithacaean
story; Telemachus’ journey across the Peloponnese makes Pherae a waystation. In a very
real sense, it is only through engagement with a world of traveling heroes that these
Messenians won lasting renown. Indeed, the deaths of Ortilochus and Crethon – and,
almost more importantly, their genealogy – are recorded precisely because the pair left
Pherae to fight at Troy.
What Homer gives the later Messenians is largely names, not stories. From sugges-
tive references, Imperial Pherae reasserted the heroic luster of its past, yet there is no
suggestion in Pausanias that these particular names were targets for further invention.
The figures added to the Homeric lineage turn out to be of greater local importance.
Pherae traces its eponym Pharis to that standard Stammvater Danaus, and uses his daugh-
ter Telegone to connect these to the Homeric genealogy (as Pausanias notes, Homer
had not named the mother of the elder Ortilochus). The addition of Anticleia (found
only in Pausanias) to the end of Homer’s genealogy affords opportunities in other di-
rections: as sister to Ortilochus and Crethon, she continues the line after their deaths at
Troy. As mother of Nicomachus and Gorgasus, she links the otherwise obscure heroes
of Pherae’s healing sanctuary into the whole genealogical network. As wife of Ascle-
pius’ son Machaon, she is a local node in the trans-Hellenic network of sanctuaries of
Asclepius and, via Asclepius’ alternative Messenian genealogy, she connects Pherae to
the trans-Messenian family tree mapped above (Fig. 3). Let’s look at this mechanism in
more detail.
The dominant tradition, supported by the sanctuary at Epidaurus, made Asclepius
the son of a Thessalian heroine, Coronis. But Hesiod provided a variant parentage for
μῆλα / σταθμοὺς ἀνθρώπων κεραΐζετον, ὄφρα
καὶ αὐτὼ / ἀνδρῶν ἐν παλάμῃσι κατέκταθεν ὀξέϊ
χαλκῷ· / τοίω τὼ χείρεσσιν ὑπ’ Αἰνείαο δαμέντε /
καππεσέτην, ἐλάτῃσιν ἐοικότες ὑψηλῇσι.
53 The unstable location of the kingdom of Pylos in
Homer is noted above.
54 Hom. Od. 3.488–490.
55 Hom. Od. 21.15–19. It must be noted that, in a no-
torious geographical problem, this meeting is also
described as taking place “in Lacedaemon” (Λα-
κεδαίμονι, 21.13). Pausanias glosses the passage
as meaning that the meeting took place in Pherae
(Paus. 4.1.4.)
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the god by naming Arsinoe, daughter of Leucippus, as his mother.56 Leucippus’ other
daughters, Hilaera and Phoebe, exist in myth only to be abducted by the Dioscouri
(see above). Arsinoe has no role in that story; she exists seemingly only to give birth
to Asclepius. Pausanias reports a “fountain of Arsinoe” at Messene,57 but nothing else
about her. Nevertheless, the city certainly exploited the Hesiodic variant to enhance the
prestige of its Asclepeion.58 More relevant to our study is how the claim that Asclepius
was Messenian created a different way of reading Homer’s geography, which in turn
allowed for – or, one might say even say, ‘required’ – the transplantation of other heroes
connected to him.
The Messenian Asclepius brought with him – so to speak – two sons. In the Cat-
alogue of Ships, his sons, Machaon and Podaleirius, lead men from “Tricca, craggy
Ithome, and Oechalia, city of Eurytus”.59 In keeping with their claim to Asclepius, the
Messenians could produce locations for these place names to rival the better-known
Thessalian sites. Ithome was, of course, the mountain above Messene, Tricca a ruined
village somewhere in the hinterland,60 and Oechalia the present-day Carnasion.61 Messe-
nia also had physical relics to support this reading: Machaon’s tomb was at Gerenia (the
free Laconian city whose Messenian identity Pausanias stresses, as noted above).62 His
remains were brought ‘home’ by Nestor, who in the Iliad tends his wounds in a ‘neigh-
borly’ fashion.63
Pausanias reviews the various claimants for “Oechalia, city of Eurytus” across Greece
and declares the Messenian Carnasion the “most likely” (μᾶλλον εἰκότα) given that the
bones of Eurytus are there, displayed along with the bronze urn in which Epiteles had
discovered the rites of Andania.64 Pausanias includes the arrival of Eurytus’ parents Mela-
neus and Oechalia in his myth-history of the region; they are given the land for their city
by Perieres.65 Quite notably, however, although this two-generation lineage is chrono-
logically located within Messenia’s past, it is not connected into the trans-Messenian
genealogy that we have been tracing in any way; nor is there any hint of how the fur-
ther stories of this family were understood to have impacted the region, or how the sack
56 Hesiod fr. 50 M-W [=Paus. 2.26.7] confirmed in part
by schol. Pind. Pyth. 3.14 [= Hesiod fr. 51 M-W].
Pausanias’ reporting of this variant in book two is
notably skeptical: he declares it “the furthest from
the truth” (ἥκιστα … ἀληθής), suggesting that it
was invented by Hesiod, or interpolated into his
work, to suit Messenian interests. He offers no skep-
tical remarks in book four, however. On Asclepius’
various birth stories, see Gantz 1993, 71–72; Fowler
2013, 76.
57 Paus. 4.31.6.
58 This complex dates from the first half of the second
century BC. Its bold iconography reflects Messene’s
political ambitions: see Themelis 1994, 29–30;
Sineux 1997, 15–18; Luraghi 2008, 282–285; Müth
2007, 183–185.
59 Hom. Il. 2.730.
60 Paus. 4.3.2.
61 Paus. 4.2.2–3.
62 Paus. 3.26.9–10.
63 Hom. Il. 11.597–598; Paus. 4.3.2.
64 Paus. 4.2.3; 4.33.5.
65 Paus. 4.2.2–3.
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of Oechalia by Heracles (the subject of a lost epic by Creophylus, who placed the city
in Euboia) was localized. The transplantation of Eurytus is thus obviously a move ne-
cessitated by the need to claim Oechalia in order to then claim Asclepius and his sons.
Certainly, there is nothing necessarily Messenian about this hero. That said, it reveals
a notable textual coincidence. There are two passages in Homer which have Eurytus’
name and that of his city in close proximity to the names of Messenian locations. We
have already seen the first of these: Odysseus receives his bow and quiver at the house
of Ortilochus “in Messene” from Iphitus, son of Eurytus, who has traveled there from
Oechalia.66 In the second, another traveler from Eurytus’ Oechalia, the singer Thamyris,
is killed at Dorion, in the district of Pylos.67 Pausanias mentions both these passages in
his Messenian book.68 These passages do not of course place Oechalia – or Eurytus – in
Messenia, but they do offer an association ripe for exploitation for those in pursuit of
Messenia’s past.
Pausanias’ account reveals one way of creating a coherent trans-Messenian geneal-
ogy out the fragments of it available in the existing archive. What we cannot know, of
course, is how his tidy arrangement corresponds in its details to the bricolage pursued
by any particular community at any particular time within Messenia itself. The unique
survival of Pausanias’ account of Messenia means that his version is the version of Messe-
nian genealogy. We get to see what he shows us. In this instance we can look behind his
account, tracing some of the machinations that transformed one archive – exploitable
passages from Homer and Hesiod – into another – the ‘complete’ Messenian lineages of
the Periegesis; but we cannot know what alternative pasts also existed.
Once more, of course, we see knowledge emerging from the interface between the
stability of texts and the fluidity of travel. Pausanias’ ‘traveling narrative’ requires him to
add to the ‘overview’ of Messenian myth he gives in the first chapters of book four; the
view also from Pherae, where local concerns added new nodes to the Homeric geneal-
ogy. Pharis, Nichomachus, and Gorgasus lacked the mobility that allowed their relatives
to win renown in Homer. Epic captured the heroic web woven from the intersecting
paths of heroes who intervened in each other’s stories and whose families became inter-
twined. Homeric and Hesiodic epic kept these heroes traveling by making them part of
a textual tradition that extended across the Greek-speaking world, so that every Greek
community encountered the same set of – now canonical – stories. But Pausanias’ local
heroes are beneficiaries of a very different narrative tradition, one that offers a frozen
66 Hom. Od. 21.5–41.
67 Hom. Il. 2.591–601. Kirk 1985, 216, suggests that
the identification of Homer’s Oechalia in Messenia
“may […] have developed from confusion engen-
dered by this very passage”. He notes that Hesiod
(Ehoeae frr. 59.2–3, 65 West) places the story not at
Dorion, but on the Dotian plain; that is, in Thessaly.
68 Paus. 4.1.4; 4.33.7.
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peek at a configuration of this lineage a millennium later. They survive because they be-
came caught up in a text – Pausanias’ – which brings narrative attention to their specific
locale.
5 Conclusion
William Hutton has argued that Pausanias’ account of Messenia should be understood
not only on its own terms, but within the ambit of the entire Periegesis. The care with
which Pausanias assembles his work suggests that he “envisioned at least some members
of his audience reading the text from beginning to end, rather than diving into it and
out of it in random intervals, as most modern readers are wont to do”.69 Such readers,
he argues, would notice pertinent parallels and points of contrast as they went. Thus, at
a macroscopic level, the victory of the Romans over the Greeks narrated in book seven
(the fourth to last book) is the mirror image of the victory of the Messenians over the
Spartans narrated in book four.70 This observation would open up further correspon-
dences: “the reader sensitive to context” would read Pausanias’ forceful account of the
ruins of Arcadian Megalopolis71 in antithesis to his earlier description of the flourish-
ing of Messene.72 Hutton’s final correspondence is the most pertinent to our study. The
Periegesis ends abruptly, with a description of a ruined Asclepion at Naupactus. The sanc-
tuary was founded by a certain blind man, Phalysius. He miraculously regains his sight
after opening a sealed tablet, and he reads its contents. This final story, Hutton argues,
should put the reader in mind of both the earlier revelation of the bronze tablets recov-
ered at Messene and her own role as reader of a text filled with the knowledge of the
past. Thus,
Pausanias seems to be claiming that his text of revelation and discovery can help
to restore something that the Greeks have lost: a clear vision of their rightful
place in a world where they have become gradually more peripheral and unex-
ceptional. The mysteries of the Great Gods of Messenia have their counterpart
in the mysteries of Hellas that Pausanias has revealed to his readers. The sort of
redemption that the Messenians enjoyed, which is denied to the Greeks at the
end of Pausanias’ account of the Achaean wars, is finally granted in some small
69 Hutton 2010, 425.
70 Hutton 2010, 429–436. The idea that Pausanias’ nar-
rative of Messenian subjugation and liberation of-
fers a model for Greeks under Imperial rule has also
been developed elsewhere. See Langerwerf 2008,
199–204; Elsner 1992, esp. 15–20; Auberger 2000;
Casevitz and Auberger 2005, x–xii; Musti 1996, 27.
71 Paus. 8.33.1.
72 Hutton 2010, 445–446.
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degree to those Hellenes and phil-Hellenes who make it all the way to the end
of the Description of Greece.73
At first sight, this would seemingly cohere with my argument through this chapter, that
Pausanias finds narrative utility in the capacity of texts to maintain knowledge in stable,
atemporal forms until such time as it is reactivated by the reader. But considered in
another way, it runs counter to it. For, as readers, we are autonomous travelers. Perhaps
Pausanias did indeed envision a readership who would read his every word in the order
that each appears and appreciate the text finally as an object of revelation and political
resistance; perhaps he did not. Certainly, he offers no clear programmatic statements that
might shape his readers’ approach: he shows rather than tells. Perhaps a reader working
through the entire Periegesis in order would encounter the ruins of Megalopolis in book
eight and cast her mind back to the construction of Messene in book four; perhaps, given
the surfeit of detail and digressions in the intervening chapters, she would not. Perhaps
she would make some other quite unpredictable association; perhaps she would have
resorted to skim-reading by this point in any case. For this is how it is with readers:
we fall short of the ideal; there’s no telling which paths we will choose to take in our
reading, nor indeed which paths are even possible.
Tracing ‘paths of knowledge’ through Pausanias’ account of Messenia reveals not
just the mechanisms that created, encoded, and preserved knowledge, but a tolerance
towards the idiomatic – even tendentious – styles of reading that afforded these mech-
anisms their authority. Pausanias’ Messenians do not merely find letters scratched onto
tin; they recognize these writings as the mysteries of Andania and understand their recov-
ery as analogous to the resuscitation of the dying old woman of Epiteles’ dream. Only
by reading them in this way can “something kept hidden” take its place in the story
of Messene; and only by reading them in this way can Messene’s founding take place
at this place. Likewise, Pausanias’ Messenians do not read Homer to witness the emo-
tional turmoil of Achilles’ μῆνις; they dip into it hunting for proper nouns that might
be Messenian heroes and Messenian cities. They approach Homer as I have approached
Pausanias: as a textual archive full of documentary material, evidence for the past. More-
over, the apparent success of such conclusions justifies the style of reading that created
them. When I extract from Pausanias’ words charts that map Agamemnon’s seven cities
or the genealogical traditions of Messenia as if Pausanias means to be quite clear on these
matters, I am not creating my own text – for that remains stable – but I am finding my
own path through, seeking whatever past which can be recovered through it.
73 Hutton 2010, 453. Prefigured in important ways by
Porter 2001, 91–92.
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Finding Identities on the Way to Rome
Summary
The theme of the journey has a primary relevance in the first book of Sidonius Apollinaris’
Letters. It represents not only an opportunity of personal growth, but also a way to rediscover
the paths that lead to the very bases of Romanitas. In this sense, the peregrinatio shapes the
life of travellers: on the way to Rome Sidonius Apollinaris, born in Lyon, really becomes
Roman (Sidon. Epist. 1.5); Eutropius, who decides to remain in Gaul, refuses his cultural
identity, turning into a peregrinus in his own land (Sidon. Epist. 1.6).
Keywords: journey; peregrinatio; Sidonius Apollinaris; Romanitas; identity
Das Thema der Reise ist im ersten Buch der Briefe von Sidonius Apollinaris von zentraler
Bedeutung. Es zeigt nicht nur eine Möglichkeit des persönlichen Wachstums auf, sondern
auch den Weg, der zu den Grundlagen der Romanitas führt. In diesem Sinne gestalte die
peregrinatio das Leben der Reisenden: Der in Lyon geborene Sidonius Apollinaris wird auf
dem Weg nach Rom wirklich Römer (Sidon. Epist. 1.5); Eutropius hingegen, der beschließt
in Gallien zu bleiben, lehnt seine ihm innewohnende kulturelle Identität ab und wird somit
zum Ausländer (peregrinus) im eigenen Land (Sidon. Epist. 1.6).
Keywords: Reise; peregrinatio; Sidonius Apollinaris; Romanitas; Identität
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Sidonius Apollinaris’ journey from Lyon to Rome in AD 467,1 described in letter 1.5
to Herenius, has a prominent relevance in his letter collection. The structure of the
first book of Sidonius’ Letters is devised in order to present at its core a thematic unit
consisting of the letters 5–10, entirely devoted to the period spent by Sidonius in Rome
and in Italy.2 Once he arrived at the court of Anthemius in Rome as legate of his land,3
Sidonius pronounced a panegyric in praise of the Emperor, which led to his election as
prefect of the city.4 Then, it is natural that Sidonius gives particular relevance to both the
‘Roman period’, which is the acme of his political career, and to the journey (peregrinatio)
that begins it. The latter represents not only the path that led him to the honor of the
prefectural office, but also a pilgrimage to the sacred places of Roman identity, in the city
that he defines in letter 1.6.2, as domicilium legum, gymnasium litterarum, curiam dignitatum,
verticem mundi, patriam libertatis.
In the letters of the Roman period, the journey takes on different functions, all inti-
mately connected. The journey from Lyon to Rome is an itinerary through history and
literature. In retracing the different literary places, Sidonius travels through time, from
the idealized past to the present, represented by Rome. The path taken also involves an
interior process. The Gallo-Roman aristocrat gradually interiorizes the ideal of Roman-
itas, and, assuming his duties towards the community, embraces the republican values,
perceived as the very essence of the Roman World.
It is telling that Sidonius opens both the letter to Herenius5 and the whole ‘Italian
digression’ of the first book of the collection with the term peregrinatio, in this way giving
a precise mark to the entire unit of letters 5–10. The word peregrinatio, with its semantic
area, leads to different meanings, all connected to the adverb peregre (‘abroad’, ‘in a for-
eign land’). In particular, peregrinatio means ‘journey in a foreign land’ and ‘pilgrimage’,
while the verb peregrinari and the attribute peregrinus also refer to the condition of the
exiled and to that of the foreigner, who cannot be considered Roman.6
1 The datation of the travel is linked to that of the
election of Anthemius to the role of Emperor:
Loyen 1970, 245.
2 After letter 1.5, the description of Sidonius’ journey
to Rome, and letter 1.6, an exhortatio to his friend
Eutropius to have the same experience, Sidonius
puts: the letter to Vincentius (1.7), concerning the
process to the prefect Arvandus in Rome; the let-
ter 1.8, an ironical description of Ravenna; the let-
ter 1.9, the narration of the the events that led the
author to compose the panegyric in honor of the
emperor Anthemius and obtain the position of prae-
fectus urbi; the letter 1.10, where Sidonius refers to
his responsabilities as praefectus urbi in Rome.
3 The reason for the embassy is not revealed. Sivan
1989 states that the delegation aimed at supporting
Arvandus and his policy of cooperation with the
Goths and Burgundians.
4 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.9.6.
5 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.1; for an account of the steps of
the journey see Piacente 2005.
6 On the specific meaning of the term peregrinus in
comparison with advena, alienigena, alienus, barbarus,
hostis see Ndiaye 2005. In respect to the juridical dif-
ferences between cives and peregrini see Liebeschuetz
1998. The scholar underlines that in the imperial
constitutions, since the fourth century onwards, the
term peregrinus refers to the condition of individu-
als not settled in their territory of origin rather than
to the status of non-citizens or non-Romans living
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That of the pilgrimage is a ‘living metaphor’; this suggestive definition, proposed by
Jacques Fontaine in an essay on the function of the peregrinatio in Augustine’s works,7
also suits Sidonius’ Letters. Peregrinatio is the term employed by the Gallo-Roman author
to define his own exile from the Auvergne,8 his natural homeland; but it is also the word
used for the path to the ‘true’ homeland, Rome,9 that leads him to the accomplishment
of his mission of defender of the Romanitas. However, the verb peregrinari and the noun
peregrinus still keep the legal connotation that refers to the status of foreigners in contrast
with that of citizens (cives).10
The interest of the addressee of letter 1.5 for the places crossed by Sidonius is related
to their strong evocative power due to their links with the past. All the Gallo-Roman
aristocrat Herenius knows about the glorious past of Rome, and thus of his own origins,
is in fact based on a mere bookish knowledge (lectio). It is only through the works of the
poets, the monuments, and the commemoration of the famous battles, that the fifth-
century nobilitas learns its history and feels part of it.11 Sidonius, however, by passing
through Italy, can testify to his friend that he has seen what Herenius has only read
about in books, and that he has traveled through the cultural memory underlying the
concept of Romanity.
Having left Lyon and crossed the Alps, the author begins both a physical and literary
journey. It is a path through the memory12 of the past of Rome, in which the reality
and the literary dimension are melded. Therefore, Sidonius mentions only the places
in some way connected with antiquity or with the literary tradition. He looks to the
landscape that has been the scene of major events, or that has been described by the
auctores, and interiorizes it. By doing this, he rediscovers his own identity and origins.
The Po river, for example, gives him the opportunity13 to mention Ovid’s Phaetontiadas
within the boundaries of the Empire; furthermore,
the word is still used after the Constitutio Antoniniana
to mark the distinction between the inhabitants of
the Empire and those who lived beyond the Roman
frontiers. On the contrary, Mathisen 2006, 1020–
1021, states that the term peregrinus keeps its original
juridical meaning in late antiquity.
7 Fontaine 1998.
8 See for example the use of the term with reference
to the condition of exile in Sid. Apoll. Epist. 7.16.1:
Facis, unice in Christo patrone, rem tui pariter et amoris
et moris, quod peregrini curas amici litteris mitigas conso-
latoriis; 9.3.3: per officii imaginem vel, quod est verius,
necessitatem solo patrio exactus, hoc relegatus variis
quaquaversum frangor angoribus quia patior hic incom-
moda peregrini, illic damna proscripti. Born in Lyon,
Sidonius had numerous family ties in the Auvergne,
where he held the episcopal function from ca. 470.
The author feels a strong sense of belonging both to
the place of his birth and to his elective homeland.
See Bonjour 1980.
9 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.1.
10 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.6.2.
11 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.1: sollicitus inquiris … quos aut
fluvios viderim poetarum carminibus inlustres aut urbes
moenium situ inclitas aut montes numinum opinione vul-
gatos aut campos proeliorum replicatione monstrabiles ….
The term replicatio expresses the action of unrolling
the volumen on which a literary work is written; the
historical battles are then commemorated through
the reading of the auctores who mention them: see
Köhler 1995, 187.
12 On the meaning of the term memoratus in this con-
text see Longobardi 2014.
13 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.3.
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sorores;14 Cremona recalls Verg. Ecl. 1 and the figure of the shepherd Tityrus,15 while
Rimini and Fano bring to Sidonius’ mind Julius Caesar’s revolt and the famous battle
of the Metaurus.16
Ravenna, instead, does not arouse any kind of interest in the author. The city has
nothing to do with the past idealized by Sidonius. Indeed, there is a contrast between
the beauty of the river landscapes described a few lines before17 and the unhealthiness
of marshy Ravenna.18 The journey, thus projected into the past, ends with the arrival in
the Urbs. Its sacredness is immediately tangible: Sidonius crosses first the pomerium, the
sacred enclosure for ancient Rome, and then arrives in the basilica of Peter and Paul,
which represents the heart of Christian Rome.19
Thus, the account of the travel through the places of Roman identity comes to an
end; in describing his activities in the city so painstakingly reached, Sidonius becomes
suddenly biting. Once in Rome, he cannot accomplish his mission, the reason being
the wedding of the Goth Ricimerus with the daughter of the emperor Anthemius, con-
cluded in spem publicae securitatis.20 It is impossible to establish whether the author is
annoyed because the cumbersome marriage prevents him accomplishing his mission
after the long journey, or because of the indignation with which the Gallo-Roman aris-
tocrat perceives the wedding between a princess and a barbarian.21 What is, however,
evident, is the clash between the dreamy dimension of the journey in rediscovery of the
past and the disappointment with the reality of Rome’s current events, which are so
different from the idea he had dreamed of.22
The sudden awakening in the present, so far removed from the expectations that
many readings, the education received, and the same peregrinatio had built, is stressed
by nunc, placed in an emphatic position to introduce the description of the celebra-
tions that overwhelm the city (Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.10 Igitur nunc in ista non modo per-
sonarum sed etiam ordinum partiumque laetitia […]). Furthermore, the anaphora of iam,
which clearly imitates the style of the epithalamic poetry is not aimed in this case at
highighting the trepidation for the wedding ceremony and for the preparation of the
14 Ov. Met. 2.340.
15 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.3.
16 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.7.
17 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.4.
18 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.5.
19 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.9. For the representation of
Rome in Sidonius Apollinaris’ works see Behrwald
2012, 283–302.
20 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.10.
21 For the perception of ‘mixed’ marriages see Sivan
1996; Guidetti 2007, 165; Mathisen 2009. These
marriages were not infrequent and were regulated
by specific laws; for example, CTh. 3.14.1 de nuptiis
gentilium (370 ca.), which imposed capital punish-
ment in the case of marriages between provinciales
and gentiles. The unions between the exponents of
imperial aristocracy and the warlords of German
origin are widely attested: see Soraci 1974; Block-
ley 1982. Perhaps, in the case of the letter here an-
alyzed, Sidonius’ indignation could not, or at least
not only, be caused by the marriage of a Roman
princess to a Gothic military chief, but by its impor-
tance for the safety of the whole Empire.
22 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.10–11.
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bride. On the contrary, it expresses the anxiety with which the ambassador awaits the
end of the celebrations, so that all the participants in the festivities could return to more
important activities.23
Rome seems to be taken by a paradoxical subversion of values, anesthetized by what
is defined by Sidonius as an occupatissima vacatio.24 In the Urbs, per omnia theatra, macella,
praetoria, fora, templa, gymnasia, resonates the confusion of the Fescennini for the wedding
of an imperial princess with a general of Germanic origin. On the contrary, as regards
the activities through which Rome has built its greatness (studia … negotia … iudicia …
legationes … totus actionum seriarum status) there reigns an unnatural silence (underlined
by the verbs silere … quiescere … conticescere), so that every important and serious activity
becomes ‘a foreigner’ (and here again we find the verb peregrinari) inter scurrilitates histri-
onicas. For the first time since the beginning of the letter, the theme of the peregrinatio,
introduced by the verb peregrinari, reappears. However, the meaning of the verb in this
context is opposite to that of the noun that opens the letter. The peregrinatio, namely
the journey, is thwarted by the current events in Rome, where seriousness has become
a foreigner (peregrinetur).
This semantic game cannot be fully understood without a comparison with the
letter 1.6 to Eutropius, which represents a pendant of the letter to Herenius. The rea-
son why Sidonius writes to the Gallo-Roman nobleman while he is still on the way to
Rome is of vital importance.25 The author wants to divert the friend from his domestic
tranquillity and persuade him to join the court of the emperor in the eternal city. Since
Eutropius is healthy in body and strong in soul, as well as equipped with horses, clothes
and servants,26 Sidonius does not understand why he is afraid of going abroad (in aggre-
dienda peregrinatione); a nobleman like Eutropius, the author immediately adds, cannot
consider a real peregrinatio, a journey to a foreign land, the path that would lead him to
Rome, his true homeland, in qua unica totius orbis civitate soli barbari et servi peregrinantur.
In the same paragraph, there is a threefold recurrence of peregrinatio/peregrinari,
which produces an amphibological game that clearly connects this letter to the previous
one. The term peregrinatio, meaning ‘journey’, opens both letters; furthermore, in both
cases there is a passage to the verb peregrinari in the sense of ‘to be or act like a stranger’.
Moreover, this passage is related in both cases to the fulfilling of public duties and is
put in a context that recalls the ‘cumbersome’ presence of the barbarians. Thus, the let-
ter 1.5 to Herenius and the letter 1.6 to Eutropius are parts of a diptych, whose link is
represented by the function of the journey to Rome for the inclusion in the Romanitas.
23 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.11: iam quidem virgo tradita est,
iam coronam sponsus, iam palmatam consularis, iam
cycladem pronuba, iam togam senator honoratus, iam
paenulam deponit inglorius ….
24 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.5.11.
25 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.6.1: scribendi causa vel sola vel max-
ima.
26 Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.6.2.
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This comparison also highlights that going to Rome takes on particular significance in
the eyes of Sidonius, not only in terms of linkage with the Roman cultural and literary
past, but also for its social and political implications. It is evident that, in order to be
considered a true Roman, the journey to the core of the Roman world is not enough.
It is also necessary to embrace the main principles of Romanitas and, among these, the
political militancy, that civic engagement which is obligatory for the boni, who have the
duty of taking care of the community.
Right at the beginning of letter 1.5, Sidonius writes that his peregrinatio to Rome
has been made secundum commune consilium. The term communis in this context can be
referred to the author and the addressee (‘our decision’), or to the wider community
of friends and Lyonnese aristocrats (‘joint decision’). The scene where Sidonius leaves,
surrounded by friends and relatives who hug and farewell him, has considerable simi-
larities with the image of the Arvernian civitas that tightens the heroes Costantius and
Ecdicius, respectively in letters 3.2 and 3.3. With his words, Constantius restored har-
mony to the community divided into factions and exhausted by the siege of the Visig-
oths; Ecdicius defeated in battle the Visigoths who surrounded the city. Moreover, these
‘twin’ passages allude to Pliny’s panegyric, where the Emperor Trajan is surrounded by
an adoring crowd on his return from the war.27
The comparison between the letter 1.5 to Herenius, the letters 3.2 and 3.3 in praise
of the two Gallo-Roman noblemen Costantius and Ecdicius, and the common reference
to Pliny, clearly put Sidonius’ journey in a communal dimension. The author aims to
represent himself as the ideal aristocrat who seeks to serve the State with his qualities
and means, derived from his education and his social position.
According to the ethics underlying Sidonius’ letters, the noble and the Roman ap-
pear as such only when they come out of their private state to fulfill the duties that their
birthplace and their studies require.28 Illustrative in this regard is Sidonius’ exhortation
to his friend Syagrius,29 who, despite being the successor to an illustrious Gallo-Roman
family, prefers to remain in his country estates rather than pursue a political career (Sid.
Apoll. Epist. 8.8.2: Redde te patri, redde te patriae, redde te etiam fidelibus amicis … !). Be-
having ut bubulcus (Sid. Apoll. Epist. 8.8.1), Syagrius does not deserve the good name of
his family, to belong to the aristocratic circle represented by his friends and, above all,
inclusion in the patria. Ignoring his civic duties, the aristocrat loses the tie that connects
him to his ancestors and makes him worthy of the privilege of friendship with the other
members of the nobilitas; he loses the right to be considered a citizen of the land for
27 Plin. Pan. 22; Sid. Apoll. Epist. 3.2.1; 3.3.5–6. On
the influence of Pliny’s model on this passage see
Giannotti 2016, 125.
28 For the relevance of the officia for late antique Gallo-
Roman aristocrats see Sivonen 2006, 10–31.
29 We have little information about Syagrius: see Jones
and Martindale 1971, 1042 (Syagrius 3); Kaufmann
1995, 349–350.
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which their ancestors and friends served and fought. Therefore, it appears clear that the
sense of belonging to the homeland is determined by ethical-behavioral features, which
are only partly linked to the rights of birth or ethnic origin.30 It is, instead, a privilege
acquired by respecting a system of cultural, ethical, and political norms. It is, though,
a privilege that can be easily lost; the noble who does not endeavor to obtain the toga
palmata is similar to a foreigner or exiled (peregrinus), an outsider by his own choice.
Furthermore, it is necessary to underline that the expression se reddere patriae in
letter 8.8 also recalls the idea of returning  home. It is noteworthy that the theme of the
reditus is also present in the incipit of letter 1.9. The letter, addressed like letter 1.5 to
Herenius, explains Sidonius’ vicissitudes in Rome after the wedding of Ricimer31 (Sid.
Apoll. Epist. 1.9.1: Post nuptias patricii Ricimeris, id est post imperii utriusque opes eventilatas,
tandem reditum est in publicam serietatem). After the festivities, which have undermined
the order that should have reigned in Rome, after the marriage is concluded in spem
publicae securitatis, and, above all, after the temporary peregrinatio of the res publica and
its seriousness, Rome returns now in publicam serietatem; the city awakes and goes back
to the criteria that the ideal of Romanity imposes.32 Also in the letter to Syagrius, then,
Sidonius depicts the image of a path, this time from a foreign territory to the homeland
– as if, through the choice of becoming consul, Syagrius could return home after having
distanced himself from the Romanitas.
Once again there is a path to take. Letter 1.5 opens with the peregrinatio to Rome,
the journey from the native land to the real homeland, while letter 1.9 opens with the
reditus of Rome from its temporary ‘exile’ to its true condition. Not surprisingly, it is in
the second letter to Herenius that Sidonius tells how, having returned the public seri-
ousness, he received the honor of the prefectural office. Sidonius’ peregrinatio, therefore,
undertaken for the common good, allows the author himself, with his own service in
favor of the community, to reach the heart of the Romanitas and embody the ideals this
represents. The author, however, faces a paradoxical situation. He embarked on a jour-
ney to rediscover his true homeland, Rome, and what it stands for, and found instead a
place where the Roman institutions had been relegated to the condition of foreigners.
Contrariwise, Eutropius does not want to go to the Urbs because he does not under-
stand that this is his true home, and thus, remaining in his villa, he behaves more like a
farmer than an educated aristocrat, sharing the condition of those barbarians and slaves
who are the only ones who can be considered peregrini in Rome. Therefore, Eutropius
30 Writing on the ‘deterritorialization’ of the Roman
concept of patria, Herescu 1961 underlines that al-
ready in Cicero’s works the sense of belonging to
Romanity is created by behavioral factors more than
by territorial ties.
31 The two letters are probably parts of the same epis-
tle: see Köhler 1995, 265.
32 An interesting comparison can be made with Mart.
Epigr. 2.11–12, where the end of Nero’s tyranny is
presented as a restitution of Rome to itself: Reddita
Roma sibi est et sunt te praeside, Caesar,/deliciae populi,
quae fuerant domini.
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is paradoxically a foreigner, a peregrinus in his own homeland, while travel abroad (pere-
grinatio) would make him feel really at home. Rural tranquility is, for the aristocrat, a
way to waste the chances that birth in a senatorial family could offer, and to miss the
opportunity to cultivate himself.
The linkage between letter 1.5 and letter 1.6, which makes them complementary,
has been perhaps undervalued by scholars. It is clear that the two letters are connected
by the topic and their context. The first is the description of the journey to the Urbs,
the second an exhortatio to have the same experience, composed on the way to Rome.
However, the relationship between the two letters is deeper. Without the letter to Eu-
tropius, the letter to Herenius is just a reportage of a journey between reality and fiction.
The following epistle, however, clarifies the primary function that this journey has, as
seen from Sidonius’ point of view; that is, the intimate appropriation of Romanity. The
result of the peregrinatio is not only a list of literary loci experienced in reality, but also
an active civic engagement in favor of the public community – even in the fifth century,
the period of the Empire’s deepest crisis, when the republican values are mere ideals.
The relationship of complementarity between the two letters is also emphasized
by the reference to Horace’s satire 1.5. It has already been noted by scholars that letter
1.5 (addressed to Herenius), in terms of position, theme, and textual references, recalls
Horace’s description of the iter Brundisinum.33 Also letter 1.6 to Eutropius seems to be
connected to satire 1, 6, although in a less direct way. This focuses on the theme of the
superiority on the rights of birth of moral nobility, which must be shown with actions,
while Sidonius in his letter encourages his friend Eutropius to deserve the privileges that
a noble birth offers.
Then, the peregrinatio is a path that leads man from the condition of foreigner to
that of true Roman, a way not only to improve himself, but also the political and social
status quo. This is exemplified by the case of Eutropius. Sidonius in his letters continues
to follow his friend’s journey to the core of Romanity. In letter 3.6 the author states
that Eutropius, having just become prefect, is now worthy of his nobility because of his
actions. By doing so, he overturns the topic of the first letter to the friend, letter 1.6
(note that the two letters are in the same position in each book): Eutropius is no longer
a peregrinus but a real Roman, and so he has restored the order that, in the previous letter,
had been broken.
In conclusion, being or not being a real Roman, is for Sidonius a matter of choice.
It is no coincidence that letter 1.6 ends with the term confinis, used by the author in the
sense of ‘near’,34 when he says that he does not want to be a passive witness to his friend’s
33 See Gualandri 1979, 50–52; Mazzoli 2005–2006,
174.
34 Editors have given different translations for the
word confinis: see for example Anderson 1936, 367:
“I have nothing to do with such wickedness”; Loyen
1970, 20: “je ne suis ni de près ni de loin complice
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extreme negligence (Sid. Apoll. Epist. 1.6.5: sin autem … mavis, … Epicuri dogmatibus
copulari, … testor ecce maiores, testor posteros nostros huic me noxae non esse confinem). The use
of a metaphor concerning space in this context is significant. In a letter, whose main
topic is the definition of the criteria of inclusion in the Romanitas, the word confinis
indicates the boundaries of the patria. For the fifth-century aristocrat, this consists in the
choice of finding his own identity and cultivating himself in order to pursue the highest
good. This, it is now clear, can only happen on the way to Rome.
de telle perversité”; Köhler 1995, 63: “dann rufe
ich unsere Nachkommen als Zeugen an, daß ich
an dieser Untat keinen Anteil habe!”; Bellès 1997,
170: “jo no tinc res a veure amb aquesta perversitat”.
The translation ‘near’ here proposed tries to render
the spatial metaphor produced by the combination
of the verb determinare (‘demarcate boundaries’) and
confinis (literally ‘boundary’). For the metaphor see
Köhler 1995, 229.
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Safari Grey
Homer’s Odyssey in the Hands of its Allegorists: Many
Paths to Explain the Cosmos
Summary
The allegorical exegetic tradition was arguably the most popular form of literary criticism
in antiquity. Amongst the ancient allegorists we encounter a variety of names and philo-
sophic backgrounds spanning from Pherecydes of Syros to Proclus the Successor. Many
of these writers believed that Homer’s epics revealed philosophical doctrines through the
means of hyponoia or ‘undermeanings’. Within this tradition was a focus on cosmological,
cosmogonical and theological matters which attracted a variety of commentators despite
their philosophical backgrounds. It is the intention of this paper to draw attention to two
writers: Heraclitus, and Porphyry of Tyre. This paper also intends to demonstrate that the
tradition of cosmic allegorical exegesis is still practiced in modern scholarship.
Keywords: Homer; literary criticism; allegory; Heraclitus; Porphyry; cosmology; metaphor
Die allegorische exegetische Tradition war wohl die populärste Form der Literaturkritik in
der Antike. Unter den antiken Allegorien begegnen wir einer Vielzahl von Namen und phi-
losophischen Hintergründen, die von Pherecydes von Syros bis zu Proclus der Nachfolger
reichen. Viele dieser Autoren glaubten, Homers Epen enthüllten philosophische Lehren
durch Hyponoie oder ,Unterschätzung‘. In dieser Tradition lag der Fokus auf kosmologi-
schen, kosmogonischen und theologischen Fragen, die trotz ihrer philosophischen Hinter-
gründe eine Vielzahl von Kommentatoren anzogen. Es ist die Absicht dieses Artikels, auf
zwei Autoren aufmerksam zu machen: Heraklit und Porphyr von Tyrus. Das vorliegende
Werk soll zudem zeigen, dass die Tradition der kosmischen allegorischen Exegese in der
modernen Wissenschaft noch immer praktiziert wird.
Keywords: Homer; Literatur-Kritik; Allegorie; Heraclitus; Porphyr; Kosmologie; Metapher
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1 Introduction
The idea that Homer composed allegorical works, and the associated practice of exege-
sis pursued by later philosophers and critics, were both prevalent by the end of the fifth
century BCE and continued well into the late Roman and Byzantine periods.1 Among
the ancient allegorists we encounter a variety of names and philosophic backgrounds
spanning from Pherecydes of Syros to Proclus the Successor. Many of these writers be-
lieved that Homer’s epics, intentionally or not, revealed philosophical doctrines through
the means of hyponoia or ‘undermeanings’.2 What is most striking about these accounts,
despite differences in the authors’ philosophical leanings or periods of practice, is the
common practice of cosmic interpretation.3 It is the intention of this paper to draw
attention to a few such writers – including the ancient grammarian Heraclitus and Neo-
platonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre.4 However, this paper also intends to suggest
that the tradition of cosmic allegorical exegesis is still practiced in modern scholarship,
through an analysis of the works of Harvard Classics Professor Gregory Nagy.5 Through
this brief survey, this paper intends to demonstrate, first, that when we speak of allegori-
cal interpretations of Homer, what we often mean is cosmic allegory, and secondly, that
these interpretations continue through current academic discourse.
2 Allegory
The inclusion of allegory as a poetic tool was attributed as early as the seventh century
BCE to Archilochus and Alcaeus.6 As early as the sixth century the critical application of
the allegorical exegesis to the works of the poets began with Pherecydes, and Theagenes
of Rhegium.7 In this practice, “allegory is used to designate a range of non-literal ex-
pression from extended metaphors to maxims (gnōmai) to riddles”.8 However, the exact
prevalence of allegorical exegesis throughout antiquity is a contested topic. Some schol-
ars would argue that it was an eccentricity, particularly of late antiquity, which can be
1 Bruns 1988; Lamberton and Keaney 1992; Browning
1992, 146; Lamberton and Keaney 1992, xiii, xvi,
xxiii; Struck 2004, 5, 18; Russell and Konstan 2005,
xiii, xiv; Tzetzes 2015.
2 Tate 1934, 107.
3 The terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ are used
throughout as a broad rubric to reflect an amal-
gam of what we would identify today as disparate
disciplines – such as cosmology, physics, horology,
theology, meteorology, cosmogony, medicine, and
soteriology, to name a few – and even those we now
consider pseudo-disciplines, such as astrology and
divination. ‘Astronomy’ is used to refer to specifi-
cally astrophysical phenomena.
4 Heraclitus Homeric Problems; Porph. De antr.
nymph.
5 Nagy 1990a; Nagy 2013. Also see Frame 1978.
6 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 5.
7 Fragment DK 7 B5 (= Origen, C. Cels. vi, 42); frag-
ment DK 8 A2 (= Porphyry, Homeric Questions i,
240, 14); Struck 2004, 26–27; Ford 2002, 69 n. 6;
Kennedy 1990, 85 and MacPhail 2011, 240–241.
8 Ford 2002, 72.
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“skipped over” by serious scholars of literary criticism to whom it can have “no possi-
ble redeeming interest”.9 This opinion seems to stem from a desire to obey Aristotelian
parameters (to which allegorists do not comply despite the fact that the Poetics seems to
demonstrate the exception, rather than the rule, regarding allegoresis in antiquity).10 A
systematic survey of literary criticism in antiquity instead demonstrates that allegorical
practices were not rare.11 In defense of its popularity P. Struck remarks that “if during
Plato’s time the Homeric professors were famous for textual criticism [or] grammatical
commentary […] we would expect to see these methods […] caricatured [in comedy]”,
rather than the allegorists, who were indeed lampooned by Aristophanes in Peace.12
While the number of allegorical interpreters through antiquity far exceeds13 the
number of vocal allegorical adversaries, the weighty reputation of the latter creates the
illusion of a disproportionate and more officious sense of disapproval.14 Yet, even the
strongest adversaries could not avoid the odd exegesis in their own works. Aristotle is of-
ten cited as the primary antagonist of allegorical exegesis. The Poetics argues that ainigma
is a flaw, and that good poets should always strive to ensure clarity within their works.
His concerns therefore are aesthetic ones; he “side-steps allegorical reading(s)” for the
sake of “clear language”.15 The fragments of Aristotle, however, reveal that he considered
his own allegorical solutions to Homer. Fragment 175 concerns the oxen of Helios, to
which the scholiasts report that “it was read as a physical allegory [by Aristotle]. The
seven flocks of fifty cattle belonging to the sun was the mythical representation of the
350 […] solar days of the lunar year”.16 Eustathius supported this interpretation, remark-
ing that “they say Aristotle read these herds allegorically as the 350 days in the twelve lu-
nar months”.17 G. W. Most has identified Fragment 175 as “a single apparent exception”
and yet R. Lamberton has also identified Fragment 149 as an allegorical interpretation
made by Aristotle.18 Aristotle’s interpretation concerned the apparent Homeric para-
dox that Helios can see all and hear all (Il. 3.277) and yet requires Lampetia to inform
him of the destruction of his cattle (Od. 12.374–375), which he explains by arguing that
Lampetia symbolically represents Helios’ sight.19 A final example can be found in Meta-
physics 12.1074b whereby Aristotle interprets the inspired sayings of the ancient thinkers
regarding the divine quality of the heavenly bodies.
9 Kennedy 1990, 78; Struck 2004, 6; Lamberton and
Keaney 1992, xvi.
10 Struck 2004, 7, 51, 63–65.
11 Tate 1929, 142–154; Richardson 1975, 77–81; Ford
2002, 67–89; Struck 2004, 17–18.
12 Struck 2004, 43; Peace 38–51; it is also telling that
allegorists do not appear among the defenders of
Homer listed by Aristotle in his Poetics 1460b.
13 For a cursory list see Struck 2004, 5.
14 Cicero, Quintilian, and Balbus, for example, are
seen as “standard among allegorical commentators”
in their opposition to it, Struck 2004, 115.
15 Lamberton and Keaney 1992, xiii; Richardson 1992,
30–40; Struck 2004, 51, 63–65.
16 Fragment 175 in Rose 1886.
17 F 175 R3 (= Eust. 1717 on Hom. Od. XII.130);
Barnes 1984.
18 Most 2010, 26 n. 1; Lamberton and Keaney 1992,
xiv–xv.
19 Fragment 149 in Rose 1886.
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The same incongruity can also be found in Plato, another popular example of anti-
allegorical thinking in antiquity. Socrates’ censure of allegorical interpretation is pre-
sented in three arguments. First, he disapproved of the easy access to lofty philosophical
truths made so easily available to the undereducated by allegorists.20 He also remarks,
rather contradictorily, that Homer’s poems should not be allowed into the ideal city
“whether they are allegorical or not” because the young are not able to distinguish it.21
Finally, he claims that one cannot assert the truth of an interpretation because the poet
himself cannot be asked his intent.22 Plato/Socrates’ objection therefore seems to stem
from either elitist intellectual practice, or his more usual concerns regarding validity.
However, these concerns did not prevent Plato from practicing,23 and indeed commend-
ing,24 allegorical exegesis in his own works. Cicero and Plutarch were also contradictory
in their anti-allegorical stances. Cicero has Vellius accuse both Zeno and Chrysippus of
twisting the meaning of fables in On the Nature of the Gods, and yet explains the mythical
account of Uranus’ castration as an intelligent rendering of physical phenomena in the
same text.25 Plutarch similarly rejects astrological and cosmic allegory as a method for
defending Homer, and then makes use of allegorical methods in his other works.26
Many of the ancient grammarians and philosophers who practiced allegorical ex-
egesis proposed that Homer, intentionally or unintentionally, embedded allegory in
his works for the purposes of education.27 It was perceived, therefore, that authors like
Homer contained within their words a gods-given authority on a range of subject mat-
ter. Tate explains the phenomena thus: “it [allegory] was practiced [by the philosophers]
in order to make more explicit the doctrines which students of the poets believed to be
actually contained within the poet’s [i.e. Homer’s] words.”28 These doctrines, of course,
frequently reflected the writer’s own philosophical bias, a practice that continued down
to the Neoplatonists and could arguably be found in contemporary interpretations as
well.29
20 Pl. Resp. 378a; Pl. Tht. 180d.
21 Pl. Resp. 378d.
22 Pl. Prt. 347e–348a.
23 Pl. Tht. 153c–d, 180c–d; Pl. Cra. 398b–c, 404b–e,
407a–b and Pl. Phdr. 229c–e.
24 Pl. Cra. 407a–c; Pl. Prt. 316d; Plat. Ion 530b–d; Plat.
Lys. 214b–d and Ps.-Plat. Alk. 2.147b.
25 Cic. nat. 1.41, 2.63–2.72; Struck 2004, 188.
26 Plut. aud. poet. 19e–20a; Plut. Is. 351, 352a, 361e,
362e, 363d.
27 Ar. Ran. (batr.) 1034; Xen. Symp. 3.5, 4.6–7; Strab.
geogr. 1.2.3, 1.2.17; Polyb. 34.4.4; Paus. 8.8.3; Diog.
Laert. 9.22; Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta Vol.3 fr.654,
655; Cornut. Theol. Gr. 35.75.18–35.76.5; Ps.-Plut.
Mor. 879c–880d; Struck 2004, 118.
28 Tate 1934, 107.
29 Tate 1934, n. 13.
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3 Cosmic allegory
Regardless of their specific philosophical inclinations, the most common feature among
many interpreters of Homer was that they attributed to Homer the mastery of a num-
ber of academic disciplines that rely on astronomical knowledge.30 The earliest record
we have of cosmic allegory is also our first record of Homeric exegesis, where we are
told Pherecydes interpreted the interaction between Zeus and Hera in Iliad 1.590 and
15.18 to be “the words of god to matter, which god put in order”; in short, a cosmogo-
nical allegory.31 Similarly, both Theagenes and Metrodorus, another of our earliest alle-
gorists, provide examples of cosmic allegory, referring to the gods and heroes as elemen-
tal forces.32 The Derveni Papyrus is perhaps the most extensive early example of purely
cosmic allegory, although it pertains to Orphic mythology and so will not be discussed
here.33
This prevalent belief that literary interpretations of Homer are bound up with onto-
logical ones naturally leads commentators to allegorical analysis of cosmic phenomena.
So much so that marrying the philosophical doctrines of the construction (cosmogony)
and nature (cosmology) of the universe with Homeric verse became the most common
philosophic convention, practiced by Zeno, Diogenes, and Apollodorus, among oth-
ers.34 For instance: Porphyry discusses Homeric horology in his passage on ‘saffron-
robed Dawn’; Plutarch despairs of divinatory interpretations pertaining to the plan-
ets; both Strabo and Hipparchus dub him the father of geography; and Heraclitus, like
many other philosophers, read his cosmic theologies in Homer’s works.35 For example,
Theagenes’ states:
For indeed they say that the dry fights with the wet, the hot with the cold,
and the light with the heavy; furthermore, that water extinguishes fire, but fire
dries water. Similarly, the opposition accrues to all the elements out of which
the universe consists … He [Homer] arranges battles by naming fire Apollo …
the water Poseidon … the moon Artemis, the air Hera.36
30 Schenkeveld 1976, 52; Heraclitus of Ephesus (attr.)
in Kahn 1981, 113.
31 Fragment DK 7 B5; Baxter 1992, 120; see also
Anaximenes in Buffiere 1973, 115–117.
32 Fragment DK 8 A2; fragment DK 61 A4; Richardson
1975, 68–70; Struck 2004, 28.
33 Laks and Most 1997.
34 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 4; see also Zen. Homeric
Questions; Republic: Chrysippus On the Republic; On
the Gods: Philo On Piety: Diogenes of Babylon On
Athena: Apollodorus of Athens On the Gods; Russell
and Konstan 2005, xiii.
35 Porphyry’s Homeric Questions 8.4–15 in MacPhail
2011, 129; Plutarch’s On How to Study Poetry in
Goodwin 1878, 4; Strab. Geogr. 1.1.2 and for exam-
ple Heraclitus Homeric Problems 22 and 33; Pl. Tht.
152e; Arist. Metaph. 983b.
36 Porphyry’s Homeric Questions 20.67–75 in MacPhail
2011, 241.
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In this brief extract Theagenes discusses what we would now call physics (the opposition
of universal elements), cosmology (the composition of the universe), astronomy/astrology
(by identifying planetary bodies such as the moon with divinities), and even meteorol-
ogy (associating weather phenomena with deities). It should be emphasized, therefore,
that the majority of critics and interpreters of antiquity should not be exclusively dis-
cussed in philological or literary contexts, but rather in theological and cosmogonical
ones.37 The next part of this paper will aim to demonstrate with examples the extent to
which ancient allegoresis relied on cosmic allegory.
It is an important caveat, however, to first distinguish these interpreters of metaphor
and allegory (both ancient and modern) from those who drew what can be called astro-
nomical data, such as eclipses and asterisms, from Homer’s epics.38 This paper attempts
to avoid discussing whether or not Homer’s epics recorded specific astronomical events,
such as eclipses, and instead focusses upon how various scholars of Homer, from past to
present, have interpreted his works as containing a kind of ‘philosophical cosmology’.
To this end, the word ‘cosmic’ is used to refer largely to cosmogonical, but also ‘astro-
philosophical’ narratives, or narratives concerning the relationship between man’s soul
and the universe; whereas the term ‘astronomical’ is used to identify observations of
specific celestial phenomena. These astronomic observations are, of course, equally in-
formative to the broader theme of ‘Homer and Astronomy’, but they do not concern the
metaphorical scope of this volume, and as such will be dealt with at a later time.
4 Heraclitus
Heraclitus the ‘Allegorist’ was a grammarian flourishing in the first century CE and is
perhaps the most famous interpreter of Homer from antiquity. Heraclitus’ text, most
commonly titled Homeric Problems, argued that it was the responsibility of philosophers
and grammarians to intuit Homer’s works, and glean from them philosophical and sci-
entific truths.39 While Heraclitus was neither the first, nor last, student of Homer to
elucidate allegorically ‘encoded’ cosmic knowledge from Homer’s works; Homeric Prob-
lems has been selected for exploration in this paper for several reasons. First of all, his is
one of the largest extant and comprehensive treatises dedicated to Homeric allegory, and
as such provides an effective example of what can be considered first-century allegori-
37 Long 1992, 51.
38 Modern examples include Schoch 1921, 19–21;
Lorimer 1951, 86–101; Gendler 1984, 489–490;
Lori 1989, 57; Mavrommatis 2000, 112–114; Flan-
ders 2007, 82; Baikouzis and Magnasco 2008, 8823–
8828; Tomboulidis 2008, 130–133; Theodossiou et
al. 2011, 22–30.
39 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 5, 75; Tate 1934, 106.
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cal Homeric criticism.40 Fundamentally, Heraclitus explicitly identifies what he does as
allegorical exegesis, unlike earlier writers.41 He is also the first critic to make so much
use of the term allegoria and its cognates, which appear on almost every page of the trea-
tise.42 Heraclitus openly defines allegory as a literary trope, in much the same manner
as Quintilian; they also both refer to the same example in order to demonstrate that
allegory is a form of extended metaphor.43 Heraclitus also belongs to the small group of
allegorical commentators that assume authorial intent.44 Finally, Heraclitus also dedi-
cates the majority of his discourse to cosmological interpretation – which spans a range
of cosmological themes, such as the origin of the universe and the interactions of its
constituent elements – as well as referencing particular astronomical phenomena, and
as such provides the best example for the present discussion.
Heraclitus devotes a number of passages to cosmological explanations. He argues
that “Homer has given us indications of the basic elements of the natural world”, which
in turn are the “origin[s] of all things”.45 In short, he believed that Homer’s texts con-
tained allegorical accounts of the birth of the universe (cosmogony) and the compo-
sition of its constituent parts, or elements (cosmology). In Problems 23, for example,
Heraclitus interprets the oath from Iliad 3.276–280 with a cosmological eye:
Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἴδηθεν μεδέων κύδιστε μέγιστε,
Ἠέλιός θ᾽, ὃς πάντ᾽ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐπακούεις,
καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ γαῖα, καὶ οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας
ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον ὅτις κ᾽ ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ,
ὑμεῖς μάρτυροι ἔστε, φυλάσσετε δ᾽ ὅρκια πιστά:
Father Zeus, ruler of Ida, noblest and greatest,
and Helios, observer of all things and listener of all things,
and rivers and earth, and you below whose work is to chastise
dead men, those who swear their oaths falsely:
you are the witnesses, trusted to keep guard this oath.46
Following the tradition before him, Heraclitus claims that the divinities listed in the
oath represent the physical elements: æther/fire (Zeus), air (Hades), water (rivers), and
40 Cornutus has also provided us with a large allegor-
ical treatise; however, he claims to summarize the
works of others (Cornut. Theol. Gr. 35.76.6–35.76.9)
and as such Heraclitus has been selected as the pri-
mary account. For a list of similarities see Struck
2004, 153–154 n. 28–41.
41 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 1.5.
42 Struck 2004, 152–153: The words ainigma and sum-
bolon are also used throughout as synonymous with
allegory.
43 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 5; Quint. inst. 8.44.
44 Long 1992, 42; Struck 2004, 152. For more on is-
sues of authorial intent and allegorical exegesis see
Struck 2004, 28, 44, 149.
45 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 23.22.
46 Hom. Il. 3.276–3.280 (translation by the author).
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earth, as well as adding the Peripatetic ‘force of rotation’ (Helios).47 Similarly, in his
discussion of the Binding of Hera (Il. 15.18–21) Heraclitus maintains that the story is
merely an analogy of “a theological account of the creation of the universe”, referring
again to the four constituent elements of cosmic creation: æther/fire, air, water, and
earth.48 He moves on from this passage to discuss another two oaths: Hera’s from Il.
15.36–15.38, and Poseidon’s from Il. 15.186–193. In these instances, however, Heraclitus
couples “an allegory of the original four elements” with a cosmogonical account of the
threefold division of the Homeric universe.49
The tripartite division of the universe is a common cosmogonical trope found in a
range of ancient literature.50 But it was Poseidon’s speech of Il. 15 that was selected by
Heraclitus for close examination:
τρεῖς γάρ τ᾽ ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα
Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ᾽ Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσων.
τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἔμμορε τιμῆς:
ἤτοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ
παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ᾽ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα,
Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἔλαχ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι:
γαῖα δ᾽ ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος.
Three we are born of Kronos, sons of the same mother who bore us – Rhea
Zeus, and myself, the third is Hades who is lord of those beneath the earth.
All was divided into three, and each received his rightful portion:
truly, I for myself obtained the lot of the grey salt-sea to dwell in forever
when the lots were cast, Hades obtained the lot of murky darkness,
Zeus obtained the lot of broad heaven amid the æther and clouds:
Gaia remains common to all, as does high Olympus.51
Heraclitus explains that when Homer speaks of Kronos he actually refers to the concept
of Time ‘the root of the four elements’, while his wife Rhea represents the perpetual
flow of the universe (rhysis).52 Together therefore, Time and Flow are imagined as the
parents of the remaining (four) elements. Zeus’ heaven again is the domain of fiery
æther, water belongs to Poseidon, Hades receives ‘unillumined air’, while earth (Gaia)
sits at the very center ‘common to all’.53 In this manner, Heraclitus believed, Homer
47 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 23; for further discus-
sion of the elements see 7, 15, 24, 26, 36, 39. For
further discussion of Heraclitus’ philosophical incli-
nations see Thompson 1973, 10–13, 155–162; Struck
2004, 142–143.
48 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 40.
49 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 41.
50 Atrahasis (SBV) 1.12–18, 2.16–19, 2.30–33, 10; Hes.
Theog. 413, 427; Achilles’ shield Il. 18.493 and Hymn
to Demeter 33.
51 Hom. Il. 15.186–193 (translation by the author).
52 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 41.
53 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 41; Hom. Il. 15.193.
196
homer’s odyssey and its allegorists
expressed the origins of the elements (from Time and Flow, Kronos and Rhea) as well as
their universal placements. He further argues that Homer repeatedly referred to ‘these
[cosmic] matters’, usually through the medium of oaths.54 That the fundamental aspects
of the cosmos should be the generic content of oaths should not be surprising when
such an oath effectively encompasses the whole universe – making it the most powerful
and binding of vows, as Hera demonstrates:
ἴστω νῦν τόδε Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθε
καὶ τὸ κατειβόμενον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, ὅς τε μέγιστος
ὅρκος δεινότατός τε πέλει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι
Know this, Gaia and broad Ouranos above
and the Stygian water that flows below, this is
the greatest and most formidable oath of the blessed gods.55
Heraclitus further argues that Homer expressed this cosmogonic trope most clearly in
the account of Achilles’ shield from Il. 18.478–613:
In forging the Shield of Achilles as an image of the revolution of the cosmos,
[Homer] has shown by clear evidences how the universe originated … and how
its different parts were formed.56
It is clear, therefore, that Heraclitus believed the Homeric epics contained allegorical
references to the cosmogonic origins, and construction of the elements of, the universe.
The account of Achilles’ shield as a cosmogonical metaphor raises matters of celestial ge-
ometry. The roundness of Achilles’ shield, according to Heraclitus, intentionally evokes
the roundness of the universe.57 This analogy is reinforced by Problems 36, which dis-
cusses the spherical nature and rotation of the universe according to evidence found
in Il. 8.16. Heraclitus here claims that “Homer gives the dimension of the sphere on
geometrical principles”, which in turn inform his knowledge of the shape of the cos-
mos.58 Homer calls the sun elektor/heliktor, meaning ‘spiraler’, “because he measures off
the world day and night by his circular movement”.59 According to Heraclitus, Homer
knew that the universe was spherical and that the paths of sun and moon demonstrated
that fact, because the Shield of Achilles represented it.
Heraclitus also makes much of what he calls his ‘First Allegory’; namely, “that Apollo
is identical with the Sun, and that one god is honoured under two names”, and devotes
54 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 41.
55 Hom. Il.: 15.36–38 (translation by the author).
56 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 43; Crates also inter-
preted the Shield as kosmopoiia (Eustathius fr. 1167).
57 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 43, also, 47–48.
58 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 36.
59 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 44.
197
safari grey
much time to this association – even connecting Apollo’s arrows metaphorically with
the shafts of the sun.60 Heraclitus’ analysis of Apollo as the sun also contains a discussion
of the seasons – particularly using lines from the Iliad to demonstrate that the “season
when the Greeks fell sick was the summer”.61 However, this is not so much an allegorical
interpretation as a poetic one. It is relatively easy to glean from lines such as “Then did
ox-eyed Queen Hera send untiring Helios unwillingly into the river of Okeanos” that the
poet is referring to long summer days without enumerating all the examples of soldiers
sweating in the heat as Heraclitus does in Problems 10.62 However, its inclusion within
the list of Heraclitus’ allegories provides further evidence of his preoccupation with the
breadth of Homer’s cosmic wisdom.
Heraclitus continues his horological readings of Homer in Problems 39, where he
discusses the joining of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida from Il. 14.347–353. This episode
was often cited as clear evidence of Homer’s desire to lead young men into immorality,
but Heraclitus calls it simply “an allegorical way of speaking of the spring”.63 For Hera-
clitus, the floral imagery and growth of new grass (Il. 14.347) combined with the dewy
weather (Il. 14.351) both serve to mark this sexual encounter as a metaphor for the birth
of spring.64
References to actual astronomical features, such as the constellations, are limited to
the description of Achilles’ Shield in Problems.65 Yet, the rest of the text seems almost en-
tirely devoted to uncovering evidence of Homer’s cosmic knowledge, or what Heraclitus
calls Homer’s “scientific theology in allegorical form”.66 Furthermore, while the major-
ity of this study has considered the Iliad, Heraclitus also devoted some 20 paragraphs
to the Odyssey. Here, a few cosmic allegories are uncovered, such as the account of Pro-
teus, whose shape-shifting is likened both to the elements and the primordial origin of
the universe.67 Similarly, Aeolus’ twelve children are connected to the twelve months
of the yearly cycle, while Aeolus himself is described as a master of time, represented by
his control over the seasonal winds.68 Furthermore, Heraclitus names Odysseus as “the
first man to foretell good sailing weather by his knowledge of astronomy”, implying
that Homer also possessed the same navigational knowledge.69 Finally Heraclitus, like
many astronomers after him, also associates Theoclymenus’ prophecy from Odyssey 14
with a solar eclipse.70 However, the remainder of the Odyssey section is largely devoted
60 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 6.13, see also 7–17, 52;
Cornut. Theol. Gr. 32; Ps.-Plut. Life of Homer 202.
61 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 8.
62 Hom. Il. 18.239–239.40 (translation by the author);
Heraclitus Homeric Problems 8–11.
63 Pl. Resp. 390c; Heraclitus Homeric Problems 39.
64 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 39.
65 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 49–50.
66 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 58.
67 Hom. Od. 4.456–458; Heraclitus Homeric Problems
66, 65. For more on shape-shifting see section 2.
68 Hom. Od. 10.6–22; Heraclitus Homeric Problems 71.
69 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 70.
70 Hom. Od. 14.62; Heraclitus Homeric Problems 74–75;
see also n. 6 (above).
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to a consideration of Odysseus as a symbol of various philosophical virtues.71 In sum-
mary, Heraclitus interprets both Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey as receptacles of allegorical
truths pertaining mostly to cosmic and astronomical matters. Yet he adds to the Odyssey
a deeper moral truth; an interpretation that was continued in Porphyry’s allegorical
reading of Homer.
Towards the end of his discussion of Homer’s Odyssey, Heraclitus presents a series
of questions to Plato, in an attempt to rebut his accusations of impiety in the standard
practice of the Homeric Apology. He writes scathingly of how Plato’s works reflect his
own sexual proclivities: “It is only natural therefore that … Plato’s conversation [should
be] the loves of young men”, while Homer’s works piously record “the life of heroes”.72
Furthermore, he implies that a work containing references to “Heaven and the universe
… earth and sea … sun and moon and the motions of the fixed stars and planets” – such
as Homer’s – is a true philosophical work, suggesting that he believed Homer to be a
greater philosopher than Plato (though he seems to ignore the cosmic account from the
myth of Er for the purposes of this argument).73 However, the link between the cosmos
and divinities is not the only reason why a writer of cosmological allegory should be
considered pious; Heraclitus suggests that the Odyssey is a tale of virtue – which provides
the intuitive reader with a formula for celestial salvation through the veil of allegory:
After all this, can Homer, the great hierophant of heaven and of the gods,
who opened up for human souls the untrodden and closed paths to heaven
deserve to be condemned as impious?74
5 Porphyry of Tyre
For both Heraclitus and Porphyry, those who see in Homer mere fabrication, rather than
intentional allegory, miss the point of the poets.75 They also share a similar soteriologi-
cal concern for the relationship between the heavens and the soul.76 In the third century
CE, Porphyry made similar connections between celestial salvation and the narrative of
Homer’s Odyssey as Heraclitus did, though his extant allegorical interpretation centers
on a particular passage fromOdyssey 13, rather than the breadth of the Homeric corpus.77
71 A common conceit, see Heraclitus Homeric Problems
78; Aristoph. Ran. (batr.) 1034; Xen. mem. (apomn.)
1.3.7; Basil of Caesarea Oratio ad adolescents 5; a com-
prehensive overview can be found in Montiglio
2005, 43, 147, 172, 178–179, 188, 194, 196, 205–206,
209.
72 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 78.
73 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 77; Pl. Resp. 10.
74 Heraclitus Homeric Problems 76; see for example
Dowden and Livingstone 2011, 283–300; Adluri
2013, 343–356.
75 Porph. De antr. nymph. 4 (trans. Taylor 1917).
76 Lamberton and Keaney 1992, xx.
77 Hom. Od. 13.93–112. Porph. antr. (nymph. antr.).
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Porphyry is thought to be the author of a text also called Homeric Questions, though this
concerned only the Iliad and does not contain as much theological-cosmological alle-
gory as Heraclitus’.78 The narrative passage of Homer’s Odyssey, which primarily con-
cerned Porphyry, pertains to a description of the Ithacan coastline, known as the Cave of
the Nymphs (De antro nympharum), portrayed when Odysseus finally returns home. The
cave is described thus:
αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ κρατὸς λιμένος τανύφυλλος ἐλαίη,
ἀγχόθι δ᾽ αὐτῆς ἄντρον ἐπήρατον ἠεροειδές,
ἱρὸν νυμφάων αἱ νηϊάδες καλέονται.
ἐν δὲ κρητῆρές τε καὶ ἀμφιφορῆες ἔασιν
λάϊνοι: ἔνθα δ᾽ ἔπειτα τιθαιβώσσουσι μέλισσαι.
ἐν δ᾽ ἱστοὶ λίθεοι περιμήκεες, ἔνθα τε νύμφαι
φάρε᾽ ὑφαίνουσιν ἁλιπόρφυρα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι:
ἐν δ᾽ ὕδατ᾽ ἀενάοντα. δύω δέ τέ οἱ θύραι εἰσίν,
αἱ μὲν πρὸς Βορέαο καταιβαταὶ ἀνθρώποισιν,
αἱ δ᾽ αὖ πρὸς Νότου εἰσὶ θεώτεραι: οὐδέ τι κείνῃ
ἄνδρες ἐσέρχονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀθανάτων ὁδός ἐστιν.
But upon the head of the harbor there is an olive tree with long-pointed leaves;
Nearby, is a cave that is lovely and misty-dark;
it is sacred to those sea-Nymphs, called the Naiads.
Within are mixing bowls and amphorae
made of stone; where the bees store their honey.
Inside, set upright are very tall stone looms, there the nymphs
weave their cloths of sea-purple – a wonder to see.
In there, water is ever-flowing. Two entrances it has
the one facing the direction of Boreas [North Wind], where men descend
the other one facing the direction of Notos [South Wind], which is more divine:
that way men cannot enter, only immortals take that road.79
Porphyry, like Heraclitus, is explicit that he continues a tradition of allegorical interpre-
tation.
the poet [Homer], under the veil of allegory, conceals some mysterious signifi-
cation;
thus compelling others to explore what the gate of men is and also what is the
78 Porphyry’s Homeric Questions in MacPhail 2011. 79 Hom. Od. 13.102–112 (translation by the author).
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gate of the Gods:
[and] what he means by asserting that this cave of the Nymphs has two gates.80
This demonstrates a continuation of both the tradition of Homeric allegorical inter-
pretation, and the newer application of Neoplatonic philosophical tenets to Homer’s
corpora.81 However, unlike Heraclitus’ more general overview, Porphyry’s allegorical
interpretation of Odyssey 13 sets out a specific cosmological argument, providing an ex-
cellent counterpoint for study. First he argues that the Ithacan cave represents a cos-
mic gateway through which man journeys to godliness through ascending or to birth
by descending.82 Second, Odysseus’ encounter with Athena outside the cave represents
his completed spiritual transformation (or ascension) from man to god – through the
power of his reason and wisdom.83 Though Porphyry’s purpose for demonstrating such
a ‘truth’ is outside the remit of this paper, it was arguably to encourage (Neoplatonic)
philosophers to expand their rational discourse towards a contemplation of higher mat-
ters.84
Porphyry first outlines the theological and philosophical significance of caves – par-
ticularly in their relation to the universe and the journey of the soul into generation. He
states that “caves in the most remote periods of antiquity were consecrated to the Gods”
and that “theologists consider caverns as symbols of the world”.85 His definition of ‘the-
ologists’ here seems to extend both to philosophers, such as Plato (“Plato showed that the
world is a cavern”), as well as religious practitioners, such as the Mithraists (“wherever
Mithra was known, they propitiated the God in a cavern”).86 Porphyry therefore asserts
that Homer’s passage is an allegorical rendition of the connection between the cave as
a symbol of the universe, and the transmigration of the soul, as discussed by philoso-
phers and practiced by Mithraists. The former assertion is outlined through his celestial
explanation of Homer’s Ithacan cave.87 In particular, the end of the Odyssey passage:
Two entrances88 it [the Cave of the Nymphs] has,
the one facing the direction of Boreas [North Wind], where men descend [un-
80 Porph. De antr. nymph. 1.
81 Lamberton and Keaney 1992, 117, 126; Struck 2004,
142; Vernant 1980, 212.
82 Porph. De antr. nymph. 10–14.
83 Porph. De antr. nymph. 15.
84 Hoffman 2014, Abstract.
85 Porph. De antr. nymph. 9; 4.
86 Porph. De antr. nymph.3; 9, see also Porph. De antr.
nymph. 2: “Thus also the Persians, mystically sig-
nifying the descent of the soul into the sublunary
regions, and its regression from it, initiate the mys-
tic in a place which they denominate a cavern”. See
Pl. Resp. 514a–520a; perhaps also Paus. 1.17.5; Dio
Cass. 4.50; Strab. Geogr. 5.4.5; for more on caves and
their significance Clauss 1990, 42; Hardie 1977, 279;
Ogden 2001, 43; Ustinova 2009.
87 Porph. De antr. nymph. 9.
88 The term ‘thurai’ was used by later philosophers to
refer metaphorically to the entrances to the soul
(e.g. Aristain. 2.7); Liddell and Scott 1940, s.v. θύρα.
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derground?]89
the other one facing the direction of Notos [South Wind], which is more di-
vine: that way
cannot be entered by men, only immortals take that road.90
Porphyry draws a direct parallel between the Northern and Southern gates of the Itha-
can cave with the Northern and Southern celestial tropics: Cancer and Capricorn respec-
tively.91 He writes that “Cancer is the gate through which souls descend; but Capricorn
that through which they ascend” because “Cancer is indeed northern, and adapted to
descent; but Capricorn is southern, and adapted to ascent”.92 That is to say that the (ce-
lestial) Tropic of Cancer lies halfway between the celestial equator (a projection of our
equator upon the sky), and the most northern star; whereas the (celestial) Tropic of
Capricorn lies halfway between the celestial equator, and the most southern star. There-
fore, to reach the central regions of both sky and earth (where the Greeks positioned
themselves) one must travel south, or ‘descend’ from the Tropic of Cancer, and north,
or ‘ascend’ from the Tropic of Capricorn. Furthermore, he makes connections between,
on the one hand, the Tropic of Cancer or the Northern gate for human souls, and on
the other; the Tropic of Capricorn or Southern gate for immortals:
The northern parts, likewise, pertain to souls descending into generation.
And the gates of the cavern which are turned to the north are rightly said to be
pervious to the descent of men; but the southern gates are not the avenues of
the Gods, but of souls ascending to the Gods.
Porphyry here notes an important caveat – that the Southern gate is not exclusive to the
gods, but to immortals. Meaning that it is possible for a man’s immortal soul to cross
this gateway.93 On this account, the poet does not say that they are the avenues of the
Gods, but of immortals; this appellation being also common to our souls, which are per
se, or essentially, immortal.94
Porphyry therefore draws clear connections between the transmigration of the soul
and Homer’s sacred cave throughout On the Cave of the Nymphs.He further reinforces this
connection in three stages. First, he emphasizes the significance of water as a spiritual
conduit – “for water co-operates in the work of generation” (On the Cave of the Nymphs
7) – when referring to the “ever-flowing [or ever-lasting] water” of Odyssey 13.109. This
89 The term kataibatai was used by Aristophanes to
describe Hermes leading souls down to the under-
world in his role as psychopomp in Peace 649; Lid-
dell and Scott 1940, s.v. καταιβαταὶ.
90 Hom. Od. 13.109–109.12 (translation by the author).
91 Porph. De antr. nymph. 10.
92 Porph. De antr. nymph. 11.
93 Porph. De antr. nymph. 11.
94 Porph. De antr. nymph. 11.
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belief is no doubt connected to Thales’ precept that water is a progenitor.95 Second, Por-
phyry draws a connection between the life-giving quality of water and the nymphs as
symbols or manifestations of souls. He writes that “souls are profoundly steeped in mois-
ture” and “therefore, souls proceeding into generation are the nymphs called naiades”
because of their association with water.96 Here, Porphyry also explains why Homer de-
scribes the amphorae within the cave as being filled by the honey of bees (Od. 13.106),
rather than wine, water, or perfume, because Nymphs were “peculiarly called bees”
by the “ancients”.97 Ergo the specific assemblage of water, Naiads (who are also called
sea-Nymphs in Od. 13.104), and bees, together symbolize “souls descending into gen-
eration”.98 Porphyry asserts, therefore, that Homer’s Ithacan cave is a cosmic conduit
through which immortal souls descend into birth.99 Porphyry’s interpretation repre-
sents a movement away from Heraclitus’ more general defense of Homer as a learned
and pious man who expressed truths about the origin and structure of the universe in
metaphor, towards a deeper interpretation of Homer’s Odyssey as an allegory of spiritual
salvation.
This is perhaps best expressed in his analysis of Athena. That Athena is presented
as an embodiment of wisdom serves only to draw this transmigration in-line with the
Neoplatonic goal of philosophical reason.100 Porphyry calls the olive-tree that spreads
its branches above the cave the “true enigma”. He explains that the olive sits at the head
of the cavern, as Athena sprung from the head of Zeus, and that it symbolizes the intelli-
gent design behind the construction of the universe (symbolized by the cave). Therefore,
Odysseus returns home, and
Here, naked, and assuming a suppliant habit, afflicted in body, casting aside
everything superfluous, and being averse to the energies of sense, [he] sit[s] at
the foot of the olive and consult[s] with Minerva by what means [h]e may most
effectually destroy [the dark] passions which reside in the soul.101
In short, Athena is the embodiment of wisdom, which Odysseus – as representative of
the philosopher – must humbly solicit in order to reach godliness through the cosmic
portal symbolized by the Ithacan cave.
This association between astronomical gates and the path of the soul is a very com-
mon trope found throughout antiquity, especially among those philosophers and reli-
gions concerned with spiritual salvation.102 It is clear through his focus on Athena as a
95 Arist. Metaph. 283b.
96 Porph. De antr. nymph. 4; 5 (original italics).
97 Porph. De antr. nymph. 7.
98 Porph. De antr. nymph. 4.
99 Porph. De antr. nymph. 14.
100 Porph. De antr. nymph. 15–17.
101 Porph. De antr. nymph. 16.
102 Porph. De antr. nymph. 11: “Parmenides mentions
these two gates in his treatise On the Nature of Things,
as likewise that they are not unknown to the Ro-
mans and Egyptians.”
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font of wisdom and reflection of the Demiurge, however, that Porphyry interprets the
Homeric text with a Neoplatonic bias.103 He builds on the assertions of Heraclitus – that
Homer’s text contained not only cosmological but also moral wisdom – and adds that
Homer encoded within his account of the Ithacan cave, and Odysseus’ return home, an
allegorical recipe for eternal salvation. This development perhaps clarifies Heraclitus’
closing assertion that Homer “opened up for human souls the untrodden and closed
paths to heaven”.104
Both examples have demonstrated the assertion that some of the best examples of
literary criticism from antiquity should be better called cosmological allegoresis. Under-
standing the passages in this way serves two purposes. First, it places our understanding
of ancient literary criticism better in line with their perception of the ancients who were
considered “not nobodies but competent students of the world, and well equipped to
philosophise about it via symbols and riddles”.105 Cornutus’ view demonstrates the pop-
ular belief that “the poem is primarily a vehicle for profound truths about the cosmos
and our place within in”.106 This is a factor that can be overlooked if we attempt to re-
strict our understanding of ancient literary criticism to simple philological or literary
contexts in order to reflect our own biases.107 The concept of “the poet as a solitary ge-
nius attuned to the hidden truths of the cosmic order” is demonstrably present in the
ancient critics, but it also has its echoes in contemporary scholarship.108 For example,
Bremer interprets Homer’s description of Hephaestus defeating Scamander as a contest
between the elemental forces of fire and water, representing an inversion of the cosmic
order.109 This interpretation is not so different to those posed by the likes of Heraclitus
when describing Homeric accounts of the universe.
6 Gregory Nagy
The tradition of cosmic allegorical interpretations of Homer established by Greek thinkers
has continued into modern Classical studies. The remainder of this paper, therefore,
concentrates on the comprehensive interpretation of Homeric metaphorical symbol-
ism as found in several works by the Harvard Classics Professor Gregory Nagy.110 Nagy
has been selected for study as he subtly imitates scholars of the exegetic tradition. First,
he has himself produced a work entitled Homeric Questions, in line with many classical
103 Porph. De antr. nymph. 15.
104 Homeric Problems: 76.
105 Cornut. Epidrome 76.
106 Struck 2004, 151.
107 Ford 2002, 70.
108 Struck 2004, 13.
109 Bremer 1987, 39.
110 Namely Nagy 1990a; Nagy 2013. See also, for exam-
ple, Marinatos 2001, 381–416.
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allegorists, which he himself cites.111 He also provides an interpretation of Odysseus’
journey that relies on cosmic allegory and analogy, utilizing the language of ancient in-
terpreters such as ainos, sēma, and sumbolon.112 Furthermore, like Porphyry before him,
Nagy argues that Odysseus’ return home is reflective of a mystical journey “embedded in
the plot of the Odyssey” “as a metaphor”.113 However, instead of analyzing a singular pas-
sage as Porphyry had, Nagy combines broader philological premises found throughout
the text with narrative analysis. He demonstrates that the Odyssey comprises a unified
account that combines the motions of the sun with a journey of spiritual awakening.
An important caveat: Nagy’s interpretation relies heavily on constructions of Indo-
European roots drawn from conclusions made by linguist Douglas Frame.114 However,
it is important to make clear that this paper is not concerned with proving or disproving
the validity of Frame’s, or Nagy’s, linguistic claims inasmuch as it is concerned with the
fact that his, and Nagy’s, works reflect a continuation of the tradition of cosmological
interpretations of Homeric texts.115
Nagy argues, in brief, that the Odyssey is a text “built on the symbolism of rebirth
from death, as verbalised in the noos/nostos of Odysseus himself”, and importantly for
this study, “visualised in the dynamics of sunrise after sunset”.116 There are several facets
to this argument. First is that the themes of noos (‘consciousness’) and nostos [or neo-
mai] (‘return’) are both pivotal to the Odyssey’s narrative. Second, that noos and nostos
are linguistically connected by the same Indo-European root. This suggests that the two
are also metaphorically connected inasmuch as the nostos, ‘return’, is both physical and
‘psyche-cal’. The connection between ‘return’ and ‘consciousness’ further draws upon as-
sociations with both: light, reflected in analogies of sunrise and sunset; and life, reflected
in analogies of spiritual awakening. Therefore, Nagy believes, the Odyssey is a text that
ultimately combines three layers of meaning or metaphor: (1) the physical return home
and (2) the awakening from sleep/death, which is set within (3) the cosmic framework
of sunrise and sunset.
Nagy’s argument builds upon D. Frame’s theory that the terms noos and nostos both
stem from the same Indo-European root *nes-.117 Noos is constructed as *nos-os, derived
from *nes-, while nostos is a nominal derivative of neomai – itself stemming from the
same lexical root.118 Frame asserts that once the “semantic difficulty” between these
two terms is removed, it can be demonstrated that ‘mind’ and ‘return home’ were “once
111 Nagy 1996, 1; his claim places him in the company
of Heraclitus, Porphyry, Aristotle, and Zeno (c.f.
Diog. Laert. Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.1.4).
112 Porphyry Homeric Questions 23.2, 24.5, 46.6, 52.19;
Struck 2004, 23, 73; Ford 2002, 74; Nagy 1990a,
202–222; Nagy 1990b, 148, 192–94, 196–200.
113 Nagy 2013, 275.
114 Frame 1978.
115 Macksey 1979, 1270; Combellack 1981, 225–228.
116 Nagy 1990a, 93.
117 Frame 1978, ix.
118 Frame 1978, ix–x.
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closely related in the Greek language”.119 Furthermore, it is precisely this close relation
that affiliates the terms with a fundamental myth of humankind: the return to life that
is itself “universally associated with the mythology of the returning sun”.120 This asso-
ciation with the sun is drawn from the meaning of the Greek root nes-, which Frame
documents as “a return from death” and therefore implicitly also “a return from dark-
ness”, given that – in Greek myth – the underworld is a place where the sun does not
shine.121 It is therefore through this connection with the role of the sun that Frame gives
the Indo-European root *nes- a meaning of “a return to light and life”; that is, “from dark-
ness and death”.122 Nagy argues in support of this interpretation that “the very idea of
consciousness as conveyed by noos is derived from the metaphor of returning [nostos] to
light from darkness, as encapsulated in the moment of waking up from sleep”.123
This theory of a linguistic connection between noos and nostos relies upon the ar-
gument that the terms are also thematically connected throughout Homer’s Odyssey.
Indeed, both Frame and Nagy would argue that the terms are not merely thematically
connected, but that the theme of ‘returning to light and life’ is itself the very core – or
rather the very plot – of Homer’s narrative. Frame, for example, asserts that “the words
noos and neomai come readily to mind in connection with Odysseus”, and argues that
their presence in the proem of the Odyssey highlights their significance:
ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσεν
πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν,
ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων.124
Though, of course, the relative placement of the terms does not of itself infer a thematic
connection. Therefore, Frame demonstrates that, within the first hundred lines of the
Odyssey, Homer tells us repeatedly that the story is an account of the homecoming (nos-
tos)125 of a man who is characterized by his noos.126 In short, he argues that the Odyssey
is thematically founded upon these two terms.
However, the real evidence for the fundamental thematic nature of these terms is
elucidated throughout The Myth of Return. Here, Frame outlines the importance and
prevalence of the terms through an assessment of their lexicographical connection and
association with each other, drawing upon various examples from both the Odyssey, and
119 Frame 1978, x, 4.
120 Macksey 1979, 1270.
121 Frame 1978, 19–21.
122 Frame 1978, 28–33; Nagy 2013, 297.
123 Nagy 2013, 299. The metaphor of sleep to which
Nagy here refers is undoubtedly Homer’s pairing
of Sleep (Hypnos) and Death (Thanatos) as brothers
(Hom. Il.: 16.681, also; Hes. Theog. 775).
124 Hom. Od. 1.1–5; Frame 1978, ix. My emphasis.
125 Hom. Od. 1.5, 1.77.
126 Hom. Od. 1.3; 1.66; Frame 1978, x.
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antithetically, the Iliad. Space does not allow for a full appraisal of Frame’s examples;
suffice to say that extensive connections are made with other Greek sources including
Parmenides, Plato, and Pindar;127 as well as non-Greek evidence, largely Vedic Sanskrit,
but also Germanic and Albanian sources.128 It is not the intention of this paper to outline
Frames’ argument further than to present his linguistic connection between noos and
nostos, and subsequently his translation of the root *nes- as a “return to light and life”,
which serves as the background for Nagy’s metaphorical reading of Homer’s Odyssey.
From these premises, Nagy connects the narrative of Odysseus’ return home (nostos)
with both the cosmic mechanics of the rising and setting sun, as well as the mystical en-
lightenment (noos) of the soul.129 Like the “esoteric Neoplatonists” Nagy interprets the
narrative of the Odyssey as fundamentally a spiritual one.130 He writes that “this return
of the hero from the realm of darkness and death into the realm of light and life is a
journey of the soul”.131 Also like Porphyry, Nagy utilizes a passage from Odyssey 13 to
demonstrate his contention that the Odyssey is a composition of three simultaneous nar-
ratives: “built on the symbolism of rebirth from death, […] verbalised in the noos/nostos
of Odysseus himself, and visualised in the dynamics of sunrise after sunset”.132 However,
unlike Porphyry, Nagy relies on philological (rather than philosophical) methods in or-
der to demonstrate the integral nature of these layers of metaphor within the narrative.
Yet, he still does so within a cosmological framework.
The passage in question immediately precedes the description of the Ithacan Cave so
loved by Porphyry. It reads:
When they leaned back, tossing the salt-sea with the blades of their oars
then a delightful sleep fell upon his eyelids,
an un-waking, pleasant sleep, nearest to death.
As on a plain four stallions yoked together
all at once spring forward beneath the blows of the lash
and rising aloft they stir up to pass over their path;
so too did the poop raise and swell, while behind her
surged the great, seething, load-roaring sea.
The unfailing ship ran without rest: not even the circling
hawk could accompany her, lightest of all flying things.
So swiftly she ran over the sea, cutting through the swell,
carrying the man, resembling a God, with his cunning,
one who had suffered very many pains, deep down in his spirit;
127 Frame 1978, 153–160.
128 Frame 1978, 125–162.
129 Nagy 1990a, 258–9; Nagy 2013, 298, 275.
130 Lamberton and Keaney 1992, 124.
131 Nagy 2013, 307.
132 Nagy 1990a, 93.
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through wars of men, cleaving through waves of adversity.
He now slept without trembling, [no longer seized by] his great suffering.
When the brightest star rose above the horizon, with the great
messenger of the light, early-born Dawn,
then did the seafaring ship approach the island.133
Nagy uses this passage to demonstrate the three layers of metaphor – associated with the
‘return to light and life’ – that run throughout the plot of the Odyssey.134 He writes that
the two meanings of nostos and noos “converge at [this] single point in the master myth
of the Odyssey”.135 Here, Odysseus’ sleep is likened to death (Od. 13.79–80), and therefore
his subsequent waking (Od. 13.188) can be likened to a return to life. Nagy writes that
Odysseus’ sleep “makes him momentarily unconscious” where he “forgets”136 all the
“algea” he has suffered, and that his return to the shore of Ithaca coincides with the rising
of the morning star (Od. 13.102).137 Odysseus’ homecoming is therefore synchronized
with both “the moment of sunrise”, and “the moment of awakening from a sleep that
most resembles death”.138 In short, Odysseus physical return home is reconciled with
both a psychical awakening, and the symbolism of enlightenment and rebirth reflected
in the rising sun. Nagy applies Frame’s linguistic analysis to this passage by combining
the metaphor of returning and awakening, with the cosmic mechanisms of sunrise.139
This is a cosmic trope, as blatant as Porphyry’s cave entrances or Heraclitus’ description
of Achilles’ shield, dressed in modern academic parlance. To this end, Nagy’s cosmic
interpretation is less explicit than the works of Heraclitus, or indeed Porphyry, but that
is not to say that the cosmic element of this tripartite metaphor is not important. Indeed,
it is the association between the passage of the rising sun that thematically connects the
otherwise disparate ‘return’ and ‘consciousness’. In short, there can be no spiritual return
(or psychic awakening) without the metaphor of returning to light.
Nagy develops this connection between leaving darkness and returning to life through
an exegesis on the importance of caves in the Odyssey narrative.140 Frame also draws at-
tention to the metaphorical significance of caves during his discussion of Nestor as a
character famed for his noos.141 Whilst Frame’s critic F. Combellack writes condescend-
ingly that “gates have long had for some theorists almost as great a fascination as caves”,
their relevance to this study is already established through their treatment in Porphyry’s
133 Hom. Od. 13.78–95 (translation by the author).
134 Nagy 2013, 300–301; for Porphyry’s use of metaphora
see Struck 2004, 73.
135 Nagy 2013, 299.
136 The verb is λελασμένος, which Nagy here connects
to ληθ ‘forget’.
137 Nagy 2013, 300.
138 Nagy 2013, 300.
139 Nagy 1990a, 219.
140 Nagy 2013, 306–308.
141 Frame 1978, 90–93.
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treatise.142 Rather, it is not modern academics who are preoccupied with caves, but an-
cient Greek theorists and religious practitioners, and so to dismiss them in modern lit-
erary studies would be a disservice. Nagy argues that “the grand theme of returning to
light and life takes shape at the beginning of Odyssey 11 when Odysseus starts to make
his descent to Hades”.143 The katabasis narrative is described by Nagy as a psychic expe-
rience, that is to say a spiritual or metaphysical one, which is reflected in the descent to
darkness and return to light experienced by Odysseus.144 He draws the same metaphor
from Odysseus’ experiences in Calypso’s cave, as well as that of the Cyclops.145
For Nagy, the physical experience of returning to light after being within the dark-
ness of a cave (or the underworld) is associated metaphorically with both the metaphysi-
cal experience of returning to life from death, and the cognitive experience of achieving
enlightenment after ignorance. The same metaphorical association was made, rather
more famously, by Plato.146 Indeed, like the philosopher of Plato’s cave, Nagy believes
that the linguistic connection between noos and nostos allows for an interpretation of
Odysseus’ journey as a path of enlightenment, because in the proem “we can see that
Odysseus is […] struggling to save his soul psukhē. That struggle is the journey of his soul,
undertaken by the noos ‘mind’ of Odysseus.”147 Furthermore, the connection between
caves and the cosmos (specifically regarding the role of the sun) is long-standing and
found in a variety of mythological literature, as already demonstrated in the analysis of
Porphyry’s Cave of the Nymphs. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that Nagy should read
significance into them in the works of Homer.
The cosmic element to the triple metaphor of the Odyssey is expanded in the connec-
tion Nagy draws between Odysseus and the god Hermes in his role as psychopomp – an
association never clearly examined in antiquity. In his discussion of Odysseus’ epithets,
Nagy writes that:
The adjective πολυτροπος “of many turns” […]148 serves as an epithet of Her-
mes, god of mediation between all the opposites of the universe. As a mediator
between light and dark, life and death, wakefulness and sleep, heaven and earth,
and so on, Hermes is πολυτροπος “of many turns”.149
According to Nagy, the epithet polutropon was originally attributed to Hermes, and ap-
plied to Odysseus in order to deliberately evoke these cosmic and spiritual associations
of the god as a conduit between this world and the next; light and life to darkness and
142 Combellack 1981, 226; see n. 86.
143 Nagy 2013, 306.
144 Nagy 1990a, 218; Nagy 2013, 307.
145 Nagy 2013, 306.
146 Pl. Resp. 514a–520a.
147 Nagy 2013, 313
148 This is a literal translation of polutropos based on
the roots polus ‘many’ and tropos ‘turning’. It is also
translated as such by Barnouw 2004, 27.
149 Nagy 1990a, 34; for Hermes’ epithet see Hom.
Hymn 4 (to Hermes) 13, 439.
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death. Furthermore, both the epithet’s prominence in line 1 of the proem and its iden-
tifying characteristic – recognized by Circe because of her knowledge from Hermes –
are used to reinforce this interpretation.150 Nagy connects the role of Hermes as psy-
chopomp to the sun in another Homeric extract.
The extract in question is the Second Nekyia episode from the opening of Odyssey 24
where Hermes leads the ghosts of the suitors Odysseus has killed to the underworld.151
Here, Nagy draws attention to the suns’ relationship to the descent (and ascent) of souls
through the presence of the Gates of Helios described by Homer in this passage.152 He
argues that the Gates of Helios in Odyssey 24 are the same Gates to Hades passed through
in the katabasis scene (Od. 5.646f.) – implying that “the psukhai ‘spirits of the dead’ tra-
verse to the underworld through the same passage travelled by the sun when it sets”.153
Furthermore, Hermes, in his role as psychopomp, is directly connected to these same
gates inasmuch as his epithet pulēdokos suggests that one of his fundamental roles is to
meet souls at these cosmic portals.154 Another of Hermes’ attributes highlighted in this
extract is as the wielder of the caduceus, which has the power to render men unconscious
(i.e. remove their noos).155 This aspect of his character supports Nagy’s interpretation of
Hermes as a divine manifestation of the ‘return to light and life’ theme.
The prominence of Hermes’ caduceus in relation to the overarching theme of
Nagy’s interpretation was also noted by Frame when he discussed the role of Hermes.156
However, in his example Frame draws on the ransom of Hector made by Priam from
Iliad 24.157 Priam’s journey to visit Achilles in order to retrieve the body of his son is
made within a similar cosmic framework to that found by Nagy within the Odyssey.
Priam meets Hermes at the Tomb of Ilus at sunset and returns with Hermes as the sun
rises.158 It is only then that Hermes leaves.159 Frame describes Priam’s pseudo-katabasis as
“a journey into ‘darkness and death’ and a ‘return to light and life”’ where the exchange
between Achilles and Priam, in imitation of the Odyssey narrative, “makes a traditional
connection between the words noos and neomai”.160
Nagy also connects the solar cycle and the underworld through his discussion of
Okeanos. Just as in Porphyry’s interpretation of the cave, Penelope’s death wish in
Odyssey 20 also seems to suggest that water is a conduit to the underworld:
Artemis, queenly goddess, daughter of Zeus, would you now
fire an arrow into my breast, and pull the spirit from me
150 Hom. Od. 1.1, 10.330–331; Nagy 1990a, 34.
151 Hom. Od. 24.1–15.
152 Nagy 1990a, 225. See also Frame 1978, 81–115.
153 Nagy 1990a, 226.
154 Homeric Hymn 4 (to Hermes) 15; Nagy 1990a, 226.
155 Hom. Od. 24.3.
156 Frame 1978, 153.
157 Frame 1978, 153. See also Juaregui 2011, 37–68.
158 Hom. Il. 24.350; 24.694.
159 Hom. Il. 24.694.
160 Frame 1978, 156.
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this moment; or might a hurricane come
and bring me down to the misty-dark path
casting me into the outpouring, refilling Ocean.161
In this instance, however, the water is directly designated as Oceanus – the stream that
perpetually flows, rather than symbolized by the Naiads.162 Interestingly, the adjective
used here to describe the path of Oceanus, ἠερόεντα, is the same used in Odyssey 13
to describe the Ithacan Cave.163 However, Nagy does not make reference to this. He
instead sums up Penelope’s understanding of the process of death as follows: “when you
die, a gust of wind carries your spirit to the extreme west where it drops you into the
Okeanos; when you traverse the Okeanos you reach the underworld which is underneath
the earth.”164 In short, Oceanus is the conduit through which souls pass in order to enter
the underworld. This is a process clearly stipulated elsewhere in Homer; namely, when
Odysseus crosses the Ocean on his way to and from the underworld and when the souls
of the suitors also first pass Oceanus when descending to Hades.165 What is central to
this paper, however, is that Nagy draws a close parallel between the role of Oceanus and
the cycle of the sun as pathways to the underworld.
For the sun itself, Okeanos has an analogous function: when the sun reaches
the extreme west at sunset, it likewise drops into the Okeanos; before the sun
rises in the extreme east, it stays hidden underneath the earth. When the sun
does rise, it emerges from the Okeanos.166
Furthermore, he connects both again to the cosmic narrative of returning to life, which
he attributes to the Odyssey story: “thus the movements of the sun into and from the
Okeanos serve as a cosmic model for death and rebirth”.167 Just as, for Heraclitus,
Oceanus represents the resolution of things that die “into the constituents from which
it grew”.168
These factors, among others not examined in this paper, combine to lead Nagy to-
ward the conclusion that “the entire plot of Odysseus’ travels is interlaced with a diction
that otherwise connotes the theme of sunset followed by sunrise. To put it more bluntly,
the epic plot of Odysseus’ travels operates on an extended solar metaphor.”169 This inter-
pretation of both Nagy and Frame clearly demonstrates a continuation of the ancient
tradition – presented above – that awards the Homeric texts – specifically the Odyssey –
161 Hom. Od. 20.61–20.65 (translation by the author).
162 As implied by the adjective ἀψορρόου in l.65.
163 Hom. Od. 13.103.
164 Nagy 1990a, 246.
165 Hom. Od. 11.13, 12.1, 24.11.
166 Nagy 1990a, 246 (citing Hom. Il. 7.421–423 and
Hom. Od. 19.433).
167 Nagy 1990a, 246.
168 Heraclitus Homeric Problems: 22.
169 Nagy 1990a, 225.
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with cosmic allegorical significance. This allegorical reading of Homer, as we have seen,
also frequently lends itself to a spiritual one, inasmuch as the cosmic cycle is inherently
associated with the transmigration of souls in pagan beliefs. It is clear that Nagy is not
motivated by Porphyry’s philosophical leanings, or a Mithraist’s soteriological concerns.
Rather, Nagy is following what he believes to be a linguistic interpretation that reaches
conclusions based in comparative mythology.
Yet, the results are the same. It seems clear from this brief survey alone that the tradi-
tion of Homeric allegorical interpretation, which has now spanned some 26 centuries,
is one intimately concerned with the role of the cosmos in the journeys of people and
their souls. It is hoped that further examination of this topic may provide insight as to
why Homer’s texts in particular elicit such ‘universal’ appraisal.
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1 Part one: Eustathius of Thessaloniki
Before leaving Constantinople to become archbishop of Thessaloniki, Eustathius wrote
a long commentary on Dionysius Periegetes, which he presented to John Doukas at
some point after 1168.1
In an interesting passage of the introduction to this work, the Byzantine scholar
expounds on the usefulness and prestige of the periēgēsis.2 The Ancients – he remarks –
considered travelling an activity befitting the greatest of heroes: those who spent their
lifetime exploring the world, such as Dionysus and Heracles were the most admired.
Eustathius goes on to state that travelling is also a philosophon and basilikon chrēma (an
activity suitable for philosophers and kings). To further persuade his reader, the scholar
mentions two kings that were renowned for their travels, namely Alexander the Great
and the Pharaoh Sesostris. He then moves on to the wanderings of Odysseus and Plato,
whom he equally defines as ‘philosophers’.
Καὶ Πλάτων δὲ, φασὶ, τοῦ πράγματος ἐρῶν, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ Σικελίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐπ’ Αἴγυπτον ἀπεδήμησε. Σεμνύνει δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὁμηρικὸν Ὀδυσσέα οὐχ ἧττον
τῶν ἄλλων τὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰδεῖν ἄστεα καὶ νόον γνῶναι. Καὶ οὕτω συ-
νάγουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκ πολλῶν τὴν περιήγησιν φιλόσοφον εἶναί τι χρῆμα καὶ
βασιλικόν.3
They say that also Plato, who was fond of the thing (i.e. the periēgēsis), trav-
elled not only to Sicily but also to Egypt. Having seen the cities of many men
and having known their mind, the Homeric Odysseus deserves to be honoured
no less than the others. Thus, on the basis of many considerations, the An-
cients conclude that exploring and describing the world is an activity suitable
for philosophers and kings.4
If such a definition applies perfectly to the great Athenian thinker, it may sound more
surprising when used to refer to the protagonist of the Odyssey. Of course, Eustathius was
aware of the exegetic tradition interpreting the journeys of Odysseus as the allegory of
1 For the date of composition of the Parekbolai on
Dionysius Periegetes see Cullhed 2014, 7*–8*, who
briefly discusses previous studies. On Eustathius’ life
and works see a recent overview with an extensive
bibliography in Ronchey and Cesaretti 2014, 7*–30*.
2 Eust. in Dion. per. epist. 482–490 Müller (Ἱστοροῦσι
δὲ καὶ ὅτι διὰ τὸ ταύτης χρήσιμον Ἡρακλῆς τε καὶ
Διόνυσος ἐξετόπιζον ἑαυτοὺς, τὴν τῶν κλιμάτων
γνῶσιν σπουδάζοντες. Καὶ ὅτι καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος διὰ
τοῦτο ἐφιλοτιμήσατο τὸν ἠῷον ἱστορῆσαι ὠκεανόν.
Καὶ Σέσωστρις δὲ, φασὶν, ὁ Αἰγύπτιος πολλὴν πε-
ριεληλυθὼς γῆν πίναξί τε δέδωκε τὴν περίοδον, καὶ
τῆς τῶν πινάκων ἀναγραφῆς οὐκ Αἰγυπτίοις μόνον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ Σκύθαις εἰς θαῦμα μεταδοῦναι ἠξίωσε).
3 Eust. in Dion. per. epist. 490–496.
4 Unless stated otherwise, all translations have been
done by the article’s author.
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the philosopher’s struggle to reach authentically philosophical knowledge.5 Neverthe-
less, despite his reliance on other sources, the learned archbishop provides an original
interpretation of the connection between Odysseus, his wanderings, and his superior
wisdom. Several examples from Eustathius’ writings will help illustrate how he came to
develop such an interpretation.
1.1 The wisest of the Achaeans
The long-established association between travelling and knowledge allows Eustathius to
resolve an endless debate that had captivated generations of scholars and continued to
intrigue his contemporaries and colleagues, including Tzetzes. For centuries, poets, writ-
ers, and exegetes had been trying to decide which hero truly represented the Homeric
ideal of wisdom and eloquence. Needless to say, the two favored candidates had always
been Nestor and Odysseus, the wise King of Pylos and the resourceful son of Laertes,
respectively.6
This age-old debate was mostly prompted by the second book of the Iliad, where
the two heroes played an essential role in preventing the untimely flight of the Achaean
army.7 In such a crucial moment, it was Odysseus and Nestor who managed to both
calm and rebuke their confused comrades, thus providing an essential contribution to
the final victory of the Greeks. In commenting on this very episode, Eustathius cannot
help but participate in the controversy over who of the two heroes can claim supremacy.
After a thorough analysis of the form and contents of the two speeches, Eustathius has no
doubts: despite his evident talent and cleverness, Odysseus cannot surpass the admirable
Nestor, who is able to take up and improve not only the style but also the ideas of his
younger rival’s speech.
5 Philosophers’ interest in the sophos Odysseus
dates back to Plato, and it would be impossible
to summarize here the multifarious interpreta-
tions adopted by each philosophical and exegetical
school. For a general overview see Montiglio 2011
and Jouanno 2013 (see especially pp. 191–222 on
the Cynic and Stoic interpretation and pp. 223–231
on the Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean Odysseus).
For Odysseus-philosophos see also the dated but still
interesting study by Buffière 1973, 365–391 (with
some insightful references to Eustathius’ Parekbolai).
On the reception of Odysseus by Neoplatonic and
Christian interpreters see Lamberton and Keaney
1992, 126–130 and Pépin 1982, 3–18 (a useful com-
parison between the Neoplatonic and Christian
Odysseus).
6 On the continuous competition between the two
heroes, see e.g. Pl. Hipp. min. 364c, 3–7, Lib. Pro-
gymn. 8, 3, 12, 4–6 and the anonymous commentary
on Dionysius Thrax’s Ars Grammatica (Grammatici
Graeci, vol. 1.3, p. 371, 29–33 Hilgard: Γίνεται δὲ
τὸ συγκριτικὸν προϋποκειμένου τοῦ ἐν συγκρίσει
πράγματος, οἷον ‘ἀνδρειότερος Ἀχιλλεὺς Αἴαντος’
προϋποκειμένης τῆς ἀνδρείας, καὶ ‘σοφώτερος
Ὀδυσσέως Νέστωρ’ προϋποκειμένης τῆς σοφΐας).
7 On the traditional comparison between Nestor’s
and Odysseus’ speeches in Il. 2 see e. g. Ps.-Dion.
Hal. Ars Rhet. 8, 12, 29–31 (ὅθεν καὶ παρέσχετο
τοῖς πολλοῖς ζήτησιν, πότερος ἀμείνων ῥήτωρ
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις, Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ Νέστωρ· καὶ
μαρτύρονταί γε τὸν Ὅμηρον ἑκάτεροι λέγοντα, ὡς
τὸν μὲν Ὀδυσσέα ἐπῄνεσεν τὸ πλῆθος, τὸν δὲ Νέ-
στορα ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων).
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ὥστε δύο τούτων ὄντων ῥητόρων τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τὸν μὲν Ὀδυσσέα καλὸν εἶναι,
ἄριστον δὲ τὸν Νέστορα, ὅσγε καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως νοημάτων, ὡς
εἴρηται, διορθώσεται ἐπισκευάζων καὶ ἐκ ταπεινοῦ ἀνάγων εἰς τὸ σεμνότερον,
καθὰ δειχθήσεται, Ὁμήρου κἀνταῦθα φιλοτίμως δεικνύντος, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα
οὕτω μὲν ῥηθὲν οὐ πάνυ καλὸν ἔσται, οὕτω δὲ λεχθὲν ἔσται ἄριστον.8
Therefore, being Odysseus and Nestor the rhetors of the Greeks, we can con-
clude that the former is skilled, but the latter, Nestor, is the best. Indeed, he
shall correct many of Odysseus’ ideas both by rephrasing them, as it has just
been said, and by elevating them from their original ordinariness, as it will be
shown later on. In this case, too, the ambitious Homer shows that the same
idea, if phrased in a certain way, is not very well expressed, whereas it will be
perfectly formulated when phrased in another way.
However, the archbishop’s initial assessment of Odysseus’ skills seems to gradually evolve
over the course of the Parekbolai on the Iliad 9. When analyzing the speech that the son
of Laertes addresses to Achilles in Iliad 19,10 Eustathius observes that Odysseus seems
to aim to outshine the older Nestor in this episode, thus making up for the defeat he
had suffered in book two. According to the exegete, even though Nestor still remains
an unsurpassed model of rhetorical talent and Odysseus cannot beat him, Odysseus can
at least compete with him, showing skills that at the beginning of the Iliad had not yet
been refined.
Ὅρα δὲ καὶ ὡς ἐν μὲν τῇ βῆτα ῥαψῳδίᾳ ὑπὸ Νέστορος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἥττηται,
κρατηθεὶς τὸν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς (5) ἐννοίας ἀγῶνα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν
παρευδοκιμεῖ, ἀμείνω τὴν δευτέραν δημηγορίαν καὶ στρυφνοτέραν ἐκθέμενος,
φιλοτιμησάμενος τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἀπελέγξῃ ἔπαινον.11
Observe that, if in the second book Odysseus is outshone by Nestor in a rhetor-
ical competition over the expression of the same concepts, in this case, he man-
ages to surpass himself, since his retort is better phrased and more severe (than
Achilles’ speech). Odysseus is compelled to do so by his own ambition, lest his
former self-praise be disclaimed.
8 Eust. in Il. 1.336.25–30 van der Valk.
9 Eustathius authored two lengthy commentaries
on the Homeric poems, the Parekbolai on the Iliad,
edited by M. van der Valk, and the Parekbolai on the
Odyssey, edited by J. G. Stallbaum (E. Cullhed is cur-
rently working on a new edition of the latter work,
part of which has been published as a PhD thesis:
see Cullhed 2014). In this paper, when alluding to
both commentaries, I refer to them simply as the
Parekbolai. Otherwise, I always specify which of the
two commentaries I am dealing with.
10 Hom. Il. 19.154–237.
11 Eust. in Il. 4.317.5–8.
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In Eustathius’ interpretation, therefore, Odysseus is far from being a fixed character. In
the course of the Iliad, the hero is able to evolve, gradually acquiring the experience he
lacked at the beginning of the poem.
The final and decisive transformation, however, takes place in the Odyssey. In a
passage clearly reminiscent of the commentary on Dionysius Periegetes, Eustathius in-
sists again on the importance of travelling, the most enriching experience of all. After
again quoting the example of Dionysus and Heracles, who spent their lives exploring
the world, Eustathius proceeds to examine the well-known comparison between Nestor
and Odysseus. This time, however, it is the son of Laertes that manages to eclipse the
old King of Pylos.
Σημείωσαι δὲ ὅτι πλείω ἐμπειρίαν ὁ ποιητὴς ἐνταῦθα τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἐπιμαρτύρε-
ται ἤπερ ἐν Ἰλιάδι τῷ Νέστορι. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ, μιᾷ ἐναβρύνεται ὁδῷ τῇ ἐκ τῆς
Πύλου εἰς τοὺς Θετταλικοὺς Λαπίθας (Il. 262–270). Ὀδυσσεὺς δὲ, πολλῶν ἀν-
θρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω· (Od. 1.3) πλὴν οὐκ ἤδη τοῦ Νέστορος ἦν ὁ
Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐν Ἰλιάδι σοφώτερος, οὔπω γὰρ ἦν τότε τοιοῦτος, ἀλλὰ μετὰ Τροίας
ἅλωσιν, γῆν τε μακρὰν ἐπῆλθε, καὶ πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν συνήγαγεν. οὐ μόνον
πλανηθεὶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ’ ἁπλῶς πολλὰ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλα πολλά
(cp. Od. 1.1). εἴη δ’ ἂν ὅμοιος τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ, καὶ παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς (Od.
2.188; 7.157; 24.51: Nestor, Echeneus). καὶ ὃς γήραϊ μὲν κυφὸς ἔην, πολλὰ δὲ
ᾔδει (Od. 2.16: Aegyptius). οἷς ἀνάπαλιν ἔχει, ὁ ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς (Il.
2.213: Thersites).12
Remark that here Homer credits Odysseus with more experience compared to
Nestor in the Iliad. Indeed, the latter takes pride in just one journey, which
led him from Pylos to the Lapiths in Thessaly (Il. 262–270). Odysseus, on the
contrary, saw the cities of many men and got to know their minds (Od. 1.3).
Save that Odysseus was not yet wiser than Nestor in the Iliad, since at that time
he was still not the man he would become in the Odyssey. However, after the
capture of Troy, he travelled through many lands, thus gathering much experi-
ence. Indeed, he has not just ‘wandered’ but he has wandered much, and not
even ‘much’, but ‘very much’ (cp. Od. 1.1). Odysseus might, therefore, be com-
pared to “he who knows many and ancient things” (Od. 2.188; 7.157; 24.51:
Nestor, Echeneus), as well as “he who, despite stooping from old age, knew
many things” (Od. 2.16: Aegyptius). To these, is to be contrasted “he who knows
many inappropriate things” (Il. 2.213: Thersites).
12 Eust. in Od. 1.5.20–26 Stallbaum.
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According to Eustathius, the experience that Nestor has gathered through his long life
can no longer compete with the knowledge acquired by Odysseus in the course of
his endless wanderings. Travelling is seen as the most educative of all experiences and
Nestor, despite his old age, is surpassed by Odysseus, who can now be considered to be
the wiser and more experienced one, despite being younger than his rival.
Inspired by his numerous sources and relying on a thorough analysis of the Homeric
poems, Eustathius represents Odysseus’ journey as a difficult path towards knowledge
and wisdom. As the learned archbishop points out in another extract from the Parekbolai
on the Odyssey, during his long travels Odysseus manages to investigate not only the mind
of the people he encountered, but also his own.13 Each phase of Odysseus’ journey can,
therefore, be seen as a new stage in a progressive acquisition of self-consciousness and
self-control. Consequently, the diverse creatures faced by the hero represent a specific
passion or instinct the wise man needs to overcome before being deserving enough to
go back to Penelope, whom generations of exegetes interpreted as the personification of
Philosophy itself.
To provide some examples, according to this line of interpretation, Circe represents
the temptation of pleasure, which can transform those who cannot resist it into ani-
mals.14 Likewise, Calypso stands for the excessive preoccupation with one’s own bodily
wellness, another impulse that the true philosophos should be able both to control and
ignore.15
1.2 The philosopher’s difficult path towards authentic philosophia
Of course, this kind of moral exegesis was particularly appealing to the Byzantine au-
thors, as it provided them with the perfect justification for their interest in Homer.16
13 Eust. in Od.1.5.27–31 (Ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι νόον ἐνταῦ-
θα ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, οὐ μόνον τὸ κατὰ νοῦν τινὰ θέμενον
ἔθιμον καὶ νόμιμον ἐν ἔθνεσι […] ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν
τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως νοῦν). As E. Cullhed points
out in his critical apparatus, Eustathius might have
drawn this interpretation from some scholia on the
first line of the Odyssey (see Cullhed 2014, 22 and
schol. DFNs and DJeR28 α 3f–g Pontani).
14 As remarked by Buffière 1973, n. 51 p. 379, this in-
terpretation can already be found in Heraclit. All.
72.2 (Ὁ δὲ Κίρκης κυκεὼν ἡδονῆς ἐστὶν ἀγγεῖον, ὃ
πίνοντες οἱ ἀκόλαστοι διὰ τῆς ἐφημέρου πλησμο-
νῆς συῶν ἀθλιώτερον βίον ζῶσι). In his Parekbolai
on the Odyssey, Eustathius both adopts and enriches
this exegesis: see e.g. Eust. in Od. 1.381.9–10; 16–
20, where Odysseus resists Circe’s dangerous charm
thanks to his paideia, symbolized by the mysterious
mōly. On the various interpretations of the Circe
episode, see also the useful overview by van Opstall
2017, 270–274.
15 On the Neoplatonic origin of this exegetical trend,
see Pépin 1982, 5–6 and Montiglio 2011, 146. Ac-
cording to Buffière 1973, 461–464, this interpreta-
tion of the Calypso episode could also stem from a
Neopythagorean background. Eustathius is clearly
familiar with this reading, which he quotes and
analyses in his Parekbolai on the Odyssey (see Eust.
in Od. 1.17.7–20).
16 On the revival of Homer in twelfth-century Byzan-
tium see Pontani 2015, 368–370 and Cullhed 2014,
3*–5*. Dated but still instructive is Browning 1975
(see especially pp. 25–29).
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As mentioned earlier, Eustathius too accepts this allegorical reading of the poems. In
the very first pages of the Parekbolai on the Odyssey, he clearly defines Odysseus’ wander-
ings as a sort of psychological journey that each sophos should make to master his own
passions and instincts. Only thus, will the sage finally obtain the self-control that befits
the accomplished philosophos. However, despite often appropriating this exegetic trend,
Eustathius seems to have a broader understanding of the meaning and contents of the
philosophia Odysseus strives to reach during his wanderings.
As it would be too long to list all of the different nuances the archbishop attributes
to the notion of philosophy, I shall here focus on an example that I deem particularly
interesting, as it will help us understand how Eustathius blends the ancient exegetic tra-
dition with his own personal beliefs. In the passage I examine, the Byzantine scholar
is especially focused on providing a negative definition of philosophy. To be more pre-
cise, in the case at stake, Eustathius does not establish what an accomplished philosophos
should learn; on the contrary, his goal is to determine what the lover of sophia should
not be learning.
The Homeric passage prompting Eustathius’ considerations is the aforementioned
episode of the encounter between Odysseus and Calypso. After relating the traditional
interpretation, according to which the beautiful goddess was the symbol of an excessive
preoccupation with the body, the exegete presents the reader with yet another explana-
tion. Such an interpretation has no parallel in any of Eustathius’ usual sources and can
therefore be considered as the expression of his personal position. 17 Indeed, according
to the Byzantine exegete, being the daughter of Atlas, Calypso could also be seen as the
very embodiment of astrology, a discipline which was very popular in Eustathius’ times.
ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ Καλυψοῖ σύνεστι μὲν ὁ ἀποτελεσματικὸς φιλόσοφος Ὀδυσσεύς. ὁ
καὶ Πλειάδας τε Ὑάδας τε θεωρῶν καὶ σθένος Ὠρίωνος κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν (cp.
Od. 5.272–275 and Il. 18.486) καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. ποθεῖ δὲ ὅμως μάλιστα καὶ τὴν μεθο-
δικὴν καὶ κανονικὴν φιλοσοφίαν. ἀφ’ ἧς ὡς οἷά τινος πατρίδος ὁρμώμενος, εἰς
ταῦτα ἦλθε καὶ εἰς ἐκείνην ἐπανακάμπτειν γλίχεται ἧς χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι φιλο-
σοφεῖν. ὅτι δὲ τοιαύτη τις ἡ Πηνελόπη, δῆλον ἔσται ὅτε τὸν ἱστὸν θεωρήσομεν
τὸν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ὑφαινόμενόν τε καὶ αὖθις ἀναλυόμενον.18
It is with this manifestation of Calypso that Odysseus lives. Here, the hero
stands for the philosopher interested in astrology, he who observes the Pleiades,
the Hyades, and Orion’s might, and so on, to quote the poet’s words (cp. Od.
5.272–275 and Il. 18.486). Nevertheless, the desire he feels for methodical and
17 As remarked by both Buffière 1973, 388–389 and
Cullhed 2014, 80 (see especially his critical apparatus
ad loc.).
18 Eust. in Od. 1.17.38–43.
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systematic philosophy is much stronger. Odysseus left the latter as one might
leave one’s own fatherland and he has come this far; but now he desires to go
back to this kind of philosophy, without which philosophy itself cannot exist.
The fact that this latter kind of philosophy is symbolized by Penelope will be
apparent when we observe the web that she weaves and then untangles.
It is interesting to remark that astrology was especially cherished by Emperor Manuel I
and by some of the most prominent literati of the time, including John Tzetzes.19 Go-
ing against this trend, Eustathius had often voiced his disapproval of a discipline that he
believed to be, at the very least, frivolous and totally unfounded.20 Apparently, his pre-
occupation with the dangerous charm exerted by astrology was so strong as to infiltrate
his Parekbolai on the Odyssey. After all, Homer represented an essential component of
Byzantine education. Therefore, the Parekbolai, addressed to the archbishop’s young stu-
dents, were a perfect occasion to discuss the contents of the ideal paideia, which allowed
no room for the study of the planets and their alleged influence on human life.
The philosophical knowledge that Eustathius’ pupils were expected to aspire to-
wards can sometimes be difficult to define, but it certainly did not include what he saw
as petty and useless fields such as astrology. Just as Odysseus found the moral and intel-
lectual strength to finally abandon the fascinating but dangerous Calypso, the lover of
sophia had to be able to suppress his interest for noxious and secondary disciplines, in
order to continue his difficult but rewarding journey to Ithaca.21 There, he will finally
reunite with Penelope, whose superiority to the maidservants can be compared to the
supremacy of philosophy over all the other sciences.22
19 On the popularity of astrology at the imperial court
see Mavroudi 2006, 73–83.
20 On Eustathius’ hostility towards astrology see Cull-
hed 2014, *44–45 and Kazhdan and Simon 1984,
180–182.
21 Eust. in Od. 1.17.7–11; 14–17; 20 (and especially
lines 14–17: Ἑρμοῦ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα
αἰνίξεται ὁ ποιητὴς μεσιτεύοντος ὅ ἐστι λόγου, γέ-
γονε τῆς κατὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ποθουμένης πατρί-
δος, ἤγουν τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου. ὅς ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς
Πλατωνικοὺς, ψυχῶν πατρὶς ἀληθής. ὁμοίως, γέ-
γονε καὶ τῆς Πηνελόπης φιλοσοφίας, λυθεὶς καὶ
ἀπαλλαγεὶς τῆς τοιαύτης Καλυψοῦς). This theme
resurfaces in another interesting passage of the
Parekbolai on the Odyssey (Eust. in Od. 1.22.11–16).
While commenting on the famous encounter be-
tween Odysseus and the Cyclops, Eustathius sug-
gests an original interpretation that is clearly rem-
iniscent of his exegesis of the Calypso episode. Ac-
cording to the learned archbishop, the Cyclops is
the symbol of the κατάστασις τῶν οὐρανίων; there-
fore, Odysseus’ blinding of the Cyclops represents
the philosopher’s decision to avoid the study and
observation of the planets (τὸν τοιοῦτον Κύκλωπα
ἐκτυφλοῖ ὁ φιλόσοφος Ὀδυσσεὺς, ἤγουν τῆς θέας
καὶ θεωρίας αὐτοῦ φιλοσόφως καθικνεῖται καὶ πα-
ραγίνεται).
22 See Eust. in Od. 1.27.10–19.
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1.3 The exegete is a traveler
If in the Parekbolai the gradual acquisition of paideia and sophia is often depicted as a long
and demanding voyage, so is the process of reading and interpreting the very poems that
are the primary focus of the Parekbolai themselves. After all, according to a widespread
biographical tradition, Homer too had been a wandering sage.23 If this was true, what
better way to acquire wisdom and knowledge than to read the very teachings of the
wisest and oldest sophos of all? We might say that, in Eustathius’ view, interpreting and
understanding the Iliad and the Odyssey becomes a sort of journey within a journey:
to complete the path towards paideia and sophia, it is necessary to face another equally
demanding voyage, namely the long journey across the immensity of Homeric poetry.
Indeed, in the preface of his commentary on the Parekbolai on the Iliad, Eustathius
often compares the study of Homer to a long journey. Travelling across the works of the
great poet is an enterprise that one cannot face without proper directions. To follow the
right path, a guide is needed. Therefore, his Parekbolai are presented as a compass that
guarantees a safe journey to those who intend to cross the expanse of Homer’s poems.
Only with Eustathius’ guidance can they avoid becoming lost in the immensity of the
Iliad and the Odyssey.
ἦν δὲ τὸ φιλικὸν θέλημα διὰ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἐλθεῖν καῖ ἐκπορίσασθαι τὰ χρήσιμα
τῷ διεξοδεύοντι, οὐ λέγω ανδρὶ λογίῳ, ἐκεῖνον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν τοιούτων
εἰκὸς λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ νέῳ ἄρτι μανθάνοντι.24
It was my friends’ wish that I should journey through the Iliad and provide
other travelers with what is useful: I am not referring to the learned man (it is
unlikely that he might be unaware of any such things), but to the young who
have just started to learn.
The representation of the exegete as a sort of guide and fellow traveler is further de-
veloped in the very first lines of the preface to the Parekbolai on the Iliad. In this case,
however, Eustathius perceives his exegetical activity as a maritime journey across the
vast waters of the Homeric Ocean.
The comparison between the breadth of the poems and the immensity of the sea was
a traditional motif that the Byzantines were familiar with.25Before them, many ancient
23 Both Eustathius and Tzetzes were familiar with this
biographical tradition that probably originated
with the anonymous Vitae of the poet. More specif-
ically, both scholars often refer to Homer’s jour-
ney to Egypt, where he gathered precious material
for his poems. See e.g. Eust. in Od. 1.2.22–29 with
Pizzone 2014, 178–179 and Tzetz. Exeg. p. 53.1–8
Papathomopoulos.
24 Eust. in Il. 1.3.5–7.
25 On the image of Homer as the ocean in Tzetzes and
Eustathius see Cesaretti 1991, 180–181 and 214–
215 respectively. For Eustathius’ refashioning of this
traditional theme, see also the excellent analysis by
van den Berg 2017.
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authors had developed this imagery to stress the unparalleled talent of the great Homer:
compared to his oceanic abundance, the works of all the other poets were nothing but
small rivers.26 Eustathius, however, further refines this motif, blending it with another
widespread simile that equaled the sweetness of Homeric poetry to the melodious voices
of the Sirens. It is the very combination of these two images that opens the archbishop’s
monumental Parekbolai on the Iliad.
Τῶν Ὁμήρου Σειρήνων καλὸν μὲν ἴσως εἴ τις ἀπόσχοιτο τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ κηρῷ τὰς
ἀκοὰς ἀλειψάμενος ἢ ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν τραπόμενος, ὡς ἂν ἀποφύγῃ τὸ θέλγητρον.
μὴ ἀποσχόμενος δέ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ᾠδῆς ἐκείνης ἐλθών, οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, οὔτε
παρέλθῃ ῥᾳδίως, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ δεσμὰ κατέχοι, οὔτε παρελθὼν εἴη ἂν εὔχαρις.27
Maybe it would be better to avoid Homer’s Sirens from the beginning, either
turning away or plugging one’s ears with wax, so as to escape their enchant-
ment. But if one did not avoid them and started travelling through their song,
I believe that he would not easily sail by even if he were restrained by many ties,
nor, having done so, would he be graceful28.
If the Homeric poems are here compared to both the ocean and the Sirens’ song, we
cannot help but conclude that Eustathius, who travels across the abyss and is able to resist
the creatures’ voice, is nothing but the equivalent of Odysseus himself. Continuing along
this sequence of parallelisms, we might also suggest that the exegete’s readers correspond
to Odysseus’ companions: neither could survive the dangerous trip without the guidance
of their master.
26 For a well-known example see Dion. Hal. Comp.
24.16–19 Radermacher (κορυφὴ μὲν οὖν ἁπάντων
καὶ σκοπός, ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θά-
λασσα καὶ πᾶσαι κρῆναι, δικαίως ἂν Ὅμηρος λέ-
γοιτο).
27 Eust. in Il. 1.1.1–4.
28 For the sake of simplicity, I adopt here the transla-
tion proposed by van den Berg 2017, 32, who sug-
gests to render εὔχαρις as ‘graceful or elegant’. Ac-
cording to this interesting interpretation, Eustathius
is here warning his readers that only through an
accurate and scrupulous study of Homer can one be-
come an educated and graceful orator. However, the
meaning of this passage – and especially of the term
εὔχαρις – remains doubtful, as recently pointed out
by E. van Opstall (see van Opstall 2017, 277–278,
n. 43). I am convinced that a comparison with the
long section of the Parekbolai on the Odyssey where
Eustathius comments on the Sirens’ episode might
help solve the enigma. Particular attention should
be devoted to a short paragraph where Eustathius
again uses the adjective εὔχαρις to describe the (dif-
ficult) situation Odysseus found himself in after lis-
tening to the Sirens’ song (Eust. in Od. 2.19.19–21:
Εἰ δὲ μετὰ τὰς Σειρῆνας μεγάλοις κακοῖς περιέ-
πεσεν Ὀδυσσεὺς, ἔστιν ἠθικῶς ἐκλαβέσθαι αὐτὸ
εἰς δεῖγμα τοῦ ἕπεσθαι ὡς ταπολλὰ τῇ ἡδονῇ τέ-
λος οὐκ εὔχαρι). In my opinion, the similarities be-
tween this passage and the preface to the Parekbolai
on the Iliad bring to the fore Eustathius’ ambivalent
attitude towards the dangerous charm exerted by
Homer and his poetic voice. The archbishop seems
to imply that as Odysseus had to face dire conse-
quences after listening to the Sirens, so the reader of
the Homeric song might be exposed to the ambigu-
ous effects of the poetic voice, whose charm is both
pleasant and treacherous.
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Despite drawing from different sources, in this passage Eustathius emphasizes the
elements that better fit both his perception of Homeric poetry and his conception of the
exegetic activity. More specifically, the learned archbishop seems not only to stress the
beauty and the magnificence of the Homeric Ocean, but he also appears to be drawing
the reader’s attention to its potential dangers. The immensity of the poems is at the same
time majestic and threatening, since it can hide fascinating and dangerous creatures,
such as the Sirens, Calypso, and Circe, that only the wise philosopher Odysseus can face
safely.
This insistence on the dangers of poetry is a recurring motif in Eustathius’ com-
mentaries and is particularly evident in his detailed interpretation of the very episode
that opens the Parekbolai on the Iliad, namely the encounter between Odysseus and the
dangerous Sirens. Indeed, in commenting on this famous passage of Odyssey 12, the
exegete resumes traditional themes such as the comparison between the Sirens’ voices
and Homeric poetry.29 Odysseus is presented again as the ideal teacher and philosopher,
who can safely guide his disciples through the dangerous waters of the Sirens’ domain.30
However, despite stating that a secure journey across the Homeric Ocean is possible as
long as one follows a reliable guide, Eustathius does not appear completely convinced
by his own statements. On more than one occasion, he seems to wonder whether it
would have been better for Odysseus to plug his ears and avoid the Sirens’ song, as he
taught his comrades to do.31 Elsewhere, he observes that in this situation the hero’s
friends proved to be more restrained than their guide, since they could resist the very
temptation Odysseus succumbed to.32 Moreover, at the very end of his commentary on
the same episode, the archbishop reaches the surprising conclusion that all the pain
29 See e.g. Eust. in Od. 2.4.26–29 (Ὅρα δ’ ἐν τούτοις
τοῖς Ὁμηρικοῖς ὀκτὼ στίχοις, ὡς ἐτόλμησεν ὁ γλυ-
κὺς καὶ μελίγηρυς ἀοιδὸς Ὅμηρος ὑποκρίνεσθαι
τὰς Σειρῆνας ὡς ἐν ἠθοποιΐᾳ, οἷα εἰδὼς τὴν ποίη-
σιν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ Σειρήνων οὖσαν ἀοιδήν.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἐν οἷς εἶπε τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπαινίττεσθαι
ὁ ποιητὴς, καὶ ὅλως εἰπεῖν, τὰ τῆς ποιήσεως).
30 On Odysseus’ decision to plug his comrades’ ears
with wax see Eust. in Od. 2.3.40–43. In this passage,
the wax used by Odysseus is interpreted as the sym-
bol of the philosophical teachings the hero imparts
to his disciples: ὁ δὲ κηρὸς … πρὸς ἀλληγορίαν δὲ
φιλόσοφόν τινα διδασκαλίας λόγον ὑπαινίττεται.
31 See Eust. in Od. 1.4.1–4, where Eustathius goes as
far as to say that sometimes even the sophos needs to
be restrained, exactly as Odysseus was held back by
his friends, who proved to be more self-controlled
(ἐγκρατέστεροι) than their master (ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μέ-
γας ὀρθοῖτ’ ἄν ποτε ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων κατὰ τὴν
τραγῳδίαν, εἰκὸς καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον εἴ ποτε τῶν
Σειρήνων μὴ χρεὼν ὂν ἀκούειν, ὁ δὲ πειρᾶται τοῦτο
κωλύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων παρηγγελμένων κανόνι
φιλίας, μὴ καὶ προσεπισπάσαιντο βλάβος τι καὶ
αὐτοὶ, προσεσχηκότος τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἑταίρου τῇ
λιγυρᾷ τῶν Σειρήνων ἀοιδῇ).
32 See e.g. Eust. in Od.1.4.1–4 and 1, 2, 3.21–25 (αὐτὰρ
ἐπειδὴ τάς γε παρήλασαν, οὐδ’ ἔτ’ ἔπειτα φθογγῆς
Σειρήνων ἠκούομεν οὐδέ τ’ ἀοιδῆς, αἶψ’ ἀπὸ κηρὸν
ἕλοντο ἐμοὶ ἐρίηρες ἑταῖροι, ὅν σφιν πᾶσιν ἄλειψα,
ἐμέ τ’ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἀνέλυσαν (cp. Od. 12.197–200),
ἐγκρατέστεροι δηλαδὴ αὐτοὶ φανέντες Ὀδυσσέως.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥττητο τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὃ δὴ μαρτύριόν ἐστιν
ὅσον ἰσχύει ἡδονὴ, οἱ δὲ, πρὸς ἰσχύος ἔχοντες ἀπα-
γαγεῖν τὸν κηρὸν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν Σειρήνων, οὐκ
ἐποίησαν οὕτως).
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and tragedies the son of Laertes had to face after his encounter with the Sirens were the
consequence of his inability to avoid their songs.33
If we now go back to the introduction to the Parekbolai on the Iliad, we might note
that this text is characterized by the same ambivalence.34 Even though he deeply admires
the great Homer and the majestic immensity of his work, Eustathius is also conscious of
its dangers. Despite all the precautions he took, the philosopher Odysseus was tempted,
imprisoned, and endangered by the Sirens and the other creatures he met during his
long travels across the sea. Likewise, the exegete will have to face the hidden dangers
of the Homeric Ocean. Regardless of the risks, Eustathius shall set sail anyway, just as
Odysseus did. However, being well aware of the perils of the journey, he tries to at least
warn his companions, suggesting that “maybe it would be wiser to completely avoid the
Homeric Sirens”35. A rather unexpected introduction indeed, especially if we keep in
mind that the archbishop devoted almost an entire lifetime to interpreting the voice of
these very Sirens.
2 Part two: John Tzetzes
It is now time to turn to Eustathius’ slightly older colleague and rival, namely the iras-
cible grammatikos John Tzetzes.36 As we will see, Tzetzes too elaborates upon the theme
of Odysseus’ wanderings. However, despite relying on the same sources that inspired
Eustathius’ works, he adopts a completely different perspective.
Let us start with the very same topic we analyzed at the beginning of the section
devoted to Eustathius, that is, the comparison between Odysseus and Nestor. We have
seen that the archbishop’s opinion evolved along with Odysseus’ skills and personality.
Despite being extremely wise and eloquent, in the Iliad the son of Laertes was outshone
by the more experienced Nestor. In the Odyssey, however, the situation was reversed:
thanks to his journeys, Odysseus had acquired unparalleled knowledge and experience,
finally surpassing his older comrade.
33 See Eust. in Od. 2.19.19–21, quoted and discussed
previously (footnote 28, p. 226).
34 On the similarities between the preface to the Parek-
bolai on the Iliad and Eustathius’ commentary on the
Sirens episode see also the interesting remarks by
Cesaretti 1991, 225–226.
35 Eust. in Il. 1.1.1: Τῶν Ὁμήρου Σειρήνων καλὸν μὲν
ἴσως εἴ τις ἀπόσχοιτο τὴν ἀρχὴν …
36 On Tzetzes’ life and works see the dated but still
useful study by Wendel 1948, and, more recently,
Grünbart 1996 and Grünbart 2005, as well as Rhoby
2010. The date of Tzetzes’ death has recently been
the subject of an interesting debate between Agiotis
2013 and Cullhed 2015.
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2.1 Nestor versus Odysseus revisited
If compared to Eustathius’ rather complex attitude, Tzetzes’ stance appears to be more
clear-cut. According to the quick-tempered grammatikos, there are no doubts: Nestor had
always been and would always be far superior to Odysseus. Despite this fact, however,
Homer decided to give more prominence to the son of Laertes, devoting an entire poem
to celebrating his supposedly adventurous journey. According to Tzetzes, such a debat-
able choice was dictated by the poet’s desire to show his own rhetorical skills: writing
an encomium of Nestor or Ajax, who were undoubtedly gifted, was too easy a task for
the great Homer, who preferred to spend countless words on behalf of despicable figures
such as Diomedes and, even worse, Odysseus. In Tzetzes’ opinion, the Homeric poems –
and the Odyssey especially – were nothing other than a long Eulogy of the Fly, a rhetorical
exercise that Homer wrote only to show his ability to glorify even the lowest of the low.
Ὁ Ὅμηρος πρὸ πάντων δε ῥητόρων, φιλοσόφων,
αἰνεῖ τὸν Διομήδην μὲν παρ’ ὅλην Ἰλιάδα (750)
καὶ Ὀδυσσέα σὺν αὐτῷ ἔν γε τῇ Ἰλιάδι,
καὶ ὅλην βίβλον ἔγραψεν ἐγκώμιον εἰς τοῦτον,
ἣν ἐξ αὐτοῦ Ὀδύσσειαν τὴν κλῆσιν ὀνομάζει.
Τὸν Αἴαντα τὸν μέγαν δε τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τὸν πύργον,
καὶ Νέστορα τὸν σύμβουλον, τὸν μελιχρὸν ἐκεῖνον. (755)
Ὧνπερ τὴν λυσιτέλειαν στρατῷ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ἴσασι καὶ αἱ ἄψυχοι τῶν ἀναισθήτων φύσεις.
Ῥητόρων ὢν δεινότατος ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν βίῳ
σιγᾷ καὶ παρατρέχει δε δεινότητι τῶν λόγων,
ἓν ἢ καὶ δύο τὰ ῥητὰ φήσας εἰς τούτους μόνα, (760)
εἰς δὲ ἐκείνους ἱκανοὺς λόγους πληροῦν βιβλία.
Τὸ ἀσθενὲς γὰρ δέεται πολλῶν ἑρμηνευμάτων·
τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἰσχυρὸν οὐ δεῖται ποικιλίας.
…
Τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπαινεῖν, ψύλλας, φαλάκρας, μυίας,
καὶ ψέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν θανάτους,
αἰνεῖν καὶ τὴν πενίαν δὲ πλοῦτον αὐτὴν δεικνύντα, (800)
καὶ Διομήδην καὶ αὐτὸν αἰνεῖν, τὸν Ὀδυσσέα
ὑπὲρ τὸν μέγαν Αἴαντα καὶ Νέστορα ἐκεῖνον,
κἂν Ὅμηρος καὶ ταῦτα δε δεινῶς παραδεικνύῃ,
καὶ πάντα τοιουτότροπον ἔπαινον τὲ καὶ λόγον,
τὸν προφανῶς τοῖς φανεροῖς γράφοντα τἀναντία, (805)
ἥττονα λόγον λέγουσι τὰ φιλοσόφων γένη,
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ὡς ταῖς Νεφέλαις δείκνυσι καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης,
τῷ παίζειν.37
Before all the other rhetors and philosophers, Homer | praises Diomedes in
the whole Iliad | and along with him he commends Odysseus, again in the Il-
iad. | He has also composed an entire poem in praise of the latter, | and this
poem is called Odyssey from the name of this hero. | As for Ajax, the gigantic
tower of the Greeks, | and Nestor, the counsellor whose words were as sweet
as honey, | – their usefulness to the Greek army is well-known | also to lifeless
and senseless creatures – | they are left out and neglected by Homer, who, fol-
lowing the rhetorical method of forcefulness, | says once or twice about them
the words I have mentioned before,38 | while filling entire books with long
speeches about the other two. | Indeed, weak arguments need multifarious ex-
planations, | whereas the true and strong ones have no need of variety. … | The
praise of such things as fleas, baldness, and flies, | the blame of rhetoric and
the praise of death, | the encomium of poverty that presents it as the authentic
wealth, | the praise of Diomedes and of Odysseus himself | above Ajax the Great
and the famous Nestor | – even if Homer skillfully demonstrates this as well – |
and every other eulogy or discourse of this kind, | that amounts to writing the
opposite of what is evident, | is called ’weaker argument‘ by the philosophers’
ranks, | as Aristophanes, joking, shows in his Clouds.39
Despite his apparent admiration for the ‘golden Homer’, Tzetzes never comes to terms
with the poet’s decision to write an entire poem in praise of a worthless traitor such as
Odysseus. In order to exalt the son of Laertes, not only did Homer alter the truth – an
unforgivable crime in Tzetzes’ eyes – but he also neglected the true protagonists of the
war of Troy, such as Nestor, Ajax, and the great Palamedes, who was treacherously killed
by Odysseus himself.40 Determined to restore the authentic version of the Trojan War,
the scholar will even launch into the composition of a new poem, the Carmina Iliaca,
where each hero shall finally get the space and renown he deserves.
37 Tzetz. Hist. 11.749–763; 788–808 Leone.
38 Cp. Tzetz. Hist. 11.787–797.
39 Tzetzes’ interest for the hēssōn logos antedates his
well-known scholia on Aristophanes’ Clouds. Homer
is represented as the inventor of this dubious rhetor-
ical technique already in the Allegories on the Iliad
and the Odyssey. The extracts from the Chiliads here
quoted represent only the final stage of the scholar’s
reflection upon this topic.
40 Tzetzes goes as far as to identify with both Ajax and
Palamedes, whom he considers to be the true heroes
of the Trojan War. In some passages of his works
he even depicts himself as the ‘living portrait‘ of
Palamedes (see All. Il. prol. 724–734 Boissonade and
Hist. 3.173–184). On the reasons for Tzetzes’ affinity
with the wise hero see Lovato 2016, 330–336.
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2.2 Philosophy, the art of telling plausible lies
In light of these considerations, it is no surprise that Tzetzes never accepts the well-
established allegorical interpretation of Odysseus’ wondrous travels. To him, the hero’s
wanderings are far from being a long journey towards knowledge and self-consciousness;
on the contrary, they appear to be nothing other than a protracted piratical jaunt, in the
course of which the son of Laertes kidnaps princesses, tricks kindly kings,41 and mingles
with prostitutes and the like.42
Actually, on closer inspection, we might say that, in Tzetzes’ interpretation, Odysseus
also manages to gradually acquire a deeper self-consciousness and show his true self.
However, in his understanding, the hero’s authentic nature proves to be a rather repul-
sive one, as Tzetzes’ reading of the encounter with Circe clearly shows:
Τζέτζης τὸν Ὀδυσσέα δέ φησιν ἐκχοιρωθῆναι
πλέον τῶν φίλων τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἐφ᾽ ὁλοκλήρῳ ἔτει
τῇ Κίρκῃ συγκαθεύδοντα πορνείοις τοῖς ἐκείνης.
Οὕτως ἡ Κίρκη λέγεται καὶ γὰρ χοιροῦν ἀνθρώπους.43
Tzetzes claims that Odysseus became more of a pig | than his comrades, because
for an entire year | he slept with Circe in her brothels. | For this reason, Circe
is said to be capable of transforming men into pigs.
Far from representing the symbol of the philosophos that faces temptation and rescues his
dehumanized comrades, Odysseus revels in pleasure (hēdonē), showing his unrestrained
nature and proving himself to be less controlled than those he was supposed to lead.
Not surprisingly, when dealing with the episode of the Sirens, Tzetzes does not even
take into account the traditional interpretation, according to which the creatures’ voice
represented the poetic song. Far from being the symbol of the accomplished philosophos
who can approach poetry without being affected by its potentially dangerous appeal,
41 See e.g. Tzetzes’ interpretation of the Polyphe-
mus episode (All. Od. 9.111–179 Hunger and Hist.
10.914–930). According to the scholar, who is
clearly drawing from Mal. Chron. 5.17–18 Thurn,
Odysseus’ blinding of the Cyclops is nothing but
the allegorical magnification of a much less heroic
feat: despite having been generously welcomed by
the Sicilian King Polyphemus, Odysseus and his
companions kidnapped their host’s daughter, who
was the “apple of the king’s eye”.
42 See Tzetzes’ reading of the Circe episode, discussed
here, as well as his interpretation of the encounter
between Odysseus and the Sirens (Hist. 1.346–355),
which will be examined in the following pages. As
remarked by van Opstall 2017, 271 n. 32, the eu-
hemeristic representation of the Sirens and Circe
as pornai can already be found in Ps.-Heracl. De in-
cred. 14 and 16, respectively. On the Sirens as pros-
titutes in Greek and Latin literature see also Cour-
celle 1975.
43 Tzetz. All. Od. 10.14–17. On this interpretation of
the Circe episode see also Tzetz. All. Od. 10.33–34, as
well as Braccini 2011, 53.
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the figure of Odysseus holds no allegorical meaning.44 What is more, Tzetzes even sug-
gests that the mysterious Sirens might be nothing but humble pornai that try and attract
every passing traveler.45 Nothing could be farther from the complex and deep analysis
developed by Eustathius.
On closer inspection, however, there might be at least one common element be-
tween the two otherwise incompatible interpretations of Tzetzes and Eustathius. In-
deed, in some cases, Tzetzes too seems to consider Odysseus as a fitting symbol for the
philosophos. In his eyes, however, the kind of philosopher the Homeric hero might rep-
resent is always a negative and unreliable one.
In a letter addressed to the philosophos Stephanos, Tzetzes complains about the un-
reliability of his addressee, who never kept his promise to send the scholar a precious
notebook. In order to stigmatize his correspondent’s deceitfulness, the disillusioned
grammatikos declares:
καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐντεῦθεν καλῶ οὐ γνῶσιν τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ
διδασκαλίαν καὶ παίδευσιν τοῦ ‘ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὅμοια’46
From now on, I will define philosophy not as the science of the true nature of
things, but as the discipline that teaches how to tell “many lies that seem to be
true”.
As Tzetzes himself explains in the Chiliads, a verse commentary on his own Letters, this
quotation comes from the Odyssey. More specifically, the line cited is the well-known pas-
sage ofOdyssey 19 where the poet describes Odysseus’ ambiguous skill in telling plausible
falsehoods.47 To criticize the unreliable Stephanos, Tzetzes compares him to the most
untrustworthy hero of all; consequently, Stephanos’ would-be science becomes nothing
else than masterful lying.48
2.3 Plato, an Odyssean philosopher
Apart from the untrustworthy Stephanos, there is at least one other philosophos that at-
tracts Tzetzes’ violent criticism and is seen as deserving of association with the repugnant
44 Even when he mentions the widespread inter-
pretation according to which the Sirens were the
symbol of hēdonē, Tzetzes refuses to acknowledge
Odysseus’ restraint. Moreover, the scholar does not
seem to approve of this reading, which he clearly as-
cribes to other poets and interpreters (see e.g. Tzetz.
Hist.1.336–338: Μόνον δὲ ταύτας παρελθεῖν φασὶ
τὸν Ὀδυσσέα | κηρῷ μὲν παραχρίσαντα τὰ τῶν
ἑταίρων ὦτα | αὐτόν δε κατακούοντα κρεμάμενον
ἱστίῳ).
45 Tzetz. Hist. 1.346–345.
46 Tzetz. Epist. 32, p. 48, 3–6 Leone.
47 See Hist. 8.52–56, where Tzetzes clearly refers to
Hom. Od. 19.203.
48 For a more detailed analysis of these passages see
Lovato 2016, 339–342.
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Odysseus. I am referring to Plato, whose famous travels Eustathius likened to the wan-
derings of the philosopher Odysseus. As we will see, Tzetzes too seems to establish a
connection between the Homeric hero and the Athenian thinker. However, his agenda
is rather different from that of the learned archbishop.
The association between Odysseus and Plato features for the first time in an inter-
esting passage of Tzetzes’ Carmina Iliaca, a poem meant to both summarize and correct
the traditional version of the war of Troy. In a scholium that our scrupulous grammatikos
adds to his own text, Odysseus’ undeserved popularity is compared to Plato’s absurd the-
ories. More specifically, in the passage at hand, Tzetzes criticizes Homer’s unbelievable
account of the funeral games in Iliad 23. According to the poet, the small and hideous
Odysseus almost won the wrestling contest against the enormous Ajax, an outcome that
our scholar considers rather dubious, at the very least. To stress the unreliability of the
Homeric account, Tzetzes concludes that the Iliadic version, as with Plato’s Republic, is
to be considered as unlikely as a white raven.49
νῦν δὲ Διομήδης τοῦτον (scil. τὸν Αἴαντα) τιτρώσκει καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς πάλῃ νικᾷ
…, δόξαν Ὁμήρῳ ὡς ὕστερον ἔδοξε Πλάτωνι πλάσαι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ φιλο-
σόφοις ἑτέροις ἐπινοεῖν ῾λευκούς τινα κόρακας᾽.50
But now, in Homer’s opinion, Diomedes wounds Ajax and Odysseus defeats
him in the wrestling contest …: similarly, later on, Plato deemed appropriate
to make up his Republic as other philosophers thought it right to theorize their
white ravens.
This theme is further developed in a long section of the Chiliads, entirely devoted to
Plato’s dubious accomplishments. As a general remark, we might note that Tzetzes gives
Plato exactly the same – negative – features that he usually ascribes to Odysseus. Just as
the son of Laertes, the Athenian philosopher does not deserve his fame. His philosoph-
ical works, for example, are nothing but the result of theft and trickery. As Odysseus
tried unsuccessfully to surpass the superior Palamedes and finally decided to resort to
treachery, so Plato betrayed his own benefactors, stealing their ideas and passing them
off as his own.51Both Plato and Odysseus, moreover, shared a tendency to flattery and
parasitism, as shown by their opportunistic attitude towards the powerful.52 The simi-
larities between the two, however, become even more apparent when Tzetzes proceeds
49 According to Leone’s critical apparatus, Tzetzes
might have drawn this evocative simile from Anth.
Pal. 11.417.4.
50 Tzetz. schol. in Carm. Il. 2.241b, p. 196, 9–12 Leone.
51 See e.g. Hist. 10. 790–803 (Plato’s dialogues are noth-
ing but the result of plagiarism) and 865–875 (Plato
plots against Dionysius, who had welcomed him in
Sicily and generously supported his work).
52 On Plato’s tendency towards flattery see Tzetz. Hist.
10. 814–820, a short historia with the telling title
Ὅτι τυράννους ὁ Πλάτων ἐθώπευεν (On Plato, the
tyrant-flatterer).
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to describe Plato’s famous journeys. In this case too, the philosopher’s travels are com-
pared to Odysseus’ long wanderings. However, the implications of such a connection
are rather different to those stated by Eustathius in the preface to his commentary on
Dionysius Periegetes.
For instance, in a long extract from the Chiliads, Tzetzes clearly compares Odysseus’
adventure in the Laestrygonians’ land to Plato’s dangerous encounter with the Aegine-
tans. The latter, who loathed Athens with all of its citizens, had once tried to stone Plato
to death when he happened to be sailing by their island. Similarly, the Laestrygonians
almost killed Odysseus and destroyed his trireme by throwing enormous rocks in its
direction.53
Κατὰ τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας οὖν τότε καὶ Αἰγινῆται,
πρὸς τοὺς λιμένας τρέχοντες μίσει τῷ Ἀθηναίων,
μικροῦ ἂν διεχρήσαντο τὸν Πλάτωνα τοῖς λίθοις.54
On the day, following the Laestrygonians’ example, the Aeginetans, | driven by
their hatred towards the Athenians, rushed to the harbor | and almost stoned
Plato to death.
Some lines later, moreover, Plato’s famous trip to Sicily is equalled to the hero’s perilous
navigation through Scylla and Charybdis.55
Τοῦτο τρισσάκις ἔπλευσεν ὁ πάνσοφος ὁ Πλάτων. (985)
Τρὶς γὰρ ἐλθὼν εἰς Σικελοὺς τρισσάκις ἀπηλάθη.
Ἕδρα γὰρ ἔχθρας Δίωνι καὶ τῷ Διονυσίῳ.56
Three times the most wise Plato sailed across this strait: | having gone to Sicily
three times, three times he was driven away, | having drawn upon himself the
hatred of Dion and Dionysius.
As we have already pointed out, Tzetzes’ interpretation of Odysseus’ travels was hardly
flattering to the wily hero. Far from being the allegorical representation of the wise
man’s path towards sophia, Odysseus’ journey is seen as nothing more than a piratical
enterprise. We can, therefore, safely conclude that by comparing Plato’s travels to those
of Odysseus, Tzetzes hardly intends to compliment the Athenian philosopher.
In the case of Plato’s journeys, however, Tzetzes’ criticism appears to be even harsher.
A closer analysis of the latter two excerpts57 shows that the grammatikos does not limit
53 See Hom. Od. 10.118–132.
54 Tzetz. Hist. 10.939–941.
55 See Hom. Od. 12.234–259.
56 Tzetz. Hist. 10.985–987.
57 See Tzetz. Hist. 10.939–941 and 985–987, discussed
here.
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himself to depicting the Athenian thinker as a sort of treacherous and hateful replica of
Odysseus. In Tzetzes’ representation, Plato is not only despicable but also rather ridicu-
lous. For instance, if the son of Laertes is threatened by gigantic creatures throwing
equally gigantic rocks towards his ship, Plato barely avoids being stoned to death by
a group of furious – but much less impressive – Aeginetans. Moreover, in Plato’s case
the perilous navigation through Scylla and Charybdis is nothing but a sort of grotesque
coming and going caused by the philosopher’s utter incompetence. Since his conspira-
cies never worked out, the treacherous Plato was constantly banished from Sicily by his
former protectors and had to sail across the deadly strait over and over again. Odysseus
might indeed have been repugnant and insufferable, but at least his perfidious plans
were effective.
2.4 The exegete is a new Moses
In light of these considerations, we will not be surprised to observe that Tzetzes does
not seem to use the travelling or sailing metaphor in order to depict his exegetic task.
Of course, as it has already been pointed out, the famous comparison between the vast-
ness of the Homeric poems and the immensity of the sea was familiar to Tzetzes, who
employs it in many passages of his works. However, his use of this traditional theme is
much different to that of Eustathius, who did not hesitate to depict himself as a new
Odysseus, ready to cross the potentially dangerous waters of the Homeric sea.
Having an extremely negative opinion of Odysseus and seeing Homer as a skillful
but often unreliable rhetor, Tzetzes could never adopt a similar imagery. Far from being
another Odysseus, the grammatikos sees and represents himself as a new – or even a better
– Homer.58 Adopting a totally different perspective to that of his colleague, Tzetzes does
not perceive his exegetic activity as a long and difficult journey: to him, interpreting the
immense sea of the Homeric poems amounts both to a building and a bridling process.
Far from being an insignificant sailor faced with the overwhelming immensity of the sea,
the Byzantine grammatikos appears as a miraculous builder of bridges, as a reincarnation
of the great Cyrus who tamed the impetuous waters of the Gyndes.59 The Ocean that
sometimes frightened the Odyssean Eustathius poses no threat to Tzetzes, who chooses
another symbol for his exegetic efforts, that of the biblical Moses.60 Why undertake a
difficult and dangerous crossing, when you already have the skills to not just navigate,
but to utterly part and control the waters of the Homeric sea?
58 See for example the introduction to Tzetzes’ Alle-
gories of the Iliad (vv. 480–487): addressing the Em-
press Bertha-Eirene, the scholar proudly declares
that the readers of his Allegories can do without
Homer and all the other poets who wrote about
the Trojan War.
59 Tzetz. All. Od. prol. 19–31.
60 Tzetz. All. Il. prol. 24–31.
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3 Conclusion
Despite being almost exact contemporaries and despite belonging to the same environ-
ment, Tzetzes and Eustathius could not have been more at odds. As we have just seen,
though they both spent much of their life reading and interpreting Homer, they had
completely different perceptions of the import of their exegetical work. Even though he
deeply admired Homer, Eustathius was also well aware of the potential dangers of his en-
chanting songs. Consequently, he saw himself as a practiced sailor that was nonetheless
always exposed to the unpredictable waters of the Homeric Ocean. Tzetzes too was con-
scious of the potential risks that the Homeric reader might face: these dangers, however,
were much less subtle and more easily confronted than those perceived by Eustathius.
In Tzetzes’ view, reading the Iliad and the Odyssey might be a perilous task, not because
of the seductive nature of their myths, but because of the many lies Homer told in order
to celebrate his favorite heroes. These falsehoods, however, can be easily unmasked by
the competent exegete, who is able to both identify and correct Homer’s fabrications,
just as Moses was capable of controlling the apparently untamable currents of the Red
Sea.
This difference in the way the two exegetes both perceive and depict Homer can be
traced back to their contrasting personalities. However, their divergent life experiences
and careers might have equally played a role in molding their opinions and beliefs. Con-
trary to Eustathius, Tzetzes always had to struggle to make a living from his literary ca-
reer. Thus, he was constantly forced to advertise himself and his own work to attract the
attention of rich patrons who might be willing to finance his works. In such a context,
presenting oneself as a new and better Homer was undoubtedly an effective strategy of
self-promotion. Eustathius, on the contrary, quickly integrated into the Constantinop-
olitan cultural elite and often obtained the prestigious and well-paid posts that Tzetzes
unsuccessfully longed for. Along with his more restrained personality, such a successful
career might explain the archbishop’s more careful approach to Homer, whose poems
were one of the main topics of his well-attended lessons. Similar considerations might
explain the two scholars’ different approaches to philosophy.61
61 It is important to remark that in Comnenian times,
philosophy was at the centre of a rather heated de-
bate. Not only were the literati divided between par-
tisans of rhetoric and advocates of philosophy (see
Garzya 1973), but philosophy itself had undergone
a strict trial after the conviction of the Neoplatonist
John Italos (see Kaldellis 2007, 228–230 and Mag-
dalino 1993, 332–333). Of course, both Eustathius
and Tzetzes were involved in these debates and their
different treatment of Odysseus and Plato might be
a consequence of the stances they adopted in this
respect. For instance, it is possible that Tzetzes’ par-
ticularly violent attacks against Plato were aimed at
gaining imperial favour, which, as we know, was es-
sential to the scholar’s survival. Moreover, Tzetzes’
fierce outbursts against the Athenian thinker might
also stem from his rather problematic attitude to-
wards philosophy in general. Despite aspiring to
write a commentary on Aristotle (Agiotis 2013)
and in spite of being a sincere admirer of Pythago-
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Yet, in spite of the various factors that might be at the heart of Tzetzes’ and Eu-
stathius’ irreconcilable perspectives, the two exegetes share a commonality, namely the
crucial role they both assign to Odysseus and his legendary wanderings. Even though
he is seen and interpreted in opposed ways, the hero is constantly involved in the two
scholars’ discussions over the reception of the Homeric poems and the relevance of phi-
losophy, both essential issues in Comnenian times62. After having divided generations
of scholars, poets, and writers, Odysseus keeps captivating the most prominent literati
of twelfth-century Byzantium, confirming once more the irresistible charm of his mul-
tifarious nature and his mysterious travels, which can take on different meanings time
and again. Both intriguing and disconcerting, the son of Laertes is always ready to guide
any willing traveler along an unpredictable journey across ideas, themes, and issues as
polytropoi as himself.
ras, the scholar repeatedly claims the superiority of
rhetoric to philosophy (see e.g. Tzetz. Hist. 11.720–
736, where Tzetzes contrasts the rhetors’ βιωφελῆ
διδάγματα with the philosophers’ ἀσυντελῆ διδάγ-
ματα πρὸς βίον). In many instances, moreover, he
insists that a grammatikos like himself is undoubt-
edly more knowledgeable and competent than any
philosopher (cp. schol. in Aristoph. Nub. 255.12–
15 Holwerda: ὃς τοιοῦτος γραμματικὸς πολλῷ
φιλοσόφων ὑπέρτερος· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπικαλοῦνται
φιλόσοφοι ὡς φιλοῦντες σοφίαν, οὐχ ὡς εἰδότες).
Such criticism might have been elicited by his diffi-
cult relationship with the members of the so-called
Senate of the Philosophers (see Pontani 2015, 385
and Luzzatto 1999, 53–55). These considerations
might also help explain why Tzetzes had such a neg-
ative opinion of Odysseus, a character that for cen-
turies had been interpreted as the very symbol of
the philosophos.
62 Here I refer mainly to the time period stretching
from the reign of Alexios I to that of Manuel I (ca.
1081–1180).
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